

**The Role of Classical Music as an Instrument of National Identity
Actualization in the Russian Federation;
The Case of Concert Programming in the Saint Petersburg State
Philharmonic**

**Kara Koskinen
Master Thesis
Sibelius-Academy
Arts Management
Spring 2024**



ABSTRACT

Thesis

Title	Number of Pages
The Role of Classical Music as an Instrument of National Identity Actualization in the Russian Federation; The Case of Concert Programming in the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic	83 + references
Author	Semester
Kara Koskinen	Spring 2024
Department	
Arts Management, Society and Creative Entrepreneurship	
Abstract	
<p>The Master Thesis focuses on discovering how the state-supported classical music organization, Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics, season programming is used as a placid instrument of national identity actualization in the Russian Federation.</p> <p>The research is a qualitative, single case study, based on a social constructionist approach. It comprises documented data on Russian State Cultural Policy reports (2014, 2016, 2023) and the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics season programmes (2013-2023). The collected data is subjected to thematic analysis, through which themes, in connection to national identity formation are generated.</p> <p>The findings of the analysis on the state cultural policy documents present five themes, connected to national identity building. These found themes are actualized in the target organizations season programming, thus functioning as evidence of the state's growing, practically hegemonic power over the Philharmonic.</p> <p>The findings indicate that the national identity agenda and classical music's role in it is strong. As a result, the study proves that classical music is a functioning tool of national identity actualization in the Russian Federation.</p>	
Keywords	
Cultural Policy, Instruments, SPb Philharmonic, Season Programming, National Identity.	
This work has been checked in the plagiarism detection program Turnitin	

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	4
1.1 Background of the Study and Past Studies	4
1.2 Problem Formulation	5
1.3 Aim of Study and Research Questions	6
1.4 Research Approach and Limitations	6
1.5 Structure of Thesis	7
2. Theoretical framework	8
2.1 Definition of Cultural Policy	8
2.2 Cultural Policy Model and Instruments	10
2.3 Cultural Policy Model and Instruments in Russia	13
2.3.1 Economic	14
2.3.2 Legal	16
2.3.3 Organizational	18
2.3.4 Value-ideological	22
2.4 Cultural Policy Development in Russia during 2012-2023	23
2.5 National Identity	33
2.5.1 The Concept of National Identity in Today's Russia	34
3. Research Design and Methods	35
3.1 Qualitative Research	35
3.2 Single Case Study	36
3.2.1 The Target Organization: Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich	37
3.3 Social Constructivism	38
3.4 Data Collection	39
3.5 Data Analysis	41
3.6 Thematic Analysis	42
3.7 Critical Reflections on the Research Process	44
4. Empirical Findings and Discussion	45
4.1 General Findings	47
4.1.1 General Structure of Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics Season Programming	47
4.1.2 Connection to State Cultural Policy; The Charter of the	

Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic	48
4.2 Inductive Thematic Analysis on the Russian State Cultural Policy Documents	50
4.3 Deductive Thematic Analysis on the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic Season Programmes, during seasons 2013-14 to 2022-2023	61
4.3.1 Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic Season Programmes from 2013-14 to 2022-23, by the Thematic Categories, presenting Table 1	62
4.3.2 Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics Season Programming Findings	65
5. Conclusion	79
5.1 Conclusion	79
5.2 Recommendations for Further Research	82
6. References	84

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study and Past Studies

When the president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin held his impactful speech at Valdai Club in 2013, with the strong rhetoric about the nations being “kto my ?” (“who are we ?”), it was the starting point of a fundamental shift in the country's cultural policy-making, towards a more conservative approach (Jonson, 2019). Through these changes in the cultural atmosphere, the national identity went through a massive rearrangement. In other words, the Kremlin institutionalized the national identity discourse into the government's use, into a so-called building block of the “Russian World” agenda (Romashko, 2020). Thus, the official documents, published since the year 2014, underline the uniform relationship between the state and the population, and by doing that legitimizing sociocultural marginalization and censorship throughout the idea of “Russian people” as a single national identity (Romashko, 2018).

The past studies (Thomas 2021; Hillen 2020; Kramareva 2018; Zabalueva 2017) have focused on proving the connection of national identity formation with cultural production, such as theater, pop and rock music, sports mega events and museums. These international studies have given invaluable information about the reality in those chosen fields, and especially how they can be instrumentalized to spread the state-led national identity agenda. However, current research, connecting national identity building and classical music, particularly in governmental institutions, such as Philharmonics and opera houses, has been overlooked. Nevertheless, a handful of Russian and one Nordic researcher (Dvuzhlnaya 2022; Ader & Belousov 2021; Viljanen 2016; Barabanov 2014) have shed new light on the situation of Russian classical music festivals. In addition, Finnish E. Viljanen (2020, 2021), has conducted historical studies on the relationship between cultural policy and classical music, focusing on the Soviet era.

The lack of research on national identity formation in connection to state-funded classical music institutions is the strong incentive for conducting this thesis work. The reasons behind choosing this particular topic are also personal; I have spent four years studying in Saint Petersburg and attended numerous concerts of the target organization, Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic. In the view that I am already

familiar with the target organization and possess previous knowledge on it have made the research even more fruitful and inspiring.

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has made it impossible to travel to Saint Petersburg and visit the Philharmonic. Given these circumstances, the research has been conducted in an independent manner, separate from the target organization. Nonetheless, I have been successful in gathering the needed information for the research from different data sources, which has given me the needed distance from the topic of interest. I believe it has aided me to stay as neutral as I can be in the process, and raise awareness on the relatively unstudied cultural topic in the most sincere way.

1.2 Problem Formulation

The third presidential term of Putin (2012-) began with rearrangements of the socio-political landscape in the Russian Federation. The re-election of the president caused the country to gradually return to conservatism with reinstating the authoritarian system, equivalent to the Soviet times, where the political power is held by Putin, his inner circle and the Kremlin-led bureaucratic machine.

These changes also extend to the cultural field, where the “reforms” of the cultural policy system, and the emergence of new, ideology compliant policy reports (2014, 2016, 2023), have been actualized at a rapid pace. The core of these documents circles around the idea of a single national identity (Romashko 2019; Jonson 2019) and the means for its building through culture, in order to form a new generation of compliant, true Russian citizens.

The formation of national identity, the combining element of a nation, has been studied by many claimed researchers (Markova 2020; Miller 2016; Linan 2010; Guibernau 2004; Smith 1991, 2002), and is considered to be a complex entity. The Russian view of national identity has been further studied by Markova (2020) and she underlines the Russian authorities power in forming it to the direction of their current political needs.

The agenda of state-initiated national identity formation, highlighted in the cultural policy reports, and its actualization in the cultural field is a fascinating subject. In my opinion, this topic needs further research, especially regarding the role of music in

the process. Classical music institutions can be used as powerful manifestational tools of national identity, where their seasonal programming portray it as a mirror, where the audience sees their own reflections, thus relating with what they see and absorbing the subconscious messages, becoming one with it.

In the light that the cultural field has been equipped by the Kremlin, through cultural policy rearrangements, to be used as the mirror of national identity outreach to citizens, I argue that the theme is worthy of further study. Considering the limited research on the relationship between national identity formation and classical music, I think that it is necessary to study this field, in order to further the understanding of the inner conservative progressions in Russia, not only in Finland, but also internationally.

1.3 Aim of the Study and Research Questions

The Master Thesis aims to discover how the state-supported classical music organization Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics seasonal programming is used as a placid instrument of the national identity actualization in the Russian Federation. Given the socio-political climate at the moment, I argue that it is crucial to recognize the influencing forces behind the normal citizens' way of seeing themselves and their country, in order to understand the way the actions take place inside of Russia. This is why the thesis has both national and global importance. Gaining more insight about the instrumentalization of classical music institutions is itself a fresh approach to the subject matter. The limited amount of information and personal interest on the topic have functioned as main reasons for choosing to conduct this research.

In the thesis, I focus on answering the following questions;

- I. What are the main themes connected to formation of national identity in the Cultural policy reports during 2013-2023 ?
- II. How are the found themes (connected to formation of national identity) actualized in the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic concert programming ?
- III. Does the target organization, Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, truly function as a tool of national identity actualization in the Russian Federation ?

1.4 Research Approach and Limitations

The research is a qualitative, single case study, which data is based on Russian state

cultural policy reports (2014, 2016, 2023) and target organization Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics seasonal programmes (2013–2023). The chosen approach of qualitative research is, according to Leavy (2014) ideal for textual material, and especially for finding linkages between two entities, such as combining ideologies of the governmental reports and the Philharmonics programming. Moreover, the choice to focus on non-numeric information, which, as stated by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), cannot be measured quantitatively, and finding hidden meanings behind them, serves as reasoning for choosing the qualitative approach.

In the first phase of the research analysis, the chosen state cultural policy documents are subjected to thematic analysis, for discovering the thematic elements inherent for national identity building. The following step is deductive thematic analysis on the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics seasonal programmes, which, as reported by Braun and Clarke (2019) bases the following analysis process on pre-identified themes. The two analysis phases aim to answer the three research questions and discover if the state-funded classical music organization is harnessed into a tool of national identity actualization.

National identity building is an ongoing process, not tied into a specific time, which is one of the reasons why the timeframe of ten years (2013-2023) could be considered a limitation for the research. After the thesis time scope the Russian Ministry of Culture has already released a new strategy of cultural policy until 2030, and the Philharmonic, concert programmes until season 2024-25, either of which were not included in this study. Even if the research presents the picture of a specific and quite narrow timeframe, the results can also be understood as indicators for future progress in Russia. My prognosis is that these findings serve only as the starting point of a long conservation process in our neighboring country, which is the main reason why it is important to take them seriously and continue to study the phenomenon also, in the future.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters and is followed by references.

The first chapter functions as an introduction to the chosen subject, where I present the background information of the research, the problem formulation, aim of the study and main research questions, as well as the research approach and limitations.

The second chapter comprises the thematic framework of the thesis, which is divided into four parts. The first is part dedicated to defining the term *cultural policy*, second presents the cultural policy model -and its four instruments in Russia, third gives a thorough account of the cultural policy development in the target country during 2012-2023, and the fourth part describes the concept of *national identity*, as well as its position in today's Russia.

The third chapter presents the methodological aspects of the research process. The first part of the chapter gives insight on qualitative approach, single case study and the target organization Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic and the philosophical paradigm of social constructivism. The middle part of the chapter, in turn, explains the data collection - and thematic analysis processes. Finally, the latter part of the chapter reflects critically on the research process.

The fourth chapter contains the empirical findings of the Russian cultural policy reports and the SPBP seasonal programmes, as well as the discussion of these findings in connection to the research questions.

The fifth chapter presents the author's conclusions and answers to the research questions, and finally gives recommendations for further study.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Definition of Cultural Policy

The concept of cultural policy received one of its first official definitions in the UNESCO round table in Monaco in 1967 (Vostryakov & Turgayev, 2018; Vostryakov, 2011). In the report “Cultural Policy-a Preliminary Study” the term was defined as “*a body of operational principles, administrative and budgetary practices and procedures which provide a basis for cultural action by the State*” (UNESCO 1967, p. 7).

This concrete characterization, for a previously barely touched topic, served as a starting point for cultural policy studies, which continue to blossom to this day and attract the attention of researchers all around the world.

One of the most renowned researchers in the cultural policy field is Serbian academic, doctor M. Dragicevic-Sesic (2000), who views the idea of politics as a conscious,

purposeful activity of people. Cultural policy, in her opinion, is associated with achieving goals demanded by society in the field of culture. Thus, we are talking about “*conscious regulation in the field of culture when making the necessary decisions on all issues related to the cultural development of society as a whole,*” and cultural policy is interpreted as a set of appropriate measures, mechanisms and actions, through the implementation of which society strives to achieve a certain direction of cultural development (Dragicevic-Sesic, 2000 p. 26). While Dragicevic-Sesic emphasizes the Western ideals of cultural policy, with society and its inhabitants as main forces of its actualization and development, the Eastern ideals highlight the role of the state. American cultural development consultants Adams and Goldbard (1995, 1986) have produced seemingly state-driven forms of actions for conscious cultural policy, either consciously or subconsciously. The three types of actions are:

- 1) determination of cultural values, goals and priorities;
- 2) programs of initiatives and expenditures consistent with these goals, which are perceived as the formation of cultural policy;
- 3) policy monitoring is a process that allows assessing the cultural impact of each social action in the light of established standards, which are the means of achieving the established cultural policy (Adams & Goldbard, 1995, 1986).

These above mentioned procedures align with the current Russian model of cultural policy making.

As continuation, the American researchers identify six major areas towards which the vector of cultural policy should be directed:

- education, which plays a key role in a certain cultural policy, since the study of the cultural life of a community of people is an educational process;
- preservation of heritage (museum collections, historical buildings, paintings, musical literature, as well as crafts and folklore);
- distribution of cultural products. Funds are used to finance performances, tours, broadcasts, publishing, distribution networks or special events created to reach a larger audience;
- creativity, which includes both the work of the creator and any support personnel involved in cultural production;
- research that involves checking the compliance of the ongoing cultural policy with the set goals and objectives;
- personnel training, which provides training for creative specialists, administrators and

workers in related fields (Adams & Goldbard, 1995, 1986).

The embodiment of Adams & Goldbard (1995, 1986) conception of cultural policy production is closely related to “governmentality”, which embodies the idea of the process of state managing its individuals (Foucault 1991, p. 87–90). In the case of Russian cultural policy, governmentality can be seen as synonymous to “hegemony”, where “*the dominant culture uses education, philosophy, religion, aesthetics and art to make its dominance appear normal and natural to the heterogeneous groups that constitute society*” (Miller and Yudice 2002, p. 9).

Hence, the official document “Basics of State Cultural Policy” (2014), Russian cultural policy is defined as “*actions carried out by government bodies of the Russian Federation and public institutions aimed at supporting, preserving and developing all branches of culture, all types of creative activity of Russian citizens and the formation of personality based on the inherent characteristics of Russian society value systems.*” The theoretical and practical aspects of implementing cultural policy in the Russian Federation, as well as the problems of developing and improving its national model are presented in a myriad of works by domestic researchers. O.N. Astafyeva (2021, 2014, 2010, 2008) L.E. Vostryakov (2018, 2011), and A.Y Flier (2018, 2000) are in the forefront of the group, with their state approved interpretations of the phenomena in their research.

As can be deduced from the chosen examples of definition of cultural policy, the interpretation of the concept is not set in stone and it is strongly connected to the researcher's cultural surroundings. Continuing from this thought, Simjanovska (2011, p. 4) adds that cultural policy is always in a state of transformation. The parameters are never fixed, which implies that it is constantly reproducing the problem on its own terms today and will continue to do so in the future.

2.2 Cultural Policy Models and Instruments

Ever since the concept of cultural policy received its first internationally accepted definition, in the UNESCO round table (1967), there have been aspirations for assessing the policy implementation at country level. This required making a decision of common mechanisms, measures and actions, in connection to cultural policy actualization, that would be under supervision of the international organs (Council of Europe, UNESCO, to mention a few).

M. Dragicevic-Sesic (2000, p. 33-34) has proposed the division of economic, political-legal, organizational and value-ideological, cultural policy instruments, for helping with the evaluation of the level of freedom of creative activity in a given society. Hence, the core element of cultural policy is considered to be the state, as it has *“the largest amount of resources and a variety of management structures capable of directly influencing various segments of cultural life”* (Zhidkov 2001, p. 69).

By conducting a thorough assessment, based on the principles of supporting cultural infrastructure, a popular typology of cultural policy models was proposed in the late 1980s by Canada Council for the Arts researchers G. H. Chartrand and K. McCaughey. According to the authors, there are four basic models of culture; facilitator, patron, architect and engineer (Chartrand & McCaughey 1989, p. 2). According to Keane and Zhang (2008, p. 3-4) one of these models has been utilized by most nations, but as they can be interpreted as *“idealized projections of one cultural policy”*, Simjanovska (2011, p. 10) continues that combinations of them can also be applied.

The first model, called *“the facilitator state”*, presents the epitome of the ‘hands-off’ model, since the state does not give financial support to the arts field (Simjanovska 2011, p. 10; Keane & Zhang 2008, p. 4). However, the state provides indirect support to the cultural sector, through tax incentives and inducements to the potential individual and corporate donors, thus creating favorable conditions for creative activity (Simjanovska 2011, p. 10; Keane & Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). As stated by Simjanovska (2011, p.10), Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) the aim of the model is to promote creative processes and diversity in the production. As a negative side of the model, the authors name the absence of quality control of the artistic products; their “quality” is measured through monetary means, in other words, by their “box-office appeal” and the tastes of the patrons. The facilitator model is mostly applied in the United States (Simjanovska 2011, p. 10; Keane & Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989).

The second model is called *“the patron state”*, where the so-called “fine arts” are supported through *“arm's length arts councils”*, which consist of government appointed trustees and work on semi-independent basis (Simjanovska 2011, p. 10; Keane & Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). According to the authors, the decisions made by these councils on financial support are based on peer evaluation, as well as the *“professional artistic excellence”* of the creative process and product. The negative quality of this model is that standard of artistic excellence may result in elitism and the

promotion of elite arts (Simjanovska 2011, p. 10; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). The formulators of the model, however, emphasize that the positive side of it is that politicians cannot intervene with the possible success or failure of the artistic venture. The patron model is practiced in the UK, Canada and Australia (Simjanovska 2011, p. 10; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). The third model “*the architect state*” gives the government more power in cultural production, with the funding system conducted through the country-specific Ministry of Culture (Simjanovska 2011, p. 11; Keane and Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). As reported by the authors, the decisions on cultural objectives are made in line with the national cultural policy, thus bureaucrats and other politically nominated individuals are in charge of the cultural production.

The state, as an architect, supports arts and culture as a part of social welfare (Simjanovska 2011, p. 11; Keane and Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). The unfavorable side of the model is lack of regard for professionalism and artistic excellence, focusing more on community based projects (Simjanovska 2011, p. 11; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). The other dangerous aspect is the heavy reliance of the artists on direct government funding (ibid). This gives the government autonomy on deciding what kind of art should be produced, thus resulting in the artists aiming to produce work in consonance with the mainstream and creative stagnation (Keane and Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). The architect model is in power in France, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries (Simjanovska 2011, p. 11; Keane and Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989).

The fourth model, “*the engineer state*”, is synonymous with any dictatorial government system: the cultural sector is completely controlled by the government (ibid). Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) highlight that this model aims for “*political standard of excellence*” meaning that the funding for culture is directed to cultural projects supporting the state ideology, instead of free artistic creativity. Cultural development is, thus, orchestrated by the state, and the government owns the production organs and media (Simjanovska 2011, p. 11; Keane and Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). As can be understood from the above mentioned facts, this particular model is appropriate for countries of “*totalist regime*”, since the cultural sector is harnessed to portray works, subservient to the official political goals (Simjanovska 2011, p. 11; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989). The authors note that the greatest shortcomings of such a model are the missed opportunity of harnessing the creative potential, and as a result

one sided cultural production and nonexistent countervoices. The engineer model reigned in the former Soviet Union and China, as mentioned by Simjanovska (2011, p. 11) “*in Romania during the time of Ceausescu, or Albania during the time of Enver Hodja*” (Keane and Zhang 2008, p. 4; Chartrand & McCaughey 1989).

2.3 Cultural Policy Model and Instruments in Russia

The thesis target country Russia has witnessed a great number of socio-political changes, when it was still called the Soviet Union and continues to do so to this day. The pendulum movement between conservative and liberal ideologies has, once again, found its most leftward position as can also be understood from the notable works of foreign researchers (Romashko 2022; 2020, Kurennoy 2021, Jonson 2019, Blakkisrud & Kolstö 2016 etc): the contemporary Russian cultural policy can, de novo, be defined as a Kremlin-lead conservative hegemonic project.

The current cultural policy making has its ideological roots in the Soviet era. In consonance with this notion, the state is in charge of the distribution of resources, their recipients, and controls the appropriateness of expenses through special government bodies (Chartrand & McCaughey 1989, p. 3). The authors continue that state ideology and its goals dominate all the cultural fields, and the creative energy of the creator is subordinated in this case. The totalitarian regime is commonly met with resistance as a response to the complete nationalization of culture is the widespread spread of “underground” culture, the researchers add. These characterizations have earlier included all counties of Eastern Europe and are starting to re-emerge with the peaking nationalism in the former Soviet countries. The Russian cultural policy, which history forms a cycle, starting with the Soviet -and ending up in the spiritual home of Putinist era can, thus be deduced as compatible with the “engineer” model.

In the following paragraphs, I introduce the cultural policy instruments, which were defined by Dragicevic-Sesic (2000) in the Russian context.

2.3.1 Economic

Expenditure for Culture, according to the Russian Federal Budget (2022 version)	Total amount in billions (rb)	Percentage of the total budget (%)
2019	122,4	0,67
2020	144,5	0,63
2021	158,0	9,63
2022	178,4	0,75
2023	186,3	0,75

Source. Federal budget of Russian Federation for 2022 and estimation for 2023-2024.

The financing system of culture in the Russian Federation can be called multi-channelled, which includes governmental sources of funding and funding received from non-state sources (Romashko 2023; Matveyev, 2022; Ader & Belousov, 2021; Vostryakov & Turgayev 2018). According to the authors, the state acts as the main investor of cultural organizations-and activities. The state makes its decisions on the budget allocations in agreement with the current cultural policy's value basis (Vostryakov & Turgayev 2018, p. 13). In connection to the funding of culture, the Strategy of State Cultural Policy (2016), defines the states role, on one hand, as “*an investor counting on the efficiency of investments and management activities of the management of cultural institutions*”, but also as “*philanthropist who allocates funds for cultural initiatives, based on a value-oriented approach, without expecting economic efficiency*”. From these statements, it becomes clear that the cultural processes are state-controlled and the prerequisite for receiving and also the amount of the governmental funding depends on the cultural organizations willingness to follow the conservative objectives and regulations of the state cultural policy.

As the highest state organ of culture, The Ministry of Culture is responsible for allocating the funding for most state cultural organizations through subsidies (Romashko 2023, p. 18; Matveyev 2022, p. 61; Ader & Belousov 2021). Authors Ader and Belousov (2021) highlight that the direct financing constitutes 73.7 percent in concert organizations. In addition to subsidies, the funding, conducted through the

Ministry of Culture, also includes the federal programme for the development of culture, which functions in 3 to 5 year periods (Romashko 2023, p. 18).

Since the current cultural policy model was instituted in 2014, Romashko (2023, p. 18-19) adds that the state has founded new funding sources for culture; the National Project 'Culture' (2019–2024), which is administered by the State Council's Commission on 'Culture', and special grants coming from the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives (2021-).

Being mindful of the fact that the state remains the major funder of culture, which the cultural institutions are heavily reliant on, there also exists external financial resources. Matveyev (2022, p. 61), Ader and Belousov (2021), and the EU Commission (2014) name the following alternative forms of raising funds: philanthropy (charity), sponsorships, donations and personal investments. Ader and Belousov (2021) divides business support to two segments, systematic and unsystematic support. Charity is an unsystematic form of support, which bases on individual situations and personal preferences of the sponsor, whereas corporate support requires systematic participation and comprehensive support from the business (ibid). In the business sphere, sponsorship highly relates to the companies market policy and advertising purposes, thus social responsibility strategy (positive, corporate image boosting intangible goods) becomes invaluable to the business in long-term relationships (ibid).

In the case of philharmonic societies, the majority of the funding comes from the state and a small part from donations (Ader & Belousov, 2021). The sponsors for such institutions range from large companies to local partners, from banks to major oil companies (Ader & Belousov 2021; EU Commission 2014). The authors state that Russian philharmonic societies favor situational charity, in other words sponsors allocate funding to a specific event or participant. The case organization, the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, has Rosneft (oil company) as its general partner and the VTB Bank as its partner. According to the EU Commission, and the limited findings in connection to the nature of the sponsorships, the role of the companies is not always easy to discover. One of Russia's main banks, the VTB bank, however, is government owned by 60 %, which leaves no room for doubt in relation to its funding policy (EU Commission 2014, p. 15). The public-private partnerships with known Russian oligarchs and the foundations of their family members, also form a lucrative opportunity for philharmonic societies (Ader & Belousov 2021, EU Commission 2014, p. 14). The Putin close circle member Gennadi Timchenkos foundation is, for example, one of the

big supporters of the famous Saint Petersburg Festival "Arts Square ", organized by the International Fund for Cultural Initiatives of Maestro Temirkanov and the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic. Other sponsors of the orchestra include the local car dealer "Dakar", the fuel and lubricants manufacturer KirishiNefteOrgSintez and the charitable foundation of American philanthropist Robert Delzell (philharmonia.spb.ru). These partners and supporters of cultural organizations are easily found on the institution's website, but the information on the amount of funding and on which purposes the possible funding has been given for are not as transparent. Therefore, more thorough research should be conducted in relation to the topic.

2.3.2 Legal

Russian cultural policy is interconnected to the already existing legal framework of the country. According to Romashko (2023), since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term (2012-), cultural policy making has witnessed the emergence of confining laws and amendments that tie the cultural field strongly to the state. This has been conducted through the presidential May decrees, which, thus, was transformed into assignments for the Government that in turn were made part of the national strategic planning (Romashko 2023 p. 22). This national strategic planning apparatus consists of concepts, strategies, projects and plans of implementation. As stated by the author, the policy framework aligns with the existing legal framework and development programmes, but "*integrates the policy development processes in the Presidential Administration, the State Council and the Presidential Councils.*" The current Russian state cultural policy consists of the following documents:

I) Basics of State Cultural Policy, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on December 24, 2014 No. 808. This decree functions as the conceptual core of the state cultural policy (Romashko 2023 p. 2; Vostryakov & Turgayev 2018, p. 6). In accordance with the authors, the state is considered the leading decisive organ and funder of the culture field. The document places the Russian culture among national priorities and emphasizes its primal mission for "*the formation of a harmoniously developed personality and the strengthening of the unity of Russian society*", as well as "*the preservation of historical and cultural heritage and its use for education*" and "*the transmission from generation to generation of values and norms, traditions, customs and patterns of behavior*

traditional for Russian civilisation” (Decree 2014, p. 2,7). These ideals of the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ were transferred into reality through the Russian Government approved ‘Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030’ in 2016.

II) Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030 (2016), approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on February 29, 2016 No. 326-r.

The document is aimed at transferring various cultural initiatives and ambitions of the 2014 Decree into the government structure (Romashko 2023 p. 9-11; Vostryakov & Turgayev 2018, p. 6-7). Vostryakov and Turgayev (2018, p. 12) describe the it as a Ministry of Culture controlled, comprehensive interdepartmental planning document, which contains specific instructions to both state federal executive authorities and state executive authorities of the constituent entities, as well as state cultural institutions and public organizations.

III) National Project ‘Culture’ and its action plan ‘Passport for 2019–2024’ (2018).

These, respectively financial and organizational action plans, were created for the execution of the cultural policy strategy until 2030 (2016) (Romashko 2023, p. 10). She highlights (2023, p. 10) that the National Project ‘Culture’ (2019-2024) creates a framework for “*infrastructural, institutional and cyberspace support for the policy priorities*”. The federal projects are called ‘Cultural sphere’, ‘Creative people’ and ‘Digital culture’.

IV) Annual State Report on the Current State of Cultural Policy.

The report proposes the implementation rate of the cultural policy in Russia and is prepared by the Ministry of Culture (Vostyakov & Turgayev 2018, p. 13).

According to the authors, the report, which preparation is enshrined by law, contains an updated list of problems and challenges in the field of culture, as well as proposals for adjustments.

In addition to the above mentioned documents, the following pieces of legislation are related to the cultural field:

I) The Constitution of the Russian Federation (2020).

The constitution was amended in 2020 and includes two references to cultural policy: It has strengthened the symbolic status of Russian language, as well as increased state patronage of culture, emphasizing the “*all-Russian civic identity*” and spiritual integrity of the country (Constitution 2020: Article 69.3).

II) National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on December 31, 2015.

Cultural policy has been an integral part of the National Security Strategy since 2014 (Romashko 2023, p. 11; Vostryakov & Turgayev 2018 p. 6). The interconnected strategy goals include for example, *“preservation and development of the all-Russian identity of the peoples of the Russian Federation, the unified cultural space of the country”* and *“increasing the role of Russia in the global humanitarian and cultural space”* (Security Strategy 2015, p. 2817). Cultural Policy was given an even clearer configuration on May 7th, 2018, when Putin approved the strategic degree No. 204 “On the national goals and strategic objectives of the development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024”, in which culture was included in priority national projects for the first time. (Vostryakov & Turgayev 2018, p. 7). This document, together with the current National Security Strategy of 2021, emphasizes the conservatism project of the cultural field.

III) Federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’ (1992). The federal law on culture and the basics of cultural policy (2014) form the legislative heart of the cultural field (Romashko 2023, p. 2). In the document (Federal Law, 1992 part I) the following tasks relating to culture are stated:

- Ensuring and protecting the constitutional right of citizens of the Russian Federation to cultural activities
- creation of legal guarantees for free cultural activities of associations of citizens, peoples and other ethnic communities of the Russian Federation
- definition of the principles and legal norms of relations of subjects of cultural activity
- definition of the principles of state cultural policy, legal norms of state support for culture and guarantees of non-interference of the state in creative processes.

2.3.3 Organizational

The governance system, involved with the Cultural Policy making in the Russian Federation, consists of many interlocked organs and actors. In the following section, I present all the main decision-makers, starting from the highest organ and continuing to the lower houses.

I) The State and the President

The current, fundamental cultural policy document ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ (2014) recognizes the State as the main actor and the patron in cultural policy of Russia, and under the State, executive authorities function as central figures in the

cultural governance structures (Romashko 2023 p. 10; Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8). The Head of State is the President of the Russian Federation (Vladimir Putin 2012-), who is in charge of selecting the Minister of Culture, as well as drafting of the national policy principles and priorities, which he presents to the Parliament (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8).

II) Organs, working in direct connection with the Head of State

II, a) State Council (Commission `Culture`) is “*a constitutional state body, formed by the President of the Russian Federation*”, which monitors the coordination and facilitation of cooperation between the organizations working under the public authority, in addition to outlining the core fields of domestic and foreign policy (Kremlin, 2023). In the field of Culture, the State Council and its Commission `Culture`, oversee reporting to the president and the implementation of the “Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030” (Romashko 2023, p. 10).

II, b) Presidential Council for Culture & Arts is the president's consultative body on culture and arts, which was established in 1996 (Kremlin 2023; Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8). According to Fedorova and Kochelyaeva (2013, p. 8) the members of the Council are selected by the President and it consists of actors in the cultural sector, for example cultural administrators and artists. It is responsible for maintaining a connection and interaction between the president and the cultural field, together with formulating proposals on relevant issues concerning the State Cultural Policy (Kremlin 2023; Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8).

III, c) Security Council of the Russian Federation is “*formed by the President in accordance with the Constitution and the Federal Law “On Security”*” (Kremlin, 2023). The Council is in charge of composing policy proposals and conceptual approaches for national security actualization, with the emphasis on forming uniform grounds for securing the state against “*internal and external threats*”, in addition to defending “*Russia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity*” (Kremlin, 2023).

III) Russian Government and its subordinate organs

III, a) Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation (Minkultury) is the main executive body, practicing power over legal regulation on culture, allocation of federal budget of culture, management of state owned cultural property and deliverance of cultural services to the public (Russian Government, 2023; Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8). Since 21st of January 2020, Olga Lyubimova, a known

Putin supporter on the conservative and nationalistic cultural policy path of Russia, has been serving as the Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation (Kishkovsky, 2023; Astahov, 2020).

III, b) Regional Ministries of Culture have similar structures as the federal ministry: they function as main organs of the regional governance, but at the same time have more limited resources (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 10). According to the authors, the heads of the regional ministries belong to the Cultural Minister-lead Coordinating Council for Culture, which in collaboration with the federal and regional decision-makers aims to embellish the national policy-making process.

III c) Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation regulates education, school accreditation, state school creation, upkeep, and closures, as well as curriculum regulation (Russian Government, 2023). Furthermore, the Ministry of Education lays out protocols for interactions between schools, students and guardians, as well as oversees professional and vocational education establishments (Russian Government, 2023).

III d) Ministry of Science and Higher Education was founded in 2018, after the division of the Ministry of Education and Science (UniRank, 2023). As reported in the site (2023), the new ministry branch is in control of scientific institutions and university-level education in the Russian Federation.

III e) Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs is an independent bureau, formed in 2015 that functions as part of the Russian Government (Kremlin, 2015). According to the government source, the FAEA handles nationality-based issues and ethnic policy; the main emphasis at the moment being ensuring “*interethnic and interfaith harmony*” and “*social and cultural adaptation and integration of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation*” (FADN, 2015).

III f) The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) is a federal executive body that has been authorized to protect personal data of human subjects (Russian Government, 2023). At the same time, it is a government compliant agency that uses monitoring, censorship and control over all Russian media outlets, which also reaches abroad with foreign media users trying to access Russian Government sites.

III g) Federal Agency for Youth Affairs is a federal body of executive authority that, according to the Russian Government (2023), provides services related to youth policy, and implements programs to support young people's career goals. In line with

the current cultural policy direction it also promotes moral and patriotic education (Russian Government, 2023).

III h) Federal Archival Agency offers “*state services based on the archive collections and responds to requests of citizens*” (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 9). The agency also conducts state registration -and register of documents, and is compliant with rules of purchasing, storing and use of archived material (Russian Government, 2023). Organs, working in close connection with the Ministry of Culture

III a I) Likhachev Russian Research Institute for Culture and Natural Heritage is a merger of two leading governmental cultural policy research institutions, formed by the order of the Ministry of Culture in 2014 (Romashko 2023, p. 9; Kultura, 2023).

In consonance with Romashko (2023, p. 11) the institute started to follow the doctrine of the current cultural policy model and during 2015-2020 it started to produce scientific basis for the core beliefs of it, including ‘*traditional values*’, and ‘*spiritual patriotism*’. III a II) Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation is a public oversight organ, which supervises “*the activities of federal and regional executive authorities and local governments*” (Publicnow, 2023). According to the mentioned source, the Chambers assembly comprises prominent citizens of Russia, representatives of national, as well as regional and interregional NGOs. The Civic Chamber, thus, issues opinions on a variety of subjects to authorities, acting as a bridge between the Russian decision-making institutions and Russian citizens.

State Duma (Lower Chamber of the Parliament) and Federation Council (Upper Chamber of the Parliament) together constitute the Federal Assembly of Russia that is in control of the federal cultural policy by “*passing federal legislation*” and “*adopting the federal budget*” (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8).

IV) State Duma is responsible for adopting federal constitutional and federal laws, which “*constitute the main source of law*”, thus possessing the highest legal force in the country, regulating the most important public relations and having direct effect (State Duma, 2023).

V) Federation Council is an organ, which exercises legislative power, basing its reviews of federal constitutional laws and federal laws, which have been adopted by the State Duma, on the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Federation Council, 2023).

IV a) Committee on Culture (under State Duma) prepares laws concerning culture

for parliamentary discussion (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8).

IV b) Public Council under the Committee for Culture was founded in 2012 by the President of the State Duma and its objective is to support embellishment of cultural legislation (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8).

V a) Council on State Cultural Policy under the Chairman of the Federation Council focuses on examining policy matters and their future directions, as well as putting forward changes to laws pertaining to the protection of the national cultures of the Russian Federation, balancing the cultural advancement of various regions, and promoting mecenat events and sponsorship (Fedorova & Kochelyaeva 2013, p. 8).

V b) Committee on Science, Education and Culture handles a wide variety of matters. involving the science, education and culture field (Federation Council, 2023). In accordance with the Council (2023), these matters include, for example, *“preservation of russian language”*, *“state policy in science, education and culture”*, and *“upbringing, guardianship, and custody of minors”*.

2.3.4 Value-ideological

The question of values and especially cultural values has received a fundamental standing in the current state cultural policy making. In the center of the value discussion is the Likhachev Institute, which according to Romashko (2023, p. 11) is greatly involved in the creation of scientific legitimacy of the ideology behind the cultural policy. The themes of *“traditional values of the Russian civilisation”* and *“protection of Russian national values”* have been keenly observed by the government and the researchers (Romashko 2023, p. 11). The following, Likhachev Institute affiliated, authors have looked into the topic in their research.

Authors Vostryakov and Turgayev (2018) have come to the conclusion that the modern Russian cultural policy model is “value-oriented”. By this definition, they imply that the core contents of the main cultural policy documents (Basics of State Cultural Policy, 2014, National Security Strategy, 2014 and Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030, 2016) circle around the theme of forming unitarian, traditional values for all Russian people to follow. The subject of values is referred to in the documents with following notions. The Basics (2014) acknowledges the main goal of the value-centric policy model as *“the formation of a harmoniously developed personality and strengthening unity of Russian society through priority cultural and humanitarian development”*, the

Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030 (2016) continues by giving instruction for the values to live on: *“preservation and development of the culture of the peoples of the Russian Federation by transferring its humanitarian value content, traditional for Russian civilization, to new generations”*, and finally the National Security Strategy (2014), makes it a strategic goal: *“preservation and enhancement of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as the basis of Russian society, education of children and youth in the spirit of citizenship”*. Researcher Flier (2018) has studied the ideological aspect of the current cultural policy and come to the conclusion that the dominant state ideology is etatism. Etatism is defined by Flier (2018, p.58) as *“absolutization of the efficiency of the state machine, the priority of the state and political power over society with its public self-government”*. Therefore, the main task of the conservative cultural policy is to ensure the loyalty of the majority of the population to the government and its political program (Flier 2018, p. 57). The loyalty is, as stated by him, ensured by influencing the mass consciousness of people through art. Special emphasis is placed on activation of the historical memory, especially the victory in the Great Patriotic War, which form a common basis for national identity, as well as overall sense of patriotism, serve as proven methods for effecting the human consciousness (Flier 2018, p. 57, 61). The non-Likhachev Institute sympathetic researcher Romashko (2023, p. 4) continues with the conception of national identity, highlighting that its establishment is secured by transmitting *“to new generations a set of moral, ethical and aesthetic values that constitute the core of national identity”*. These are noted to be the watershed between conservative and liberal, value-oriented and secularized East and West.

2.4 Cultural Policy Development in Russia during 2012-2023

The 11 year-long period, including the time period of focus for the Thesis (2013-2023), is filled with socio-political changes. The return to a conservative- authoritarian regime with Putin's re-election to president in 2012 caused a rapid series of “reforms' ' that have shook the Russian nation, and also the global community. On the grounds of the relevance of the events on political -and ideological level, as well as in connection to the thesis topic, I take a close look at the major events on a yearly basis.

The beginning of Vladimir Putin's third term as the president of Russia in 2012 was marked with the re-emergence of the logic and mechanisms of the Soviet system (Jonson 2019, p. 30; Romashko 2019, p. 11). As stated by Kurennoy (2021, p. 170), Putin commenced Yeltsin's ideology of conservatism, emphasizing the importance of

“traditional values”, which was then continued by the Ministry of Culture, executing reforms in state infrastructure and numerous “optimizations”. These conservative “reforms” in the cultural sphere meant, in practice, the reinstatement of state censorship and aggressive limitation of independent thinking, as well as of artistic freedom in the creative fields (Romanov & Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2015). The new concept of cultural policy, consequently, included strong opposition towards anything deemed “Western” (Romashko 2019, p. 11). The notions of conservative values, patriotism and Orthodox moralism, in addition to the ideals of a “single national identity” rose to dominant positions in the official rhetoric (ibid, p. 11-12; Jonson 2019, p. 15, 22). Putin's famous speech in the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2013 presented the newly founded conservative ideology to the global audiences, thus serving as a concrete water divider between Russia and the West. The core of the speech consisted of the importance of identity “*in the spiritual, cultural and national senses*”, and rehabilitating the Russian cultural code, which is embedded in the Russian traditions and history (Jonson 2019, p. 14). During the year, the Orthodox Church rose back to power as a beacon of “*ethical, moral and religious values*”, reciting which cultural products are authorized in the public space (ibid, p. 16, 22). In consonance with the teachings of the Church, the “*propaganda for non-traditional sexual orientations*” was forbidden by law (Russian Government, 2013).

The year 2014 brought major changes in the cultural field: The new cultural policy model "The Basics of State Cultural Policy in the Russian Federation" was finalized and signed by president Putin. This presidential decree includes the objectives, concepts and assignments of cultural policy (Kurennoy 2021, p. 170; Yefremova, et al. 2018, p. 435). According to Kurennoy (2021, p. 170) the Basics works as a revival of Soviet and post-Soviet ideological cornerstones, as it validates the state organizations activities in connection to cultural policy. As can be deduced from this, the state is in charge of the cultural activities in the country and it controls the cultural institutions (Kurennoy 2021, p. 170; Jonson 2019, p. 19; Jakobson, Rudnik & Toepler 2016, p. 14). As a continuation, Romashko (2023, p. 4) notes that Russian culture receives the dominant standing in the list of national interests. One of the main goals of cultural policy is, thus, guaranteeing the “priority culture” production (Basics, 2014). Several authors have noticed that, both the state and the society are also acknowledging the important role of culture and cultural policy in Russian reality, as well as “*in the formation of a harmoniously developed personality and in the strengthening of civil unity* (Romashko 2023, p.2;

Kurennoy 2021, p. 170; Yefremova et al. 2018, p. 435; Jakobson et al. 2016 p. 13). The conservative-authoritarian cultural policy pictures Russia as an unrepeatable nation and people, which functions beyond West and East, working as a connecting link between the opposites (Jonson 2019, p. 19). The country and its cultural policy are, thus, deemed to possess the best qualities of both worlds. Russia follows, according to the authors, a special “cultural-civilizational code”, which has its roots in traditional Russian values (Kurennoy 2021, p. 170; Jonson 2019, p. 19; Jakobsen et al. 2016, p. 14), which are based on Russian Orthodoxy (Jonson 2019, p. 19; Jakobson et al. 2016, p. 13). The aim of the cultural policy can be interpreted to be harnessing of the Russian “spirituality”, embedded in culture and used as a domestic and international operational asset (Romashko 2023, p. 4). The author continues that by doing that, the above mentioned “spirituality” can be used by the nation to reinstate Russia as a major force in the global field (p. 4). Continuing with the ideological path, the Russian Government (2014) highlights the goal of the cultural policy as a tool for forming a specific national mentality (Jonson 2019, p. 19). This common national feeling is achieved, according to Kurennoy (2021, p. 170) by ‘*strengthening the unity of Russian society through prioritizing cultural and humanitarian development*’. In addition, he underlines the crucial role of culture in fostering ‘*feelings of patriotism and national pride*’ (ibid, p. 170). The main fears concerning the future of Russia, as stated in the decree, is connected to the ‘*threat of a humanitarian crisis,*’ which can be perceived as ‘*a decrease in the intellectual and cultural level of society*’ (Romashko 2023, p. 4; Kurennoy 2021, p. 170). The threat is envisioned to be caused by domestic and external cultural political shifts, that is to say Western, liberal influences (Romashko 2023, p. 4). To battle these looming threats, culture and arts connect cultural policy to the National Security Strategy (2015), which has become an integral part of it, and now has acquired political dominance (Romashko 2023, p. 4,8; Jakobson et al. 2016, p. 13).

The political atmosphere has become very Anti-Western, causing new antagonistic laws to emerge during 2012-2015 (Romashko 2023, p. 4; Romashko 2019, p. 12). These laws restrict the actualization of human-, for example, regarding sexual orientation, national -and cultural rights, and overall freedom domestically (ibid.). As a consequence culture functions as means for national identity building (Romashko 2023, p. 4; Romashko 2019, p. 12).

The national identity building, now the core of National Security, is meant for ensuring the nation's support of the state, as well as creating a connecting ideology for different

ethnicities in Russia, and works on the grounds of a social mission (Romashko 2023, p. 4; Romashko 2019, p. 12; Jakobson et al. 2016; p. 13).

As reported in the Basics the social mission of culture *‘transmits to new generations a set of moral, ethical and aesthetic values that constitute the core of national identity’* (Basics 2014: 2). In order to achieve that, cultural policy must take into consideration all cultural activity fields, for example media, national policies, education and the spiritual and patriotic education of Russian citizens, in the production of a certain, state orchestrated, truth (Romashko 2023, p. 4; Romashko 2019, p. 12).

This conscious manufacturing of truth is carried out through the liaison of the state machine and academic community during 2012-2015 (Romashko 2023, p. 5; Romashko 2019, p. 13). According to Romashko (2019, p. 13) the government funded Likhachev institute is now responsible for creating and reproducing the needed scientific background for state ideology, as it possesses dominant moral and intellectual leadership to convince the masses.

In order to actualize the ideology of the new cultural policy document “the Basics” (2014) in 2016 the Government adopted The ‘Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030’ (Romashko 2023, p. 10; Kurennoy 2021, p. 171). As stated by both authors, this Strategy, thus, constitutes mechanisms for fulfilling the aims of the cultural policy, as well as working as a guideline for the Russian authorities.

The antagonistic stance towards anything Western, especially Western capitalism *‘mass culture that fosters the consumer’*, countering Russian “civilizationality” is repeated in the document (Romashko 2023, p. 11). In line with this drain of thought, one of the main themes of the Strategy is connected to the black omens for the Russian future, or as stated in it *‘the most dangerous symptoms of the humanitarian crisis’* (Strategy 2016, p. 4). According to the Strategy (2016, p. 4) these symptoms include *“a devaluation of universally recognised values and the misrepresentation of value-based guidelines”, “the rise of aggression, intolerance and asocial behavior”* and *“the distortion of historical memory”*. The above mentioned symptoms could cause severe threats to national security in the cultural field (Strategy 2016, p. 6) and, as a consequence, the objective of the cultural policy is to annihilate these threats (Romashko 2023, p. 12). In 2017 president Putin commanded the government to prepare a new federal law on culture, which would be compatible with the ‘Basics’ (2014), thus replacing the 1992 federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’ (Romashko 2023, p. 5). The author, however, notes that the 2018 version, called ‘Concept of the New Federal

Law on Culture’, has been discussed many times by the experts, but still has not received official approval.

Years 2018-2019 were dedicated to the preparation and actualization of the so-called ‘social mission of culture’, which was realized by government programs and projects, as well as action plans. According to Kurennoy (2021, p. 171) Putin discharged a decree, called ‘On National Goals and Strategic Tasks of the Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2024’ during summer 2018, where he publicized twelve ‘national projects’. These projects offer the supporters of the current cultural policy (and governmental structures) state funding for their projects, from the newly established Presidential Grants, as well as the federal, regional and local budgets (Romashko 2023, p. 5; Romashko 2022, p. 21-22).

The national project concerning culture, is regulated with two interconnected papers of strategic planning, called the National Project ‘Culture’ and the action plan ‘Passport of the National Project “Culture” for 2019–2024’ (Romashko 2023, p. 5, 10; Romashko 2022, p. 21; Kurennoy 2021, p. 171-172). Romashko (2022, p. 21; 2023 p. 10) states that the main function of these papers is to present financial and organizational methods and instruments for the application of the Strategy (2016). The National Project ‘Culture’ (2019–2024) is divided into three federal projects. I) ‘Cultural sphere’ for developing cultural infrastructure, ii) ‘Creative people’ for nurturing and harnessing the citizens creativity, and iii) ‘Digital culture’ for digitization of cultural space and services (Romashko 2023, p. 10; Romashko 2022 p. 21; Kurennoy 2021, p. 172). The National Project ‘Culture’ has also the responsibility for carrying out the ideological components of the state cultural policy (Romashko 2022, p. 21-22; Kurennoy 2021, p. 172). In consonance with principles of the Basics (2014), the core of the project lies with ‘*Strengthening Russian Civil Identity on the Basis of Spiritual, Moral and Cultural Values of the Peoples of the Russian Federation*’ and the ‘*preservation of the single cultural space*’ (ibid). In practice, this is deemed to be achieved by ensuring the Russian citizens easy access to suitable cultural products and their production (Constitution, article 44). Concrete target indicators of the success of the increase in accessibility to cultural goods, and thus forming stronger connection to “correct” cultural values, is stated in Kurennoy (2021, p. 172) by ‘*an increase by 15% of the number of visits to cultural organizations and by 5 times the number of inquiries to digital cultural resources*’.

At the turn of the decade in 2020, the conservative policy production continues with

amendments to the Constitution and Law on Education.

President Putin suggests a variety of changes to the Russian Constitution in January, as a means to ensure his political standing also in the future (Romashko 2023, p. 10; Laine & Zamyatin 2021, p. 2). According to the authors, the amendments were finalized and published during summer 2021, and contain several important aspects. The first is related to the Constitution, which has augmented “*the symbolic status of the Russian language*” as well as the languages of the “*traditional family*”, which refers to “ethnic” Russians (Romashko 2023, p. 10; Laine & Zamyatin 2021, p. 2, 4). This group is also considered to be, in Laine and Zamyatin (2021, p. 2, 4), “*the state-founding people*” and, as a consequence, their “*ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity*” is guaranteed. The other aspect is the role of Russian compatriots abroad and the need for supporting them is, likewise, emphasized, which raises the question in connection to the current state borders and how they should be interpreted (ibid). Identity Politics have an even more integral role in the Amendments of the Constitution than before. The basis for national identity-ideology is constructed by “*safeguarding the historical truth*”, in other words through legislation, which portrays the Kremlin approved version on historical events (Laine & Zamyatin 2021, p. 2, 12). As a continuation, the current Constitution includes the state consolidated perception of national identity, or ‘*all-Russian civic identity*’, which is based on memory politics and patriotism, thus ensuring the “*spiritual and territorial integrity*” of Russia (Romashko 2023, p. 10; Laine & Zamyatin 2021, p. 12). Finally, Article 71 of the amended Constitution presents a single legal framework for upbringing and education (Laine & Zamyatin 2021, p. 11-12). As stated by the authors, this places the entire educational system under the power of the central state. The inclusion of upbringing to the framework marks as restoration of Soviet ideology, and also the conveying of, for example “*spiritual-moral values*” and “*the feeling of patriotism*” to the younger generation (ibid).

The year 2021 continued with amendments to the Law on Education. In April 2021, new law on “*enlightenment activities*”, that consist of educational activities outside of formal education, was authorized to protect students from “*anti-Russian propaganda*” (Laine & Zamyatin 2021, p. 11). From the point of view of the authors, the definition of the activities remains vague, but can be used to include any activity, deemed in discord with the Constitution and thus the official imaginaries. The National Security Strategy was also amended in 2021, and according to Romashko (2023, p. 11) further employs the national conservation project in the cultural field. The amended document draws a

picture of a changing world and a shift in global power dynamics, as it postulates the ending of “*Western hegemony*” (Guler & Shakirova 2021, p. 2). However, the document focuses mainly on Russia's own, domestic issues, raising the “*moral and ethical aspects*”, which are connected to the traditional Russian values, to the center of the table (ibid).

New aspects to the National Security Strategy are the two emerging national goals: “*saving the people of Russia and the development of human potential*”, and “*the defense of traditional Russian spiritual-moral values, culture and historical memory*”, which the officials claim to be threatened by malicious outside forces (Cooper 2021; Guler & Shakirova 2021, p. 3).

As Russia has become increasingly fearful of any potential security threat, Cooper (2021) states that the NSS of 2021 has removed the segment containing “*the development of international links in the fields of science and education*”, thus isolating the future generations from Western influences. Overall, information security has received a higher standing, since “foreign IT” can contribute to breaches in Russian information infrastructure (ibid). In connection to culture, the 2021 document has made many additions to the section. The previous (2015) document emphasized the importance of “*the retention and multiplication of traditional Russian spiritual-moral values as the foundation of Russian society*” and named the external “low quality” mass culture and manipulation of Russian history as threats (Cooper, 2021).

In the NSS of 2021, the external threats are specified as the US and its allies, who are now categorized together with “terrorist and extremist organizations” as evil counter-forces and even overthrowers of traditional Russian values (Cooper 2021; Guler & Shakirova 2021). The main symptoms of these foreign influences are named as “*informational-psychological diversions*” and finally as the “*Westernisation*” takes a stronger hold of the cultural field, the annihilation of “*cultural sovereignty*” in Russia (ibid). As a recap of the above mentioned facts, the amended Security Strategy of 2021 is a concrete indicator of Russia turning its back on the Western world and plunging back to the yesteryear isolationist practice. During the years 2021 and 2022, the government organs, in collaboration with the Likhachev Institute pondered on themes such as ‘*traditional values of the Russian civilisation*’ and the ‘*conviction that Russian national interests, history and values must be protected*’ from foreign influences (Romashko 2023, p. 13). These discussions resulted in January 2022 with the publication of a document draft titled “*The foundations of the state policy for preserving*

and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values", meant for public discussion (MEMRI 2022; Mishina 2022). The decree was finally approved, becoming law by president Putin on November 9th, ten months after Russia's launch of a '*special military operation*' in Ukraine, which was justified from the Russian side on the ideological basis of protecting the country from Western '*pseudo-values*' (Romashko 2023, p. 8; Ukrainskaya Pravda 2022).

The interdisciplinary strategic planning document serves as a part of Russian national security with the aim of "*strengthening and protection of the traditional spiritual and moral values and the cultural and historical heritage of the people of Russia*" (MEMRI 2022). The main point of focus, the traditional values are described in the document as "*life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, civic consciousness, high moral ideals ... historical memory and intergenerational continuity, and unity of the peoples of Russia*" (Decree 2022: Article 3). According to Ukrainskaya Pravda (2022) and Mishina (2022), the Russian government assumes that these values are constantly under external threat from the US and other "unfriendly states", as well as domestically from "terrorist and extremist organizations" and as a consequence must be protected. The concept of "destructive ideology" appears numerous times in the decree and can be freely interpreted as any notion or action that goes against the main ideology, shaped by the government. In the decree these, national interest contradicting, ideologies are named as "*the cult of selfishness, permissiveness, immorality, denial of the ideals of patriotism, service to the Fatherland, procreation, creative work, the positive contribution of Russia to the world history and culture*" (Decree 2022: Article 8). In addition, Mishina (2022) emphasizes that the Article 8 section on the destructive consequences of spreading "*Reforms in education, science, culture and informational activities*", which are not in synchronization with the traditional values, could have "terrible" consequences to the Russian society. Finally, Ukrainskaya Pravda (2022), mentions the new addition to the national threats "*the destruction of the traditional family through gay propaganda*", which could annihilate the society's value system, as it goes against the holy institution of marriage as "*a union between man and a woman*", as well as against the ideological foundation of the Russian identity (Decree 2022: Article 13). On the level of public policy, the transmission and reinforcing of traditional values must include all societal actors, from education and upbringing all the way to international collaboration (Decree 2022: Article 6). Ukrainskaya Pravda (2022) highlights the importance of co-working between the authorities and media. The cooperation can also be understood as

ensorship on the governmental side, which reaps the countering voices from media platforms and eases the spreading of the chosen values.

Internationally, Russia aims to portray a vision of itself as “*the guardian of traditional universal values*” (Decree 2022: Article 12). This notion further shows the division between the East and West; the traditional and moral versus the liberal and perverse. The traditionalist-conservative production of state cultural policy culminates in 2023. On January 25th president Putin signs the decree amending “the Basics of State Cultural Policy” (Petrova 2023; Kitov & Gertner 2023 p. 43; Interfax 2023). The amendments affect the entire Basics text and, according to Kitov and Gertner (2023, p. 43), are based on a certain, value-based philosophy and ideology, which is especially concerned with preserving “Russian uniqueness and identity” and thus focuses on guaranteeing national security, and socio-economic development in domestic interethnic-and faith processes (Petrova 2023; Cultmanager 2023; Interfax 2023). The document draws a thorough picture on the looming security threats, underlying possible “*humanitarian crisis*” (Decree 2023: Article 2). In connection to the humanitarian crisis, the number one threat in the document (2023: Article 3) is named to be “*the destruction of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, the weakening of the unity of the multinational people of the Russian Federation*”. Other major threats are stated by Petrova (2023), Kitov and Gertner (2023, p. 47) to include the capitalism driven “*increase in individualism, disregard for the rights of others*”, as well as “*deformation of historical memory*” in Russia. The main threat, according to Article 4 however, is deemed to be sociocultural and come from abroad. Petrova (2023) and Interfax (2023), together with the authorities, define it as “*a number of unfriendly states*” and other “*terrorist organizations*” that aim to undermine “*the cultural sovereignty of the Russian Federation*” and destroy “*traditional Russian spiritual and moral values*” as well as “*contribute to the aggravation of conflicts in the global information space*”. In order to “save” Russian citizens, the preservation of “*fundamental values and principles*” is needed for the “*preservation and strengthening of the all-Russian civic identity*”, which ensures domestic unity in the country (Decree 2023: Article 2). To resist external threats, the Russian authorities have chosen a new course for state support and financing of culture. At the moment the funding is prioritized and aimed at projects “*preserving traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, historical memory and protecting historical truth*” (Petrova 2023; Kitov & Gertner 2023 p. 44; Interfax 2023). Cultmanager (2023) names a few new sources of additional funding, which include

Putin's own Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives and the “My History” Foundation for the Support of the Humanities; these foundations focus especially on cultural and educational activities that promote the state ideology.

An emphasized standing and funding is, thus, newly given to the field of “*cultural heritage of the peoples of Russia*” and development of their art and literature; preservation and popularization of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values; preservation of the all-Russian civic identity; countering sociocultural threats and extremism, as well as ensuring quality control of the implementation of the government order (Kitov & Gertner 2023, p. 44; Cultmanager 2023; Interfax 2023). A new section is added to the Basics, concerning the creative industries. The subsection specifies “*the creation of conditions for the production, distribution and popularization of products of domestic creative industries both in the domestic and global markets*” (Decree 2023). The functions of CI are, according to Kitov and Gertner (2023, p. 44) directed to creating an information environment, favorable for the development of personality. To rephrase it, the contents of cultural production and the products of different types of media are supplemented to the goals and objectives of the conservative state cultural policy making, to eliminate any countering ideologies. In connection to education and upbringing, the field has received a civil-patriotic, spiritual and moral direction (Petrova 2023; Cultmanager 2023). The protection of the children's interests, in addition to the protection and transferring of traditional family values and the ideology of marriage institution as a union of a man and a woman, have become mainstream educational doctrines at schools (Interfax 2023; Petrova 2023). Finally, the field of Russian language and the languages of the peoples in Russia has received new elaboration. According to Interfax (2023) and Petrova (2023) the decree seals the standing of Russian as state language and aims to protect it by “*ensuring compliance with the norms of the modern Russian literary language (including the prevention of obscene language) and countering excessive use of foreign vocabulary*”.

In November 2023, Minister of Culture Olga Lyubimova represented the new reduction of the Strategy of the State Cultural Policy Until 2030 (Duma 2023). The main conservative direction further continues, as stated by Duma (2023) the spiritual, moral and patriotic values remain dominant, and patriotic cinematography is given increased funding. The results of the amended strategy remain to be seen, but it is evident that Russia has truly ducked its trenches and declared a “cultural war” against the outside world.

2.5 National identity

To define an expression as multifaceted as the one of national identity, it is necessary to begin the explanation from the term of ethnies, since it functions as a common core for all nation-related studies. Historical sociologist Anthony D. Smith (1986, p. 32) has defined ethnies as a *'named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity'*. Smith was a pioneer in the nationalism studies and his notion on "ethnies" is fundamental to his ethnosymbolist theory, which explores the cultural features of nations and nationalism (Guibernau 2004, p. 126). According to Guibernau (2004, p. 124), while doing research on the origins of nations and national identity, Smith discovered the connection between ethnic and collective cultural identity. Smith (1991, p. 25) proclaimed that collective cultural identity is based on I) a sense of continuity between the generations of the cultural unit, II) shared memories and historical periods of the unit and III) notions, shared by the generations about the common destiny of the unit and its culture. These discoveries helped in determining the first interpretation of nation in Smith's book "National Identity" (1991), and later in the revised definition, which characterizes it as *"a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs"* (Smith 2002, p. 15). The definition of nation possesses many similar elements with the evermolding and fluid concept of national identity. In his book of the same title (1991) Smith emphasizes that national identity *"involves some sense of political community, history, territory, patria, citizenship, common values and traditions"* (ibid, p. 9). Keillor and Hult (1999) add that each culture is unique with a set of meanings owned by it. Smith further underlines the multi-dimensional nature of national identity by naming its five fundamental attributes of historic territory; common myths and historical memories; common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members, and common economy with territorial mobility for members (Smith 1991, p. 14). Today, there are two types of national identities, which have been formulated by Smith (1991); civic-and ethnic national identity. According to Markova (2020, p.1), civic national identity presents the Western perception of the term, highlighting territory, and a *"sense of political community"* with which *"citizens identify with and feel they belong to"*. The ethnic national identity, in contrast, underlines a non-Western perception and shared roots of its citizens (Smith 1991, p. 9-10). The

major difference between the two identities is, thus, the notion of citizenship being inherited from birth (ethnic) and on the other hand it being voluntarily obtained (civic) (Greenfeld 1992, p. 11). The two national identity forms are deemed complex and multi-dimensional by Smith (1991, p. 14), and they may contain attributes from both ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ identity. National authorities are influential in shaping the national identity in their country, through, for example, clever use or possible alteration of the common historical narratives (Miller 2016, p. 448; Liñán 2010, p. 167). This brings us back to the study of ethnosymbolism, with its interest areas of myths, symbols, traditions, heroes and holy places, which can, as stated by Guibernau (2004, p. 127), provide formidable reasoning to nationalists in order to reinforce the political legitimacy in their country. This drain of thought is visible in today's Russia, where the national authorities have a dominant position in shaping the Russian national identity (Markova 2020, p. 2).

2.5.1 The Concept of National identity in today's Russia

The formulation of a suitable and ends-meeting nationalist narrative for a Russian national identity has, according to Girvin (2022, p. 40) taken Putin nearly two decades. In January 2012, as a presidential candidate, he finally succeeded and shared the results of his work by releasing a programmatic article, which develops its understanding of Russia as a single civic multi-ethnic nation and of modern Russia as a national state (Blackburn 2020, p. 4; Yahshiyani 2020, p. 2). According to Putin, the basis for the unity of multi-ethnic Russian nation lies with the Russian cultural and historical code, which is reproduced in the space of the “dominant culture”, in other words Russian language, high Russian culture, historical memory and statehood (ibid). When Putin was re-elected in May 2012, The Kremlin started to actualize his vision of unitarian national identity by blurring the lines between the civic *rossiiskii* and the ethnic *russskii* identities (Blakkisrud 2016, p. 267). The president is firmly dedicated to national assimilation, basing his logic in common history with reference to the Czarist empire and its integration of all people in the territory to the dominant Russian culture (Girvin 2022, p. 40). The Valdai club speech in 2013 of the newly elected president included the following definition of national identity that was civic in nature and based on ‘*shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, communion with the fate of the Fatherland without losing touch with ethnic or religious roots*’

(Putin, 2013). As can be interpreted from the definition above, there is little, if any, room for diversion of the state ideology. Romashko (2018, p. 3-4) states that the official documents post-2013 acknowledge cultural values only through dominant (Russian) cultural patterns and “*provide a ground for the legitimation of sociocultural marginalization and censorship*”. This leads to neglecting cultural diversity -and free expression of non-Russian cultural practices. The newly formed “state-civilization” identity, thus aims to unify the many people of Eurasia under the common roof of Russian statehood, which is based on the preservation of the Russian cultural dominant, as well as conservative discourses on values, patriotism and Orthodox morality (Yahshiyani 2020 p. 2, 4; Romashko 2019, p. 12). The ideology of “state-civilization” identity is not constrained by the Russian territorial borders, but is a unique civilization “*ruskii mir*”, which also includes the Russian diaspora abroad (Blakkisrud 2016, p. 271). This partially explains the need of the Russian people in diaspora to practice their culture wherever they may be and sometimes even blindly defend it.

3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

In the following sections, I uncover the rationale behind the research process by demonstrating and validating the selection of methodology and analysis type. For this particular work, I have chosen the qualitative, single case, social constructivist study approach. As a continuation, I give more insight to the choice of target organization, data collection, including selection of relevant documents and collection of Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic seasonal programmes. The chosen analysis method on the state documents thematic analysis, which is followed by deductive thematic analysis on the concert programmes.

3.1 Qualitative research

Qualitative research is a study method, which is used to study various, different subjects (Leavy 2014). According to her, the method can be used to examine, describe, or explain social phenomena. In my case the phenomena of Russian cultural policy and its powerful capacity in affecting the formation of national identity. Mason (2002) further specifies the goals of qualitative research. She states that this research type seeks to

generate understanding of “*how things work in particular contexts*” from a set of complex and nuanced data (Mason, 2002, p. 1). Leavy (2014) continues that this kind of research entails finding meanings behind the written word, discovering linkages between the individuals and the institutions, in addition to examining new disciplines. Those linkages can be understood as overlapping ideologies between the cultural policy agenda and the seasonal programming of the Philharmonic, which can be difficult to detect for the uninformed eye. The qualitative approach is proven to be complementary with all-kinds of textual material, document and speech materials included, as well as giving the researcher flexibility in choosing the research method best suited for the research question (Leavy, 2014). For the reason of mainly focusing on written -and archival material, which in line with Denzin and Lincoln (2005) cannot be measured quantitatively or in numbers, but in social constructions and emphasizing the processes, this along with aiming to find “hidden” meanings behind them, is the main reason why the qualitative approach is best suited for this thesis.

3.2 Single Case Study

The case study has been given the following definition by Creswell (2013, p. 97) “*The case study method “explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information... and reports a case description and case themes*”. In order to create a high-quality theory, authors Dyer and Wilkins (1991) state that a single case study is more suitable for production of better theory than multiple case study. The core idea of my research is to demonstrate the actualization of cultural policy in the Russian cultural field. For this reason, I have chosen to conduct a single case study on an institution from my own field of speciality, classical music; Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich. The scope of focus is, thus, concentrated to address a specific group of actors, which enables me to get a deeper understanding of my chosen subject (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991).

The case study approach is deemed appropriate for answering questions of holistic nature, in other words the “how” and “why” questions (Myers 2009; Yin 1994). Since I have chosen to form my 2nd research question about the connection of assumed mutual themes between the Russian cultural policy reports objectives and Saint Petersburg State

Philharmonic's concert programming, with the wording "how", the study approach is justified.

In the view of the fact that the research aspires to find an in-depth description of the social phenomena of Russian national identity production through a state classical music institution (Yin, 2015), the case study as chosen methodology fits the research needs. Moreover, because the research design may change during the process, Yin (2015) accentuates that the case study approach is flexible for possible adjustments.

3.2.1 The Target Organization: Saint-Petersburg State Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich.

The organization, which is nowadays known as the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, named after D. D. Shostakovich took its first steps in 1802. The main venues of the Philharmonic, the Grand Hall on Mihailovskaya Square and the Small Hall on Nevsky Prospect have then become the centers of classical music life in Russia. The Philharmonic has witnessed many significant historic events of the country and, as a result, been affected by the political scene ever since. The aftermath of the October Revolution of 1917 was felt with the new mission of the organization with promoting classical music to all members of the new Soviet society. Conductor and director of the Philharmonic Nikolai Malko was made in charge of the reforms, and during season 1926-27 he introduced a new subscription system, to create a newer and wider audience base. The system remains the core of orchestral activities to this day and the programmes are known to be influenced by the politico-ideological atmosphere of the country. The other major historical event was the ending of the siege of Leningrad and the victory in the Great Patriotic War (WWII) in 1945. The subscription system was then remodeled; four different categories, one of which was targeted for the youth, were formed. The concert programmes in connection to the Leningrad Siege and the Great Victory are still present in the programmes, creating images of the heroic past and awakening patriotic pride in the listeners with multiple annual celebration-events. The Soviet times overall are part of the legacy of the Philharmonic, and the organization received the name Leningrad Philharmonic named after D. D. Shostakovich, honoring the great collaborator and composer Dmitri Shostakovich in 1975.

The Philharmonic houses two resident orchestras: the Honorary Collective of Philharmony (HCP) and the Academic Symphony Orchestra (ASO). They both have

received praise for high-level performances on international and domestic level. In addition to their concert activities, the Philharmonic rents its venues to both domestic and international ensembles and guests.

Since the beginning of the third presidential term of Putin (2012-), the cultural policy making has had its toll on the programming of the concert activities. One of the most evident changes are related to the subscription system, which has been expanded and now also include thematized concerts to support the dominant ideology. The increasing power of the Ministry of Culture and the Kremlin are apparent with changes to the power structure. After the death of Maestro Temirkanov in November 2023, who served as the artistic director of the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic since 1977 and held monopoly power over artistic, as well as organizational and financial matters, the position of artistic director has been re-arranged. From December 2023 on, the post has been divided between director and chief conductor, giving the director-bureaucrat main decision-making power in the organizational and financial matters of the organization. The role of the chief conductor has, thus, been limited to the artistic matters, working under the director, in addition to following the current regulations, made by the putinist Ministry of Culture.

(philharmonia.spb.ru).

3.3 Social Constructivism

The concept of social constructivism has its roots in the seminal book of Berger and Luckmann (1966), called *The Social Construction of Reality*. In their work, the authors claim that the understanding and knowledge of citizens, in the thesis Russian citizens, are based on their social surroundings. In consonance with this statement, the reality of the target group is built through *social interactions, relationships, and experiences* (Leavy 2014, p. 85). The construction of modern Russian social reality, especially since the beginning of Putin's 3rd presidential term (2012-), is heavily influenced and continually “re-invented” by him and the ones in the close circle. This spreading of carefully crafted imagery is actualized through the means of, regularly shifting, cultural policy.

One of the central ideas behind social constructivism, as well as the modern Russian cultural policy, is the *social creation of identity* (Leavy 2014, p. 85). The formation of national identity is reliant on the actors' identities, the context they are part of, and the

interpretations they make of surrounding events (Hopf, 1998). According to Wendt (1992, p. 399) history has a great role in the identity formation. In the case of Russia, the past failures to become a part of the Western hegemony (Hopf 2010, p. 338) have led them to a different path, and a mission to form their own “counter-hegemony” inside and outside of Russia. On the Russian level, Tsygankov (2012, p. 22) proposes that culture, economy and politics, along with memories of difficult past with the West, create a will to act.

The complicated past and present with the West, together with the constant changes inside of Russia are considered the starting force of the formation of a new national identity in Russia (Hopf, 2005). The acknowledgement of social constructivism as the key paradigm in discovering the elements of identity building, is fundamental for the thesis work. Centering on that fact, the cycle of ideological transfer, from the leading organs, through the state cultural policy, through Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic seasonal programming, into the subconsciousness of culture consuming citizens, and finally transforming into a sense of national pride, can be scientifically proven.

3.4 Data Collection

The main sources that I have chosen for the thesis are connected to research question one, which concerns the core themes of building national identity. These are the official Russian State Cultural Policy documents, from 2014 to 2023.

The reason for choosing to use already existing material is connected to the world situation, with the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. It has made it impossible and unwise for me as a foreigner, to travel to Saint Petersburg. In addition to the travel restrictions, I have chosen not to conduct interviews through the communication channels (Telegram, E-mail, Zoom etc.), for the purpose of not making life more difficult to the prospective interviewees in the target country. The other reason behind the choice is the possible biases the interviewees might have in connection to the research topic, which could endanger the ending results of the project. This being said, the main source of information for the thesis is documented data, which will be subjected to analysis.

Following documents were chosen for the analysis:

- Указ Президента РФ "Об утверждении Основ государственной культурной политики" (The decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On approval of Origins of State Cultural Policy") 808, 24 December 2014, *Kremlin*.
- Стратегия государственной культурной политики на период до 2030 года (The Strategy of The State Cultural Policy) 326-R, 29 February 2016, *Kremlin*.
- Указ Президента РФ "О внесении изменений в Основы государственной культурной политики, утвержденные Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 24 декабря 2014 г. No 808" (The decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On amendments to the Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 24, 2014 No. 808") 35, 25 January 2023, *Kremlin*.

The second part of data collection circles around the chosen classical music organization; the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic and its concert seasons of 2013-2023. The collection of data, however, has turned out to be more difficult than expected. Since the beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine, Russia has started to limit foreign entry into its informational space. These limitations include also the access to the Philharmonics official website and, hence, the seasonal programmes. For this reason, my research and data collection were postponed to the beginning of this summer (2023), when I found an archival website, through which I could enter the archived information. This started a time consuming screenshot-taking of the needed material, as well as cataloging it for future use.

The websites used for data collection are:

- Internet Archive: <https://archive.org/web/>
- Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, official website:
<https://www.philharmonia.spb.ru/>
- 100 лет Санкт-Петербургской филармонии (100th anniversary of Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic: <https://100philharmonia.spb.ru/>

The latter part of collected data is then analyzed, based on the thematic findings of official documents. By these means the second research question, concerning the actualization of national identity building through common themes between the reports and seasonal programming, may be verified.

3.5 Data Analysis

The next phase after collecting all the relevant data for the research is its analysis. Merriam and Tisdell (2016, p. 202) have defined data analysis as a process, which requires “*consolidating, subtracting, and interpreting in understanding data*”, where writers report the data through specific steps, for example reduction and conclusion. Regarding a case study, Simmons (in Leavy 2014, p. 464) highlights that this process includes “*reducing or transforming a large amount of data to themes that can encapsulate the overarching meaning in the data*”. The analysis, thus, begins with intuitive suppositions, which develop into themes, and even theories (Simmons, in Leavy 2014, p. 464).

My thesis material consists of documented data, which has been selected through a document analysis process. Document analysis is characterized by Bowen (2009, p. 27) as a “*Systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer – based and Internet- transmitted) material*”. These documents could comprise of books, journals, newspapers, reports, and other material, which is relevant to the research. The analysis, thus, involves going through chosen documents and finding connections between the data, and finally generating themes and categories. The use of documented data served also as a viable source of foundation to the socio-cultural and political context for the research problem, in addition to bestowing a holistic framework for the researched phenomena (Stake, 1995).

The documented data has been written in two languages: The majority of the data, selected through the document analysis process, consists of documents written in English. However, the official Kremlin reports and the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic seasonal programmes are in the original, Russian language. Keeping this in mind, I had to translate and later transcribe the documents into English, to match the language requirements of the Arts University.

The translation and transcription was followed by thematic analysis, for identifying the primary themes, connected to the national identity formation, in the first set of data. Here I am referring to the data relating to the first research question. The identification of the themes in the first data block was done inductively, rather than based on any possible assumptions or previous knowledge of the researcher. The coding, thus, was

not given any predetermined frames and the analysis was mainly data-driven (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

Succeeding the analysis of the first data set and identifying the main themes, attached to the centering concept of national identity, I conducted the deductive thematic analysis on the second data set of SPBP seasonal programmes. The second part of the analysis is aimed at answering research question number two, on how the found themes (connected to formation of national identity) are actualized in the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic concert programming.

3.6 Thematic analysis

Leading thematic analysis supporters, psychologists Braun and Clarke describe thematic analysis as a qualitative analysis method, which is appropriate “*for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) detail*” (Braun & Clarke 2006, p. 79). The reason behind selecting thematic analysis as my method is because of the versatility of it. The method allows researchers to use this approach for many types of studies and to select the research design that matches their interests and areas of expertise (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Relating to my research, the formation of Russian national identity through cultural policy making and actualization in the chosen concert organization.

The study of national identity is strongly connected to the philosophical approach of social constructivism (Leavy, 2014). On grounds of this, it is crucial that the chosen analysis type fits the needs of the research. According to Braun and Clarke (2014), thematic analysis is in its flexibility compatible with the social constructionist approach, within the field of qualitative research, and thus can be used in the study. In line with most other research methods, the thematic analysis can be conducted inductively or deductively (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The first part of my analysis is based on the inductive variable. Thus, the identified themes are firmly connected to the data under analysis (Boyatzis, 1998).

The thematic analysis process consists of six phases, but according to Braun and Clarke (2006) it is worth noting that the analysis process is not linear, where one goes through the phases in strict order. One could more likely picture it as a recursive process, where you circle between the phases, when necessary (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The first part of the thematic analysis consists of conducting a selection and familiarization of the relevant Russian cultural policy documents and speeches for the research (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I have chosen cultural policy related official documents and speeches from a ten-year timeframe (2013-2023), based on the conservative reforms made during that time period.

The second part of the analysis is coding, which is a process for developing themes by identifying items that are related to the research question in the data and tagging these with a coding label (Boyatzis, 1998) that is to say data connected to formation of national identity.

The third part consists of generating initial themes. Themes differ from codes in that themes are phrases or sentences that identify what the data means. They describe an outcome of coding for analytic reflection (Saldana, 2009).

The fourth part is reviving the found themes. At this point the researcher checks their initial themes against the coded data and the entire data-set, in order to ensure that the analysis hasn't drifted too far from the data and provides a compelling account of the data relevant to the research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The fifth part is based on defining and naming themes. Analysis at this stage is characterized by identifying which aspects of data are being captured and what is interesting about the themes, and how the themes fit together to tell a coherent and compelling story about the data (Braun & Clarke, 2016).

The sixth and final part of the analysis consists of the researcher writing the final report. While writing the final report, the researcher should decide on themes that make meaningful contributions to answering research questions which should be refined later as final themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

After discovering the main themes that are connected to the formation of Russian national identity, I begin the second phase of the research analysis; the process of deductive thematic analysis on the concert programming.

Deductive thematic analysis is strongly shaped and influenced by pre-existing theory and pre-identified themes, making it more interpretative than its inductive counterpart (Braun & Clarke, 2019). This approach, thus, can be used for discovering already identified themes in previous research based on the data-set, or using existing theory as a framework for organizing, coding and interpreting the data. The nature of deductive analysis makes it ideal for the research, in other words,

finding possible common themes between the cultural policy reports and the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic's seasonal programming. By conducting this type of thematic analysis, I verify if the state concert organization is harnessed into spreading the national identity agenda through its activities.

3.7 Critical reflections on the research process

It is a widely recognized fact that the researcher's philosophy, beliefs, feelings, and personal experience have an effect on the research process and its outcomes (Chesney, 2000). In the case of my thesis work, the chosen topic is very close and personal for me, since I have experiences from living in the country, studying there and frequenting the concerts of the target cultural institution.

The life-experiences from Russia, on one hand, have a positive and enriching effect on the thesis work. I got a first hand chance to absorb myself in Russian culture, during my conducting studies in Saint Petersburg State Conservatory (2015-2016, 2017-2021). This experience has given me knowledge and perspective about the realities in the country, which have been beneficial to the writing process. The study years in Russia and my own personal interest in the Russian language and culture have enabled me to interpret documents and literature also in Russian, thus giving me a wider spectrum of sources to research for the thesis. Finally, the familiarity with Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic has given me a case study subject that has not been previously researched, by Russian or foreign researchers.

Bearing the aspects mentioned above in mind, I do acknowledge that academic research can never fully be without biases. Even though I have lived in Saint Petersburg for many years and have thoroughly enjoyed my time there, I am of Finnish origin and have a western viewpoint (and mindset) on the ongoing events across the border. For this reason, I am not a neutral outsider, looking at the subject matter *tabula rasa*. However, I strive to approach this project in an objective and non-nationalistic way, and do my utmost to conduct the research with scientific integrity.

In addition to recognizing my position as a researcher, the master thesis is dedicated to following the practice of research ethics during the process and in its publication. In the research, I have used pre-existing documents, since they offer the needed amount of data for reaching the aim of the research and answering the research questions. The other

advantage of using pre-existing documents is that they raise fewer ethical concerns than using other qualitative methods (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). This was one of the reasons behind choosing to work on documents and other pre-existing sources. The current situation in the Russian Federation is so turbulent that conducting interviews with the citizens living there or abroad could possibly cause them or their family harm. The gosuslugi (governmental communications supervision service) is ever present in the communication networks, which also makes corresponding with public organizations nearly impossible.

This is the main reason why public documents are a great and safe way to conduct research; they are available for anyone to examine, as well as often anonymous. Authors of books and articles are aware that anyone will be able to read their content. This awareness usually reduces the ethical concerns associated with using public documents. However this kind of content can reflect the biases (for example political biases) of the authors who create it, so the researcher must be aware of this possibility (Linders, 2007).

Finally, after finishing the research process, the data has been stored in a safe space and the ethical guidelines of the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2012) have been honored in the process.

4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In the next part of the thesis, I present my empirical findings of the three major Russian cultural policy documents, along with the discoveries from the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic Charter -and seasonal concert programmes. The interrelated themes in connection to the first research question, the formation of national identity, are identified through thematic analysis. The found themes are validated by introduction of relevant quotes and extracts from the dataset, illustrating the ideological factors of national identity building. The thematic analysis was conducted through the Braun and Clarke (2006) six-step process, which has been more thoroughly presented in the Methodology chapter.

The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part of the chapter, I give a general

overview of the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics season programming structure, by identifying the separate parameters connected to it, based on the information gathered from the organization's official website, *philharmonia.spb.ru*. The second component of the synopsis is the unfolding of the interdependence of the Philharmonic's activities with the authorization of the Russian Ministry of Culture and the dominant state cultural policy. This is conducted through examination of the document Устав федерального государственного бюджетного учреждения культуры “Санкт Петербургская академическая филармония им. Д.Д. Шостаковича” (*Charter of the Federal State Cultural Institution “Saint Petersburg Academic Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich”* (2023)). The second part of the chapter presents the findings of the inductive thematic analysis, identifying the primary themes concerning national identity formation.

The chosen documents for the initial analysis phase are: I) Указ Президента РФ "Об утверждении Основ государственной культурной политики" (The decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On approval of Origins of State Cultural Policy”) (2014), II) Стратегия государственной культурной политики на период до 2030 года (The Strategy of The State Cultural Policy) (2016) and III) Указ Президента РФ "О внесении изменений в Основы государственной культурной политики, утвержденные Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 24 декабря 2014 г." (The decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On amendments to the Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 24, 2014”) (2023). These cultural policy documents are chosen, because they present the socio-cultural atmosphere during Putin's third and fourth presidential terms, including the changes towards hegemonic conservatism, and thus function as concrete evidence of the gradual (but rapid) changes, impacting the activities in the Russian cultural field.

The third part of the chapter provides the results of deductive thematic analysis, based on the found themes of the cultural policy documents, on the concert data of ten Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic season programmes (seasons 2013-2023). By conducting both phases of the thematic analysis I justify the notion of the Russian government's firm grip on the chosen concert organization by demonstrating the connecting links between the Kremlin national identity building agenda and its actualization through the activities of the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic.

4.1 General Findings

4.1.1 General Structure of Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics Season Programming

The Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic hosts annually, approximately 460 cultural events in its two main venues, the Grand Hall -and the Small Hall of Philharmonic. The concerts for greater assemblies, essentially symphonic concerts and other major cultural events, are held in the Grand Hall, while the Small Hall functions as a concert venue for smaller ensembles, typically chamber music performances.

The Philharmonics annual seasonal programming consists of a variety of cultural events, and as a result the organization's concert activities can be divided, based on five separate parameters: *I) Subscription Cycles, II) Other Thematized Concerts, III) Evenings of Creativity and Poetry, IV) International and All-Russian Competitions, and V) International Festivals.*

The Grand Hall functions as the main concert venue for the two house orchestras; the Honorary Collective -and The Academic Symphony Orchestra of the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic. The orchestra's concert activities revolve mostly around parameter *I) Subscription Cycles*. A regular season includes eight to thirteen cycles. The themes of them follow a very specific pattern during the time period, chosen for the Thesis (seasons 2013-2023). The first category of concert cycles considers the two house orchestras, HCP and ASO, and their artistic leaders. They are granted all together three cycles annually and feature works of historical importance to the collectives, conductors or the country. The next set of concert cycles connects to the public education of the concert-goers. In connection to this categorization, there are four to five annual cycles, which regard all age groups, from smaller children and their families to the adult demographic, in their programming. The final concert cycle category varies annually, consisting from one to four cycles. These cycles may consider anniversaries of individual domestic or foreign composers, together with the music of specific musical capital -or period. Parameter no. 2 *Other Thematized Concerts* feature concert-events, which are not connected to the subscription cycles. The concerts are mainly held by visiting domestic and international collectives and artists, while having a certain theme, for example celebration of the Victory Day, at their core. The third parameter *Evenings of Creativity and Poetry*, presents special cultural events, in connection to the

preservation of Russian language and spreading the Ministry of Culture approved cultural contents. These events include performances of domestic intelligentsia, from media personalities to local historians, as well as interpretations of poetry, which has important historical connotations, such as poetry by Ahmatova and Tsvetayeva. Parameter 5 *International Festivals* presents a myriad of cultural events, ranging from the annual Winter Festival “Art Square” and Festival of New Music “Sound Paths” to patriotic festivals, such as “Honorary Citizens of Saint Petersburg”.

The Small Hall hosts concerts by the two house orchestras, chamber orchestra-, ensemble -and artist performances, along with other cultural actors. The Hall also includes parameter no. 1 *Subscription Cycles* as does the Grand Hall. Annually, the hall has from twelve to sixteen cycles. The themes of the cycles remain relatively the same during the ten-year scope for the Thesis. The first category consists of two cycles in connection to anniversaries of, for example, great composers, prominent figures in the Philharmonic and domestic music. The next involves different performance genres, namely chamber-, ensemble-, string-, piano-, vocal -and opera music. The third cycle set, consisting of three to four cycles, considers young children, families and adult listeners. Finally the last group of cycles is more miscellaneous and changes every season. These concerts are usually connected to a specific musical period, music genre (jazz, baroque) or other musical phenomenon. In addition the Small Hall organizes concerts in connection to parameter no. 2 *Other Thematized Concerts*, which feature concerts of domestic and international chamber orchestras and ensembles, in addition to evenings of vocal, folk and jazz music. Furthermore, the annual seasonal programming includes parameter no. 4 *International and All-Russian Competitions*. The competitions consist of first rounds of music competitions, from instrument performance to vocal and opera singing competitions, ranging from Tchaikovsky Cello Competition to “Yelena Obraztsova” Competition for Young Vocalists. (philharmonia.spb.ru).

4.1.2 Connection to State Cultural Policy; The Charter of the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic

The key areas of the organization's activities and societal responsibilities are defined in the *Charter of the Federal State Cultural Institution “Saint Petersburg Academic Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich”* (2011). According to the first article of

the Charter (2011, p. 2) the Philharmonic functions as *“a non-profit organization carrying out professional activities in the field of musical art”*. The organization is subject to the Constitution of Russian Federation, federal laws, as well as the 2011 Charter (Charter; Article 8). The 15th Article, which is divided into four parts, gives a detailed description of the Philharmonic's tasks, which are on all levels tightly connected to the state. The first part of it highlights that the organization *“carries out a state task, formed and approved by the Ministry of Culture”* that are named in the Charter (Charter; Article 15). As a result, the Ministry of Culture, working in unison with the State, decides what kind of activities are conducted in the Philharmonic. The next part concerns the financing of the concert activities. Financial support is given for the *“implementation of the state task...in the form of subsidies from the federal budget”*, which are given in accordance to the Russian legislation by the Ministry of Culture (ibid). Thus funding happens, honoring the current laws and cultural policy directions, made by the Ministry of Culture (and the state). The third part nods to the *“compulsory social insurance”* of the Philharmonic, meaning that the concert activities should mirror the *“state assignment”* and in other words are subjected to the State (ibid). The last part of Article 15 emphasizes the power of the State and the significant nature of the state task: *“The Philharmonic has no right to refuse to fulfill a state task”*.

Next important section, the third in the Charter, relates to the rights and obligations of the Philharmonic. Article 26 a) states that the Philharmonic has a right to *“make an independent choice of artistic and creative directions of their activities, repertoire, independently make decisions on the public performance of concert programs created by the Philharmonic, publication of advertising materials within the limits established by the legislation of the Russian Federation”* (Charter; Article 26). This article is an oxymoron, it starts with a liberal note, offering “free will” in artistic decisions, but in the latter part invalidates it and shows that the current legislation is dominant. Article 26 k) relates to the supervisory power of the Ministry of Culture in the creation of *“branches and open representative offices, as well as make decisions on their reorganization and liquidation”*. And article 26 f) of the Ministry's supremacy in deciding, who can rent the real estate under the Philharmonic, thus managing the filtering of visiting/guest artists, and their programs, wishing to perform in the premises. Finally the fourth section, the Management of the Philharmonic activities, details the responsibilities of the Artistic Director. As stated in Article 29, the Ministry of Culture is in charge of *“appointing and diminishing”* the Artistic Director, who is responsible

for “*the general management of the Philharmonic's activities*”. The 31 Article further clarifies that the Artistic Director possesses an “*unity of command*”, but also “*bears personal responsibility for the fulfillment of the functions assigned to him*”. From the above mentioned article one can understand the unlimited power of the Ministry of Culture in the life of the organization and thus the dictator-like power of the Artistic Director in their position, if they have good relationship with the leading elite (such as the relationship between Temirkanov and Putin). In the case of Temirkanov, the beneficial relations resulted in great access to monetary benefits, as well as a lengthy reign until his death.

The Charter of Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic is seemingly old, considering it was released already in 2011, and has only received one amendment after the introduction of the new Cultural Policy documents, in December 2023. This can be explained by looking into the contents and authors deductions: the chosen articles of the Charter did not need to be revised to convey the dominant directions of the new Cultural Policy, since the cultural activities and production were already subjected to the power of the Ministry of Culture and to the people in close connection to the leading elite. The singular amended factor, thus, remained the division of the role of artistic director into director and chief conductor. This being said, it remains to be seen how the passing of former artistic director Maestro Temirkanov and the division of decision power to two people, affects the Philharmonic's future. My insight tells me that the current people in leading positions in the organization do not have such an established standing in the musical (and political) world. Hence, this may lead to arbitrary planning of the Philharmonic's future activities, which further convey the Kremlin subconscious messages through a musical platform.

4.2 Inductive Thematic Analysis on the Russian State Cultural Policy Documents

In the following section, I introduce the findings of the analysis process. The following themes were discovered during thematic analysis: *I) Proud History and Patriotism, II) Russian Language and Literature, III) Upbringing, IV) Enlightenment, and V) Religion and Spirituality.*

Theme I) Proud History and Patriotism

The Russian government has harnessed the state cultural policy to ensure “priority cultural development” in order to form a unified national identity in the country. The

first chosen document, “The Basics of State Cultural Policy (2014)”, starts very strongly, highlighting the *“historical path of Russia”* as the cornerstone of national identity building, as well as the foundation of national mentality and value basis of the society. The *“unique historical experience”* is deemed to bring together the different peoples of Russia and form the centuries-old Russian statehood. This unifying and ever present entity is also referred to as *“historical consciousness”* of the multinational Russian people. As stated in the introduction of the Basics: *“Throughout Russian history, it was culture that...ensured the unity of the multinational people of Russia, fostered feelings of patriotism and national pride...”* (p. 2). The power of culture in creating a sense of patriotism in the Russian nation and, as a consequence, civil unity in the domestic arena are crucial subconscious influencers that guarantee civic obedience towards the current (and future) regime. However, there are, at least according to the composers of the document, dangerous manifestations of crisis for the Russian future that the cultural policy is prepared to battle. This includes *“deformation of historical memory, a negative assessment of significant periods of national history, the spread of a false idea of the historical backwardness of Russia”* (Basics 2014, p. 2). In the center of this idea is the criticism towards the Great Patriotic War (WWII) and its premises, and other important historical periods, crucial to the common unifying story of Russians. The Kremlin is terrified of the *“atomization of society, the growth of individualism”*, in other words freethinkers that see the truth behind the curtain, which could cause a threat to the existing power status. With all this being stated, the general provisions and goals of the report focus on the preservational power of culture, which includes *“preservation of historical and cultural heritage...transmission from generation to generation of values and norms, traditions, customs and patterns of behavior traditional for the Russian civilization”*(ibid, p. 7). The preservation process of culture also contributes to the *“formation of personality based on the system of values inherent in Russian society”* (ibid, p. 4). As can be sensed from these statements, the historical awareness and feelings of patriotism in people are the core of government led national identity imaginary, which is spread and implemented through culture in its many forms. The Basics is followed in 2016 by “the Strategy of Cultural Policy for the period up to 2030”, which functions as the implementational tool of the goals and objectives of the 2014 document. The strategy presents state and federal target programs in the field of culture, which are aimed at *“strengthening the unity of the Russian nation and harmonizing interethnic relations...”*, and the development of *“patriotic education of*

youth” (Strategy 2016, p. 4-5). In these desires, classical music is given a special standing, as domestic academic music is considered to be *“the national glory and pride of the Russian Federation”* (ibid, p. 5). This notion has historical connotations and especially concerts including works with links to important historical events, such as certain compositions by Shostakovich, Prokofiev and Tchaikovsky etc., are ensured assistance by the state.

Regarding the human crisis threatening the Russian future, the strategy aligns with the Basics by underlining the risks of Russian history falsification, but further defines the means of it: *“Attempts to falsify Russian history, to subject it to revisions, including in order to revise the results of the Second World War, do not stop”* (ibid, p. 10). This can only be fought, according to the Strategy (p. 9), by using culture as a soft power domestically and abroad. The means for protecting the government instrumented view of Russian history, preservation of historical and cultural heritage, formation of *“harmoniously developed personality”* and unity of the society is thus conducted by firm state intervention in the cultural life. In connection to history, this is ensured by *“holding of events dedicated to the celebration at the federal level of memorable dates of the subjects of the Russian Federation and anniversaries of prominent cultural figures”* for example memorial and anniversary concerts (ibid, p. 29). Harnessing a sense of patriotism in citizens is overseen by *“development of military and patriotic education of citizens, increasing the prestige of service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and law enforcement agencies”*, as well as *“perpetuation memory of those who died during the Great Patriotic War”* (ibid, p. 31-32). This includes the popularization of national and military history through cultural means (ibid, p. 32), one of which is specially thematized concerts, for example dedicated to the Victory Day (of WWII).

As the cultural conservation project, led by the government, reaches new spheres, the Basics (2014) has been amended in January 2023. “The Amended Basics of Cultural Policy” added the wording *“all-Russian civic identity”* to the aims of the policy, thus combining all peoples of Russia under one, single nominator, and eliminating possibilities of discord. The new term of all-Russian identity is now also considered to be centuries old and share the same timeline as the historical development of Russian statehood. The previous documents highlighted the importance of historical preservation and now this process also considers the human aspect, in other words, *“preservation and strengthening of the all-Russian civic identity”* (Amended Basics, 2023, p. 3). By

aligning historical consciousness and all-Russian identity as beacons of culture (and being), the government aims to make all diverging customs a threat to national security and especially the unity of Russian society. In the Basics, historical falsification was already named a great threat to the Russian future and even now the preservation of Russian “*historical memory and protecting historical truth*” remains a crucial part of the document's ideology (ibid, p. 7). Thus, cultural institutions (such as philharmonic societies and concert halls) are given a stronger role in historical and cultural education of citizens (ibid, p. 8).

The theme of “Proud History and Patriotism” is firmly linked to the formation of national identity as a major factor in the conservative-authoritarian system. Through the Thesis scope years, the Kremlin has increasingly incorporated the notion of shared history and awakening patriotic pride towards the fatherland into the official cultural policy documents, and continues to do so. In order to unite the vast and multiethnic nation of Russia under one *all-Russian civic identity*, the reinterpretation and straight rewriting of historically significant events, such as the deeds conducted during the Great Patriotic War, have been made by the government. In this process, cultural events have a great role as a soft power, which subconsciously affects the thinking of the citizens. Organizing events that idealize Tsarist and Soviet history, as well as the domestic military, have far reaching effects on the human psyche. Especially citizens, who have no contact to the outside world, are the most influenced, and start believing and absorbing the message sent by the state. As a result, they integrate these factors into their sense of self, and the state goal of “creating” patriotic, historically unified and obedient citizens is reached.

Theme II) Russian Language and Literature

The government has taken into account the adjacent connection between national identity and language, and turned it into one of the most dominant tools of cultural policy. The Basics of Cultural Policy (2014) places Russian language on a pedestal, stating that it possesses “*the key, unifying role in the historical consciousness of the multinational Russian people...the great Russian culture*” (Basics 2014, p. 2). The crucial role of supporting and preserving the Russian language has not been taken lightly by the regime. Measures are taken to improve the “*quality of Russian citizens' knowledge of the Russian language*” as well as securing “*the use of the standard*

Russian literary language in the all-Russian public space and state media” (ibid, p. 11). As a consequence, Russian literature, among other fields of culture, is given a significant role in the country's social processes and progress. By this notion, the document refers to the power of culture in the transferring process of “*moral, ethical and aesthetic values that form the core of national identity*” (ibid, p. 3). Through literature and selection of what kind of literature receives state support, the regime, thus, aims to deliberately mold the thinking processes of the citizens into unified, state-approved consciousness. In order to fulfill this task, the state has started “*expansion of accessibility for citizens of works of classical and modern domestic and world literature...*” (ibid, p. 12). The Russian diaspora, contributing to the *Russkij mir* are also considered as ambassadors of the domestic language and owing to it, public organizations and associations receive support from the state to spread government ideology through the culture and language abroad (ibid, p. 12).

The Strategy (2016) commits to the goals and objectives of the Basics (2014) by implementing state and federal targeted programs for supporting Russian language. These programs include, for example, projects “*increasing the demand for the Russian language and Russian literature abroad*” (Strategy 2016, p. 5). These kinds of programs are directly linked to the prevention of threats to national security, which include “*decrease in the role of the Russian language in the world*” (ibid, p. 7). The diminishing role of Russian abroad also causes the reduction in translating Russian classics and modern literature, thus limiting the access of cultural goods to impressionable foreigners and hence assisting the fall of the country's influence abroad. To prevent this scenario from happening, the state is laying its trust on the Russian compatriots and gives assistance to “*projects aimed at preserving and developing the Russian spiritual, cultural and linguistic environment*” (ibid, p. 28). Domestically, the document acknowledges that to ensure unity of the nation, measures should be made to “*preserve and strengthen the role of the Russian language as a state language and as a language of interethnic communication*” (ibid, p. 9-10). The knowledge of Russian language is highly important for active participation in the society, which despite promises of the possibility of using the peoples language or for example English, remains the only generally used language in the public life. The language skills are also inherent in the state vision for true Russian “*harmoniously developed personality*”, which is the reason for the state cultural policy to ensure “*general education programs in the Russian language*” and create “*conditions and incentives for improving knowledge of the*

Russian literary language” (ibid, p. 31). In the concert organizations this actualizes in including vocal music in Russian language to the programmes, and organizing creative evenings, presenting works of state ideology compliant domestic poets and authors, such as M. Tsvetayeva and A. Ahmatova.

The Amended Basics (2023) has made new additions regarding Russian language and literature. A state order has been formed for creating literature for “*preserving the all-Russian civic identity, counteracting socio-cultural threats and extremism, as well as ensuring quality control of the implementation of this state order*” (Amended Basics 2023, p. 8). In simple words, this paragraph implies that the production of written word is now supplemented to portray state compliant, hegemonic- conservative imageries of the surrounding world, and the regime also supervises the and sensors the results of the creative process. In connection to literary works, the way the language is used in general receives further clarifications. Russian language becomes protected and supported as the Russian state language and the state supervises and ensures the “*compliance with the norms of the modern Russian literary language (including the prevention of obscene language) and counteracting the excessive use of foreign vocabulary*” (ibid, p. 9). As can be deduced from the previous quote, concerning literary creation, the government has taken a stand of a judge of what is “appropriate” literature and use of language in published works. By conducting these sensory measures, the regime simply limits the freedom of speech (including foreign, harmful influence) and expression of the citizens. In the field of domestic academic music, Russian literature is portrayed as a tool for enlightenment: “*Effective use of the unique Russian cultural heritage, including literary, musical... for the purposes of spiritual and moral education of citizens*” (ibid, p. 10). Suitable musical works, with pro-Russian lyrics, texts and poems, compatible for all-Russian civic identity building now take center stage in cultural organizations around the country.

The theme “Russian Language and Literature” amongst the Russian people, and the interrelated connection of any national language with the target nation, is integral to the national identity building of a person. In the Russian cultural policy documents of the Thesis period, the status of Russian language shifts from a humanist role of a connector and common national language, which should be protected, to a tool for spreading the state approved ideologies and extremities. The state has chosen the purist way of presenting Russian language and domestic literature as the beacons of *all-Russian civic*

identity, while strongly diminishing the status of the peoples languages and literature in the country. The dominant presence of the state language is also felt in Russian cultural life. The state approved works of literature, supporting the Kremlin ideology, are ever present in the cultural events. As the public is exposed only to programmes in Russian, by Russian authors and portraying Russian conservative-hegemonic philosophy, it is no wonder that encountering something divergent (Western) starts to feel alien and threatening. Through this unilateral presence of one language, the state ensures that the status of Russian remains unchallenged and, thus, maintains its standing as a unifying element for national identity formation.

Theme III) Upbringing

Education plays a significant role in molding the minds of the younger generations and especially, when knowingly equipped by the regime, in their feelings towards the Fatherland. The Russian government is well aware of this fact and has taken it into consideration in the development of the domestic educational system. In the *The Basics of Cultural Policy* (2014) it has been declared that the unity of education and arts is crucial for the understanding of “*social mission of culture as a tool to transfer to new generations a set of moral, ethical and aesthetic values that form the core of national identity*” (Basics 2014, p. 2-3). To ensure the development of patriotic national identity in the younger demographics, the state has developed targeted children's and youth movements, and educational programs for its implementation. The goal of these programs is, thus, preserving the historical and cultural heritage of Russian people, as well as the “*development and popularization of cultural values*” (ibid, p. 5). In the sphere of cultural organizations, such as philharmonics and concert halls, the state has strengthened their role in “*historical and cultural enlightenment and education*” of children and youth (ibid, p. 10). The focus points in connection to upbringing are tightly connected to family. “*Revival of the traditions of family education*” in addition to raising social status of family by affirming “*traditional family values in the public consciousness*” are ever present in the programming ideology (ibid. p. 13).

The Strategy (2016) presents state and federal target programmes for the actualization of the Basics (2014). In connection to national identity building the most prominent ones include “*Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation for 2016 - 2020*” (Strategy 2016, p. 2). The state ideology compliant educational programs are targeted to combat the so-called manifestations of the humanitarian crisis, especially the “*rupture of*

social ties (friendly, family, neighborly)” and *“the growth of individualism”* (ibid, p. 6). Since “broken families” and refusing to raise a family in general violate the transferring of intergenerational value and norm exchange, the regime has placed its hopes in value-oriented education, which is based on “best domestic traditions”. Cultural institutions are included in the main educational goal of enabling the construction of *“harmoniously developed personality”*. This is conducted by forming concert programmes that spread the “ideal” traditional family values, for example, *“popularizing family dynasties in culture”*, together with *“popularization of the cultural heritage of Russia”* (ibid, p. 30-31).

The Amended Basics (2023) follows the already established view, concerning the obligations that the state cultural policy has regarding upbringing. The main principle of rooting the education on *“traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”* has received continuation with the phrase *“protecting the interests of children”* (Amended Basics 2023, p. 6). This refers to the state assigned responsibility of the educational system, not to spread “propaganda” of diverging family values in the programmes, referring to information about LGBTQ community, which is deemed harmful and corruptive towards the children. Cultural organizations, such as philharmonic societies and concert halls, are given a more powerful status in *“historical and cultural education and upbringing”* of the citizens (ibid, p. 8). This refers to the operational use of *“unique Russian cultural heritage, including literary, musical, artistic, theatrical and cinematic, for the purposes of spiritual and moral education of citizens”*, which includes acquainting families with appropriate domestic and foreign masterpieces of art (ibid. p. 10-11). These measures for influencing and manipulating how a child or a young person sees the world have long term consequences, which is a perceptive decision on the behalf of the state. The mission to “save the Russian people”, in other words molding the thinking processes of the young to fit the needs of those in power, is a deliberate strategy for forming obedient citizens, who will stand by their country no matter what.

The theme “Upbringing”, which focuses on creating a homogenic and patriotic younger generation of Russian citizens, has over the years become a significant part of the national identity building. The cultural policy documents of the thesis scope have a set core beliefs of teaching the children and youth the true Russian values -and way of living, encouraging them to follow the footsteps of their great ancestors. Through the years, the understanding of upbringing has become increasingly conservative, with

ensorship of “harmful” Western ideologies from educational programmes. The shift is not limited to special patriotic educational programmes, but is integrated into the cultural organizations children -and youth education programmes. Only time will tell, if president Putin's 2013 prognostic of creating a new generation of true Russian citizens in fifteen years comes into fruition. However the alarming signs are already in the air, as progressively more children and youth internalize the Z-ideology and join the Yunarmiya, showing to the world what results the carefully planned upbringing programmes can bring.

Theme IV) Enlightenment

Adult education as a method for development of enlightened citizens, relating in a positive manner towards their country and culture is a clear goal of the Russian Cultural Policy. The Basics (2014) has acknowledged “*education and self-education of citizens*” as a substantial part of the campaign against the looming crisis against Russian future. Some of the greatest threats are the “*decrease in the intellectual and cultural level of society*”, as well as “*devaluation of generally recognized values and distortion of value orientations*” (Basics 2014, p. 3). These refer to the growing “harmful” influence of leading a “Western” lifestyle and growth of individualism in Russia. To decrease the hold of the West in the citizens, the state has taken measures to create conditions for enlightenment of the people. Different kinds of state-approved programmes and spectacles, with cultural enlightenment in their core, are actualized in the cultural institutions that have the high aim of “*increasing the intellectual potential of Russian society*” (ibid, p. 17). The cultural organizations, including philharmonics and concert halls, have, thus, received a reinforced role “*in the matter of historical and cultural enlightenment and education*” of citizens of all ages (ibid, p. 10).

The Strategy (2016) shares the ideological principles of the Basics (2014) and functions as its concrete production tool. The Russian government has launched state and federal programmes for the development of “*enlightenment education and self-education of citizens*” (Strategy 2016, p. 4). In order to ensure a successful enlightenment of a person, the cultural organizations are elemental in “*providing citizens with access to knowledge, information and cultural values*” (Ibid, p. 26). This indicates, not only, overall familiarization of the citizens with world and domestic cultural products, but also harnessing culture into the nationalist goals of the state. As a result, the alleged proven form and methods on patriotic education are included in the programming of the

cultural organizations, to subconsciously (and evidently) influence the peoples nationalistic tendencies (Ibid, p. 31).

The Amended Basics (2023) deepens the already officiated, nationalist-based view of the enlightenment activities, facilitated by the state. The main concern, the worry for the intellectual and cultural downfall of the Russian people, remains the core threat, which is fought by enlightenment activities (Amended Basics 2023, p. 3-4). The cultural organizations, philharmonic societies and concert hall roles are further strengthened in “*historical and cultural education*“ of the citizens. The enlightenment programmes are, thus, based on fruitful use of “*the unique Russian cultural heritage, including literary, musical, artistic, theatrical and cinematic, for the purposes of spiritual and moral education of citizens*” (ibid, p. 10). These programmes are carefully crafted and faithfully follow the government dogma. The following of these rules is encouraged by additional financial support. To secure the obedience of the organizations to the dominant government ideology, state grants are made more accessible for organizations, which engage in approved cultural and educational activities (ibid, p. 8).

The theme “Enlightenment” or, in other words, audience education aims to maintain and, if necessary, reproduce the Russian national value orientation in the adult demographic of the citizens. The three cultural policy documents acknowledge the growing need to reincorporate the adults, who have adopted Western thinking -and value models, back into the dominant, state driven conservative value system. The cultural organization led enlightenment programmes, thus, are mainly based on domestic cultural products, which are ideologically motivated to re-establish cohesion in the nation, and subconsciously affect the attendant. As a result, the portrayals of the grand Russian culture and history raise feelings of national pride and unity, which then serve as the particles of the person's national identity building.

Theme V) Religion and Spirituality

National identity building in Russia and other Eastern European countries has a strong connection to religion. Eastern-Orthodoxy, therefore, forms the sacred essence of the identity, which affects the subconscious level of the human mind. The religious and spiritual sphere of identity is also noted by the government in the Basics of Cultural policy (2014). According to the document, orthodoxy has historically played “*a special role in shaping the value system of Russia*”, as well as “*contributed to the formation of*

the national and cultural identity of the peoples of Russia” (Basics 2014, p. 2). As a consequence, culture and cultural activities are viewed, by the conservatist state, as strategic tools for preserving, transmitting and popularizing these ideology-compliant *spiritual values*. The “*spiritual sphere*”, thus acts, not only as a “*system of ideas about the world and man, about human society and human relations...*”, but also of values and hierarchy (Ibid, p. 5). The reinforcement of the idea of hierarchical system, where the government, together with the Church work in harmony, holding an almost divine level of power, contributes to the conscious influencing and modification of the citizens' spiritual and moral values to mirror the ones of their superiors.

The Strategy (2016) presents the processes for the realization of the Basics (2014) goals and for confronting domestic and foreign threats against Russian spiritual and moral values. The most prominent omens in the cultural field are named the “*erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values*” and “*religious intolerance*” (Strategy 2016, p. 6-7). Domestically, these threats are faced by formation of “*socially significant cultural projects based on traditional spiritual values*”, which are conducted by all-Russian organizations and movements (ibid, p. 41). In the classical music organizations these projects include concerts, featuring Orthodox Church and other spiritual music, as well as concerts celebrating traditional Russian holidays, such as Easter and Russian Christmas. The threats, towards the traditional spiritual rights of the Russian people abroad, have also received countering measures. For protecting the rights of the Russian compatriots to “*preserve traditional spiritual and moral values*” and, thus the livelihood of the *Russkij mir*, the state offers assistance to organizations “*in the implementation of projects aimed at preserving and developing the Russian spiritual, cultural and linguistic environment*” (ibid, p. 28). These projects promote the strengthening and expansion of Russian influence abroad through culture, in addition to further escalating the Russian sovereignty goals.

The Amended Basics (2023) puts additional emphasis on the essential role of traditional Russian spirituality in the formation of the *all-Russian civic identity*. The Russian spiritual and moral values are depicted here as a system, creating domestic cohesion: “*uniting the original cultures of the multinational people of the Russian Federation*” (Amended Basics 2023, p. 2). The common value basis connects citizens of very different cultural backgrounds, thus ensuring civic unity and protection of national interests. One of the main interests of cultural policy is now named as the formation of a Russian person, who is “*moral, socially responsible, independently*

thinking, creative person who shares the traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” (ibid, p.2). The document draws a picture of a crisis, threatening the inherent Russian value basis, which equips the state to react to the threat by taking calculated measures to strengthen the *all-Russian civic identity* and ensure “*interethnic and interreligious peace and harmony*” (ibid, p. 6). These measures include giving priority state support to cultural activities and events, which promote the preservation and popularization of the *traditional Russian spiritual, moral and family values* (ibid, p. 11). The activities and events are subjected to thorough state led quality control by censoring programmes, which might portray psychologically impactful content “*aimed at the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values*” (ibid, p. 12). This has led to the, quite rapid, disappearance of state ideology, divergent cultural events and, as a consequence, given room for the *harmoniously developed personality, the all-Russian civic identity, to truly develop*.

The theme “Religion and Spirituality” highlights the traditional relationship of Russian people and the Church, as well as the orthodox spiritual value-basis they are deemed to conventionally possess. The cultural policy documents begin with references to Eastern-orthodoxy as the connector and key component of the collective national identity, but to be more inclusive to the peoples of Russia, gradually move to the term of interreligious harmony. This is a sign on the state's behalf of acknowledgement for the need of interethnic cohesion, which cannot afford to exclude large demographics of the Russian nation, because of difference in religions. As a result the common nominator is chosen to be the All-Russian spiritual and moral values, which can fluctuate to fit the states needs. Even though the documents aim to appear inclusive, the reality is that the Orthodox Church, with the Putin-affiliated Father Kirill, has the dominant status as the nation's spiritual leader. This is also reflected in the cultural offerings in Russia, which predominantly portray orthodox music and thematics in the programmes, making the church visible in the sphere and, thus by that affecting the spirito-moral orientations of the citizens.

4.3 Deductive Thematic Analysis on the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic Season Programmes, during seasons 2013-14 to 2022-2023.

In the deductive analysis-section, I present the findings from the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics seasonal programming. The concerts have first been divided into the

themes discovered during the inductive thematic analysis: *I) Proud History and Patriotism, II) Russian Language and Literature, III) Upbringing, IV) Enlightenment, and V) Religion and Spirituality*. Secondly, inside each thematic category, the various concert-activities have been divided, based on five parameters: *I) Subscription Cycles, II) Other Thematized Concerts, III) Evenings of Creativity and Poetry, IV) International and All-Russian Competitions, and V) International Festivals*.

4.3.1 Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic Season Programmes from 2013-14 to 2022-23, by the Thematic Categories, presenting Table 1

The numerical data, collected from the target organizations season programmes during 2013-14 to 2022-23 are composed and presented in Table 1. (see Table 1.)

The upper line is dedicated to the individual concert seasons (autumn and spring). Under the Seasons cell, the other cells indicate the thematic categories. Each category includes three cells: the upper cell portrays the number of concerts under the given theme, the middle cell indicates the percentage of the thematic group in comparison with all concerts -and the lowest cell the percentage of the thematic group compared with other thematic groups. The bottom line presents all concerts of the season, counted together. Each thematic group is given a shortening. They are: HP is Proud History and Patriotism-, RL Russian Language and Literature-, UB Upbringing-, EN Enlightenment, -and R&S Religion and Spirituality. In addition, in the lower half of the table is “Them”, which indicates all thematized concerts, counted together and their percentage of all concerts, as well as “Other”, which is uncategorized concerts and their percentage of all concerts. In order to clarify the emergence of new state cultural policy documents and the corona years, together with their situationing in the concert seasons, I have color-coded certain cells from the Seasons column. Season 2014-15 is coded light blue, indicating the release of the New Basics of State Cultural Policy (2041). Season 2016-17 with the publication of the Strategy of State Cultural Policy (2016) is painted light green. The seasons affected by the Coronavirus (2019-20 to 2021-22) are marked red. The final season (2022-23), with the emergence of the Amended Basics of the State Cultural Policy (2023), is color-coded green.

Table 1.

**Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic Season Programmes from 2013-14 to 2022-23,
by the Thematic Categories**

Seasons	2013 -14	2014 -15	2015 -16	2016 -17	2017 -18	2018 -19	2019 -20	2020 -21	2021 -22	2022 -23
HP	192	203	225	200	229	197	152	187	232	264
HP %	39	44	46	42	43	45	44	45	51	51
HP % T	57	62	63	60	60	62	60	66	69	68
RL	62	38	38	50	62	35	33	53	49	52
RL %	13	8	8	10	12	8	9	13	11	10
RL % T	18	11	11	15	16	11	13	19	14	14
UB	40	55	56	56	58	60	44	24	26	38
UB %	8	12	12	12	11	14	12	6	6	7
UB % T	12	16	16	16	15	19	18	8	8	8
EN	18	27	25	25	29	20	20	17	22	24
EN %	4	6	5	5	5	5	6	4	5	5
EN % T	5	8	7	7	8	6	8	6	7	7
R&S	28	9	11	7	5	6	3	4	7	10
R&S %	6	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
R&S % T	8	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	2	3
Them.	340	329	355	331	383	318	252	285	336	388
Them %	69	72	73	70	72	73	72	69	74	75
Other	150	131	130	139	149	119	97	126	117	132
Other %	31	28	27	30	28	27	28	31	26	25
All	493	463	485	477	532	440	349	411	453	520

Source: Data, gathered from philharmonia.spb.ru web site.

To further explain the logic behind the numeral data in the table, I give two formulaic examples.

I) All concert percentages (middle cells inside the thematic categories and other %) make a hundred percent: $HP \% + RL\% + UB\% + EN\% + R\&S + Other\% = 100\%$. For example, Season 2013-14: $39\% + 13\% + 8\% + 4\% + 6\% + 30\% = 100\%$.

II) Thematized concerts (lower cells inside the thematic categories) make a hundred percent: $HP\%T + RL\%T + UB\%T + EN\%T + R\&S\%T = 100\%$. For example, Season 2013-14: $56\% + 18\% + 12\% + 5\% + 8\% = 100\%$.

Table 1. shows that during the thesis scope seasons (2013-14 to 2022-23) the division of the two diverging programmes; the thematized, Russian national identity building affiliated programmes, and the other, non-thematized programmes, presenting predominantly Western works, witnessed a transparent shift. The thematized concerts rose by six percent, while the other concert, consequently, lowered by the same percentage. This indicates the strong connection between the state cultural policy and classical music organization, Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, as well as the direct interference of the Kremlin national identity agenda with the concert programming. The findings, presented in numeral form in Table 1., in addition to the actualization and the results of this process are further explained in the following subchapter 4.3.2.

4.3.2 Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics Season Programming Findings

I) Proud History and Patriotism

The theme “Proud History and Patriotism”, which numeral data is presented in Table 2., shows that it is the largest thematic category during the thesis scope of 2013-14 to 2022-23.

Table 2. Proud History and Patriotism

Seasons	2013 -14	2014 -15	2015 -16	2016 -17	2017 -18	2018 -19	2019 -20	2020 -21	2021 -22	2022 -23
Concerts	192	203	225	200	229	197	152	187	232	264
Percentage of All Concerts	39	44	46	42	43	45	44	45	51	51
Percentage of Thematized Concerts	57	62	63	60	60	62	60	66	69	68

Source: Data, gathered from philharmonia.spb.ru web site.

The category commits to the state goal of sustaining cultural visitors' historical memory and harnessing their sense of patriotism, through concert programming. The programmes can be divided into two subcategories; the patriot-historical -and the anniversary. The following section sets light into the contents of the season programming, and is based on four parameters. The first parameter “*Subscription cycles*” takes place in both the Grand -and Small Halls. During the thesis scope 15 subscription cycles were organized in the Grand Hall and 8 cycles in the Small Hall. In the Grand Hall, the first group of cycles is dedicated to the two resident orchestras HCP and ASO, as well as their artistic directors. These include no. 1 “Yuri Temirkanov and His Orchestra”, no. 3 “1st Symphony Orchestra in Russia” and no. 4 “Alexander Dmitriev and His Orchestra”, later renamed “Academic Symphony Orchestra of the Philharmonic”. The second group consists of anniversary cycles, which honor the history of the Philharmonic, as well as the patriotic-historical events of the country. These are no. 2 “Music of Revolution. Two Colors of Time” (2017-18), which is dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the October revolution, and succeeded by

“Memories of the Grand Hall” (2018-19 to 2019-20), which celebrates the 180th anniversary of the Dvoryansky Hall. Furthermore, cycle honoring the “75th Anniversary of Complete Liberation of Leningrad from Fascist Siege” (2018-19), and cycles celebrating the organization: “Philharmonic-100. History in the Mirror of Decades” (2020-21 to 2021-22), “Russian and Foreign Ensembles, to the 100th Anniversary of the Philharmonic” (2020-21 to 2021-22) and “Philharmonic from Creation of the World” (2021-22), belong to the anniversary subcategory. The third group contains anniversary cycles, honoring both great Russian and international composers. These are, in chronological order, no. 2 “Tchaikovsky. Six Meetings” (2014-15 to 2015-16), continuing with “Dvorak and...” (2016-17), and “Rahmaninov. Pages of Diary” (2022-23), in addition to no. 13 “Beethoven +” (2019-20 to 2020-21) and cycle “Skryabin, Prometheus of Russian Music” (2021-22). In the Small Hall, cycle no. 12 is dedicated to the Philharmonic artists, called “Artists of the Philharmonic in Ensemble and as Soloists” (2016-17 to 2022-23). The other cycles are devoted to the anniversaries of prominent figures of Russian and international musical arena. Two cycles are dedicated to maestro Temirkanov; no. 1 “Happy Birthday, Maestro (2013-14) and “Offering to Maestro” (2018-19). The cycle, honoring international composers was first called “Anniversaries”, later becoming no. 2 “In the Circle of Great Names” (2013-14 to 2022-23). Finally, during the last season (2022-23) Russian jazz was celebrated with cycle no. 6 “100th Anniversary of Russian Jazz” and the 30th anniversary of Divertimento with cycle no. 7 “Better and Newer. Chamber Orchestra Divertimento”. The second parameter “*Other Thematic Concerts*” refers to the concert-events that are connected to the theme “Proud History and Patriotism”, and subtheme “Anniversaries” but are not a part of the subscription cycles. The annual patriotic concert programmes include approximately nine events. The celebratory -and memorial concerts feature works from Soviet composers of the War years and consist predominantly of four themes. The celebration of Victory in the Great Patriotic War (GPW) and honoring the GPW veterans, dedication concerts for the honorary citizens of Saint-Petersburg, the annual anniversaries of Total Liberation of Leningrad from the Fascist Siege, and “Yellow Stars” memorial-concerts of the Holocaust victims. The Anniversary concert-events, which take place outside of the subscription cycles, include memorial concerts of famous Russian cultural figures, such as, composers Rimski-Korsakov, Tchaikovsky, Gavrilin and Slonimsky, as well as important figures of the Russian literature and poetry scene, namely Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Ahmatova and Tsvetayeva.

The fourth parameter “*International and All-Russian Competitions*” includes a wide array of classical music competitions. They incorporate performance competitions from the International Tchaikovsky -to the Chopin Competition, in addition to composition competitions, for example, the Andrei Petrov Competition and the All-Russian Shostakovich Competition.

The fifth parameter “*International Festivals*” features concerts from domestic and international ensembles and stars, presenting versatile programmes from Russian and Western symphonic-,opera -and military music masterpieces to new music and jazz. The festivals, notably, include the annual International Winter Festival “Art Square”, International Festival “Admiralty Music”, festival “Petersburg Musical Spring” and International Festival “From Avantgarde to Our Days”.
(philharmonia.spb.ru).

According to the findings on Table 2. the theme “Proud History and Patriotism” witnessed a gradual, as well as significant growth, in all aspects, during the ten-year thesis scope. The concert amounts increased by 72 concerts and twelve percent in comparison with all other concerts. This serves as concrete evidence that the thematic category serves as an integral part of the Russian national identity formation. In the Basics (2014) the importance of *historical consciousness* and “*fostering feelings of patriotism and national pride*” in the citizens was already acknowledged (Basics, p. 2). As a result, the Strategy of 2016 launched special targeted state and federal programmes, aiming to unify the multiethnic Russian nation by presenting and enforcing the parts of history, which are appropriate for raising a sense of national unity, as well as patriotic feelings towards the Fatherland. The existence of these programmes is perceptible in the SPBP season programming, as multiple subscription cycles and thematic concerts are subjected to portray these ideals. The interconnectedness of the hegemonic-conservative ideology and the target cultural organization can, thus, be proven by the analysis of the data.

Theme II) Russian Language and Literature

The theme “Russian Language and Literature”, which numeral data is presented in Table 3., shows that it is the second largest thematic category during the thesis scope of 2013-14 to 2022-23.

Table 3. Russian Language and Literature

Seasons	2013 -14	2014 -15	2015 -16	2016 -17	2017 -18	2018 -19	2019 -20	2020 -21	2021 -22	2022 -23
Concerts	62	38	38	50	62	35	33	53	49	52
Percentage of All Concerts	13	8	8	10	12	8	9	13	11	10
Percentage of Thematized Concerts	18	11	11	15	16	11	13	19	14	14

Source: Data, gathered from philharmonia.spb.ru web site.

The category promotes the presumption of national language -and identity being reciprocally connected and in a sense synonymous entities. The government acknowledges the fact, and aspires to reach the set goal of protecting and developing the domestic language and literature scene, through considerate concert planning. The SPBP programmes, dedicated to the theme are divided into four parameters.

The first parameter “*Subscription cycles*” takes place in the Small Hall and consists of two cycles, which both feature Russian and foreign artists, performing vocal -and opera music. The annual cycle no. 2 “*Evenings of Vocal Music*” is dedicated to Russian romance, songs -and folk songs, as well as opera arias, while cycle no. 6 “*Destinies and Roles*”, which after a couple of renamings became “*Music. Invisible Connector of Time*” (2013-14 to 2021-22) focuses mainly on opera music. The Russian composers, whose vocal music is mostly performed during the cycles are Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Rahmaninov and Sviridov.

The second parameter “*Other Thematic Concerts*” incorporates two historical poetry and literature spectacles by Russian authors, in addition to vocal music, outside of the subscription system. The first spectacle, “*Unknown Friend*” by Ivan Bunin (2016-17 to 2021-22) is narrated by famous Russian actress Kseniya Rappoport. The performances portray 20th century poetry by Tsvetayeva, Ahmatova, Gumilyov and Blok, as well as literature excerpts from works by Bulgakov, Harms and Brodsky. The second spectacle, called “*1926*” features performances, based on the overall theme of correspondence between Tsvetayeva, Pasternak and Rilke. Along with the spectacles, the International

Music Academy of the esteemed vocal pedagogue Yelena Obraztsova presents evenings of vocal music, giving the stage to the young talented students of the academy.

The third parameter “*Evenings of Creativity and Poetry*” presents cultural events in the Russian language and aims to increase accessibility of the citizens to domestic literary language -and literary works. *Evenings of Creativity* consist of individual programmes by the domestic cultural intelligentsia, presented in the mono-spectacle medium. The featured guests include, among others, bard Alexander Gorodnitsky, historian Edvard Radzinsky, journalist Vladimir Pozner and actor Konstantin Raykin.

Evenings of Poetry presents domestic poetry and literature-themed events. The evenings are dedicated to Russian literary works, incorporating the values necessary for Kremlin-lead national identity building. These include the works, written during the Leningrad Siege, by Tsvetayeva, Ahmatova and Mandelstam, in addition to the Russian classic poetry and literature by Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy.

The fourth parameter “*International and All-Russian Competitions*” promotes Russian language and vocal music works through classical singing competitions. During the thesis scope, four vocal competitions were organized. They incorporate the International Shtokolov Vocal Competition, International Festival-Competition “Three Centuries of Classical Romance”, and two competitions, honoring legendary vocal pedagogue Yelena Obraztsova; International Yelena Obraztsova Competition for Young Vocalists and International Yelena Obraztsova Competition for Young Opera Singers.

(philharmonia.spb.ru).

According to the findings, presented in Table 3. the number of the concerts under the theme “Russian Language and Literature” has remained relatively steady, changing between eight and thirteen percent of all concerts, during the thesis scope. The changes have been caused by the inconsistent amount of creative -and poetry evenings, and vocal competitions, which both were not organized each season. During the last season (2022-23) the percentage reached the medium, ten percent in comparison with other seasons, still making the thematic category the second largest of the themes. The strong standing among other thematic groups functions as affirmation that Russian vocal music, as well as the state ideology-abiding domestic literary works, are worthy of attention, when it comes to formation of national identity. The Basics (2014) highlights the power of common (Russian) language as a connector of the multi-ethnic Russian people, the force of which is then harnessed in the Strategy (2016) with the emergence

of the state target programs, supporting the language. The third parameter “*Evenings of Creativity and Poetry*” in the SPBP programming can be interpreted as a part of the targeted programming. As a continuation and result, the principally one-sided portrayals of languages in the organizational programming (as foreign vocal music is often translated into Russian), the musical tradition, together with the influence of the cultural policy orientations, produces images of a hegemonic language for a unified nation.

Theme III) Upbringing

The theme “Upbringing”, which numeral data is presented in Table 4., shows that it is the third largest thematic category during the thesis scope of 2013-14 to 2022-23.

Table 4. Upbringing

Seasons	2013 -14	2014 -15	2015 -16	2016 -17	2017 -18	2018 -19	2019 -20	2020 -21	2021 -22	2022 -23
Concerts	40	55	56	56	58	60	44	24	26	38
Percentage of All Concerts	8	12	12	12	11	14	12	6	6	7
Percentage of Thematized Concerts	12	16	16	16	15	19	18	8	8	8

Source: Data, gathered from philharmonia.spb.ru web site.

The category is dedicated to the cultural education and, at the same time, national identity building of Russian children and youth. The state ideology, with the emphasis on familiarizing the younger generation with the domestic cultural heritage and adopting the inherent Russian values in the process, is conducted through targeted educational programmes. The SPBP, as a state-funded institution, partakes in the spreading of government agenda in their seasonal programming. This thematic category incorporates two parameters; I) *Subscription Cycles* and II) *Other Thematic Concerts*.

The first parameter “*Subscription cycles*” consists annually of approximately six concert cycles, which are hosted by leading Russian musicologists and presenters.

The cycles are divided into five subcategories; I) *Story-based Programmes*, II)

Introduction to Musical Instruments and Performance Tradition, III) *Introduction to*

Musical Eras -, Countries -, Genres -and Forms, IV) Introduction to World Composers, and *V) Introduction to Russian Composers and Their Works.* In addition, inside the subcategories, the subscription cycles are divided by hall and target audience.

The first subcategory of *Story-based programmes* consists of three subscription cycles. The category is based on programmatic music, such as world and Russian fairy tales, as well as thematic music, appropriate for younger listeners. In the Grand Hall, cycle, no. 12 “Childrens Scenes” is meant for family audiences and takes place during nine seasons. In the Small Hall, two cycles are targeted to younger children. These are cycles no. 13 “Great Music for Younger Children” (2013-14, 2022-23) -and no. 12 “Visiting a Fairytale” (2015-16, 2019-20). The second subcategory *Introduction to Musical Instruments and Performance Tradition* comprises two subscription cycles, both of which are taking place in the Small Hall -and targeted for younger children. The first cycle, no. 12 “Who is Playing on What ?” (2014-15, 2018-19, 2020-22), familiarizes the younger audience with musical instruments, from orchestral instruments to piano and voice. Firmly connected to the previous cycle, the second cycle no. 14 “We are Musicians” (2017-18 to 2018-19) focuses on performance tradition with concerts, presenting different ensembles, among which are string quartet, choir and orchestra of Russian traditional instruments. The third subcategory *Introduction to Musical Eras -, Countries -, Genres -and Forms* includes four subscription cycles. In the Grand Hall, two cycles are organized for youth and family audiences, which consist of different genres and styles, from symphonic masterpieces to film music. Both subscription cycles are organized for nine seasons. Cycle no. 10 “Concerts in Tailcoats and Jeans” is customized for the youth -and cycle, no. 11 “Concerts for the Whole Family”, for family-audiences. Additionally, the Small Hall presents two subscription cycles, meant for children. Cycle no. 13 “Magical Hours of Music” (2013-14 to 2017-18) concentrates on musical forms and genres, such as opera and aria, and cycle no. 15 “Musical Cruise across Europe” (2015-16, 2019-20 to 2020-21) musical eras -and countries. The fourth subcategory *Introduction to World Composers* serves the audience portraits of Russian and world composers, as well as their music, from Baroque era with Bach and Vivaldi to the 21st century Russian works by Shostakovich and Sviridov. The category consists of two subscription cycles, which take place in the Small Hall. Both cycles have been organized for six seasons; cycle no. 14 “Six Naughty Boys, who became Great Composers” is targeted for children and cycle no. 16 “Popular Melodies and Their Creators” for the whole family. The fifth subcategory *Introduction to Russian*

Composers and Their Works is part of the patriotic educational programmes, initiated by the state. The category follows the same ideology as the previous subcategory, but focuses solely on Russian composers and their works. The category comprises one cycle, which is meant for the whole family. It is cycle no. 16 “Through the Pages of Russian Classic Masterpieces”, which is in the final season renamed no. 15 “Great Names of Saint-Petersburg. From Golden Age to Our Days”, focusing on the local composer's creation. The programmes include, among others, works by Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Prokofiev and Dunayevsky.

The second parameter “*Other Thematic Concerts*” involves the interactive, fairytale-themed new years concerts, which are intended for younger audiences. The concerts take place during six seasons (2014-15 to 2019-20) in the Small Hall. The featured spectacles include both Western and Russian storylines, from “Nils Holgersson” on music by Shaisky to “New Years Adventures with Masha and Vita” and Gladkovs music.

(philharmonia.spb.ru).

According to the findings, presented in Table 4. the theme “Upbringing” experienced noteworthy growth before the beginning of the corona restrictions (spring 2020). The number of concerts rose during seasons 2013-14 and 2018-19 by 20 concerts and six percent in comparison with all concerts, and most likely would have continued to rise, if the corona virus had not taken place. The clear increase of the thematic category served as a result of the new Basics of Cultural Policy (2014) and the connecting Strategy document (2016), the educational agenda of which was effectively executed in the Philharmonics season programming. After the Covid-19 restrictions were lifted in season 2022-23, the concert amounts returned to almost the same level (7 percent of all concerts) as in the first thesis scope season (2013-14), with 38 concerts. The progression of the Philharmonics season planning can be explained by looking into the state cultural policy reports. In the Basics (2014), classical music organizations were given a strengthened role in the historical, cultural and patriotic education of the younger generation, which is deemed to positively impact their national identity formation (Basics 2014, p. 10). The executional tools for its actualization are named, in the Strategy (2016), as special state and federal target programmes, which in the Philharmonics activities are realized through the above mentioned subscription cycles. These crafted cycles, portraying predominantly “unique Russian cultural heritage”

through classical music, are considered beneficial for the purpose of “moral education of citizens” (Amended Basics 2023, p. 10-11). By participating in the Kremlin initiated national identity building project, the Philharmonic knowingly gives new “purpose” to the most humanist form of art. The outcome of needing to follow through with the decision is ultimately shaping the influential children and youth into a new type of Russian individual, devoid of Western sympathies and truly patriotic and putinist.

Theme IV) Enlightenment

The theme “Enlightenment”, which numeral data is presented in Table 5., shows that it is the fourth and second smallest thematic category during the thesis scope of 2013-14 to 2022-23.

Table 5. Enlightenment

Seasons	2013 -14	2014 -15	2015 -16	2016 -17	2017 -18	2018 -19	2019 -20	2020 -21	2021 -22	2022 -23
Concerts	18	27	25	25	29	20	20	17	22	24
Percentage of All Concerts	4	6	5	5	5	5	6	4	5	5
Percentage of Thematized Concerts	5	8	7	7	8	6	8	6	7	7

Source: Data, gathered from philharmonia.spb.ru web site.

The category focuses on the national identity formation process of the Russian adult demographic. State-led cultural audience education contains the mission to diminish the possible individualistic tendencies of the adult citizens by reverting them back to the inherent Russian conservative hegemonic value system, through enlightenment programmes. In this end goal, Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic has a prolific role, as a governmental organization, which is engineered in their concert activities. The Philharmonics programmes can be divided into two parameters; *I) Subscription Cycles* and *II) Other Thematic Concerts*.

The first parameter “*Subscription Cycles*” comprises approximately three cycles annually. In the Grand Hall, four subscription cycles were organized during the

thesis scope. Two of the subscription cycles, no. 7 “Philharmonic Fridays” (2013-14 to 2014-15) and no. 9 “Guide to Classics” (2013-14 to 2019-20, 2022-23) serve as introductory platforms to symphonic music, through different eras, genres, forms and styles. The cycles are led by the resident orchestras HCP and ASO, who interpret both Western and domestic masterpieces from Mozart's Requiem to Rimski-Korsakov Scheherazade. Creating a connection between the audience, musicians, as well as performed works is also a part of the audience outreach. Cycle no. 8 “Musical Meetings” (2015-16 to 2016-17) is created to harness this relationship with thematic concerts, interpreting, among others, masterpieces of Russian opera by Glinka and Tchaikovsky, in addition to music by Bach family and symphonic images by Lyadov and Rimski-Korsakov. The final subscription cycle, held in the Grand Hall, is a collaboration project between the Hermitage, and later Russian Museum, and the Philharmonic. Cycle 8 “Dialogues about Art”. The thematic concerts are connected to the paintings of the exhibition, presenting a montage from French music and Province paintings to Romantic, to domestic and foreign music of the machine with paintings by Matisse and Kandinsky. During the final season, the cycle is renamed “Dialogues about Russian Art”, receiving a clear patriotic undertone. The programmes partner Russian art with Russian symphonic masterpieces by, among others, Tchaikovsky, Rahmaninov, Skryabin and Prokofiev. In the Small Hall two subscription cycles were organized during 2023-14 and 2022-23. The first cycle no. 5 “Music for the Soul” (2017-18, 2019-20 to 2021-22) offers the listeners versatile and at the same time easily approachable and touching music. In the concerts music from different musical eras, to Russian folk -and ballet music, in addition to jazz and cinema music is portrayed in the programmes. The second cycle no. 10 “I love Orchestra” (2013-14 to 2022-23) introduces the audience with a parade of Russian orchestras. These include, among others, ensembles focusing on I) domestic music, with patrio-historic connotations; Russian Concert Orchestra and Admiralty Orchestra of Leningrad Naval Base, II) Russian traditional music; Chamber Orchestra of Folk Instruments of the Saint Petersburg State Institute of Culture “Skomorokhi”, and III) both Russian and foreign academic music; Youth Chamber Orchestras as HCP and ASO.

The second parameter “*Other Thematic Concerts*” consists of two enlightenment projects, held in the Grand Hall: the annual “Night of the Museums” -and “Readings with Meaning”. The “Night of the Museums” (2013-14 to 2022-23) is an annual

concert marathon, which is part of the Petersburg White Nights festivities. The one evening and night long concert series is an accessible way of familiarizing the newer audiences with a wide array of music, from classic repertoire to Jazz and new music. The “Readings with Meaning” project (2020-21 to 2022-23) connects famous writers, artists, theater and film directors and audiences who are starting their journey in art. The project connects prose with music interpreted by ASO, and functions as a thought awakening journey, where the collective meanings of the two mediums raise the understanding of the audience about the sometimes hidden meanings of art. The events are based on the Irada Bergs philosophic prose, which has patriotic undertones, presenting, for instance, thematics of voluntary servitude to a greater cause (the fatherland). The, evidently, state-led ideology is mirrored on symphonic music from Baroque to Soviet eras. (philharmonia.spb.ru).

According to the findings, presented in Table 5. the theme “Enlightenment” has remained almost at the same level during the thesis scope. The amount of concerts has risen by a percent in comparison with all concerts, and the change can be explained by a small, but gradual growth in connection to the three state cultural policy reports. The Basics (2014) acknowledges that music is a useful medium in influencing the citizens attitude towards the fatherland and, especially raising feelings of patriotism. As a consequence cultural institutions, such as the Philharmonic, have a highly influential position in the national identity formation of all age groups. The growth, which is experienced, especially the following seasons of the release of the respective cultural policy documents (2014, 2016), is due to the special state target programmes, emphasizing the “*enlightenment education and self-education of citizens*” (Strategy 2016, p. 4). The programmes are executed in the Philharmonic with the subscription cycles, as well as the two enlightenment projects, which harness domestic cultural heritage to maintain and even mass produce Kremlin approved ideals, and as an end goal influence the inherent value-orientation of the audiences.

Theme V) Religion and Spirituality

The theme “Religion and Spirituality”, which numeral data is presented in Table 6. is the fifth and smallest thematic group during the thesis scope of 2013-14 to 2022-23.

Table 6. Religion and Spirituality

Seasons	2013 -14	2014 -15	2015 -16	2016 -17	2017 -18	2018 -19	2019 -20	2020 -21	2021 -22	2022 -23
Concerts	28	9	11	7	5	6	3	4	7	10
Percentage of All Concerts	6	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2
Percentage of Thematized Concerts	8	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	2	3

Source: Data, gathered from philharmonia.spb.ru web site.

The category focuses on the religio-spiritual component of the national identity formation process. Eastern-Orthodoxy is given by the government a special standing in shaping the citizens' value system, and through this accepting, without questions, the hierarchical power relations between the state and the subject. The Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic is a part of these proceedings, by organizing concerts, which focus on spiritual and orthodox music. The target organization's programmes include four parameters.

The first parameter “*Subscription Cycles*” consists of two cycles during the thesis scope, which are organized in the Small Hall. The first, cycle no. 11 “*Evening of Spiritual music*” (2013-14) is dedicated to sacred vocal music and partakes in the mission to revive Russian spiritual traditions. The programmes portray predominantly domestic spiritual choral music, from traditional chants to spiritual cantatas by composers, such as Grechaninov, Taneyev, Tchaikovsky and Sviridov. The second, cycle no. 6 “*Unbanned Songs*” (2015-16) continues the ideological mission of the previous cycle. The programmes consist of spiritual choral works, which are performed by the Chamber Choir of the Smolny Cathedral. They include, for instance, “*Liturgy*” by Tchaikovsky, *Choir Concerts* by Schnittke, as well as works by Bortnyansky, Sviridov and Desyatnikov.

The second parameter “*Other Thematic Concerts*” is divided into following four subcategories; *I) Anniversaries, II) Charity Concerts, III) Holiday Concerts* and *IV) Other Sacred Concerts*.

The first subcategory of *Anniversaries* celebrates the jubilees of important places of worship, in addition to historical figures and composers, in connection to Orthodox faith. These include the 300th anniversary of the Holy Trinity Monastery and 25th celebration of Smolny Cathedral, in addition to jubilees of Tsar Peter the Great, Saint Alexander Nevsky and monastery reformer Sergei of Radonezh, together with composers of sacred music Pleshak and Sviridov.

The second subcategory *Charity Concerts* (2013-14 to 2014-15) raises funds for helping sick children. The events consist of the fourth and fifth concert, honoring Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker, who is considered the paragon for Santa Claus, with the Saint Petersburg Mitropoly Choir performing Russian spiritual music.

The third subcategory *Holiday Concerts* consists of the concert-events, celebrating the two major Church holidays, Easter and Christmas. Easter festivities feature great spiritual works, such as the All-night Vigil by Rahmaninov, “Seven Last Words of Christ” by Gubaidulina and Easter Oratory “Farewell Hour in Jerusalem” for children, as well festive Easter chants by Bortnyansky, Tchaikovsky, Grechaninov and Sviridov. The works are performed by the Chamber Choir of Smolny Cathedral, Men's Chorus “Optina Pustyn”, Saint Petersburg Concert Choir and Melodi Choir. The second Church holiday, Christmas, is met with both Western and Russian spiritual music, interpreted by the Men's Chorus “Optina Pustyn”, Chamber Choir “Rossika” and Children's Choir Saint Petersburg Television and Radio.

The fourth subcategory *Other Sacred Concerts* consists of both spiritual instrumental and choir music. These include performances by Konevets-quartet, playing spiritual instrumental music, The Monastery Choir of Thirteen Assyrian Fathers interpreting Georgian Church songs, Saint Petersburg Concert Choirs performances of choral works by Rahmaninov, Shostakovich and Schedrin, along with Choir of the Clergy of the Saint-Petersburg Metropolitana version of Malevich Oratory “Sufferer until Calvary”.

The two events of the fourth parameter “*International Competitions*” are organized during Easter time. The 2nd International Composition Competition of Spiritual Choir Music “Roman the Sweet Songwriter” takes place during the Bright Week of 2014 and the Festival Competition “Slavic Spring”, featuring Yekimov-Bodrov-Tanonovs choral work “Easter Triptych”, in 2021.

The fifth parameter “*International and All-Russian Festivals*” comprises three festivals. The International Festival “Academy of Orthodox Music” occurs during

Easter. The spiritual programmes are connected to honoring the Orthodox Church declared Saints, theologian Gregory Palamas and Holy Martyr Grand Duchess Yelizaveta Fyodorovna, with lenten chants, spiritual poems and hymns for Saint Elizabeth. English Orthodox composer John Taverner's memory is also honored with memorial concerts. Furthermore, the festival focuses on the spiritual education of children and their parents, with two concert-events. The second festival, connected to Easter, is called "Easter Festival" and it features the Admiralty Orchestra of Leningrad Naval Base, which performs spiritual Orthodox music by Russian composers. The third, All-Russian Festival of Orthodox Singing Tradition "Sources", focuses on Russian Monastery music with spiritual works by Petrov, Chesnokov and Glazunov, as well as Solovetsky and Valamo chants. (philharmonia.spb.ru).

According to the findings, presented in Table 6. the concerts in connection to the theme "Religion and Spirituality" have varied between 28 and 3 concerts during the thesis scope years, finishing with ten concerts during 2022-23. The sizable changes are due to the subscription cycles being organized only during seasons 2013-14 and 2015-16. This explains the peaks in the concert numbers then, while in the regular seasons, the concerts consist of Church holiday programmes, predominantly dedicated to Easter. Overall, the changes during the normal seasons have remained mild and, as a result, the percentages of all concerts have moved between one and two percent. The ideological message of the Basics (2014) underlines the significant role of Orthodox faith and values as the components of national identity building. In order to get the message delivered to the Russian citizens, the Strategy (2016) has equipped the cultural organizations with "*cultural projects based on traditional spiritual values*" (Strategy 2016, p. 41). In the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic the execution of these target programmes has remained moderate, with the events taking mainly place during Church holidays. Nevertheless, the emergence of the Amended Basics (2023), which put added emphasis on the popularization of "*traditional Russian spiritual, moral and family values*" has led to a new growing curve of the thematic category (Amended Basics 2023, p. 11). This can be interpreted as effective implementation of the conservative hegemonic cultural policy in the season programming, as well as the strengthening of the hold of the state on the Philharmonic's thematic contents.

5 CONCLUSION

In the subsequent and concluding section of the thesis, I present the results of the findings, answer the research questions, and offer recommendations for further research.

5.1 Conclusion

The Master thesis is dedicated to discovering how a governmental classical music organization, in this case the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, is a part of the national identity formation process in the Russian Federation.

The selection of the study subject originated from the author's deeply rooted interest in Russian culture and the wish to understand the Kremlin influence on the classical music scene, the programming structure, as well as other activities inside the organizations. This interest, in addition to the turbulent world situation and the curiosity towards the influencing forces behind the events, has led me to the phenomenon of national identity and its manifestations in Russia. The increasing interest of the academic world in the Russian state cultural policy and its actualization in different cultural fields has created new knowledge. However, research in connection to Russian classical music organizations has remained non-existent. The need to fill in the gap in knowledge and produce new insights of the complex entity, has been the driving force in doing the research. By doing this lengthy study, I aim to remove any doubt that classical music could not be used as a powerful tool in the national identity formation in conservative-hegemonic countries and in any nation, with dominant governments and nationalist ideologies.

The main contents of the thesis focus on the thematic analysis of the Russian state cultural policy reports and the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic's seasonal programmes (2013-14 to 2022-23). The chosen governmental documents and target organizations programmes take place during president Putin's third presidential term (2012-), when the cultural policy started to portray increasingly conservative-hegemonic tendencies, and use culture as a soft tool of national identity actualization. The thematic analysis on the documented data has the objective of shedding unabridged light in the thematic particles of Russian national identity in accordance with the cultural policy reports (2014, 2016, 2023), and how these

elements are carefully incorporated into the target institutions seasonal programming.

The problem formation of the Master Thesis, began with devising research questions to center the research process. I have chosen three research questions, out of which the first two, serve as theoretical and empirical evidence for the third, main question of the research.

The first question focused on identifying the main themes in connection to national identity formation in the state cultural policy reports (2014, 2016, 2023). The thematic analysis provided the following themes; *I) Proud History and Patriotism, II) Russian Language and Literature, III) Upbringing, IV) Enlightenment, and V) Religion and Spirituality*. These findings prove that Kremlin-controlled Likhachev Institutes academics have fully instrumentalized culture in its many forms. The themes can be divided into two groups; the ideological and value based themes, no. 1, 2 and 5 that form the “Holy Trinity” of Russian national identity, in addition to the thematic tools for their actualization, no. 3-4.

The second question concentrated on discovering how the target organization, Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic, conducted the seasonal programming (2013-14 to 2022-23) in connection with the thematic analysis results of the state cultural policy reports. All the chosen institutes concerts of the ten-year thesis scope were subjected to deductive thematic analysis and the results prove that all the analysis-generated themes in connection to national identity formation are found in the Philharmonic's seasonal programmes. In order to express the findings with the utmost clarity, I demonstrated them in both numeral and text form. Through this process, it was uncovered that the first theme “*Proud History and Patriotism*” (57% to 68% of thematized concerts) was the largest thematic category, and the other categories in given numeral order gradually smaller, making the fifth theme “*Religion and Spirituality*” (8% to 3% of thematized concerts) the smallest group. The actualization of the individual themes was predominantly administered through special federal and state target programmes, which I have clarified by dividing the concerts, possessing characteristics of the specific thematic category, into five parameters. The most transparent of them is no. 1 “*Subscription Cycles*”, as well as parameters no. 4-5 “*International and All-Russian Competitions*” and “*International*

Festivals". During the ten-year thesis scope, these ideology-driven parameters have strengthened their position in the seasonal programming, emphasizing the exponentially growing stronghold of the Kremlin led Ministry of Culture on the musical contents of the organization.

The third and final research question intends to answer the main conundrum behind the whole thesis work; does classical music actually function as a subconscious tool for initiating national identity formation in the regular citizens. The question has received positive indications from the empirical data. The findings, gathered from the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonics seasonal programming, show that the amount of thematized concerts in comparison with the other, non-thematized, concerts has risen by six percent, during the ten seasons. In the first focus season (2013-14) 69 percent of the concerts was thematized, which was already a high quantity of the category, while the non-thematic category comprised 31 percent of the concerts. The tendency to have the majority of concerts thematized, and by these means supporting a dominant state ideology, is typical in autocratic countries such as Russia. An aligning inclination has been present in the Philharmonics concert programming, already in the seasons, previous to the first thesis scope season of 2013-14. Leaping to the final focus year (2022-23) the concert amount of the thematic category increased to 75 percent, whereas the non-thematic category decreased to 25 percent. The change can be explained by the great rise in the first thematic category "*Proud History and Patriotism*", which was 12 percent, during the ten-year period. This change can be explained by the strengthening hold of the state on the organization, which is actualized through the increase of state targeted programmes, especially in connection to the first thematic category.

When looking at the numeral data, as well as the contents of the SPBP seasonal programmes, the shift towards dominant conservative-hegemonic state ideology is visible. The amount of ideology based, thematized concerts comprised 75% of all concerts during the final thesis scope year (2022-23), indicating that the concert production is predominantly under government control. As a result, I have come to the conclusion that classical music can be used as a powerful tool of national identity formation.

Given the times we live in and the growing number of nationalist movements in the world, I am convinced that this research possesses valuable new knowledge about the connection of national identity and classical music. The research is a pioneer in the field, when the majority of studies focus solely on other cultural fields, and the situation during the Soviet era. Having expressed that, I believe further study about the phenomena in connection to the classical music field should be conducted, to receive further insights. The recommendations for what they might be, will be discussed in the following sub-section. In any case, I wish that my work sets new light and interest in the relatively untouched topic, as well as piques interest in the colleagues to continue the established work of the study.

5.2 Recommendations for Further Research

The study of the Russian cultural policy effects on the classical music field, as well as deciphering the national identity production behind that process, takes time and requires studying multiple organizations. In the research, I chose to focus on President Putin's third term and the ten-year seasonal period of the Saint Petersburg State Philharmonic (2013-14 to 2022-23). At the present time, having completed the vast research, I have come to the conclusion that the research could and should be continued, in order to receive an even clearer picture of the complex entity.

By this I am referring to future research, and widening the time frame to include the Philharmonics seasonal data from 2023-24 to 2024-25, to see if the progression continues as predicted. In addition, the future study on the topic could include the Medvedyev presidential terms (2008-2012), during which the cultural policy ideology was considered to be more Western oriented and open to outside influences. Widening the time frame would offer deeper understanding of the pre-Putin era and the time under his rule, giving a clearer perspective of the conservative-hegemonic process and its progression (2012-).

Investigating the relationship between music and national identity formation during our time is, in the author's opinion, crucial for understanding the way Russian citizens think. This includes gaining insight on the reasoning behind their thinking processes in connection to their country and the outside world, the feelings of blind patriotism and love for the fatherland versus distrust and fear towards the diverging West. These feelings do not grow overnight, but are subconsciously molded through

time and different mediums. Music is one of the powerful mediums, which is the reason why its impacts should be investigated more, especially among the culturally active Russian citizens.

Furthermore, I propose conducting research on other governmental classical music organizations, for example major opera houses and Philharmonics in other cities.

Investigating also their seasonal programming philosophy would give possible further validation to the conclusions of this Master Thesis, as well as illuminate the current situation and the impacts of the state cultural policy agenda in other regions of the country.

7. REFERENCES:

Adams, D., & Goldbard, A. (1995, 1986). Basic concepts: Modes and means of cultural policy-making. <http://www.wgcd.org/policy/concepts.html>

Ader, A. & Belousov, K. (2021). *Muzyka i biznes v postsotsialisticheskoy Rossii*. Biznes & Obschestvo. <https://www.b-soc.ru/pppublikacii/muzyka-i-biznes-v-postsotsialisticheskoy-rossii/>

Astafiyeva, O.N. (2008). Kulturnaya politika gosudarstvo: voprosy o realno sushchestvuyushem i potentsialno vozmozhnom. *Знание. Понимание. Умение*. 3. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kulturnaya-politika-gosudarstva-voprosy-o-realno-suschestvuyuschem-i-potentsialno-vozmozhnom-okonchanie>

Astafiyeva, O.N. (2010). Kulturnaya politika Rossii: teoriya, realnost, perspektiva. *Politologicheskie nauki*. <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kulturnaya-politika-rossii-teoriya-realnost-perspektiva>

Astafiyeva, O.N. (2014). Teoreticheskie osnovy kulturnoj politiki i integrirovaniye idei kultury v obshchestvennyy diskurs. *Библиотековедение*. 6. <https://bibliotekovedenie.rsl.ru/jour/article/view/115>

Astafiyeva, O.N. (2021). Kontseptualizatsiya i soglasovanie konkuriruyushih diskursov: teoriya kulturnoj politiki. *Observatoriya kultury*. T. 18(6). DOI: 10.25281/2072-3156-2021-18-6-574-585.

Astahov, D. (2020). *Biografiya novogo ministra kultury Olgi Lyubimovoj*. TASS. <https://tass.ru/info/7572611>

Barabanov, A. (2014). Festivali klassicheskoy muzyki v kulturnoj politike Rossii. *Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba*, 3(89). <https://pa-journal.igsu.ru/articles/r47/1913/>

Basics of State Cultural Policy, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on December 24, 2014 No. 808. pp. 2, 7.

<http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d526a877638a8730eb.pdf>

Blackburn, M. (2020). Mainstream Russian nationalism and the “state-civilization” identity: Perspectives from below. *Nationalities Papers* (2020), p. 1–19
doi:10.1017/nps.2020.8

Blakkisrud, H. (2016). Blurring the boundary between civic and ethnic: The Kremlin’s new approach to national identity under Putin’s third term. In P. Kolsto & H. Blakkisrud (Eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-2015* (p. 249-276). Edinburgh University Press.

Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), pp. 27–40.

Boyatzis, R.E. (1998). *Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
(<https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/transforming-qualitative-information/book7714>).

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*. 3(2), pp. 77–101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
(<https://doi.org/10.1191%2F1478088706qp063oa>).

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2014). *Thematic analysis*. Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology. Springer: 1947–1952. doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7_311
(https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-5583-7_311).

Chartrand, H. & McCaughey, C. (1989). The arm's length principle and the arts: an international perspective- past, present and future. In *Who's to Pay? for the Arts: The International Search for Models of Support*, M.C. Cummings Jr & J. Mark Davidson Schuster (eds.) American Council for the Arts, N.Y.C, pp. 2-3.

https://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/ArmsLengthArts_paper.pdf

Chesney, M. (2000). Interaction and understanding: 'Me' in the research. *Nurse Researcher* 7, pp. 58–69.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation (2020: Article 44; 69.3).
http://duma.gov.ru/news/48953/,_10003000-03.htm

Cooper, J. (2021, July 19). Russia's updated National Security Strategy. *Russian Studies Series 2/21*. NATO Defence College.
<https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=704>

Crabtree, B (1999). *Doing qualitative research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Creswell, J.W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry & research design. Choosing among five approaches*.

Cultmanager (2023). *Osnovy gosudarstvennoj kulturnoj politiki: klyuchevye izmeneniya s 2023 goda*. ↴

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On amendments to the Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 24, 2014 No. 808” 35, 25 January 2023, *Kremlin*. <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48855>

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2005). *The sage handbook of qualitative research*. (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications

Dragicevic-Sesic, M., & Stojkovic, B. (2000). *Culture: management, animation, marketing*. Novosibirsk: Tigra. pp. 26, 33-34. (in Russ.).

Duma of Russian Federation (2023, November 29). *Olga Lyubimova predstavila doklad o realizatsii gosudarstvennoj kulturnoj politiki*.
<http://duma.gov.ru/news/58400/>

- Dvuzhilnaya, I.F. (2022). “Yellow Stars”: Memory of the Holocaust in the Musical Project of the St. Petersburg Philharmonic Society. *ICONI*. (1), pp. 110–119. (In Russ.) <https://doi.org/10.33779/2658-4824.2022.1.110-119>
- Dyer, W. G., & Wilkins, A. L. (1991). Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better theory: A rejoinder to Eisenhardt. *The Academy of Management Review*, 16(3), pp. 613–619. <https://doi.org/10.2307/258920>
- Efremova, L., Rusetskiy, M., Molchan, A., Lechman, E., & Avdeeva, R. (2018). Russian cultural policy: Goals, threats, and solutions in the context of national security. *Journal of History Culture and Art Research*, 7(3), p. 433-443. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.7596/taksad.v7i3.1743>
- European Commission (2014). *Culture in EU external relations; Russia country report*. European Union.
https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/culture/policy/international-cooperation/documents/country-reports/russia_en.pdf
- Fedorova, T. & Kochelyaeva, N. (2013). *Russian Federation, country profile*. Compendium. pp. 3-4.
https://www.culturalpolicies.net/wp-content/uploads/pdf_full/russia/russia_022013.pdf
- Federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’ (1992), part I.
<https://base.garant.ru/104540/>
- Federal Agency on Ethnic Affairs (2015). *Polozhenie o Federalnom agenstve po delam natsionalnostej*. <https://fadm.gov.ru/agency/polozhenie-ob-agentstve>
- Federation Council (2023). *Status and authority*.
<http://www.council.gov.ru/en/structure/council/status/>
- Federation Council (2023). *Federation Council Committee on Science, Education and Culture*. <http://council.gov.ru/en/structure/committees/9/>

- Fedorova, T. & Kochelyaeva, N. (2013). *Russian Federation, country profile*. Compendium. pp. 3-4.
https://www.culturalpolicies.net/wp-content/uploads/pdf_full/russia/russia_022013.pdf
- Flier, A. (2000). *Kulturologiya dlya kulturologov*. Izdatelstvo “Akademichskij proekt”. http://yanko.lib.ru/ann/flier_cult-f_cult-a.htm
- Flier, A. (2018). *Ideologicheskaya funktsiya kulturnoj politiki*. Kultura i obshchestvo (1). pp. 57-63. DOI: 10.17805/zpu.2018.1.5
- Foucault, M. (1991). *Governmentality*. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effects: Studies in governmentality*, pp. 87-90. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Gellman, V. (2015). *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes*. US: University of Pittsburgh.
- Girvin, B. (2022). *Putin, national self-determination and political independence in the twenty-first century*. Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1111/nana.12876
- Government of the Russian Federation. (2013). *Vneseny izmeneniya v zakon o zashchite detei ot informatsii, prichinyayushchei vred ikh zdorovyyu i razvitiyu*. Moscow: Federal Government Website. June 30, 2013.
 <<http://kremlin.ru/acts/18423>>.
- Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity*. Harvard University Press.
https://nationalismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Nationalism-Five-Roads-to-Modernity-by-Liah-Greenfeld-z-lib.org_.pdf
- Guibernau, M. (2004). Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: A critical assessment. *Nations and Nationalism*, 10(1/2), p. 125–141.

- Guler, M. C., & Shakirova, A. (2021). Deciphering Russia's 2021 national security strategy document. *SETA/Perspective*, 67 (September, 2021).
<https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2021/09/P67En.pdf>
- Hillen, S. P. (2020). *Nationalism and its discontents: Transformations of identity in contemporary Russian music on and off the web*. Arizona State University.
<https://keep.lib.asu.edu/items/158685>
- Hopf, T. (1998). Constructivism in international relations theory, *International Security*, 23(1), pp. 171-200.
- Hopf, T. (2010). The logic of habit in international relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(4), pp. 539–561.
- Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15, pp. 1277-1288.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687>
- Interfax (2023, January 25). *Putin vnes izmeneniya v Osnovy gosudarstvennoj kulturnoj politiki*. <https://www.interfax.ru/culture/883230>
- Jakobson, L., Rudnik, B., & Toepler, S. (2016). From liberal to conservative: shifting cultural policy regimes in post-Soviet Russia. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*. DOI: 10.1080/10286632.2016.1186663
- Jonson, L. (2019). Russia: Culture, Cultural Policy, and the Swinging Pendulum of Politics. In N. Bernsand & B. Törnquist-Plewa (Eds.), *Cultural and Political Imaginaries in Putin's Russia* (Vol. 11, p. 13–36). Brill.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvbqs855.5>
- Keane, M. A., & Zhang, W. (2008). *Cultural creative industries or creative (cultural) industries?*, in Hu, Huilin, Eds. *China's Cultural Industries Forum (Chinese publication)*. Shanghai People's Publishing.
- Keillor, B. D., & Tomas M. Hult, G. (1999). A five-country study of national identity. *International Marketing Review*, 16(1), p. 65–84.

- Kitov YU. V., & Gertner S. L. (2023). Cultural policy fundamental changes as a subject of cultural-philosophical analysis. *Culture and Arts Herald* 1(73): p. 43–53.
- Kishkovsky, S. (2023). *US imposes sanctions on Russian culture minister*. The Art Newspaper.
<https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2023/02/24/russia-culture-minister-olga-l-yubimova-us-sanctions>
- Kolstø, P., & Blakkisrud, H. (Eds.). (2016). *The new Russian nationalism: Imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 2000–2015*. Edinburgh University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1bh2kk5>
- Kramareva, N. (2018). *An analysis of Russia's "alternative" soft power strategy and national identity discourse via sports mega-events*. University of Birmingham. <https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/8589/>
- Kremlin (2023). *State Council*. <http://www.en.kremlin.ru/structure/state-council>
- Kremlin (2023). *Presidential Council for Culture and Art*.
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/structure/councils#institution-7>
- Kremlin (2023). *Security Council*.
<http://www.en.kremlin.ru/structure/security-council>
- Kremlin (2023). *Instructions on the establishment of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs*. <http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/assignments/orders/47849/print>
- Krylova, T. V., Shkunova A. A., Lelekova A.V., Voloshina S. E. (2020). Formation of cultural policy in Russia. *Moskovskij ekonomicheskij zhurnal* (11). pp. 532-535. DOI 10.24411/2413-046X-2020-10771
- Kultura (2023). *Likhachev-Institute*.
<https://www.culture.ru/institutes/37463/rossiiskii-nauchno-issledovatel'skii-institut-prirodnogo-i-kulturnogo-naslediya-im-d-s-likhachyova>

- Kurennoy, V. (2021). Contemporary state cultural policy in Russia: organization, political discourse and ceremonial behavior. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 27(2), pp. 166, 169. DOI: 10.1080/10286632.2021.1873966
- Laine, V., & Zamyatin, K. (2021). *Russia's nationalities policy before and after the 2020 constitutional amendments: Is the "ethnic turn" continuing ?*. FIIA (June 2021).
<https://www.fia.fi/en/publication/russias-nationalities-policy-before-and-after-the-2020-constitutional-amendments>
- Leavy, P. (Ed.). (2014). *The Oxford handbook of qualitative research*. Oxford University Press. pp. 2-6.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199811755.001.0001>
- Liñán, M. (2010). History as a propaganda tool in Putin's Russia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 43(2), p. 167-178.
- Markova, M. (2020, July 14). *The political use of Soviet nostalgia to develop a Russian national identity*. E-International Relations.
<https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/14/the-political-use-of-soviet-nostalgia-to-develop-a-russian-national-identity/>
- Mason, J. (2002). *Qualitative researching*. 2nd Edition, Sage Publications, London. pp. 1, 120-124.
- Matveyev, V. (2022). Financing cultural sector in aspect of implementing state cultural policy: analytical review. *Vestnik ASTU. Series: Economics 2022* (4). pp. 59.69. <https://doi.org/10.24143/2073-5537-2022-4-59-69>.
- MEMRI (2022, February 24). *Russia publishes draft decree on 'Public policy to preserve and strengthen traditional spiritual and moral values' to counter 'destructive ideology' – i.e. progressive liberalism*.
<https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-publishes-draft-decree-public-policy-preserve-and-strengthen-traditional-spiritual>

- Merriam, S. B., & Tisdell, E. J. (2016). *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation*. Jossey Bass. pp. 202.
- Miller, D. (2016). *Citizenship and national identity*. In: R. Blaug and J. Schwarzmantel, ed., *Democracy: A Reader*, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 447-449.
- Miller, T., & Yudice, G. (2002). *Cultural Policy* (1st ed.). SAGE Publications. pp. 7.
- Ministry of Finances of the Russian Federation (2021) *Federal budget of Russian Federation for 2022 and estimation for 2023-2024*.
https://minfin.gov.ru/common/upload/library/2021/12/main/Prezentatsiya_FB_22-24.pdf
- Mishina, E. (2022, February 6). *How to establish a state ideology incognito*. Institute of Modern Russia.
<https://imrussia.org/en/analysis/3416-how-to-establish-a-state-ideology-incognito?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default>
- Myers, M.D., (2009). *Qualitative Research in Business & Management*. London: Sage Publications.
- National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on December 31, 2015.
<http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40391>
- Petrova, M. (2023, February 1). *Chem grozyat obschestvy izmeneniya v osnovy gosudarstvennoj kulturnoj politiki*. Law in Russia.
<https://lawinrussia.ru/chem-grozyat-obshhestvu-izmeneniya-v-osnovy-gosudarstvennoj-kulturnoj-politiki/>
- Putin, V. (2013). ‘Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo diskussionogo kluba “Valdai”’ [Meeting of the international discussion club ‘Valdai’], *Kremlin.ru*, <<http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/19243>>

- Putin, V. (2023). *Formation of new Civic Chamber composition began*.
<https://www.publicnow.com/view/B8E51F4B529C802209C867D9112936ACFF39EDAB?1677225707>
- Romanov, P., & Iarskaia-Smirnova E. (2015). “Foreign Agents” in the field of social policy research: The demise of civil liberties and academic freedom in contemporary Russia.” *Journal of European Social Policy*, 25(4), p. 359–365.
- Romashko, T. (2018). Biopolitics and hegemony in contemporary Russian cultural policy. *Russian Politics*, 3(1), p. 88-113.
<https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00301005>
- Romashko, T. (2019). *Russian cultural policy: From European governance towards conservative hegemony*. In T. Hoffmann, & A. Makarychev (Eds.), *Russia and the EU : Spaces of Interaction* (pp. 27-51). pp. 11. Routledge. *Studies in Contemporary Russia*. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203730744>
- Romashko, T. (2020). Production of cultural policy in Russia : Authority and intellectual leadership. In I. Kiriya, P. Kompatsiaris, & Y. Mylonas (Eds.), *The Industrialization of Creativity and Its Limits : Values, politics and lifestyles of contemporary cultural economies* (pp. 113-130). Springer. *Science, Technology and Innovation Studies*.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53164-5_8
- Romashko, T. (2022). ‘To make a people out of a mere population’ : Sovereignty and governmentality in hegemonic Russian cultural policy. *Russian politics*, 7(4), pp. 555-580. <https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604031>
- Romashko, T. (2023). *Interim cultural policy profile: Russian Federation*. Compendium. pp. 2, 7, 9-11, 22.
https://www.culturalpolicies.net/wp-content/uploads/pdf_short/russia/Russia_short_012023.pdf
- Russian Government (2023). *Federal Agency for Youth Affairs*.
<http://government.ru/en/department/241/events/>

Russian Government (2023). *Federal Archival Agency*.

<http://government.ru/en/department/336/>

Russian Government (2023). *Federal service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media*.

<http://government.ru/en/department/58/>

Russian Government (2023). *Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation*.

<http://government.ru/en/department/27/events/>

Russian Government (2023). *Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation*.

<http://government.ru/en/department/390/events/>

Saint-Petersburg Philharmonic, official website. <https://www.philharmonia.spb.ru/>

Simjanovska, V. (2011). Concepts and models of cultural policy: State versus city. *New identity and new paradigm*.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333080514_Concepts_and_Models_of_Cultural_Policy_State_versus_City_Concepts_and_Models_of_Cultural_Policy_State_versus_City

Smith, Anthony D. (1986). *The ethnic origins of nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, Anthony D. (1991). *National identity*. London: Penguin.

Smith, Anthony D. (2002). 'When is a nation', *Geopolitics* 7(2): p. 5–32.

Stake, R. E. (1995). *The art of case study research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

State Duma (2023). *Status and powers, composition and Regulations of the State*

Duma. <http://duma.gov.ru/en/duma/about/>

Стратегия государственной культурной политики на период до 2030 года (The Strategy of The State Cultural Policy) 326-R, 29 February 2016, *Kremlin*.

- Thomas, A. J. (2021). *Russian theatre in the age of high putinism: Politics and aesthetics*. University of Oxford.
<https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7de72418-fbb4-419a-8275-b8c23b002bf5/files/dsn009z01w>
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2012). *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor In International Relations*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ukrainskaya Pravda (2022, November 9). *Putin issues decree to protect "traditional Russian values"*. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/11/9/7375649/>
- UNESCO. (1967). *Cultural policy – a preliminary study*. Published in the series Studies and documents on cultural policies 1, Paris, 1969. p.7.
- UniRank (2023). *Ministry of Science and higher Education in the Russian Federation*. <https://www.4icu.org/institutions/ru/253.htm>
- Устав Федерального государственного бюджетного учреждения культуры “Санкт Петербургская академическая филармония им. Д.Д.Шостаковича”, (*Charter of the Federal State Cultural Institution “Saint-Petersburg Academic Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich*), 680, 1 June 2011,
<https://www.philharmonia.spb.ru/upload/iblock/339/ff131gif01jlyuuaf0mtdbnw904no38u/202312u.pdf>
- Устав Федерального государственного бюджетного учреждения культуры “Санкт Петербургская академическая филармония им. Д.Д.Шостаковича”, (*Charter of the Federal State Cultural Institution “Saint-Petersburg Academic Philharmonic named after D.D. Shostakovich*), 680, 13 December 2023,
https://www.philharmonia.spb.ru/upload/iblock/e8b/y48rtjz6cdrltmbl1ypqv2paqkanfpy4/ph_ustav_202402_stamp.pdf
- Viljanen, E. (2016). *Musiikki venäläisen identiteetin rakentajana*”. *Idäntutkimus* 23 (1), pp. 84-93. <https://journal.fi/idantutkimus/article/view/77911>.

- Viljanen, E. (2020). The formation of Soviet cultural theory of music (1917–1948). *Stud East Eur Thought* (72), pp. 135–159.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-020-09357-3>
- Viljanen, E. (2021). Soviet legacies and global contexts : Classical music and Russia’s cultural statecraft. in S. Mäkinen & T. Forsberg (eds), *Russia's Cultural Statecraft*. 1 edn, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, pp. 141-161 .
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003141785-7>
- Vostrjakov, L.E. (2011). *Kulturnaja politika: Osnovnye kontseptsii i modeli*.<https://culture29.ru/upload/medialibrary/0bf/0bfb4cb9753cded37c6339eae422bbc7.pdf>
- Vostrjakov, L.E., & Turgaev, A.S. (2018). Novaja model' gosudarstvennoj kul'turnoj politiki Rossii. *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo instituta kul'tury*. No 3 (36). pp. 6-7, 12-13. DOI 10.30725/2619-0303-2018-3-6-16
- Vostrjakov, L.E., (2018). Ob osobennostyah novoj modeli gosudarstvennoj kulturnoj politiki. *Sovremennaya nauka: aktualnye problemy teorii i praktiki. Seriya "Poznanie"* (9).
<http://www.nauteh-journal.ru/files/5db04766-3bde-4fca-b0c4-4a85356ff31e>
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization* (Vol. 46).
- Yakhshiyani, O.Yu. (2020). Consistency of the provisions on the all-russian civil identity contained in the doctrinal documents on the state national policy of Russia and the republics-subjects of the Federation. *Vestnik universiteta*. I. 12, p. 176–183. DOI: 10.26425/1816-4277-2020-12-176-183
- Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case study research: Design and method*. (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Zabalueva, O. (2017). Cultural policies in Russian museums. *Museum International*, 69: pp. 3-4, 38-49. DOI: 10.1111/muse.12171.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/muse.12171>

Zhidkov, V. (2001). *Kulturnaya politika Rossii: teoriya i istoriya*. Akademicheskij proekt. pp. 69. <https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/01005455758>