Institutional theory has undergone major development in recent decades, while resource dependence theory has remained essentially unchanged since its inception in 1978. This study examines the associations of these two theories and organisational performance in the context of cultural centres in Finland. This thesis also addresses the gap in the literature by empirically examining how and why resource dependence influences organisations' strategic responses.

The results support the conclusion that private cultural centres do not passively adhere to institutional constraints. Rather, they selectively choose strategic responses that balance conflicting institutional pressures and their own interests and goals. Additionally, the more dependent a cultural centre is on a single revenue source—in this study, the municipality—the greater of conformity it displays. Likewise, the more dependent a cultural centre is on diverse revenue sources, the greater diversity it displays.

ISBN: 978-952-329-118-8 (PRINTED)
ISSN: 0788-3757 (PRINTED)
ISBN: 978-952-329-119-5 (PDF)
ISSN: 2489-8155 (PDF)
STUDIA MUSICA 76 (ISSN 0788-3757)

UNIGRAFIA
HELSINKI 2019

SIBELIUS ACADEMY
UNIARTS HELSINKI

RESEARCH STUDY PROGRAMME
MuTri DOCTORAL SCHOOL

Tomas Järvinen
The Challengers of Public Cultural Centres
A mixed method study on private cultural centres in Finland
STUDIA MUSICA 76

The Challengers of Public Cultural Centres

A mixed method study on private cultural centres in Finland

TOMAS JÄRVINEN

76
STUDIA
MUSICA

THE SIBELIUS ACADEMY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE ARTS HELSINKI

THE CHALLENGERS OF PUBLIC CULTURAL CENTRES
A mixed method study on private cultural centres in Finland

Tomas Järvinen

Sibelius Academy, University of the Arts
Helsinki. MuTri Doctoral School
Studia Musica 76

Cover: Jan Rosström
Layout: Tomas Järvinen
Printed by: Unigrafia Oy, Helsinki 2019

ISBN: 978-952-329-118-8 (PRINTED)
ISSN: 0788-3757 (PRINTED)
ISBN: 978-952-329-119-5 (PDF)
ISSN: 2489-8155 (PDF)

ABSTRACT

Institutional theory has undergone major development in recent decades, while resource dependence theory has remained essentially unchanged since its inception in 1978. This study examines the associations of these two theories and organisational performance in the context of cultural centres in Finland. Few studies have attempted to empirically determine the effects of resource scarcity on institutional pressures. In addition to the novelty of combining these two theories, this thesis addresses this gap in the literature by empirically examining how and why resource dependence influences organisations' strategic responses.

Using a mixed methods approach, this research involved in-depth semi-structured interviews and surveys in a later stage. A total of 20 interviews was conducted at four private cultural centres in Finland, while quantitative data (i.e. surveys) were gathered from 106 cultural centres. Thematic analysis was applied to the qualitative data to investigate the factors that influence the practices of private cultural centres. Next, the quantitative data were reviewed to confirm or reject the assumptions from the qualitative data. A broad range of participants was selected to generate generalisable, reliable, valid and meaningful data and conclusions.

The results support the conclusion that private cultural centres do not passively adhere to institutional constraints. Rather, they selectively choose strategic responses that balance conflicting institutional pressures and their own interests and goals. Additionally, the more dependent a cultural centre is on a single revenue source—in this study, the municipality—the greater of conformity it displays. Likewise, the more dependent a cultural centre is on diverse revenue sources, the greater diversity it displays.

Through this theoretical discussion and empirical assessment, this research contributes to an expanded, more accurate understanding of how organisations can engage in sustainability practices that improve performance. This study also fills the research gap on Finnish cultural centres and identifies factors that affect the adoption of organisational strategical responses. Finally, this study yield recommendations for future research and implications for the practice of cultural centres, suggesting how resource dependence alters organisational strategic responses.

Key words: Institutional theory, resource dependence theory, strategical responses, cultural centres

ABSTRAKT

Institutionell teori har varit föremål för en stor utveckling under de senaste decennierna, medan resursberoendesteori har mer eller mindre hållit status quo sedan starten 1978. Den här studien har granskat samband mellan de två teorierna och organisationsprestationen i sammanhanget av kulturhus i Finland. Även om kombinationen av dessa två teorier är något av ett framväxande koncept, har rätt få studier empiriskt försökt studera vilka effekter resursbrist har på institutionellt tryck. Därav tar denna avhandling upp detta litteraturgap genom att empiriskt undersöka hur och varför resursberoende påverkar organisationer strategiska val.

Denna forskning har använt en blandad metod (mixed methods), och har prioriterat djupgående halvstrukturerade intervjuer i ett första skede och genomfört en enkätundersökning i ett senare skede. Sammanlagt 20 intervjuer genomfördes i 4 privata kulturhus. De kvantitativa uppgifterna omfattade 106 kulturhus. Studien använde tematisk analys på den kvalitativa data, för att undersöka faktorer som påverkar praxisen bland de privata kulturhusen inom fältet för kulturhus. Därefter använde den kvantitativ data för att bekräfta eller avvisa antagandena från kvalitativa data. Denna omfattande spridning av deltagare har valts för att skapa generaliserbara, tillförlitliga, giltiga och meningsfulla data samt slutsatser.

Den här studien drar slutsatsen att privata kulturcentrum inte passivt följer institutionella restriktioner. De väljer selektivt strategiska svar som balanserar konflikten mellan institutionellt tryck och sina egna intressen och mål. Studien föreslår vidare att desto mer beroende ett kulturhus är av en enda inkomstkälla, i det här fallet kommunen, desto högre grad av konformism kommer den att visa. Likaledes, ju mer beroende ett kulturhus är av en stor mångfald av intäkter, ju högre grad av mångfald den kommer att visa.

Primärt genom en teoretisk diskussion och en empirisk bedömning bidrar denna forskning till bättre precision och förståelse för hur organisationer i en tillräcklig grad kan nå hållbarhetspraxis för att få fördelar i deras prestanda. Denna forskning bidrar också till litteraturen, genom att bidra med information om det finländska fältet för kulturhus i allmänhet och identifiera faktorer som påverkar antagandet av organisatoriska strategiska svar i synnerhet. Denna forskning ger dessutom rekommendationer för framtida forskning och

praktiska implikationer för kulturhus, genom att ange hur resursberoende förändrar det organisatoriska strategiska svaret.

Nyckelord: Institutionell teori, resursberoendeteori, strategiska respons, kulturhus

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A PhD is an individual work. My thesis, however, would not have been smoothly and effectively completed without the help and support of many individuals. I would like to express my gratitude and thanks for my three supervisors, Tanja Johansson, Roy Suddaby and Jesper Strandgaard Pederseen. Johansson (D.Sc. Econ.) is professor and head of the Arts Management Department at the Sibelius Academy, University of the Arts Helsinki. As my main supervisor, Johansson helped me with issues big and small through good and less-good times. Suddaby (PhD) is Winspear chair of management and director of research at the Peter B. Gustavson School of Business, University of Victoria, as well as strategic research professor at Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University. He gave significant advice on how to connect theory to my research object. Strandgaard Pedersen (PhD), professor at the Institute for Organisation, Copenhagen Business School, clarified many of my initially somewhat unclear thoughts. The work all three supervisors put into my thesis is very much appreciated.

I furthermore thank other individuals who have had huge impacts on this study. Henrik Dobewall (PhD), a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Helsinki, helped me greatly with everything related to quantitative methods. I can honestly say that without his help, this would not have been a mixed methods study—many thanks to him. Emil Vahtera (PhD), researcher at the environment centre at the City of Helsinki, helped tidy up the quantitative part of my thesis, which is very much appreciated. In addition, Jan Furustam, Bachelor of engineering and Director of sales at NAPA Design Solutions, helped me make tables 9 and 10.

This thesis would not have been completed without the help of many organisations, especially the private cultural centres that participated in the qualitative interviews. Many other cultural centres also took time to answer the questionnaire—thank you. The Sibelius Academy of Uniarts Helsinki also deserves my gratitude for providing me with the opportunity to do my doctoral thesis. For this, I am very grateful.

Furthermore, I thank my parents, Pirjo and Håkan, for their support and encouragement throughout my studies. Finally, my family—my two wonderful children, Tilde and Tyra, and my lovely wife, Sofia Eriksson. Without her encouragement, patience, sacrifice and friendship—through both good and bad times—this thesis would never have been finished.

Table of contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IT	Institutional theory
M	Mean
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
RDT	Resource dependence theory
SD	Standard deviation

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

I RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

1.1 Introduction

This thesis focuses on private cultural centres and their operational preconditions within the fields of both private and public cultural centres in Finland. This research examines processes of change within these organisational fields, using institutional theory (IT) and resource dependence theory (RDT). The aim is to develop an explorative theory by examining the ways resource dependence encourages heterogeneity among cultural centres in Finland, or reverse institutional isomorphism, transforming the change agents of private cultural centres into driven institutional entrepreneurs.

Organisations sharing the same goals generally have similar actions (Scott, 2014). IT suggests that change is triggered primarily by exogenous shocks that disrupt the current situation in a field and lead to periods of innovation. IT provides valuable guidelines for analysing organisations, with an emphasis on expectations, norms, social rules and values as sources of pressure on organisations (Scott, 2014). RDT, in turn, suggests that organisations cannot internally generate all the resources required to sustain their activities and, therefore, must conduct transactions with elements in the environment to secure a stable flow of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Pairing these two theories helps this study examine how organisations react to different degrees of uncertainties and multiple actions of other elements in their environment. This study applies Oliver's (1991) assumptions and framework linking institutional factors and organisational strategic responses to guide the analysis.

The concept of arts facilities in residential areas was proposed during the Finnish cultural debates in the 1960s, followed by the expression 'democratisation of culture' in the 1970s (Silvanto, et al., 2008). The main objective of cultural democracy was to highlight citizens' activities, needs and understandings of culture (Kangas, 1988). During this on-going debate, Finnish municipalities began to produce cultural services (Silvanto, et al., 2008). Helsinki was the first city to plan a multi-purpose centre, and in 1984, Stoa, the first public cultural centre, was opened. In Finland, the idea was to establish such a centre in every part of the country, or at least every big city (Silvanto, et al., 2008), which why cultural centres are mostly found in cities (Kangas & Ruokolainen, 2012). There, of course, were venues, such as the Turun VPK (2018) house built in 1892, that were used in the same manner before 1984 but simply were not called cultural centres then.

The majority of the private cultural centres in Finland were founded after the state initiative (Statistics Finland, 2017). In western Europe, the opposite seems to have taken place. States began to build their own centres in the 1990s, after the private initiative of the art labs in the 1960s, which became private cultural centres in the 1970s and 1980s (Fitzgerald, 2010). Hence, Finnish private cultural centres bear the challenger label in the study topic (for more on the challenger concept, see section 1.6.5).

This interdisciplinary study draws on both social sciences and management studies. It was conducted as a mixed methods study, involving 20 interviews in four Finnish private cultural centres and a questionnaire sent to 194 Finnish cultural centres for the primary data.

1.2 Background of cultural centres

In 2017, there were 185 cultural centres in Finland, including 71 (38,37%) private cultural centres (Statistics Finland, 2017). As can be seen in section 3.3.2.1, Statistics Finland's list is not comprehensive but gives an adequate picture of the situation. Of the 71 private centres, 28 are maintained by non-government organisations (NGOs), 26 by joint-stock companies, seven by university fraternities, four by foundations, three by private citizens, two by parishes and one by a cooperative (Statistics Finland, 2017). Regarding management, 105 are maintained by municipalities directly, six by joint-stock companies owned by municipalities and three by the state. Interestingly, of the eight hybrid centres (both private and public), this study could identify four joint-stock companies, two NGOs, one foundation and one fraternity.

Cultural centres are venues in public use that create a platform for people to both practice and take part in cultural activities (Stenlund, 2010). In this study, the concept of cultural centre implies a house used in versatile ways for cultural activities, such as concerts, theatre and visual arts. The concept also includes cultural institutions and cultural halls, although venues used for a single purpose (e.g. theatres) are not taken into account (Statistics Finland, 2017). Any big venue arguably could function as a cultural centre, and that most likely was the case earlier. Generally, cultural centres do not have any artistic personnel of their own and mostly focus on productions (Silvanto, et al., 2008). Public cultural centres commonly describe their primary mission as to produce (by prioritising and coordinating) exclusive cultural offerings to the community (Ruusuvirta, et al., 2012). Cultural centres are often seen as a tool for the municipality's cultural planning and development efforts (Lambert & Williams, 2017).

In Helsinki, Finland, a local debate in the 1950s occurred over the need of a bigger meeting place and a concert hall (Malmberg, 2008). This led to a private initiative by a few politicians to found the joint-stock company Helsingin Kulttuuritalot Oy, which then built the private cultural centre Kulttuuritalo in Helsinki over 1951–1958. Due to financial problems, the cultural centre was sold during the 1990s and ended up as a public centre owned by Senaatti-kiinteistöt (Kulttuuritalo, 2018). The majority of the cultural centres in Finland are funded and maintained by either the state or municipalities (Statistics Finland, 2017) due to the aforementioned Finnish cultural debates of the 1960s and the democratisation of culture in the 1970s (Silvanto, et al., 2008). The main idea of cultural democracy was to highlight citizens' own cultural activities, needs and perceptions (Kangas, 1988). During this debate, Finnish municipalities started to provide cultural services (Silvanto, et al., 2008).

For an example of the numbers for a cultural centre in Finland, the public cultural centre Savoy in Helsinki had a turnover of 1 624 894 euros in 2016, including 808 301 euros from subsidies from the city of Helsinki (Helsingin kaupunki, 2017). Overall, it had 415 events in 2016, of which 17 were its own productions, 250 joint ventures and 148 external renters. It aimed to have an audience of 60 000 in 2016 and ended up with an audience of 89 451 people (Helsingin kaupunki, 2017).

According to Renko and Ruusuvirta (2018), there were 105 public cultural centres in Finland in 2016. They received a total of approximately 43 million euros in municipal funding. The amount varied among municipalities from 0 to 9,8 million euros. The mean (M) was 1,8 million euros, and the median 0,6 million euros. Helsinki gave the highest funding, subsidising its 9 cultural centres with 9,8 million euros (Renko & Ruusuvirta, 2018).

Drawing on data from 45 private cultural centres in 27 countries, Trans Europe Halles, a Europe-based network of cultural centres, notes that the M turnover in Europe is 1,25 million euros (Schiuma, et al., 2015). Nonetheless, differences arise among centres depending on which area of Europe they represent: '*The Scandinavian and western European organizations budgets averaged over €2 million, while the annual budgets of the organizations based in southern and Eastern Europe were only just under €200,000*' (Schiuma, et al., 2015, p. 25). According to Schiuma et al. (2015), Scandinavia has the highest amount of public funding, 100% according to the report, whereas southern European centres get 70% of the total turnover. Ten per cent of all centres studied received no public funding. The average number of annual events is 200, with 295 in western Europe, 273 in Scandinavia and 105 in eastern and southern Europe. The centres in Scandinavia have an annual average attendance of 166 000 people, western European centres 114 000, eastern Europeans 24 000 and southern Europeans 14 000 (Schiuma, et al., 2015).

According to Mulcahey (2000), government funding for arts organisation in United States, France, Norway and Canada, has decreased since the 1990s. This has led to a need to diversify the palette of funding sources, for instance, through corporate and private philanthropy (Froelich, 1999). In Finland, municipal funding to cultural centres and subsidies grew over 2006–2016, from 106 310 000 euros to 116 313 000 euros. In total, an increase of 10 003 000 euro or about 8,6% (Statistics Finland, 2017b). Renko and Ruusuvirta (2018), in a study on 24 Finnish cities in 2016, found that the public centres received a total of 37 148 000 euros in 2010 and 43 218 000 euros in 2016, an increase of 6 070 000 euros, or about 14%. These numbers are not absolutely comparable, but they still imply that most of the municipal funding reserved for subsidies to cultural centres other than those run by municipalities has decreased. This can also be seen in the number of subsidies from private funds (The Swedish Cultural Foundation in Finland, 2017; Konstsamfundet, 2016) and the diversification in private centres' revenue sources (Anonymous, 2016c).

Private cultural centres, both non-profit and for-profit, pursue non-financial goals, such as community commitments and aesthetic goals (Sherer & Suddaby, 2018). They have clear exposure to mission drift as they aim to fulfil their mission by acquiring a broad range of revenues. At the same time, RDT highlights that diverse dependencies increase independence from the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

According to a survey by the Finnish Cultural Foundation (2013), the Finnish think it is important to have opportunities to exercise and take part in local cultural activities, with an emphasis on venues, such as cultural centres. According to Kangas and Ruokolainen (2012), the majority of municipalities think that the cultural sector develops the community's image and cultural heritage, economic development, citizens' wellbeing and children's cultural skills.

On the Nordic level, researchers in Sweden and Norway indicate that cultural centres have the same impact on society (Ambrecht, 2012; Storstad, 2010). In North America, cultural centres, called performing arts centres, are seen as a part of the '*creative and cultural industries,* *significantly influencing the cultural and economic vitality of communities*' (Lambert & Williams, 2017, p. 1). There are still very few studies on cultural centres. As Lambert and Williams (2017) put it:

> *'It seems to be taken for granted that these complex, multi-million-dollar institutions will be built and maintained by communities, and be responsibly managed by whatever organization is working behind the scenes to support a vibrant and dynamic local art scene' (p. xi).*

There, however, many difficulties to managing these complex organisations, and the field of cultural centres is divided into many different actors and centre types.

1.3 Cultural centres as organisations

Organisations are often divided into private or public (Bozeman, 1987; Rainey, 2003). Bozeman (1987) offered three dimensions of public character that define organisations: 1) ownership, 2) funding and 3) control. Different organisations fall differently within these dimensions, which is why categorisation is difficult. Bozeman (1987) defined *ownership* as the maintainer of the organisation, whether private organisations or the state. *Funding* refers to how the money generated by the activities of the maintainer, whether subsidies, tax revenues or sales of products or services. An organisation, of course can have diverse ways of getting funding. The last dimension, *control*, concerns the question of who inspects the organisation's activities. Generally, the stakeholders carry through the inspection; the owner supervises the production, the customer (renter) the product (event), and society ensures that laws and regulations are followed (Bozeman, 1987). Many other dimensions have been presented throughout the years, but according to Boyne (2002), these three core definitions are the most used. They are mostly used in a simplified manner, and when significant differences are identified, it is not uncommon that only the ownership dimension is used to distinguish organisational publicity.

Fitzgerald (2010) saw clear differences between public and private cultural centres:

> '*What is clear is that there is an ideological gap between independent culture and the state. ... The struggle is often about private investment versus civic ideals and the relentless march of the free market, which tends to trample over community considerations and not-for-profit idealism of any kind. One of the "trade-offs" for security in the*

maturing process of independent culture is that many independent cultural centers operate as venues and resources with social and political agendas pushed well down the list of priorities' *(p. 24).*

Many types of cultural centres serve different community functions, which makes it difficult to study them (Lambert & Williams, 2017). According to Statistics Finland's (2017) list of the maintainers of cultural centres in Finland by there seem to be three main groups of cultural centres: 1) the private centre; 2) the public centre; and 3) the combination private and public centre (the hybrid model). Also, some private centres are maintained by the municipalities that founded them. A fourth type is private centres maintained by government agency.

There may be different kind of entities involved in ownership, governance, management and operations that are not fully depicted here, but the following figure presents how the groups of cultural centres are situated in relation to each other, in a Finnish context.

Figure 1—Ownership and control

		Ownership	
		public	*private*
Control	*public*	b) the public center	d) the centers maintained by governmental companies
	private	c) the hybrid centers	a) the private centers

The field of cultural centres seem to be swiftly changing as these different types of cultural centres emerge (Statistics Finland, 2017). Lambert and Williams (2017) emphasised the need to address the '*hybrid mix of public administration, nonprofit management, and for-profit entrepreneurship competencies required of these leaders*' (p. 8).

1.3.1 The private centre

When the initiative to found cultural centres and maintain them is on a non-governmental basis, cultural centres are called private (Fitzgerald, 2010). Private centres can be divided into several subgroups: 1) a collective with no formal structure and no legal entity; 2) a collective with a structure and a legal entity; 3) a non-profit organisation; 4) a for-profit organisation; 5) an organisation operating under the legal auspices of a local authority, such as the Cable Factory (2017) in Finland, a joint-stock company owned by the municipality (though this example is problematised in subsection 1.4); 6) a partnership between two or more organisations; 7) a social business, which is run like a business but with a non-profit motive; 8) an educational institution, either public or private; 9) a foundation, which in Finland are seen as non-profit organisations (Manninen, 2005).

According to Sandy Fitzgerald (2014), with Trans Europe Halles, the activities of the private cultural centres

> '*take place in the vacuum that often exists between citizens and the state, between vested interests and communities, between cultural development and consumerism … where the political or social status quo has failed to take responsibility, failed to act or is actively opposed to cultural democracy*' *(p. 6).*

Private cultural centres seem to rely on many different private subsidies, for instance, from the Swedish Cultural Foundation in Finland (2017) and Konstsamfundet (2016), and do thereby not have the same steady income from the state or the municipality as their public peers do. These private institutions are a very heterogeneous collection of actors that usually have modest balance sheets, making them unattractive for investors—which, in turn, usually prevents them from expanding (Kangas & Pirnes, 2015).

1.3.2 The public centre

Of the administrative bodies in Finland, both the state and municipalities maintain public cultural centres (Statistics Finland, 2017). The latter maintains the most. The idea to maintain a public cultural centre is to '*ensure both equal ability to both produce and experience art regardless of one's residential area or social background*' (Silvanto, et al., 2008, p. 170).

The offering of public services can be arranged in different ways by municipalities (Kangas & Ruokolainen, 2012). Public cultural centres are mostly part of municipalities' cultural services and thus funded by municipalities (Silvanto et al., 2008; Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2014). In a survey in 20 Finnish cities, public funding accounts for 17% of the total annual turnover of public cultural centres, sales and payment revenues 40%, rent income 28% and other incomes 14% (Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2014). A later survey finds that it is mostly impossible to gather information about public grants for public centres as the costs are divided among many areas of the municipality's spending. For example, the costs of maintaining the venue itself are often not counted in the turnover of a public cultural centre (Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2014).

Furthermore, according to Kangas and Pirnes (2015), the current system of accounting for state subsidies includes only expenditures and the amount of personnel, which does not give adequate information for assessing the content of activities or societal influence of the public centres. State subsidies, though, do offer economic security. At the moment, the municipalities have no sufficient efficiency or quality requirements or any aims of cultural policy that must be met. Neither is there an incentive system to reward organisations that have succeeded in achieving the aims of the current cultural policy (Kangas & Pirnes, 2015).

1.3.3 The hybrid model centre

The model in which both private organisations and the municipality maintain a cultural centre, or '*the open hybrid model of an institution based on civil-public partnership*'' (Fitzgerald, 2010, p. 63), seems to vary in funding sources and the share of ownership the various entities hold (Ruusuvirta et al., 2012; Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2014). Hybrid organisations appear at the interface of the state, market and civil society (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). These are organisational forms involving government bureaucracy, business firms and non-profit organisations. Although studies indicate the establishment of such public–private cooperation in Finland (Kangas & Pirnes, 2015), there are rather few practical examples of it within the cultural field, according to Kangas and Ruokolainen (2012). According to the quantitative findings of this study, there are 11 such hybrid centres.

Public funding is a commonality between this model and publicly funded private centres (Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2014). In Finland, the funding of public cultural centres and publicly funded private centres varies but generally is a substantial part of municipalities' budget for cultural services (Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2014). Directly involving the municipality as a co-maintainer of the cultural centre gives it direct responsibility for both the mission and the financial sustainability of the centre (Fitzgerald, 2010). The main idea in this collaboration is that the municipality present an equal, not a dominant partner.

1.3.4 The centre maintained by government agencies

The goal of privatisation among public cultural organisations in Finland has been to lighten the economic burden of municipalities (Kangas & Pirnes, 2015). The idea is that organisations themselves will find alternative private funding. The art industry, though, is different than the market and commercialism (Chong, 2008), so it is to be seen who will gain from the privatisation of cultural centres.

The support the government distributes to private organisations can have both direct and indirect forms (Kangas & Ruokolainen, 2012; Kangas & Pirnes, 2015). The most common support mechanisms are subsidies or grants, and the reported values of these are often used to summarise government funding to, for instance, to non-profits (Rushton & Brooks, 2007). Publicly funded private centres enjoy tax money, which, according to Chris Torch (2010), artistic director of Intercult in Stockholm, Sweden, builds their sense of responsibility as it is '*money from my neighbors and from the school teachers of my children, and it is also my own*' (p. 17).

1.4 Research problem

The aim of this study is to investigate how resource dependence influences institutions' strategic responses in the context of cultural centres. Private cultural centres are used as cases to highlight the institutional change happening in the field of cultural centres in Finland.

Not all municipalities have the resources to maintain cultural centres, and the future seems to promise even fewer opportunities for public funding. A survey indicated that public officials believe that cultural centres will not be a public service in 10 years, as external producers were assumed to take over this service (Kangas & Ruokolainen, 2012). There has been criticism of the number of public cultural institutions due to decreasing possibilities for public funding and the inability of centres to meet the changing demands of artistic content (Kangas & Pirnes, 2015). Whereas decreasing the numbers of these public institutions very well could solve the economic problems, it would also inevitably lead to a decrease in public services. Since 2010, there has been a movement to privatise governmental and municipal institutions. According to Kangas and Pirnes (2015), the main reason for this is to decrease cultural expenditures and to encourage and oblige these institutions to raise money from elsewhere. Still, in most of these cases, municipalities have retained their authority to monitor and control the activities and the economy of the centres, conveyed, for instance, by municipal board members (Ruusuvirta & Saukkonen, 2015). Furthermore, there are not many such private institutions operating under the legal auspices of a local authority.

People in Finland are looking for experiences and find cultural centres to be important providers of such (Silvanto et al., 2008). This could be a sign of growing interest in founding new private cultural centres even in smaller cities, where there are no public centres. I, therefore, assume that private centres will likely become an alternative to public centres in the future. Assuming that private centres aim to have the same mission as their public peers, what possibilities and tools do the managers of private centres have to actualise this mission? As legal entities, the private centres have the sole liability for their activities. With less steady income, they might over-emphasise renting the venue to external producers of cultural events. One can assume that the market for such cultural venues is restricted in smaller communities. With less external producers (renters) to choose among, the question becomes whether private centres can commit to a mission to produce versatile offerings of cultural activities in their venues, as their public peers do? The private centres simply may not be able to influence the program content of the external producer (the renter). In addition, a focus on acquiring more revenue can lead to mission drift.

However, the economic uncertainty among the private centres, created by the lack of steady public funding, generates a natural flexibility towards a changing environment (Eikenberry & Klover, 2004). Consequently, the lack of competition, as would seem to be the case with the public peers, leads to decreased innovation, efficiency and productivity (Sherer & Lee, 2002). Without competing forces, organisations have no need to change. In addition, private centres do not have to endure a public scrutiny and demands for insight, transparency and control of information and resources, which inevitably create time-consuming administrative work.

The creative economy is not consistently recognised as a market economy but as a quid-pro-quo economy, which complicates entrepreneurship, business activities and the development of organisational forms in the field (Taalas, 2010). Then again, in the creative hybrid economy (not to be confused with the hybrid model cultural centre presented above), Taalas (2010) emphasised, actors tend to lean against both the quid-pro-quo and the market economy. Here, both economies work in synergy, adopting the best features from both, challenging the institutional boundaries of the field. The creative hybrid economy questions the prior views on ownership, revenue logic and the common practice of organising, for instance, co-creations and peer networking. I argue that this quid-pro-quo and market economy synergy can be seen among cultural centres in Finland. Due to resource scarcity, private centres may be moving towards the creative hybrid economy and thus diverging from current institutional forces within the field of cultural centres in Finland. This movement is commonly the result of population changes and the role and status of the public sector, as well as continuous technical development and the internal dynamics of the cultural field (Kangas & Pirnes, 2015).

The aim of this study is to identify the strategic behaviours private cultural centres utilise in interactions with their environment. The focus of this study are the behaviours they adopt due to environmental pressure and resource dependence, particularly whether and how private cultural centres choose to accept or resist institutional forces in their environment. This study applies the patterns of behaviours conceptualised by Oliver (1991): 1) acquiescence; 2) compromise; 3) avoidance; 4) defiance; and 5) manipulation.

Figure 2—Relationships among the variables



New IT suggests that organisations wind up in conformity as to both form and performance outcomes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), while RDT suggests diversification based on sources of revenue (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). By extending Figure 1 in this thesis, the categorisation of the four centre types can be interpreted as follows.

Figure 3—Extension of Figure 1

New Institutional Theory		Resource Dependence Theory	
The Public Center	The Centers maintained by Governmental Companies	The Hybrid centers	The Private Centers
High Conformity	Moderate Conformity	Moderate Diversity	High Diversity

Figure 3 implies that the predictions of high conformity or isomorphism in new IT apply mostly to public cultural centres, whereas high diversification in both activities and revenue structures applies to private centres. The remaining two squares in the middle of the figure represent transitional stages between these two extremes and show that centres maintained by government agencies tend to exhibit slightly more conformity, and hybrid centres slightly more diversity. In practice, this implies that the more dependent a cultural centre is on a single source of revenue (in this study, the municipality), the higher the degree of conformity it displays. Similarly, the more dependent a cultural centre is on multiple revenue sources, the greater diversity it displays.

The overall aim of the study is to develop new insights into theories by problematising the empirical work in this study. Although cultivating different assumptions than those in the applied literature and problematising the empirical work are considered to be two disconnected methods (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014), this study put these approaches into interplay to produce contributions on a theoretical level.

1.5 Research questions and hypotheses

To unravel the research questions and hypotheses, this thesis focuses on exploring the rise of diverging strategical responses in an existing field due to resource dependence and the properties of institutional entrepreneurship and awareness.

The main research question of this study is:

How does the type and level of resource dependence affect the perceived institutional pressures on cultural centres?

This study is aimed at identifying the arguments on why and under which situations an organisation accepts or resists institutional pressures. Using IT, the RDT literature and Oliver's (1991) framework that connects environmental pressures to distinct organisational strategies, this study analyses how the type and level of resource dependence affect cultural centres in different ways. Private centres, which likely are dependent on diverse revenue sources, likely will exhibit a higher degree of diversity, whereas public centres, which likely are dependent primarily on one revenue source, likely will exhibit a higher degree of conformity.

How do such institutional contradictions arise? By focusing on knowledgeable change agents, this study examines change in a field-level setting and is aimed at answering this research question through a literature review on IT and RDT, interviews on the cases of four private cultural centres and a questionnaire sent to all cultural centres in Finland. The aim is to explore and build theory on how micro-level organisational behaviour influences macro-level field changes.

This research question requires a mixed methods approach. A solid mixed methods study, according to Creswell (2009), should begin with a mixed methods research question, such as this main research question, to frame the methods and the overall design of the research. Mixed methods research does not rely exclusively on either quantitative or qualitative methods as a combination of them contributes the broadest information to the study.

To address this broad main research question, three subquestions are examined:

Subquestion 1: *How does field-level isomorphism affect the development of private cultural centres that have different resource dependence than public centres?*

This thesis is aimed at exploring the effects of isomorphic pressures in the context of cultural centres. Isomorphism, a central concept within IT, refers to a shift towards homogenisation among organisations within a particular field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hambrick et al. (2005), though, suggested the opposite: isomorphic pressures can lead to isomorphism in reverse. In this thesis, my argument is that institutional change due to resource dependence leads not to isomorphism but to isomorphism in reverse.

Subquestion 2*: How does the perceived resource dependence affect the potential for mission drift in private cultural centres?*

Mission drift, in which an organisation deviates from its mission, is commonly defined as a process of organisational change (Jones, 2007). It may occur due to commercial activities and dependence on any dominant funder, such as foundations and the state. Mission drift is defined as a '*focus on profits to the detriment of the social good*' (Battilana et al., 2012, p. 51). While trying to manage diverse revenue sources, private cultural centres may become more resource than mission oriented. This study explores the connection between perceived resource dependence and mission drift.

Subquestion 3*: How do cultural centres*' *(all types) notions of their perceived legitimacy affect their environmental interdependencies?*

This thesis focuses on the legitimacy of existing cultural centres and how it affects their environmental interdependencies. As Oliver (1991) stated, organisations have possibilities to both resist and change the environment. Organisations should not be seen merely as passive recipients of institutional pressure. There are many ways for these organisations to manage institutional change, and this thesis explores how private cultural centres are doing that. In addition, this study explores how cultural centres perceive themselves as recognised by the environment.

To triangulate, confirm and get broader information about the situation of cultural centres in Finland, this study proposes a set of hypotheses related to the research questions and developed after examining the qualitative material. They are examined, along with the cases in the qualitative part of this study. The hypotheses of this study are:

H1: Public cultural centres experience more institutional pressures than private centres.

H01: Public cultural centres do not experience more institutional pressures than private centres.

H2: The type of perceived resource interdependence leads to a higher degree of resource diversification in private cultural centres.

H02: The type of perceived resource interdependence does not lead to a higher degree of resource diversification in private cultural centres.

H3: The degree of perceived strategic options leads to a higher degree of mission drift in private cultural centres.

H03: The degree of perceived strategic options does not lead to a higher degree of mission drift in private cultural centres.

H4: Cultural centres in general have a manageable environmental interdependence.

H04: Cultural centres in general do not have a manageable environmental interdependence.

There has been very little research on cultural centres per se, but related international research has shown that culture has positive impacts on cities (Lorentzen & Van Heur, 2013; Rehn et al., 2013). This study, therefore, also contributes useful information and tools for the administration of these centres. Using a similar approach as Sine et al. (2005), this study also contributes by demonstrating how regulations, competition and municipal support (or the lack thereof) have shaped organisational diversity among cultural centres in Finland. Chapter 4 presents a qualitative empirical analysis based on the interviews and quantitative empirical analysis of the questionnaire responses to highlight institutional entrepreneurs' strategies to overcome institutional contradictions and cope with resource dependence.

1.6 Definitions of the main concepts

To frame this analysis in IT and RDT, some core terms should first be defined: 1) organisations; 2) institutions; 3) organisational fields; 4) homogeneity and heterogeneity; and 5) early adopters and the late majority.

1.6.1 Organisations

Organisations are defined as social structures created by individuals with the objective to support the collaborative pursuit of stated goals (Scott, 2002): '*an organised collection of individuals working interdependently within a relatively structured, organised, open system to achieve common goals*' (Richmond & McCroskey, 2009, p. 1). Organisations vary in shape and size, but usually, every organisation has a structure, participants, technologies, a set of goals and physical limits that frame and constrain its actions. It is assumed by Scott (2014) that organisations can respond to changes in their environment as they are open systems. Organisations are social arrangements but follow collective goals within their institutional frameworks (Scott, 2014). Even if organisations encounter the same or similar institutional environments, they experience and respond to these influences in different ways. In other words, organisations are influenced by their institutional environment and react to it differently. As Child (1976, p. 2) highlighted, ‘*no organisation operates in a vacuum*’.

Scott (2002) emphasised that organisations are systems with rational, natural and open features. As rational systems, organisations are defined structures seeking to achieve goals. As natural systems, organisations are entities competing to survive within their environment. Lastly, as open systems, organisations exist to establish relationships with their environment. In other words, there is no point in studying organisations outside their environment, the very thing that explains their behaviour and efficiency (Scott, 2002).

Within the creative industries, where cultural centres are positioned, the work carried out is symbolic and produces experiential goods of non-utilitarian value (Townley et al., 2009). Arts organisations work with ‘*expressive or aesthetic tastes rather than utilitarian needs; their meaning and significance determined by the consumer’s coding and decoding of value*’ (Townley et al., 2009, p. 942). Creative cultural offerings are used and consumed differently than traditional goods, so there is uncertainty about their response to a presumed market. In fact, according to Chong (2008, p. 14), an arts organisation should ‘*be in the business of helping to shape taste, which suggests leading rather than merely reacting*’. Furthermore, arts organisations do not consider economic equity to be as important as cultural equity, whereas institutions in the business of mass production have an opposite view on the matter (Halonen, 2011). As Baumol and Bowen pointed out in 1966, the creation of art work is not correlated with productivity gains, the costs always grow over time, and revenue increases are limited by market forces, so the arts organisation are likely to fall behind (Webb, 2017). Nevertheless, arts organisations need to be cost effective and aim to diversify their funding sources and achieve efficiency in management structures in order to ensure financial stability without being guided by money (Chong, 2008). Quality and profitability, however, not mutually exclusive.

This study focuses on strategic choices at the organisational level. Decisions affecting changes within the field are made by cultural centres, which are organisations themselves. They are defined structures pursuing goals and competing for survival within their environment. In addition, they are in a relationship with their environment.

1.6.2 Institutions

In management studies, institutions are commonly analysed in the context of organisation (Scott, 2014). It, therefore, is important to distinguish between institutions and organisations. There are many definitions of institutions, and there is no general agreement on how to conceptualise institutions (North, 1990). Nevertheless, institutions are durable, versatile social structures built upon symbolic elements, material resources and social activities. They display unique characteristics, such as resistance to change and reproduction, and are non-generation specific (Scott, 2014). Actors usually accept and re-create beliefs and practices that have become institutionalised (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977). Streeck and Thelen (2005) described institutions on a general level as '*building-blocks of social order: they represent socially sanctioned, that is, collectively enforced expectations with respect to the behavior of specific categories of actors or to the performance of certain activities*' (p. 9). The institutions are furthermore distinguished between appropriate and inappropriate and between possible and impossible actions (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).

Institutions generate behavioural predictability and reliability (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Regardless of what the actors independently want to accomplish, they are expected to adjust themselves to the institution. The actors themselves, as well as society, hold these expectations. Douglass North (1990) proclaimed that institutions '*are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction*' (pp. 4-5). Institutions '*reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life*' (p. 3). They incorporate both formal rules (laws and constitutions) and informal constraints (conventions and norms). According to Greenwood et al. (2008), an institution is a

> *'more or less taken for granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-producing social order' (Greenwood, et al., 2008, pp. 4-5)*

Institutions reinforce each other and

> *'on the one hand, organizations inculcate and reflectively manifest norms, values, and meanings drawn from the institutions that surround and support them; and, on the other hand, institutions are reproduced through the actions of organizations' (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009, p. 177).*

Institutions are considered to be an answer to a problem (Berger & Luckmann, 2008). However, they are challenged if the answer changes. Equally, institutions can succeed if they are seen as answering a problem, even if it is no longer the original one.

There are at least three academic schools that define institutions in different ways (Scott, 2014). These are 1) historical, 2) economic and 3) sociological institutionalism. Albeit they share some similarities, they have evolved in quite differently. Historical institutionalists (1) usually examine the state, which is not considered to be a neutral player, but rather a network of institutions able to interfere in group conflicts (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This school sees "*institutions as providers of moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action*" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 6-8). Institutional economics (2) in turn aim attention on understanding the function of the evolutionary process and the role of institutions in forging economic behaviour. They give priority to an extensive study of institutions and they see markets as a result of the complicated interaction of these distinct institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996). There are quite a few versions of sociological institutionalism (3) (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Still, all of them are interested in institutions as social systems that adjust social interactions. According to sociological intuitionalists, institutions are composed of "patterns of activity", where actors conduct their material lives (e.g. rules, routines, habits, roles etc), and furthermore "symbolic" or meaning systems (e.g. beliefs, values, principles, paradigms, ideologies, theories etc) through which they make sense of the world. Sociological institutionalism usually sees institutions as social constructions that shape the understandings and preferences of actors (Scott, 2014).

This study focuses on, among other things, the interplay between homogeneity and heterogeneity, and institutions have an active role in disseminating institutional norms within an organisational field. This study does not aim to define whether a private cultural centre is considered an institution but does view public cultural centres as such. It does apply a sociological institutionalist approach to investigating responses to institutional pressures on organisations, as the empirical study foremost investigates perceptions, not behaviour.

1.6.3 Organisational fields

Researchers studying organisations occasionally use the term *field* to describe a set of organisations linked together, either as collaborators or competitors, within a social space with the purpose of accomplishing a distinct action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The literature includes various similar concepts, such as inter-organisational field (Aiken & Alford, 1970), institutional field (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and organisational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1991). Bourdieu (1984) presented a related but distinct concept of field as the setting where agents and their social positions are situated. Whereas Bourdieu (1984) concentrates on power and class relations, this study adopts the concept of a field defined by organisational researchers. Mazza and Strandgaard Pedersen (2004, p. 876) summarised the definition of the *field* in the literature as '*a social space [that] identifies a number of nodes, points of observation or positions and their mutual relations in the analysis*'.

The definition of an organisational field is still somewhat ambiguous in the literature (Machado-da-Silva, et al., 2006). Organisational fields are commonly viewed as

> *'sets of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products' (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 48).*

Scott and Meyer's (1991) concept of a societal sector is similar. It includes both organisations that offer comparable services or products in a given domain and other organisations that *'critically influence their performance'* (Scott, 2014, p. 83), where the concept of a field is emphasised as practical interrelation over geographical proximity. Scott (1994, 2002) identified funding sources and regulators as patterns in a functional field. Hoffman (1999) suggested that

> *'the field should be thought of as the center of common channels of dialogue and discussion […] which bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes'. (p. 352)*

A field can exist at various levels (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). It can be a distinct organisation consisting of a group of departments or individuals or a network of organisations functioning in the same environment, market or subsector. In addition, organisations can be seen as functioning as both as-fields and in-fields (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).

According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the actors in an organisational field interact through diverse exchanges and through competition. The authors also described the environment as a socially constructed field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this study, an organisational field consists of the arenas (e.g. cultural centres) for producing cultural offerings for the local community.

Institutional analyses commonly pay attention to field-level processes as these are happening at the organisational field level (Suddaby, 2010). As Scott (1994) put it:

> *"a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field". (pp. 207-208)*

The following three important components reinforce organisational fields: 1) actors, both individuals and organisations; 2) logics; and 3) governance arrangements (Scott et al., 2000). Hoffmann and Ventresca (2002) broadened this perception of an organizational field by recognising two supplementary field elements: 4) intermediary institutions; and 5) local sense-making activities. These components can both inhibit and enable action within fields and thus mold the behaviour and characteristics of organisational participants (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Meyer, 1991). Hoffman and Ventresca (2002) described the concept of a field as an empirical trace, which can be beneficial as it defines the borders for the shaping processes (e.g. competition, influence, coordination and innovation) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).

The field concept is relevant to the present research as it provides a method to study organisations both in combination and in interplay with their institutional contexts. Based on the foregoing, this study interprets the concept of an organisational field as a platform for interactions among all the cultural centres and their stakeholders. The institutional pressures exerted on private cultural centres are defined by this organisational field.

1.6.4 Homogeneity and heterogeneity

IT is intended to illustrate relations between organisation and environments and describe the contrasting aspects of processes that develop social facts (Scott, 1987). Environments reward organisations for efficiency and efficacy in markets, while institutional environments oblige individual organisations to conform in order to get support and legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organisations have to make choices to attain the legitimacy critical to their success when encountering the rules and regulations of institutional environments

Reacting to the pressures of an institutional environment, organisations active in the same field usually make similar choices to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This, in turn, causes isomorphism by reducing variety. In the initial stages of field development, organisations take different organisational forms. Diversity changes into homogeneity when the field is established (Rothman, 1980). Consequently, isomorphism is a constraining development that increases the similarity of organisations when they encounter similar sets of environment conditions and institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), primarily through three kinds of environmental mechanisms: coercive, normative and mimetic (for details, see section 2.1). Thus, IT focuses on institutional forces that lead to increased homogeneity.

Organisations may naturally also develop heterogeneity. They can avoid the constraining power of institutions (DiMaggio, 1988) or utilise overlapping institutions (Seo & Greed, 2002). The concept of institutional entrepreneurs' points to resourceful organisations that mobilise acceptance and support (DiMaggio, 1988). The extent of uncertainty and the rate of change in an environment affects the change of internal characteristics in organisations as the environment of every organisation has a distinct environment and makes choices that best suit the environment at hand (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). If an environment is weak or has fewer constraints, differences will increase as the organisation adapts to its environment. The literature demonstrates that both homogeneity and heterogeneity mirror the institutional effects on an organisational field (Hambrick, et al., 2005). IT has paid attention mostly to homogeneity and left heterogeneity quite under-researched.

Based on the theories of homogeneity and heterogeneity, private cultural centres that are late adopters within their organisational field (see chapter 1.6.5), face institutional forces and must adapt to the current rules set by the early adopters, which are public cultural centres. This study also points out that the dependence on diverse revenue sources that differentiates private cultural centres from their public counterparts leads to heterogeneity.

1.6.5 Early adopters and late majority

In 1962, Rogers published his book *The diffusion of innovation*, which explains how ideas and innovations are spread in society and how groups are classified in this process (Rogers, 1995). The diffusion of innovation, as the process is called, consists of the compliance of a particular element by a group of people connected to a social system over time. As Rogers (1995) put it, ‘*conceptual and analytical strength is enhanced by incorporating time as an essential element in the analysis of human behavior change*’ (p. 98).

Rogers (1995) proposed the curve of diffusion of innovation to describe the process through which an innovation is disseminated over time. The curve presents five categories of different adopters: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. Rogers (1995) emphasised the adoption of innovation as a social development, in which an adopter communicates with another possible adopter about innovations. If the first adopter sees potential to make it work, then the second adopter is more inclined to follow. The innovation is adopted if a group of people believes it will enhance their utility. The decision is made based on a cost-benefit analysis (Rogers, 1995). Furthermore, innovations that agree with organisations’ earlier operations demand fewer changes and are easy to evaluate are more likely to be adopted (Gustafson et al., 2003).

Rogers (1995) developed a model of the adoption new innovations in which innovators, the first to adopt, are distinguished by how much earlier they adopt new ideas than others in the social system. The model shows percentages of the number of adopters, divided in the five adopter categories Rogers (1995) introduced. The model can be seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4—Diffusion of innovation



Source: Rogers (1995).

The five categories that Rogers (1995) introduced are as follows.

Group 1 are the *innovators*. This group of people is prepared to take risks. They have a significant role in the early phase of implementation as their example makes others follow.

Group 2 consists of the *early adopters*. They are slightly more discrete and use the existing data of the innovators. This group is considered to have the majority of opinion leaders, and as such, it has the most important role in making the other potential candidates adopt.

Group 3, the *early majority*, are more conservative. They take more time to make a decision than the earlier two groups. They are seldom opinion leaders but do have regular contact with the early adopters.

Group 4, the *Late Majority*, adopts innovations at a later stage than the average participant. This group is more sceptical about innovations and have less disposable wealth. They are in contact with the early majority but seldom have opinion leaders.

Group 5 is the *Laggards*. They are usually quite traditional or even isolated in their own social system. They interact only with others in the same group and have a hard time seeing the benefits in presented innovations. They have few or no opinion leaders.

Rogers (1995) suggested that the adopters of an innovation can be classified by the normal distribution of the time of adoption. Applying the M and standard deviation (SD) of this distribution, it is possible to classify adopters in the five categories. Rogers (1995) furthermore concluded that early adopters are less fatalistic than late adopters, defining *fatalism* as the '*the degree to which an individual perceives a lack of ability to control his or her future*' (p. 273).

To simplify the following discussion, this study counts as early adopters both Rogers's (1995) categories of innovators and early adopters, and the later adopters as the groups in the rest of Rogers's (1995) categories. As presented in the introduction of this thesis, the very first cultural centre, Kulttuuritalo in Helsinki, was a private initiative, but except for this example, public centres have been the innovators and early adopters. Private cultural centres have been mostly late adopters, along with the two remaining categories.

A related theory to Rogers's (1995) categorisation of organisations into five distinct types is the incumbents/challengers distinction. Introduced by Gamson (1975), the categorisation of organisations as either incumbents or challengers has long been used social movement theory. Gamson (1975) suggested that social movement organisations, in this case, private centres, are likely to be challengers in a political system dictated by incumbents. In public cultural centres as systems of power, the rules help the incumbents preserve power and keep challengers to the side.

The incumbents have excessive influence in the field and power to construct it to their advantage, especially the rules, regulatory frameworks and structures for the distribution of resources (Gamson, 1975). Challengers, in contrast, have limited privilege and fewer resources but also fewer prerequisites under the rules and, therefore, can propose alternative visions of the field. Fligstein and McAdam (2011) suggested that 'in the modern world, state actors alone have the authority to intervene in, set rules for, and pronounce on the legitimacy and viability of most non-state fields', thus giving them 'unrivalled ability to impact the stability of most' private organisations' (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 8). Challengers nevertheless can change the field, especially if state actions change regulations and create new favourable circumstances or if new intruders arrive and invent extreme tactics that force the incumbent to react (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

This study assume that challengers have motivation to rearrange the social order. Incumbents have a strong relation to early adopters, as presented by Rogers (1995), as does the early majority with challengers. The title of this thesis refers to the distinction between incumbents and challengers.

1.7 Methodology

This study applies a sequential mixed method approach to analyse and discuss the findings as one phase of the study supports the next. A sequential mixed method approach is, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), beneficial for studies that aim to elaborate and expand the findings of one method using another method. In this research, the findings of the first phase of in-depth, qualitative interviews are expanded and elaborated in the second phase using a questionnaire-based quantitative approach (Creswell, et al., 2003). The quantitative and qualitative data are then analysed together but with more emphasis on the latter.

This PhD study examines contrasting aspects of a complex topic, and the research questions demand different methodologies. To understand how and why private cultural centres respond to institutional pressures and resource scarcity, an in-depth qualitative approach is needed. To estimate the differences between private and public cultural centres, a large representative dataset is essential to maximise the precision and generalisability of the results. Methodologically, to achieve triangulation, the first phase employs an interpretivist/qualitative research paradigm, while the second phase applies a post-positivistic/quantitative approach. The analysis combining these two paradigms relies mainly on pragmatism (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).

This study requires a high degree of analysis and interpretation, so I consider a case study to be the most beneficial research method for the first phase of qualitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2005; Svenning, 2003). Yin (2014) noted that as an empirical inquiry, case study design

> *'investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (p. 14).*

This study draws on 20 semi-structured interviews with five interviewees each at four cultural centres. An additional five interviews conducted at a fifth cultural centre are excluded as that centre concentrates on music, so it does not meet this study's definition of a cultural centre. The few other arts forms offered in the same house as the cultural centre are presented by other organisations with their own venues and entrances, making the house a scattered cultural oasis with no coherent theme, unlike a cultural centre.

A qualitative case study is intended to gain a broader understanding of the case, which is consistent with the aim of this study (Bryman & Bell, 2005; Svenning, 2003). I compare and contrast in-depth case study data and adopt an analytical framework to provide important, original contributions to knowledge. There is very little research on the subject, so I aim to fill this gap by reporting the findings of a qualitative study on the impact of strategy on the administration of private cultural centres.

In the second phase of quantitative research, a questionnaire survey was employed to collect data from all the Finnish cultural centres listed by Statistics Finland (2017). This study achieved a 56% response rate as 106 of 189 centres responded to the questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent to both public and private cultural centres. An inter-organisational field context, in which numerous organisations share resources and jurisdictions and where the government is dependent on the organisations to achieve its own cultural political goals (Fleishman, 2009), was the most suitable level of analysis to capture the interaction between the structural evolution and the institutional change of the cultural centres. Inter-organisational fields provide a beneficial framework to detect and making sense of the characteristics and the process of institutional change. The research methodology of this study is discussed more comprehensively in chapter 3.

1.8 Theoretical perspective

The administration of cultural organisations falls within a field of study drawing on management studies and the social sciences, including sociology, anthropology, political science, economics and social psychology (Giddens, et al., 2007). The interdisciplinary and methodological pluralism of this field should position it well to identify key contemporary concerns in the areas of economic performance, innovation and skills.

I use both RDT and IT to be able to examine the dynamic nature of the dependencies of the cultural centres. The multi-theoretical approach of this study follows Nicholls and Cho's (2006) call for a stronger theoretical basis for the study of social enterprises. Barney and Hesterly (1996) furthermore emphasised that the different contemporary approaches still resemble one another due to their common focus on the structure and survival of organisations. In addition, Scheinberg (2005) stressed the advantage of combining these different new institutional approaches.

IT (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) is adopted to illustrate how the exchanges between public and private centres, the early and late adopters, influence institutional change. Using RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), this study identifies effective approaches to the relation between mission and funding. Unlike traditional resource dependence studies, this study focuses on externally oriented and, to some extent, non-market-based organisations. I argue that both theories help explain the dependencies of the centres and the ongoing changes in the field. The theoretical perspective of this study is discussed more comprehensively in chapter 4.

1.9 Significance of the study

This study addresses gaps in the literature by focusing on the strategies private cultural centres employ to face institutional pressures and explores whether these strategies lead to isomorphism or isomorphism in reverse, which could lead to novel knowledge of what causes the reaction in either direction. Furthermore, this study aims to point out a distinction between IT and RDT, by categorising conformity (public centres) to IT and diversity (private centres) to RDT. This research also examines how resource dependence affects mission drift and perceived legitimacy. Private cultural centres need to find alternative revenues due to resource scarcity, so there are possibilities for mission drift as centres focus excessively on attaining resources. Perceived legitimacy is how the private centre identifies stakeholders' opinions about the centre and how that affects the activities of the private centres.

This study is significant at both the theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical level, it examines and extends the premises of IT and RDT to different environmental situations. Examining the insights of these theories in environments characterised by uncertainty, financial dependency and novel private initiatives may provide a basis for comparative research in the future. At the practical level, private cultural centres are seen as alternative agents, or institutional entrepreneurs, in the field of cultural centres in Finland. This study is aimed at explaining how and why the strategies of the private cultural centres develop and are implemented, as well as the extent to which these strategies affect the legitimacy and survival chances of the private cultural centres.

This thesis is also aimed at filling gaps in the literature on cultural centres in Finland by improving our understanding of them as organisations in terms of their measurement, modelling and organisational field. Finally, this thesis contributes by illuminating the strategic choices and the management factors that influence organisational performance and the sustainability of this institutional field.

1.10 Delimitations of the study scope

When conducting a study such as this thesis, it is essential to delimit the study from numerous themes and perspectives that could have been both interesting and relevant. This study focuses on cultural organisations, more specifically, private cultural centres in the Finnish context. Cultural organisations whose primary mission is to deliver one specific form of art, such as theatre, are excluded as their purpose differs to some degree from organisations focusing on many art forms with external performers.

Another delimitation of this study is to focus on the organisational aspects of private cultural centres rather than, for instance, the environmental impacts they have on society. I also decided not to study how the private cultural centres manage the quality of their artistic content. In addition, no comprehensive comparison between the economy of public and private cultural centres is made in this study as there are no accurate figures to be found on public centres on a common Finnish level.

This study employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches and a pragmatic worldview but still faces subjective limits. This study concentrates on providing a deeper understanding and insight into the phenomenon in focus. The material gathered in this study can contribute to existing empirical and theoretical information and identify directions for future research on private cultural centres and their strategic responses to institutional pressures and resource dependence. There are compromises and limitations when adopting a mixed methods approach, as in any study, whether qualitative or quantitative. When using the mixed methods approach, the researcher trades off generalisability in the qualitative phase and depth of understanding for the scope of the study in the quantitative phase. Even if the mixed methods approach decreases the shortcomings of both approaches, these weaknesses do not completely cease to exist. In all research decisions, including research design, therefore, the researcher focuses less on one thing due to a greater interest in another. In this study, for instance, public centres receive less attention due to the set focus on private centres. Public centres still shape the field of cultural centres and provide a very useful point of comparison. This study thus concentrates on how private cultural centres adapt or react to pressures in the field and uses public cultural centres as a point of departure.

1.11 Outline of the thesis

This thesis comprises five chapters, including the introduction. A general summary of the content of each chapter is provided here. Chapter 1 on the research objective presents an abstract and outline of the other sections of the thesis. Chapter 2 gives a review of the related literature, providing a historical and theoretical overview of both IT and RDT and the combinations of the two theories. This chapter covers the large, varied literature on the relationship between organisations and their environments. It also presents Oliver's (1991) framework, which anticipates organisations' strategic responses to environmental antecedents. Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach of this mixed methods study. Chapter 4 on the results reviews the main features of private cultural centres in light of Oliver's (1991) institutional antecedents and presents the similarities and differences of the four cases examined, as well as the questionnaire results. Lastly, chapter 5 presents the discussion and conclusion, including the concluding remarks on the research's practical implications and limitations and future research directions.

II LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents the theoretical foundations of the study and constructs a conceptual model applied in the empirical analysis. First *IT* is introduced, after which is a brief presentation of *RDT.* These sections present theoretical concepts and existing contributions to the theories. The chapter then moves on to discuss these theories and their application in detail in the section 2.3. This chapter concludes by identifying the theoretical and empirical gaps in research and to presenting the conceptual model applied in the empirical analysis.

2.1 Institutional theory

The research subject of this study falls within the scope of IT, which is addressed here accordingly. IT (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) is adopted to illustrate how the exchanges between public and private centres, the early and late adopters, influence institutional change in the organisational field. Given the abundance of relevant literature, this study is inevitably somewhat selective, something that Dacin et al. (2002) also endorses in order to gain focus.

For the aim to focus on institutional changes, it is essential to emphasises that the concept of an organisational field (see section 1.6.3) is the very essence of IT (Greenwood, et al., 2002). An organisational field is a group of organisations that are influenced by and cooperate with one another while producing goods and services (Scott & Meyer, 1991). This collective participation creates shared meanings within a framework that define the borders of the organisational field, which sets the qualifications for membership and the correct behaviour by internal members and members of other fields. This perception of an organisational field is seen among cultural centres as private initiatives initially give the impression of aiming to fulfil the same mission as their public counterparts.

2.1.1 Paradigm of institutional theory

IT is a strand of organisational research in which researchers have employed an open systems perspective to understand organisations (Scott, 2014). In practice, the theory focuses on how the organisation's environment both affects and interacts with the organisation. IT traditionally is divided into old and new IT. In what has become a seminal work on old IT, an article entitled 'Foundations of the theory of organization', Selznick (1948) perceived organisations as organisms that adapt to environmental threats. He saw tension between the formal and informal structures inside organisations. These tensions were also in tension with the institutional environment, which can repeatedly undermine the legitimacy of the managers in an organisation. The managers, in turn, may choose to co-opt the undermining environmental force to maintain legitimacy and survive. The consequence of this action is that the organisation has to adapt to its environment (Selznick, 1948).

Both old and new IT focuses on how organisations adapt to forces in their institutional environment, especially in the action of maintaining legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). New IT supplements rather than contradicts old IT. A difference nonetheless can be detected. In the old perspective, conflict is a political process, and constraints are imposed by compromises with vested interests. In the new perspective, both the political process and constraints arise from legitimacy and present common understandings (Scott, 2008). Another difference is that the old theory views the concept of environment as loose and local, with multiples ties and treaties. The new theory, in contrast, sees the environment at the field level as non-local (Scott, 2014).

New IT created new paradigms to grasp how institutional pressures form organisations and stimulate organisational change (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In what has become the fundamental work in new IT, the article 'Institutionalized organizations; formal structure as myth and ceremony', Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that a formal structure emerges in organisations as they conform to institutional norms and beliefs in their organisational environment. When an organisation conforms, it becomes restrained by rules and practices. These rules may not be efficient or the best organisational practices but are a necessity for obtaining resources and surviving. The rules are simply a result of institutional pressures to appear legitimate.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) expanded new IT by focusing on field-level institutional forces that increases organisational similarity over time. Organisations may adopt specific elements to seem normative within a field. This can also be done as a strategy to cope with uncertainty, for instance, by imitating those seen as the most successful in their specific fields. This is called institutional isomorphism.

IT focuses on deeper aspects of social structure (Scott, 2014) and examines the mechanisms that establish structures (e.g. schemes, rules, norms and routines) as valid codes for social behaviour. IT suggests that society consists of various institutions that give sense to and enforce conformity in social behaviour, thereby influencing and limiting organisations' actions (Pache & Santos, 2010). As Suddaby (2010) put it:

> *'The empirical reality is that organizations often behave in ways that defy economic logic or norms of rational behavior. And IT offers a paradigm devoted to understanding that' (p. 15).*

IT is considered to be a preeminent perspective within macro-organisation theory (Greenwood, et al., 2008). An organisation is affected by institutions that draw from its external environment and from within the organisation itself (Zucker, 1987; Scott, 2008). Along with social and cultural pressures, economic pressures that emerge from organisations' interactions in their institutional environments affect organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

There are many different approaches to IT (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Although there have been suggestions of a single paradigm for organisational studies, such umbrella-type institutionalism has also been criticised as the variety and complexity of the knowledge derived from organisational studies does not support it (Suddaby, 2010). Theories are developed for a diverse set of circumstances, and their premises and conclusions, as expected, echo these variations (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). For example, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focused on organisations and the organisational field as units of analysis, whereas Schmidt (2010) focused on '*culturally specific practices*' or 'institutions' as the unit of analysis, with institutions made of the '*norms, cognitive frames, scripts, and meaning systems that guide human action*' (p. 10).

When considering the arguments of Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1987), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (1987) that organisational interests and task requirements are institutionally defined and shaped, a theoretical problem emerges (Leblebici, et al., 1991). If what should be done and how to do it already are established by an institution, then can innovators become aware of necessary or possible changes in an inter-organisational field when the definitions of appropriate practices already are authenticated? As Leblebici et al. (1991) pointed out, the question arises whether methods replaced with new ones were ever truly institutionalised.

Leblebici, Salancik and Copay (1991) emphasised that institutionalised practices, which naturally solve coordination difficulties, also may be less appropriate for some parties and provide an impetus for concentrated resource competition. The authors (Leblebici, et al., 1991) furthermore highlighted that in contrast to what Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued, new practices that might develop will most likely be introduced by less powerful and peripheral actors, whose resource scarcity forces to look for alternative ways to maintain their activities.

At the same time, increased competition will inspire the dominant players to adopt the practices introduced by the successful outskirt organisations, which, in turn, will legitimise (and at some point, institutionalise) these practices—leading back to resource competition (Leblebici, et al., 1991).

2.1.2 Legitimacy versus efficiency and effectiveness

The notion of legitimacy is at the very heart of the concept of institutions and the idea of institutional change (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Meyer and Rowan (1977) were the first to argue that not all organisational actions are guided by efficiency. Departing from Berger and Luckmann's (2008) work, new institutional theorists argue that 'meaning is socially constructed among large numbers of organisations through the creation of shared practices and the collective attribution of rationality or justice to those practices' (Strandgaard Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006, p. 897). That is, organisational actors deal with problems by borrowing solutions they find in the broader environment. These solutions or best practices are usually selected based on their observed legitimacy instead of efficiency. Also, Oliver (1991) proposed legitimacy as an organisational purpose rather than efficiency or effectiveness. Organisations apply to themselves collective interpretations, which connect meaning to events and gives value to organisational outcomes and processes (Suddaby, 2010). Legitimacy is a method for organisations to acquire and maintain resources. Just as individual and collective identities usually are characterised in relation to another individual or collective, organisations tend to mold their organisational identities in relation to other organisations in their field, as well as the wider economy (Strandgaard Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006). Legitimacy is an objective to ensure organisational compliance to environmental stakeholders (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Suchman (1995) defined the concept of legitimacy as

> '*a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are socially desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, value, beliefs and definitions*' *(p. 547).*

Suchman (1995) suggested that there are three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy is based on the organisation's interactions with its audience, which has an interest in how the actions of the organisation benefits it. Moral legitimacy is less about a self-interest and more about a positive normative evaluation of an organisation. The organisation is granted legitimacy if its seen as doing what it should. It does not have to act in accordance with the norms and values of the audience; it merely has to have an explanation of how its actions fit into those. Cognitive legitimacy is neither the self-interest of the audience nor the evaluation of the organisation. If people see no other alternative except the taken-for-granted way of the organisation, they perceive it as legitimate. Suchman (1995) highlighted that these three types of legitimacy will probably conflict due to poorly articulated organisations or the historical transactions of the country.

Suchman (1995) furthermore merged two other existing approaches to his typology of legitimacy. First is the strategical approach of Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), where legitimacy is seen as a method for organisations to manipulate '*evocative symbols in order to garner societal support*' (Suchman, 1995, p. 572). Second, is the institutional approach of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), which emphasises broader dynamics beyond the purposive control of organisations.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) pointed out that some practices endorsed by the organisation could be less effective but still give legitimacy to the organisation in the eyes of key resource providers in the environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) broadened this viewpoint by suggesting that organisational fields end up with homogeneous forms due to the pressures of societal institutions and the collective rationality of organisational actors. DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) work has been developed and broadened ever since it was introduced, thus culminating in an institutionalisation of both the paper and the authors themselves (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). The homogeneity of forms, or the effects of isomorphism, is presented more thoroughly in section 2.1.3. The research strand of institutional change recognises that when creative organisations benefits from new methods, change will happen (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In other words, change affecting legitimacy can also happen internally as late adopters and challengers put pressure on the very concept of what is legitimate.

2.1.3 Isomorphism

Institutional isomorphism was presented by Powell and DiMaggio in their 1983 article 'The iron cage revisited' (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional change was described as organisations and institutions becoming increasingly similar, also known as the process of isomorphism. This dominant perspective within IT seeks to explain how and why isomorphism happens.

In the beginning of the organisation's lifecycle, it causes changes in the field in comparison to existing organisations, but it eventually finishes in institutional isomorphism to gain field stability (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014). '*Once an organizational field becomes well established, … there is an inexorable push toward homogenization*' (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). The idea is that organisations adjust to *rationalised myths* of proper organisations in society (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). These myths are thought to be answers to problems on a wider scale, which become rationalised as they are perceived as appropriate solutions. The very same notion that organisations in the same environment become increasingly alike was introduced by Weber in 1916, who proposed that organisations are forced into similarity by the *iron cage of rationality* and the competitive forces in society (Greenwood, et al., 2008). Isomorphism is an important alternative to efficiency-based explanations of organisational change in organisation theory (Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined the process of institutionalisation by identifying three distinct mechanisms through which institutional isomorphism is achieved: 1) *coercive isomorphism*; 2) *mimetic processes*; and 3) *normative pressures*. They are treated as mechanisms for isomorphism rather than types or forms of isomorphism (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) acknowledged that these analytically distinct mechanisms are empirically hard to separate. Furthermore, two or more might operate at the same time.

Coercive isomorphism. When an organisation experiences institutionalised pressure to behave in a certain way from an organisation on which it is dependent, this is called coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These pressures are considered by organisations to be forces for action, a sort of invitation to join collusion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but also as threats of sanctions if not complied with (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). Coercive pressures can be a consequence of resource dependence, where the organisation, for instance, has to adopt certain practices to be eligible for state grants (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive pressures that can lead to organisational isomorphism include, for example, government mandates, the budget cycle, financial reporting requirements and regulatory agencies.

Mimetic processes. Organisations have a tendency to imitate others that appear to be successful and legitimate within their environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This isomorphic propensity is a result of mimetic pressures and often uncertain environments and unclear organisational objectives. Thus, when organisations perceive the correct course of action as unclear, they may mimic the actions of other organisations that appear to be legitimate (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). This mimicking can go unnoticed by the organisation mimicked and provides appropriate actions that a copying organisation can make use of (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Mimicking has a favourable low cost in human capital. It provides a viable, low-cost solution to a problem due to an ambiguous environment. Of these three mechanisms, mimetic processes have received the most attention in research (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).

Normative pressures. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined normative pressures as the result of professionalism within particular organisational fields, characterised as

> *'the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the "production of producers", and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy' (p. 70).*

In other words, the operations of organisations can be influenced by employees' experiences in other organisations and education structures. One mode of legitimisation thus is the inter-organisational networks that span organisations. Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1987) expressed the viewpoint that social processes assume a rule-like status in thought and deed (Scott, 1987). Social processes become the shared definition of social reality and evoke conformity with common understanding defining rational, appropriate behaviours. Similarly, Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1987) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discussed the development of institutional templates as a catalyst of isomorphism, leading to a high level of structural homogeneity among organisations. Although the concept of isomorphism suggests no real opportunity for the organisation to differ from existing organisations within an organisational field, at least not in the long term, there is an articulated escape plan coined as *institutional entrepreneurs*, those who introduce change (DiMaggio, 1988).

Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) raised the question of what makes organisations more or less similar to each other. They challenged the notion of environment, asking: Which is the relevant environment to which the organisation reacts in isomorphism? In what ways are organisations presumed to become similar? Some answers may be found from Ostrom (2005), who presumes that due to the uncertainty surrounding founding of new institutions, most people are not willing to experiment with profound institutional changes. This argument is again in stark contrast to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (2014), who argued that it is in the beginning of the lifecycle that organisations implement changes before ending up in institutional isomorphism. Furthermore, Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson (2005) questioned the current focus on observing isomorphism, in many cases, among organisations selected for their internal similarity.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasised coercive, mimetic and normative pressures as most essential sources of isomorphism. Here, both individuals and organisations are involved in a comparatively passive process of accepting institutionalised models in response to institutional pressures and thus become isomorphic to achieve external legitimacy. Friedland and Alford (1991), though, argued that institutional change is brought about by potential for individuals and organisations to not only reproduce institutional orders but also actively change them:

> *'When institutions are in conflict, people may mobilize to defend the symbols and practices of one institution from the implications of changes in others. Or they may attempt to export the symbols and practices of one institution in order to transform another. […] Thus the sources of change and resistance within institutions are just as likely to be found in the contradictions between them' (p. 255).*

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) indicated that if organisations expand their transactions with the state or, in this study, the municipality, this will increase isomorphism due to the rules, formality and standards of government agencies that enforce conformity. According to Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson (2005), expanding DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) argument could just as easily lead to greater differentiation among organisations if governmental influence diminished for some reason. Whereas early new institutionalist theory viewed the institutional process as somewhat a one-way effect on organisations, it is instead a dual-direction process as organisations are not consistently passive or powerless (Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991; Scott, 2014). Facing institutional pressures, organisations can act in numerous ways, for example, by passively accepting or actively resisting pressures to adjust. This is very much what Oliver (1991) recognised in her five types of strategic responses: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation.

Although the iron cage hypothesis has gained support over the years, there has been a shift towards recognition of heterogeneity within the institutional environment (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Scott, 2014). Powell (1991) addressed this later but merely as a sort of error variance (Czarniawska, 2008). Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson (2005), Thornton and Ocasio (2008) and Dunn and Jones (2010) presented arguments that organisations become more heterogeneous, not more homogeneous, as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stated. The isomorphism in reverse that Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson (2005) presented shows an alternative or an expansion of the isomorphic viewpoint of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in which macro-cultural forces actually diminishes isomorphic pressure on organisations. The iron cage hypothesis, which focuses on how contextual forces affect the extent of homogeneity within an organisational field, highlights how increasing contextual forces lead to increased homogeneity. However, this hypothesis neglects the compatible logic that decreasing contextual forces lead to decreased homogeneity—in other words, heterogeneity within an organisational field.

Furthermore, how is transmission of such new practices even possible in an isomorphic institutional field? This question is partly explained by the concept of power (DiMaggio, 1988): Only institutions that have adequate resources are capable of introducing institutional change. However, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) stated that it is usually new organisations that introduce changes, which does not explain how power could be a sole explanation to the problem at hand. Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) argued that there is very little evidence on institutional isomorphism: The '*extant evidence is simply not conclusive*' (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008, p. 79).

2.1.4 Institutional pressures

Institutions act as forces upon individuals and organisations, developing social pressures and constraints and setting limits for all things accepted and not accepted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). These influences can be in the shape of normative, coercive and mimetic pressures (Davidsson, et al., 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), as discussed earlier in 2.1.3. Oliver (1991) constructed a typology of responses to institutional pressure based on the following questions: Why are pressures applied? Who is applying them? What kinds of pressures are they? How are they applied? Where do they occur? All these questions are related to the predictive factors influencing the choice of strategy (i.e. acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation). This typology indicates a new institutional perspective as it highlights the deliberate capacity of organisations as they strategically counter the demands of their environment. Oliver (1991) noted that there has been very little research on the flexibility of organisational responses to institutional pressures. She proposed that researchers should critically examine early institutional frameworks, which, in turn, has emphasised the passive role of organisations within institutional environments. Oliver (1991) thus challenged the hypothesis of early institutionalists by simplifying the ways that organisations can (and usually even do) take action to change, influence and resist institutional pressures. She did this by presenting five distinct types of organisational strategic responses to institutional processes while focusing on managing the institutional context.

Acquiescence. This response consists of complete compliance with taken-for-granted norms, accepting and obeying rules of the field and mimicking models promoted and endorsed by the field (Oliver, 1991). This may happen through habit, compliance or imitation. Habit is unconscious adherence to accepted norms and values. Compliance is conscious obedience to institutional requirements, norms or values. Imitation is organisations' mimicking of successful organisations within their environment.

Compromise. This response is adopted by organisations when they face conflicting institutional demands or inconsistencies between institutional and organisational goals and demands (Oliver, 1991). Compromise is a sign of partial compliance. This response in intended to balance, bargain or pacify institutional demands through negotiation with institutional stakeholders. When balancing, the organisation plays institutional actors against each other. Bargaining is accommodating some institutional elements and discussing compromises with institutional actors at the same time. To pacify is to partially conform to one or more constituents to pacify any threats.

Avoidance. This strategy incorporates activities that to some extent disguise or absorb organisational disagreement with institutional norms (Oliver, 1991). If organisations use such an approach, they may aim to alleviate their institutional attachments in order to modify the goals or activities the institutional context forces upon them. Avoidance may be done through concealing, buffering or escaping. Concealing is symbolic compliance to institutional norms or procedures. Buffering involves reducing institutional inspections from outsiders. The organisation can also escape conformity by changing its goals, activities or physical location (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Defiance. In this response, organisations take actions directly challenge or attempt to shape institutional requirements. Oliver (1991) presented three methods of defiance: dismissal, challenge and attack. The organisation may altogether ignore institutional pressures when, for instance, these norms differ dramatically from organisational values. They also challenge the rules, norms and expectations of the institutional environment to enforce their own vision, especially if these rules are not broadly shared. To attack is to actively resist. The organisation can try to change institutional values by denouncing or belittling them.

Manipulation. Manipulation is the most active strategy and encompasses organisational recognition and understanding of institutional rules and their value to organisational sustainability (Oliver, 1991). This response requires that the organisation has a dominant position within the institutional context. The methods of manipulation are influence and control. In influencing, the organisation may try to change the acceptable practices by, for instance, lobbying the government. In controlling, the organisation may try to establish dominance and power over the source of institutional pressures, forcing it to change (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Figure 5—Responses to institutional pressures

Passive Conformity ⟷ **Active Resistance**

Acquiescence	**Compromise**	**Avoidance**	**Defiance**	**Manipulation**
Habit	Balance	Conceal	Dismiss	Co-opt
Imitate	Pacify	Buffer	Challenge	Influence
Comply	Bargain	Escape	Attack	Control

Source: Jamali (2010).

These five distinct organisational responses are also in focus while analysing the empirical material in this study. In contrast to the framework for organisational strategic responses presented by Oliver (1991) stands the already-presented view of isomorphism, in which organisations have much less room to influence their development and position within their organisational field.

Oliver's (1991) model introduces some problems, according to Reale and Seeber (2010). For example, the predicting factors can foretell conflicting responses but cannot determine which one is accurate as there is no ranking of the responses (Reale & Seeber, 2010). In other words, there is no possibility of full acquiescence as it is not possible for both responses to work alongside each other. Oliver's (1991) typology is grounded on the assumption that organisations do not change their habits. If they have nothing to gain, organisation will not participate in processes. This assumption is overturned occasionally as organisations may have something to lose if they do not change, according to Reale and Seeber (2010). Furthermore, pressures need to be clearly defined in order for the typology to fully work, as would be hard to do, for example, if analysing organisational reactions to funding cuts.

2.1.5 Institutional change

Every strand of IT has its own specific features (Amenta & Ramsey, 2010), but all still try to explain from different perspectives the causal relationship between distinct effects in society and higher-order conditions. This study highlights sociological theory, which, according to Hodgson (2006), sees institutions as '*systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions*' (p. 2). Researchers have long debated the concepts of change and transformation (Mazza & Strandgaard Pedersen, 2004).

Institutions are somewhat stable social arrangements and practices through which collective actions are taken (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009). A social arrangement is institutionalised when it is practiced extensively, resistant to change and undisputed. When a set of institutional arrangements is exchanged with another or reshaped substantially, institutional change occurs. This can occur for both external and internal reasons (Scott, 2008). External reasons for change, which can be political, social or economic, are interruptions in neighbouring systems that undermine current rules and perceptions. Among internal reasons for change are gaps and discrepancies between macro-systems and micro-activities in reactions to local situations, expectations not met by persistent poor performance levels, and conflicts between institutional elements and competing frameworks.

Institutional change, however, usually is incremental, not abrupt (North, 1990). New practices emerge when creative organisations collect the benefits of new methods (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). At the same time, organisations are said to be affected by institutions through regulations. Organisations endure by adjusting to the institutional norms (Meyer, et al., 1983) and social expectations of the environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Even institutions that endure a long time are not immune to change. However, if actors, through their actions, actively create social structures that are themselves socially constructed, and if these actors also have the ability to both change and create new institutions, this poses a paradox to resolve: *'How can actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to* *change?'* (Holm, 1995, p. 398). As Scott (2014) put it: *'Change poses a problem for institutional theorists, most of whom view institutions as the source of stability and order. If the nature of actors and their modes of acting are constituted and constrained by institutions, how can these actors change the very institutions in which they are embedded?'* (p. 181).

Institutional change was conceptualised as a six-stage process by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002). In stage 1, the institution likely undergoes jolts that destabilise norms and established practices. In stage 2, a process of de-institutionalisation commences and interferes with the socially constructed consensus. Stage 3 is the pre-institutionalisation level, where innovations that may come to replace the previous norms and practices are introduced. In stage 4, also called the theorisation period, the institution develops the pragmatic and moral legitimate arguments for the new norms and practices. Next, in stage 5, the new norms are spread among other organisations in the field. Finally, stage 6 is the re-institutionalisation phase when the new norms and practices gain cognitive acceptance and become taken for granted (Greenwood, et al., 2002).

Figure 6—Stages of institutional change

Stages	Characteristics
1 - Precipitating jolts	Social, technological or regulatory events that destabilize practices
2 - Deinstitutionalization	Emergence of new players Ascendance of actors Institutional entrepreneurship
3 - Preinstitutionalization	Independent innovation Technical viability paramount
4 - Theorization	Specification of general organizational failing Justification of abstract possible solution Moral and/or pragmatic legitimacy
5 - Diffusion	Increasing objectification Pragmatic legitimacy
6 - Re-institutionalization	Cognitive legitimacy

Source: Greenwood et al. (2002).

Scott (2014) highlighted that IT as a whole is built on the notion that organisations are open to their social and cultural environment. In fact, much of the literature considers institutional change to be an evolutionary Darwinian process of variation, selection and inheritance (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Still, the cultural contexts in which organisations are active are often viewed as permanent, which suggests that actors do not always recognise or reflect upon the cultural contexts (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009). This assumption, in turn, supports Veblen's theory from 1889, the old institutionalism, which holds that institutional change is driven by changes in population and technology, so institutions never completely adapt to the demands of the present and are subject to constant change (Veblen, 2009). Continuous change is also supported (Dacin, et al., 2002). Nevertheless, Czarniawska (2008) emphasised that continuous change is a feature of old institutionalism, whereas stability is the norm according to new institutionalists, who have not adequately explained the issue of change. Consequently, the persistence of institutions is identified by many as the very thing that makes institutions meaningful (North, 1990; Scott, 2008). This persistence, though, also prevents attempts at institutional change, at least theoretically, and makes all changes profoundly gradual.

The theory of institutional change has been criticised for its lack of understanding contemporary changes (Greenwood, et al., 2008; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Earlier, institutions were often seen as immutable entities (Dacin, et al., 2002; Greenwood, et al., 2008) in the midst of homogenisation (Dacin, et al., 2002). However, a growing number of studies today have pointed towards institutions as dynamic and somewhat political processes (Greenwood, et al., 2008; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). According to Czarniawska (2008), the common institutional view has become that change takes place within boundaries made up by institutional thought structures. However, a vast number of changes still occur, and among the unforeseeable changes are radical ones. This implies that other factors are at play in addition to the institutional pressures of an organisational field.

To illustrate the interdependence between organisations in a specific domain, the idea of an organisational field has been presented (Scott, 1994). Organisations become more homogeneous over time as they strive to gain legitimacy within their environment, according to IT (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In a process known as isomorphism, the institutional context offers organisations a *template for organising* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 27). Organisational fields nevertheless may vary in both the structure and the strength of the institutional pressure exercised within them (Tolbert, 1985; Battilana, et al., 2012).

Organisations, however, are to an increasing extent seen as active agencies (Oliver, 1991) that may respond to institutional pressures in a variety of ways. Oliver's (1991) ideas correlate to field-level dynamics.

Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King (1991) drew the conclusion that the organisation of a field is not perpetual but is conditional to institutionalised definitions of the things that are transacted. Rather than looking at fields as stable, they are viewed as in a state of constant change (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Thus, institutional complexity is accepted and regarded as the instrument for institutional change rather than enduring institutional stability. According to Suddaby (2010), contemporary organisation theorists nevertheless focus merely on change as the favoured outcome and overlook the aspects of institutionalisation that maintain institutions and create stability.

Mission drift, in which an organisation deviates from its mission, is usually defined as a process of organisational change (Jones, 2007). It has especially been applied to organisations with a social mission, such as non-profit organisations, social enterprises, hospital and educational bodies. Mission drift may occur due to commercial activities and dependence on any dominant funder, such as foundations and the state. Mission drift is described as a *'focus on profits to the detriment of the social good'* (Battilana, et al., 2012, p. 51).

Identifying missing drift is seldom uncomplicated (Jones, 2007). It may clearly arise when organisations officially change their missions, strategies or objectives, but it can also take place in less visible ways, such as changes to practices of organisational work or to the quality of the services (Weisbrod, 2004). Moreover, the organisation may be forced to change its mission as the problems or demands on which it initially focused have changed. It, therefore, may be difficult to distinguish between what is a necessary change and what is mission drift (Bielefeld, 2009).

Weisbrod (1998) emphasised that organisations with flexible mission statements are prone to mission drift from their core services as financially tempting projects appear. These organisations may be tempted to take part in economically stable and politically neutral projects. The goals of the organisation and the government may be compatible, but Lipsky and Smith (1989) have nonetheless highlighted that contracting requirements may change the organisation's approach to services*: 'In essence, they may be forced to conform to standards* *imposed by contracting policy at the expense of their home-grown notions of what constitutes effective service delivery'* (p. 638).

Bennet (2008) emphasised that a flexible mission may be beneficial and more sustainable for organisations. Although Cairns et al. (2005) argued that mission drift exists, Chew and Osborne (2009) contended that organisations can stay true to their missions even if they display flexibility in organisational operations and structures. Macmillan (2010) furthermore stated that, '*in the absence of focused empirical research on the maintenance or elasticity of third sector organization missions over time, we are left with some concern about the potential for mission drift, but no clear indication of its prevalence or the causes and consequences of drift*' (p. 23). The risk of mission drift is thus deep-rooted in social enterprises (Jeter , 2017). It even seems as if it is inevitable, whether temporary or permanent. It, therefore, is often seen as a spectrum instead of a binary concept.

The concept of mission drift nevertheless is much debated. Sommerfeld and Reisch (2003) found that '*nearly all respondents remarked on how their agencies*' *programs have become more outcome-based, although their overall mission has not changed*' (p. 312). Chavez et al. (2004), though, has pointed out that public funding has not had negative effects on non-profit political activity, and organisations with public contracts do not automatically forget their engagement with their mission. Froelich (1999) stated that mission drift might actually be a resource diversification strategy.

Meyer and Rowan (1977), moreover, discussed that any attempt to change institutional environments can advance in two dimensions. The first dimension is where powerful organisations compel their networks to adjust to their practices, much like DiMaggio's (1988) concept of power. The second dimension also includes powerful organisations, especially those associated with the state, that seek to impose their goals and practices onto society as institutional rules. Here, we can draw a parallel with the public cultural centres. If we put aside the unilateral view of powerful organisations as the only possible game-changers, Leblebici et al. (1991) raised a second theoretical problem:

> *'Why do those who occupy the positions of power in the existing institutions willingly change its practices? Their self-interests are isomorphic with the prevailing practices, and they would have the most to lose' (p. 337).*

Leblebici et al. (1991), in a sense, thus, paved the way for the *embedded paradox* (Holm, 1995): How actors can change institutions if their actions, intentions and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?

DiMaggio (1988) tried to give an answer to this question by explaining that the

> *'.success of an institutionalization process creates new ... legitimated actors who… pursuing distinct interests, tend to delegitimize and deinstitutionalize aspects of the institutional forms to which they owe their autonomy and legitimacy' (p. 13).*

Here, we can find private cultural centres as the late majority or the late adopters as it is probable that as the resources required to maintain an established standard become scarce, more actors look for the same resources. This leads to an uneven distribution of resources, and a number of actors has to look for other alternatives (Leblebici, et al., 1991). DiMaggio (1988) also referred to this scenario, acknowledging that standards might not be consistently applied as they might not appeal to every organisation.

What, though, if the constant change is not a change other than in comparison to the boundaries of the original organisational field? Where do we draw the outer limits for an organisational field? When is change merely a shift in paradigms within an organisational field, and when is it a split into two organisational fields? Private cultural centres appear to have presented an alternative method for the field, with contrasting funding and content. With a different structure, they have also introduced a different set of dependencies into the original field of cultural centres in Finland.

Pressure from both the market and dominant funders may cause mission drift. Resource dependency theory and IT are both especially advantageous to understand the connection between organisations and their environments (Oliver, 1991). They both illuminate the pressures and mechanisms that may induce mission drift. This study highlights the friction between early and late adopters, public and private cultural centres, and the field level change happening. The legitimacy of early adopters is being contested by late adopters due to the need to establish effectiveness to get funding.

2.1.6 Institutional entrepreneurs

DiMaggio (1988) termed actors that introduce changes that support the conversion of existing or the creation of new institutions as institutional entrepreneurs. These institutional entrepreneurs are usually characterised by three qualities (Fligstein, 1997): They are knowledgeable actors (Giddens, 1976), have enough resources to influence institutionalised rules (Fligstein, 1997) and possess a social skill that helps them persuade others to support the institutionalisation processes carried out (Fligstein, 1997). Institutional entrepreneurs can be organisations or groups of organisations (Greenwood, et al., 2002) or individuals (Maguire, et al., 2004), including commercial entrepreneurs, regulatory agencies, scientists, governments and other actors involved in the development of a new field (Battilana, et al., 2009). While seeking to change the institutional environment, actors often act together to gain socio-political legitimacy and to run the transformation process (Wijen & Ansari, 2007).

Mahoney and Thelen (2009) suggested that institutional change takes place when complications in interpreting and applying rules enable actors to implement current rules in new ways. Additionally, Leblebici et al. (1991) highlighted that incentive for change in inter-organisational field might emerge as actors modify practices to solve emerging problems from transactions with each other. The problems that may arise could be the nature of the goods being transacted and the availability of resources. Leblebici et al. (1991) thus argued that changes happen at the micro level and are later validated on the macro level.

Suddaby (2010) stressed that researchers should focus on why an organisation has adopted a new practice by asking the participants, instead of only assessing the outcome. Individuals disappear altogether from institutional research surprisingly frequently. Suddaby (2010), though, also reminded us that Mills (1949) and Goffman (1961) already pointed out that actors often do not know why they submit to social pressure. Suddaby (2010) still proposed that instead of focusing on structural components (isomorphism and decoupling), there should be a greater emphasis on ideational elements, such as rationalised myths, legitimacy and taken-for-grantedness.

Westphal and Fredrickson (2001) argued that people in general have a tendency to legitimise their earlier action. Organisational managers, therefore, are likely to validate the prevailing strategy merely because they were part of its formation. Validation is also the likely to occur if an individual among an extensive group is prominently engaged in an activity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).

Nevertheless, one may end up in a theoretical paradox when incorporating actors and interests into IT due to the assumption of actors' agency. If it is assumed that actors are moulded by their institutional environment, then '*how can actors change institutions if their actions, intentions and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?'* (Holm, 1995, p. 398). This theoretical inconsistency between institutional determinism and agency is called the *paradox of embedded agency* (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Holm, 1995; Seo & Greed, 2002). It is nevertheless important to remember that institutions do not only limit human agency—institutions are above all constructed by human agency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).

Despite the emergence of the concept of the institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988), there is not wide understanding on why specific change agents take action. The connection between micro-level actors and the dynamics of macro-level field changes is yet to be explored. The assumptions about institutional entrepreneurs made by DiMaggio (1988) and Fligstein (1997) have some difficulties. They do not consider the intricacy of actors' agency and actors' institutional environment but assume that some institutional entrepreneurs have the drive to make changes regardless of institutional pressures and without explaining why. I assume that, for example, resource instability gives rise to these institutional entrepreneurs. Studies have found that unstable resource allocation can bring about an institutional change; Ruttan (2006), for instance, argued that agricultural technology improvements and population growth in a Philippine village accelerated faster under decentralised private contracting between individual farmers than would have happened with centralised and coordinated political entrepreneurs.

One could argue that both heterogeneity and homogeneity fit in the premises of the initial isomorphism presented by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Fringe players introduce new conventions, which become institutionalised, and thereafter, these fringe players become similar with the rest of the field. According to a study by Leblebici, Salancik and Copay (1991), successful outskirt organisations were instrumental in developing new practices which later became institutionalised and proceeded to construct new competitive pressures to find alternatives outside their boundaries. Leblebici, Salancik and Copay (1991) suggested that institutional change is the result of internal forces connected to the historical evolution of the field itself.

Although surely not exhaustive, this discussion above has hopefully contributed a foundation for readers of this thesis to understand the essence and background of IT. The focus now turns to RDT, its background and its relevance to this study.

2.2 Resource dependence theory

Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) first proposed the RDT in 1978 in their book *The external control of organisations*, but it has its roots in Emerson's (1962) power-dependence relations. RDT has become highly influential mostly because it is empirically accurate and appropriate for the social environment of research (Davis & Cobb, 2010). RDT is connected to organisational theories, and its aim is to explain the behaviour and performance of organisations (Nienhuser, 2008). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) initially proposed that organisations are not self-sufficient and in complete control of their destiny, so they need to identify their external environment as a source for being controlled and affected by others (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).

> '*Organizations must transact with other elements in their environment to acquire needed resources, and this is true whether we are talking about public organizations, private organizations, small or large organizations, or organizations which are bureaucratic or organic*' *(Burns & Stalker, 1961, p. 2).*

This is very much what Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) highlighted in 1978: the organisation's environment '*encompasses every event in the world that may potentially have an effect on the organization's activities*' (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 3). Hatch (2013) further developed this definition by emphasising that an organisation's dependence on its environment is a reaction of '*its need for resources such as raw materials, labor, capital, equipment, and outlets for its products and services*' (Hatch, 2013, p. 70). Hence, the environment can influence organisations through elements as '*competitive process, desirable products and services, and efficient organizational structures and processes*' (Hatch, 2013, p. 70).

The range of the organisation's dependence on specific exchanges needed for its activities determines its vulnerability to extra-organisational influence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The two somewhat interrelated dimensions of the significance of a resource exchange are the relative magnitude of the exchange and the urgency of the resource. There must be either a concentration of resource control or a few (or only one) significant organisations doing all the input or output transactions for one organisation to depend on another. In other words, the critical point is whether the organisation has access to the same resources from other sources. The mere quantity of resource suppliers (or purchasers, for that matter) is not as important (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Dependence on the environment for successes and tribulations per se is not a challenge (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). Rather, it is the undependability of the environment. There might be changes, new competition or perhaps a decrease in the supply of resources. A change in the environment thus can lead to either to ruin or modifications of organisational activities.

2.2.1 Positioning resource dependence theory

Before mid-twentieth century, the dominant view on organisations were prescriptive, as if one ideal structure fit all without a regard for organisational differences (Tausky, 1978). These theories were debunked by many researchers, who showed that the structures of organisations are connected to a variety of factors (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1976). Features of the environment, the size of the organisation and other factors influence both the structures and activities of organisations.

RDT is by no means the only or even the first theory to stress the significance of the environment. Environmental dimensions emerged in Williamson's (1975) transaction cost economics theory, Meyer and Rowan's (1977) IT and Hannan and Freeman's (1975) population ecology. Nevertheless, these theories are not the same; transaction cost economics emphasises uncertainties (demand, behavioural, technological and supplier uncertainty) that add to the cost of exchanges (Williamson, 1979). The environment is said to directly form the organisation in population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and in IT (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In contrast, RDT emphasises the possibility of managerial action to both shape and react to the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Whereas one might agree that the initial study by Pfeffer and Salacik (2003) accorded well with the empirical world of its time, some have pointed out that it has become a child of its time (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). As Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) highlighted, the need for modification is apparent, especially in tactics, such as diversifying, which very well might do more harm than good among industry corporations. Although Pfeffer and Salancik's (2003) book is frequently quoted, few studies have contributed empirical validation of the theory's predictions.

> '*RDT has acquired the status of a powerful general metaphor, but it was marginalized as an engine for theoretical advancement and a basis for testable empirical research' (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005, p. 167).*

Despite the theory's period of inactivity, it seems to have seen a revival of interest, among authors such as Amy Hillman (2005), Westphal et al. (2006) and Katila et al. (2008). The latter claimed that RDT has neglected the competitive side of tie formation and called recent efforts to update it a '*recent renaissance of resource dependence theory*' (Katila, et al., 2008, p. 321).

2.2.2 Interdependency, strategic options and power

RDT has three main themes crucial to understanding how organisational decision making is constrained by the environment: 1) *interdependency*; 2) *strategic options*; and 3) *power* (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Interdependency. Organisations are embedded in networks of both interdependencies and social relations. Organisations use resources acquired from external relations as inputs to ensure their survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Dependencies are generally mutual and occasionally indirect. If organisations could generate all the resources they need to survive, there would be no need to establish relations with the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). However, organisations need to interact with other organisations to obtain a continuous and sufficient flow of resources in order to satisfy their stakeholders. Resource availability depends on the dynamism, complexity and generosity of the environment. Thus, organisations interact with the environment to guarantee the availability of the resources on which they depend (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

> '*Virtually all organizational outcomes are based on interdependent causes or agents. Interdependence characterizes the relationship between the creating an outcome, not the outcome itself' (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 40).*

RDT adds a new perspective to the debate of inter-organisational relations by adding a detailed register of organisational responses to interdependence. The resources on which organisations traditionally dependent are financial, informational and physical (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Strategic option. RDT emphasises managers' role in reducing resource dependence by managing the dependencies (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Malatesta & Smith, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This view—that the manager has the ability to shape the environment, not only be shaped by it—constitutes the originality of the theory compared to other contemporary theories, such as population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).

Figure 7—Typology of relationships and strategies

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">Is the stakeholder dependent on the organization?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Is the organization dependent on the stakeholder?</td><td>Yes</td><td>Direct compromise
(high interdependence)</td><td>Direct coercion
(stakeholder power)</td></tr>
<tr><td>No</td><td>Indirect compromise
(organization power)</td><td>Indirect coercion
(low interdependence)</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Frooman (1999, p. 200).

Frooman (1999) furthermore emphasised that the organisation's relationships with stakeholder can affect the strategies the organisation and the stakeholder apply. He proposed four arguments in this regard, as follows:

1) *'When the relationship is marked by stakeholder power, the stakeholder will choose a direct withholding strategy to influence the firm.*
2) *'When the relationship is marked by firm power, the stakeholder will choose an indirect usage strategy to influence the firm.*
3) *'When the relationship is one of high interdependence, the stakeholder will choose a direct usage strategy to influence the firm*
4) *'When the relationship is one of low interdependence, the stakeholder will choose an indirect withholding strategy to influence the firm' (Frooman, 1999, p. 202).*

The consequences of these four arguments are as follows. First, if the organisation's dependence on the stakeholder is high, one stakeholder is capable of using a restraining strategy, exercising high-intensity measures (Frooman, 1999). Second, if the organisation has dominance over the stakeholder, the stakeholder is only capable of use an indirect usage strategy while searching for alliances with other stakeholders. The stakeholders exercise lowintensity measures. Third, if there are high exchanges between the stakeholder and the organisation, the stakeholder aims to use direct usage strategies, implying lower-intensity measures than the direct restraining strategy. Fourth, if the exchange between the stakeholder and the organisation is low, the stakeholder uses an indirect restraining strategy to intimidate the resource needed by the organisation with measures to balance organisation power by cooperating with other stakeholders (Frooman, 1999).

Power. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) analysed the sources and consequences of power in inter-organisational relations and addressed questions such as the sources of power and dependence and how those who run organisations use their power and manage their dependence. Central to RDT is the argument that dependence leads to power, and power consists the control over vital resources (Ulrich & Barney, 1984; Davis & Cobb, 2010). If one organisation is dependent on another, the latter is the one with power. In other words, power is more a structural variable than an attribute of organisations (Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

According to Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), the notion of resource interdependence is quite vague as it combines a variety of dimensions that should be distinguished. This argument is crucial as it changes the predictions of RDT. The theory traditionally states that a high level of interdependence results in cooperation between firms (by alliances or mergers). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), however, emphasised that a high power imbalance in a dyad is connected to a reduced likelihood of creating an alliance as the powerful partner has advantages in an alliance with the weaker partner. Such an alliance would implicate that the powerful partner shares its competitive advantage and gains nothing, diminishing its power and sharing its favourable conditions. However, if the mutual dependence is high, both organisations have good reasons to cooperate (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).

Figure 8—Interdependence, strategy options and power



Figure 8 is an attempt to visualise the relations between the interdependent organisations (A and B), and how the socio-political system can exert political and social power over the organisation and how market power is the force between the organisations and their competitors. All of these relations are met with strategical manoeuvres and the resource interdependence between organisations A and B is considered as an asset leading to power for them both.

Malatesta and Smith (2014) pointed out that RDT's key constructs, such as the power-dependence effect that emerges in diverse inter-organisational relationships, are not that easy to measure. Matters evolve, and a relationship can be hard to distinguish from a partnership or a joint venture.

2.2.3 Role of the environment

As stated, to accomplish goals, organisations need to acquire resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). To do so, they have to interact with the environment and collaborate with other organisations to obtain resources. Consequently, no organisation is in complete control of its existence. The need to adjust to changed circumstances is as much an external as an internal affair. In other words, organisations' autonomy is limited by their dependence on certain stakeholder groups to sustain certain resource bases. RDT provides a way to understand the connection between the organisation and its environment (Hillman, et al., 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). If a stakeholder group possesses a resource critical to an organisation, then the stakeholder group can make valid claims on the organisation due to its control of the supply of this vital resource (Frooman, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The challenge for the organisation is to be effective and anticipate external demands within existing patterns of constraints and contingencies (Guo & Acar, 2005).

The environment is considered to be partly activities outside the organisation's control (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). Thus, the environment is a system of interdependencies. The focal point of RDT is three environmental features: *concentration*, *munificence* and *interconnectedness*. The first feature refers to the extent to which authority and power are distributed throughout the environment. Munificence indicates the scarcity of critical resources, whereas interconnectedness refers to the extent to which organisations are connected to each other in an overall system. These environmental features work jointly to determine collective dependence (Malatesta & Smith, 2014).

RDT emphasises that organisations seek to minimise their dependence on other organisations to acquire important resources and change the environment to make those resources available (Hillman, et al., 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The theory highlights the following assumptions: 1) organisations favour predictable environments over uncertain ones; 2) organisations favour more permissive than restricted environments; and 3) if possible, organisations endorse strategies to change the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

Organisations furthermore react to changes in the environment at different paces (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In addition, even if most changes in the environment are preceded by hints, these hints may not be monitored or, worse, might be get altered within the organisation. Balancing monitoring of the environment is problematic; if the organisation monitors everything, it is overwhelmed by information and unable to operate, but if it does not monitor enough, it is not ready to react to changes that might threat its very existence.

The organisation's contact with its environment determines the information it has about the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). People working for an organisation, both volunteers and staff members, might serve on board commissions, belong to a variety of clubs and otherwise interact with the environment. Furthermore, these people may participate in government hearings and so gain knowledge about matters that could influence their activities. Ultimately, it is how the organisation interacts with and processes information about the environment that determines its ability to react to external constraints (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). It is still important to distinguish between inside and outside directors, as regardless of expertise, the insider director still provides internally focused resources, whereas the outside director provides external resources needed when dealing with external factors (Hillman, et al., 2000).

Dependence on the environment leaves organisations with a certain amount of insecurity as those that control resources and thus have power over the organisation may be unreliable partners (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). It all comes down to the organisation's capability to negotiate exchanges and manage changes in the environment. The inability to anticipate or determine the capability and demands of different interest groups and how these restrain the organisation or conflict internally may be the reason why an organisation has problems adapting to its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The organisation can make crucial administrative errors if it is ignorant of its interdependence or restraints. An organisation is effective when it '*responds to the demands from its environment according to its dependence on the various components of the environment*' (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 84).

Jones (2007) pointed out that a high level of dependence on a single revenue source, whether the government or foundations, leads to mission drift in organisations. The dependence of private organisations on public grants has faced criticism; Kelly (2007) argued that such dependence compromises organisation's legitimacy and causes mission drift as NGOs are compelled to change both their priorities and activities to meet funders' requirements (Bennett & Savani, 2011). Mission drift might make the activities of organisations drift away from its initial mission and make difficult relations with donors, who may think that organisations are using grants to subsidise government contracts (Jones, 2007). Organisations may also have to use extensive time and resources to abide by the reporting requirements of funders (Choudhury & Ahmed, 2002). In every social undertaking, there is a tension between being more efficient and solving social problems, for instance, in how organisations adapt to the purpose of creating social value as well as economic value (Miller, et al., 2012).

Organisations should aim to change their focal point in response to environmental attempts to change organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Everything organisations do are reactions to their environment, so the focus should be on how to alter the environment to advantage organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The actions of organisations can be changed by altering the circumstances of their environment. If there has been any change in the environment, organisations should focus on analysing the possibility of other organisations pursuing this change to their advantage as no laws or social values are sacrosanct.

2.2.4 Regulation and deregulation

According to Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000), one environmental change that highlights resource dependence is the balance between regulation and deregulation. By regulation, Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) mean government economic regulations that affect the competitive dynamics of a particular industry, for instance, by setting prices and services and imposing rivalry and constraints. Governments generally use the power acquired from resource dependence to influence organisational operations, such as acquisitions, staffing and reporting (Froelich, 1999; Tolbert, 1985). This, in turn, leads to governments assuming an active role in the governance of organisations depending on the government's resources. Regulations thus result in limited strategical availability for the organisation. According to Stigler (2003), government intervention, in some cases, can be more harmful than, for instance, market failures. Stigler (2003) argued that regulations can interrupt innovation and progress. Deregulation, in turn, is commonly connected to market transitions, such as privatisation, or the transfer of public ownership and management to the private sector (Vickers & Yarrow, 1991). Privatisation is usually focused on finding suitable boundaries between the public and private sectors. Amid deregulation, organisations face new sources of uncertainty as they are not protected from competition anymore and are confronted with a need for strategic change (Stigler, 2003; Vickers & Yarrow, 1991).

Stigler (2003) emphasised two perspectives on whether the government should intervene or regulate markets. First, regulations may be established to protect or benefit the public or a large part of it. Second, regulations may benefit industry. These two perspectives are not necessarily antagonistic as the impact of the perspectives most likely varies over time. However, even if the initial motivation was the public benefit, industry might ultimately take charge and demand a regulation be continued. Vickers and Yarrow (1991) highlighted two factors affecting the efficiency of organisations: ownership and the force from the competitive market. Privatisation can be a greater force if it leads to greater competition, but with a large public organisation, competition might be as strong or stronger.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasised that coercive isomorphism (see section 2.1.5) '*is most likely to occur where there is financial dependence, centralised resources with limited alternatives*' (p. 264), suggesting public cultural centres with their limited authority and sole dependence on municipal funding. RDT explains that the primary duty of the board of a regulated organisation is to supply organisation-specific information to the regulatory agency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In this study, this applies to publicly funded public cultural centres. In the case of deregulated organisations, the information recipient usually is the board itself, as in the case of private cultural centres.

Economic viability, like legitimacy, is a prerequisite for organisational survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). According to classical economics, low-cost production and meeting market demand better than one's competitors are imperative for economic viability. Again, this assumption does not apply to state regulation and intervention into the marketplace. As there are pros and cons with both competition and state regulation, there are also signs of these two replacing and becoming intertwined with each other over time. Nonetheless, state regulations are more common in times of crisis and less helpful for the market as a whole during prosperity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).

> '*When organizations are regulated by the state, the economic environment diminishes in importance as the importance of the political and administrative environment increases. Both attention and behavior shift accordingly. The decisions of consumers become less important than the decisions of lawmakers and government agents*'. *(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. 203).*

Organisations seem to struggle to attain stability in the provision of a resource or consumption of an output if they also need steady resource transactions to operate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Froelich, 1999). Some organisations need stability more than profitability or growth. Here, again, a situation with acceptable supply of resources might easily turn into one of insufficiency. Stability does not only facilitate administration but is also in the interest of all the allied groups that gain benefits if the organisation survives. Instability casts the shadow of doubt on the organisation, and those relying on its resources either try to stabilise it or seek a more stable organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). As management's duty is to guarantee access to resource, the continuation of alliances is of upmost importance (Hillman, et al., 2009).

The type of external demands depends on the ownership of the organisation (Bozeman, 1987; Vickers & Yarrow, 1991). Public organisations owned by a municipality or the state experience both political and common interests in their administration (Silvanto, et al., 2008). Political governance fluctuates depending on the political balance in society. In addition, public organisations do not have to tolerate the pressure of competition, at least in the short term (Boyne, 2002). They do not have to struggle for their existence in the same manner as private organisations, which negatively affects innovation, efficiency and productivity. Furthermore, public organisations, including public cultural centres, have to endure a public scrutiny and demands for insights, transparency and control of information and resources (Jennergren, 1981; Metcalfe, 1993; Rainey, 2003). Whereas Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) emphasised that firms may gain certain benefits from their board members (e.g. expertise, advice, access to resources, legitimacy), Hillman (2005) noted that heavily regulated organisations have more former politicians on their boards than less regulated organisations. Hillman (2005) furthermore demonstrated that having more former politicians on their boards correlates to lower financial performance for regulated organisations, and higher financial performance for less regulated organisations.

2.2.5 Strategies to overcome dependence

Only if the organisation is able to either expand the quantity of resources or diminish the quantity of competitors for those resources can it change its level of interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In addition, when it the organisation stabilises its access to resources, scarcity of these resources does not diminish—but only moves to other organisations. By forming alliances, joint ventures and mergers, organisations can attempt to overcome dependencies and increase organisational autonomy and legitimacy (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Drees & Heugens, 2013; Hillman, et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Provan, et al., 1980; Sharif & Yeoh, 2014). There are also other ways for organisations to acquire power over resource providers. For example, increased size is a possible source of advantages (Davis & Cobb, 2010), while smaller organisations seem to gain more from cooperative exchanges than larger organisations (Das, et al., 1998). Alliances seem to form when organisations are mutually dependent, although the organisation with some leverage has strategic control (Yan & Gray, 2001). In cases of resource misconduct, Katila et. al (2008) recommended potential resource requirements and defence mechanisms for smaller partners.

The management of an organisation has to convince the environment that its activities, beliefs and values are socially acceptable to achieve legitimacy, especially if there are many organisations of different types competing for the same resources or domains (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), as in the case of public and private centres in the same city. Legitimacy influences the contest for resources, and public centres might have less difficulty claiming social worth.

Westphal et al. (2006) refined the hypothesis of co-optation, in which representatives of competitors, key suppliers and customers are invited to serve on board as a means of co-optation. Although this hypothesis does not explain the patterns of organisational interlock behaviour, Westphal et al. (2006) argued that the mechanism in itself works as suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), only through less obvious means, such as friendship ties. An organisation, though, does not have to maintain more allies than those necessary to uphold of its activities; instead, it needs alliances with those with the right resources and those with a need for the outcomes of the organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Consequently, allies are those defining the activities of the organisation. In the case of a change in a coalition, the organisation end or change its activities to match its remaining allies.

The organisation itself may carry out diversification of its activities to shift its interdependence from a few parties to many (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In doing so, the organisation can connect hitherto unconnected environmental segments in a single organisation and make them internally interdependent. This, in turn, leads to internal competition, which shifts the interdependence of the focal organisation to the segments in the environment (Hillman, et al., 2000). However, there is a risk that an extensive collection of environmental segments may lead to managerial difficulties for an organisation without sufficient resources. Although this possible multitude of segments may lead to conflicting interests and managerial difficulties, it is also helpful in managing the problems created. When the organisation has more demands, any given demand becomes less important (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Scattering the dependency among many segments decreases the organisation's need to reply to any given requirement. Furthermore, numerous segments can be satisfied at once when the organisation has a more differentiated organisational structure. This is in line with Froelich's (1999) observation of the increasing diversification of revenue strategies within NGOs. It furthermore is consistent with reducing resource dependence and maintaining organisational autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). However, there is also a problem with diversified funding:

> '*A greater variety of resource providers typically leads to a corresponding increase in funding criteria, and satisfying the criteria of one provider may preclude satisfying another' (Froelich, 1999, p. 262).*

The subsequent goal conflicts and organisational pressure can be difficult to manage (DiMaggio, 1986; Twombly, 2003) and lead to mission vagueness (Weisbrod, 1998), which is very much in line with the concept of mission drift, as presented in section 2.1.5 (Jones, 2007). While some have found weaknesses in RDT, Davis and Cobb (2010) and Katila et al. (2008) point out that there is evidence of a newfound interest in and scholarly contributions to this theory. '*As long as power plays a part in the conduct of organizational life, RDT will continue to provide insight*' (Davis & Cobb, 2010, p. 40).

2.3 Combining the theories

In this section, we focus on IT, emphasising its connection to RDT, to develop a more comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding managerial actions in private cultural centres. As shown, resource dependence and IT have much common (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Oliver, 1991; Zucker, 1987). Both theories share assumptions about organisational change, such as that the survival of an organisation depends on its ability to respond to external pressures and demands. The focal points of both new institutionalists and resource dependence theorists are transactions and exchanges between organisations (Pfeffer, 2003). The fundamental issues are power, uncertainty and their decline, factors crucial to all organisations.

Both theories have received criticism (Oliver, 1991). It has been disputed that RDT, which partly focuses on transactional interdependence, neglects other substantial environmental organisational pressures, such as the various institutional demands (e.g. regulations, laws, norms and social expectations). As mentioned, IT is quite passive towards the strategic behaviours chosen by organisations in reaction to institutional pressures.

> *'Institutional theorists, by virtue of their focus, have tended to limit their attention to the effects of the institutional environment on structural conformity and isomorphism and have tended to overlook the role of active agency and resistance' (Oliver, 1991, p. 195).*

Powell (1991) addressed this limitation by acknowledging that a limited focus on the process of conformity has diverted theoretical interest from taking into account the situations where institutionalisation is contested or incomplete.

Some important differences between the two theories can be distinguished. In a kind of new 'invisible hand' view IT is aimed at predicting which cost-minimising instruments organisations chose to protect themselves from uncertainty (Weick, 1995). RDT also acknowledges no universal solutions: every organisation designs its own distinct strategies (Pfeffer, 2003). The key elements in RDT are the organisation's abilities to make strategic choices and adapt to ensure an adequate flow of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). IT focuses on the effects of a set of institutional pressures (laws, rules, procedures, beliefs, values) that inhibit change and increase conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Visa versa, both pressures and demands in an institutional system emerge from a variety of sources, including but not limited to obtaining material and financial resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2002). In addition, power has a different position in the two theories. In RDT, the matter of who controls and owns the resources is emphasised, whereas in IT, it is about who has command of the assets that shapes and enforces institutional rules and beliefs (Oliver, 1991).

Table 1—Comparison of theoretical perspectives

	Basic premises/ Main Tenets	**Role of Environment**	**Role of Manager**	**Descriptive and Explanatory Targets**	**Main Dependent Variables**	**Main Independent Variables**
Resource dependence	Organizational actors pursue relationships with other organizations to satisfy resource needs: Resources are the basis for power and dependence; organizations take action to manage external interdependencies (either to minimize their own dependence on others or to maximize others ́ dependence on them	Activities and behaviors outside an organizations control are considered part of the environment. The environment is presumed to hold valuable resources that the organization needs to survive.	RDT presumes some level of managerial discretion. A manager who can reduce uncertainty, help the organization obtain critical resources, and manage important environmental dependencies has more power as a result of ensuring organizational survival and success	RDT is applicable to discussing relationships between organizations and relationships among units within organizations. Main tenets can be used to explain various organizational strategies including mergers, leadership choices, affiliations and alliances.	The power of one organization or unit within an organization over another; the dependence of one organization or unit over another; choice of structure.	Criticality of the resource, alternatives for the resource; discretion
Institutional perspective*	In order to survive organizations must conform to rules and norms that prevail in the environment. The institutional environment profoundly influences the formal structure of the organization; organizations resolve uncertainty by imitating what appears to be prevalent and appropriate.	The emphasis is on the social and cultural environments and their effect on behavioral predispositions and organizational outcomes.	Early versions of the theory tend to downplay the role of strategic choice; rules and norms motivate decisions. More recent accounts incorporate the idea of changing norms through managerial strategy interests are institutionally defined and shaped. Actions are chosen by recognizing a situation as being familiar and matching to a set of rules.	How do structure and institutions affect organizational decisions, inter-organizational relationships, intra-organizational relationships, implementation, and organizational performance? What institutions can be altered to guide organizational outcomes?	Institutional emergence, conformity, conflict, change, isomorphism (early versions)	Processes which establish schemas, guidelines for behavior (e.g. rules, norms, and routines)

** IT is highly pluralistic and includes branches in economics, sociology and political science. Information in this table is extracted from this set of theories.*
Source: Malatesta and Smith (2014)

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) extended RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) by suggesting that dependence on a distinct resource leads to increased homogeneity due to constant pressure from key resource providers. This high clustering, in turn, brings about uniform strategies, structures and systems that suit the dominant resource provider. However, Hambrick, Finkelstein and Cho (2005) argued that there has been an opposite effect in many cases as the diminishing of resource providers leads to expanding the set of resources. The lessening of governmental regulations opens possibilities for joint ventures, or, as Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) put it, inter-organisational relations.

Moreover, Suddaby and Greenwood (2009) and Sherer and Lee (2002) emphasised the need to problematise institutional change in a multi-theoretic manner to recognise and explain institutional change. Suddaby (2010), though, pointed out that this might lead to a *hyper muscular view* that overlooks the central point of institutional assumption: the question of why and how '*organizations attend, and attach meaning, to some elements of their institutional environment and not others*' (p. 15). Tolbert and Zucker (1996), in contrast, pointed out that many authors defending the new institutional approach have used arguments closer to the resource dependence approach, which could be a result of discomfort with the static and passive image of organisations in the early new institutional work. Thus, the boundaries between the two approaches are currently blurring (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).

Oliver (1991) suggested that resource dependence and IT integrate principles from each other and should be merged to explain environmental pressures and patterns of organisational responses. Organisations, as stated, are affected by their institutional structure but can make strategic choices to avoid, resist and maintain their autonomy when facing external pressures. This opens the possibility for organisations to both resist and change the environment itself (Oliver, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008). By doing so, accepting that organisations are interest-seeking, they should not be seen as passive recipients of institutional pressure. Many features of the two theories converge (Oliver, 1991). In order to please different external institutional elements that interact with important sections within an organization, managers are according to Delmas and Toffel (2008) likely to embrace distinct management practices. Pursuing economic resources aligns well with RDT, while cultivating resources to enhance power and legitimacy seems to be consistent with IT. Instead, the different strategic responses to different institutional pressures should be emphasised in this combined framework (Oliver, 1991).

Oliver (1991) improved the views on organisational conformity and passivity towards environmental pressure characterising IT by emphasising the active behaviours and responses of organisations discussed in RDT. She integrated the two theories into a single framework that 1) acknowledges the institutional predictors of the individual organisational environment;

and 2) indicates the scope of organisational strategic responses, from passivity to positivity (Oliver, 1991). As Tucker and Parker (2015, p. 119) stressed: *"…institutionalism must deal with episodes of organizational resistance that can vary from manipulation to deferral, avoidance, outright rejection of compromise."* Oliver (1991) suggested using environmental dimensions (or institutional factors) to conceptualise environmental characteristics, especially when identifying the situation of institutionalisation. The indicators of institutionalisation are more indirect than the measures of resource dependency. Oliver (1991) also introduced two dimensions, known as the antecedent conditions, to describe each institutional factor: 1) cause (legitimacy, efficiency); 2) constituents (multiplicity, dependence); 3) content (consistency, constraint); 4) control (coercion, diffusion); and 5) context (uncertainty, interconnectedness). This combined framework has continuity with the predicted strategic responses to environmental pressures and the five reactions introduced in section 2.1.4: *acquiescence*, *compromise*, *avoidance*, *defiance* and *manipulation*.

Figure 9—Response strategies to institutional pressure



Table 9 describes ten estimated dimensions of the organisations' resistance or willingness to conform (Oliver, 1991). This table measures the probability of organisations' choosing specific strategies from low to high. Next are detailed definitions of the institutional factors and their antecedent conditions and how they influence strategic choice.

Cause. This refers to the reasons why institutional pressures are exerted on organisations and why organisations should conform to these pressures (Oliver, 1991). The first antecedent condition, *legitimacy*, refers to the degree of legitimacy the external actor applying the pressure (e.g. government, donors, customers) has within the organisation. The higher its legitimacy is, the higher is the likelihood that the organisation prefers to acquiesce or compromise. The second antecedent condition, *efficiency*, indicates that the higher the perceived efficiency of the external actor is, including the expected efficiency advantages for the cultural centre, the higher the likelihood of conforming strategies is.

Constituents. This refers to actors in the environment applying pressure on cultural centres. Oliver (1991) identified two dimensions of constituents in institutional factors: *multiplicity* and *dependence*. An organisation generally faces multiple conflicting pressures (e.g. HR, funding, marketing and production). The likelihood of resistance to pressures is also predicted from a dependence perspective; resistance is less likely if stakeholders depend on the pressure-exerting party. It, therefore, is assumed that a higher probability for resistant strategies results from a higher multiplicity of constituents. Resource dependence and IT both acknowledge that environmental conformity with multiple constituents is difficult (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Scott, 2014) as constituents may have conflicting demands, and meeting the demand of one constituent usually involves neglecting or defying the demands of another (Oliver, 1991).

Content. The two dimensions of content suggested by Oliver (1991) are *consistency* and *constraint*. If the exerted pressures are not consistent with organisational goals, the probability of choose a resistance strategy increases. The less new regulations and processes constrain organisations' decision-making process, then the more conformity increases.

Control. This is the enforcement mechanism of imposed pressures. Its dimensions are *coercion* and *diffusion*. Oliver (1991) emphasised that if coercion is high and culturally approved, acquiescence is the appropriate response by the organisation. Alternatively, if the coercion is low, an organisation can avoid, defy or manipulate the institutional pressure. Diffusion refers to voluntary adoption of practices. Organisations tend to acquiesce to environmental pressure if the institutional norms and values seem to work elsewhere.

Context. The institutional context or the organisational environment most probably leads to an organisational strategic response. The dimensions of this institutional factor are *uncertainty* and *interconnectedness* (Oliver, 1991). Environmental uncertainty can be defined as difficulty anticipating and predicting the future (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Interconnectedness refers to the density of constituents and inter-organisational relations in an organisational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The organisation attempts to assert the illusion (or reality) of control and stability over forthcoming organisational outcomes (Oliver, 1991). Consequently, the organisation tends to acquiesce, compromise and avoid when environmental uncertainty is high. If the level of certainty is high, and the organisation has secured its available resources and legitimacy, the strategic response is to defy or manipulate institutional value and the pressure-exerting actors. Correspondingly, if the environment is highly interconnected, organisations tend to conform.

Table 2—Predictive factors of strategic responses

	Strategic Responses				
Predictive Factor	**Acquiescence**	**Compromise**	**Avoid**	**Defy**	**Manipulate**
Cause	*Why are organizational units pressured to conform to rules or expectations?*				
Legitimacy	High	Low	Low	Low	Low
Efficiency	High	Low	Low	Low	Low
Constituents	*Who is exerting pressures?*				
Multiplicity	Low	High	High	High	High
Dependence	High	High	Moderate	Low	Low
Content	*To what norms and requirements are organizational units pressured to conform?*				
Constistency	High	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low
Constraint	Low	Moderate	High	High	High
Control	*How or by what means are the pressures being exerted*				
Coercion	High	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Low
Diffusion	High	High	Moderate	Low	Low
Context	*What is the organizational context within which pressures are being exerted?*				
Uncertainty	High	High	High	Low	Low
Interconnectedness	High	High	Moderate	Low	Low

Source: Oliver (1991, p. 160).

While new IT predicts conformity in both form and performative outcomes, RDT predicts diversification depending on the revenue sources at hand. As we are experiencing an era of declining state resources, the connection between public policies and organisational strategic responses become more important (Cashore & Vertinsky, 2000). Institutional theory is used increasingly to anticipate strategic response (McNamara, et al., 2003).

Combining IT and RDT with Oliver's (1991) organisational strategic responses to change allows this study to analyse cultural centres by examining the relationships between the funding and administration of private and public centres, the effects of the different possibilities to maintain activities on the organisational structure of private cultural centres, and these centres' strategic responses and affects on the organisational field.

2.4 Gaps in the literature: contributions

This literature review has identified a gap in IT. It has been suggested that presently, IT cannot fully explain the micro-processes in organisations and the reasons why organisations react to and affect their environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). Accordingly, Powell (1991) identified three areas that can be improved within IT: 1) comprehensive differences in contemporary studies between market sectors and institutionalised sectors, although these might not necessarily be conflicting; 2) awareness of organisational structures and practices as loosely coupled, which, although an insight from the field of IT, has led to differing assumptions of institutionalised organisations as passive, not dynamic; and 3) additional improvements in understanding of the causes of heterogeneity in institutional environments and the processes of institutional change. This study advances the focus on market sectors and institutionalised sectors and the notion of heterogeneity.

III METHODS

> *'A science is often thought of as being a coherent body of thought about a topic over which there is a broad consensus among its practitioners. However, the actual practice of science shows there are not only different perspectives on a given phenomenon, but also alternative methods of gathering information and analyzing the resultant data' (May, 1993, p. 4).*

Chapter 2 explained the theoretical framework that influenced this study's knowledge claims and guided how it was conducted. This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology selected to examine cultural centres in Finland, with a focus on private organisations. This research explores the influence of organisational characteristics, environmental conditions, institutional pressures and resource availability on an inter-organisational relationship level. This study was conducted as a sequential exploratory mixed methods study. Twenty (20) qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted with members of four private cultural centres. Next, a quantitative questionnaire was sent to 194 cultural centres, including private, public, hybrid and governmental organisation cultural centres. This chapter includes the following sections: 1) philosophical approach; 2) research design; 3) collection of the empirical material; 4) analysis of the empirical material; 5) changes in the research process; 6) trustworthiness; 7) ethical considerations; and 8) critical reflections on the research process. A brief discussion of each is provided.

3.1 Philosophical approach

It is important to formulate a philosophical position and orientation and consider a paradigm for research (McCallin, 2003; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). A paradigm is defined as

> *'the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways' (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 105).*

Defining it as an accepted model or pattern, Kuhn (1970) was the first to introduce the word *paradigm*. Distinct paradigms express distinct sets of beliefs in ontology, epistemology and methodology (Gephard, 2004). *Ontology* refers to how reality is constructed and how humans fit in and develop this reality—a theory of both what exists and how it exists (Gioia & Pitre, 1990). *Epistemology* refers to the subjective or objective relationship between the researcher and what is known (Gephard, 2004). Epistemology asks questions about the nature of knowledge. Finally, *methodology* refers to how knowledge is acquired and what is genuinely known.

Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) added there more elements to this list: axiology, research methods and rhetoric. These are all philosophically dictated according to the research paradigm. *Axiology*, the fourth element, is about the position of values in shaping the research. When bringing values into the research process, it is important to acknowledge their potential influence on how the research is conducted and how the results are written, which is why many social researchers debate values (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). *Research methods*, the fifth element, are, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), the distinct techniques of data collection and analysis—similar to Gephard's (2004) *methodology*—but, unlike methodology, include the philosophical basis of the research and its design. Finally, the sixth element, *rhetoric*, is the language and presentation of the research findings (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). How knowledge is communicated may vary among communities of researchers, setting boundaries for how to share findings.

These paradigms are as a set of beliefs or assumptions that guide research (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Paradigms—or worldviews—dictate the outcomes and conducting of research (Creswell, 2009). These sets of belief are philosophies rooted in culture, personal experiences and history (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Two opposed paradigms that generally have dominated have been variously termed post-positivism and constructivism (Creswell, 2009), positivist and naturalist (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and positivism and interpretivism (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The literature has largely focused on the dichotomy between post-positivism and constructivism, conflating the first with quantitative research and the latter with qualitative research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Guba and Lincoln (1994) pointed out the inaccuracy in this view as '*both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately with any research paradigm*' (p. 105). Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) suggested that the incompatibility of data types and approaches to analysis are so deeply rooted that there has been talk about a paradigm war.

While traditional paradigms are contradictory, requiring either quantitative or qualitative approaches, '*the situation today is less quantitative versus qualitative and more how research practices lie somewhere between on continuum between the two*' (Creswell, 2009, p. 4). Alternative research strategies have emerged as continually more complex problems have become routine, and social research has matured (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). These alternative strategies involve *advocacy and participatory research* (action research) and *pragmatism* (mixed method research). These alternative strategies are results of the dichotomy between post-positivism and constructivism. The four worldviews (*post-positivism, constructivism, advocacy* and *participatory and pragmatism*) identified Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) and their implications for social research are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3—Common elements of four worldviews

	Post-Positivism	**Constructivism**	**Advocacy & participation**	**Pragmatism**
Ontology	Singular reality	Multiple realities	Political reality	Singular and/or multiple realities
Epistemology	Distance & impartiality	Closeness	Collaboration	Practicability
Axiology	Unbiased	Biased	Biased & negotiated	Multiple stances
Methodology	Deductive	Inductive	Participatory	Combining
Methods	Quantitative	Qualitative	Usually qualitative	Quantitative and qualitative
Rhetoric	Formal	Informal	Advocacy & change	Formal or informal

Source: Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, p. 24).

Creswell (2009) developed a framework for research design (Figure 10) that is quite convenient when locating the methodological setting of one's study.

Figure 10—Framework of the research design



Source: Creswell (2009, p. 12).

This research has adopted a pragmatic worldview. Pragmatism is derived from the word *pragma*, which means 'action' (Shields, 1998). In this philosophical movement from the late 19th century, the idea of the early pragmatism is that the real world can be accessed only by a singular scientific method. Pragmatism is considered to have undergone two historical periods. The second one, starting from the 1960s and known as neo-pragmatism, has had considerable influence on both the philosophy of science and social science methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Modern pragmatists regard intellectual humans as capable of shaping experiences rather than external forces shaping them.

Neo-pragmatism is a quite new paradigm and allows the researcher to use both inductive and deductive reasoning through various mixtures of qualitative and quantitative data (Creswell, 2008; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Many mixed methods researchers see strong a connection between mixed methodologies and pragmatism (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

> *'We agree with others in the mixed methods research movement that consideration and discussion of pragmatism by research methodologists and empirical researchers will be productive because it offers an immediate and useful middle position philosophically and methodologically; it offers a practical and outcome-orientated method of inquiry that is based on action and leads, iteratively, to further action and the elimination of doubt; and it offers a method for selecting methodological mixes that can help researchers better answer many of their research questions' (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17).*

Pragmatism is not attached to one reality; instead, the researcher recognises both single and multiple realities (Creswell, 2009). In other words, some research questions may correspond to absolute positivistic truth (hypothesis testing), while others aim for interpretivism in their work. While examining the research questions, pragmatism directs attention at *what works* as the truth (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). It supports the perspective that research takes place in social, political, historical and other contexts that demand multiple worldviews and different expectations to understand the data (Creswell, 2009). This pragmatic worldview provides a well-suited guide for a mixed methods research as it allows multiple approaches and is open to both subjective and objective knowledge (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).

> *'Pragmatism rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for the use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that the values of the researcher play a large role in interpretation of results' (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 713).*

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) stressed that researchers should follow various general characteristics of pragmatism, as follow:

1) *'Pragmatism places high regard on the reality and influence of the inner world of human experience in action.*
2) *'Pragmatism advocates using both qualitative and quantitative methods in a single study and rejects their incompatibility.*
3) *'Pragmatism prefers action to philosophizing and endorses* '*practical theory*'.
4) *'Pragmatism recognizes the existence and importance of the natural or physical world that include language, culture, human institutions, and subjective thoughts.*
5) *'Pragmatism takes an explicitly value-oriented approach to research that is derived from cultural values and specifically endorses shared values, such as democracy, freedom, equality, and progress' (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 18).*

Unlike other theoretical frameworks, pragmatism highlights other areas such as the consequences of the research, the significance of the research questions, especially the methods used in the research, and the weight of using multiple data collection methods to inform the study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Practicality is the key to pragmatism, if one were to consider it epistemologically.

According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), methodological purists regard the combination of different methods and data types as philosophically incompatible. There is further disagreement on basic definitions of methodology and an ongoing debate on the paradigmatic foundations and the utility of mixed methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Some even argue that the philosophical assumptions of mixed methods research make it a third paradigm (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011), assuming that mixed methods research is neither positivism and interpretivism. This study deprioritises such debates about research paradigms and takes a pragmatic view judging a method by how adequately it can answer a particular research question. In short, despite some criticisms and disunity in the mixed methods literature, this study finds that combining multiple data types presents an indisputable opportunity to answer the research questions.

3.2 Research design

There is no one right (or wrong) approach to research (Bryman & Bell, 2005; Yin, 2014). The researcher should simply adopt the approach that best gives answers to the research questions (Gerson & Horowitz, 2002). Research design is the logical method of connecting the empirical data to the research questions and, furthermore, the conclusions (Yin, 2014).

> '*A research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between "here" and "there" may be found a number of major steps, including the collection and analysis of relevant data*' *(Yin, 2014, p. 28).*

This thesis next outlines the steps in the research design. Among the different methods available to collect and analyse information in qualitative and quantitative research, I have chosen a mixed methods approach.

3.2.1 Mixed methods approach

Mixed methods is a relatively new research approach that has been described as a philosophically based model of inquiry, combining qualitative and quantitative models of research to mix evidence or embed the data in order to produce results or findings that more significantly knowledge than either model could achieve separately (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). For triangulation, the research study has to incorporate two or more methods to examine the same phenomenon. The methods should be implemented simultaneously but independently to increase the validity of the constructs (Greene, 2008). The design of this study falls within the developmental aim of mixed methods as ‘*one method is implemented first, and the results are used to help select the sample, develop the instrument, or inform the analysis for the other method*’ (Greene et al., 2008, p. 267). This mix of interpretive and multivariate elements is optimal when mapping ‘*sources of changes in attitudes about dominant institutional structures*’ (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009, p. 190). Using competing paradigms that provoke intellectual tension can further contribute to research.

According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the application of both quantitative and qualitative research methods can reveal a broader, more complete scope of research questions as the researcher is not limited to a single method. Everything from words, pictures and narratives can be utilised to add meaning to numbers, which, in turn, can be used to add precision to the former. The mixed methods approach can provide stronger evidence for conclusions through the merger and verification of findings, contributing understanding easily lost while using only a single method. This method increases the generalisability of results and generates more complete knowledge (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Researchers are capable of exploiting the entire applicable toolkit by dismissing the incompatibility of different analysis techniques and data types instead of being restrained by ontological or epistemological boundaries (Creswell, 2009; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) developed a typology-based categorisation of the six most common mixed-methods designs, which display different interaction, timing, priority and mixing decisions. The six mixed methods designs are: 1) convergent parallel design; 2) explanatory sequential design; 3) exploratory sequential design; 4) embedded design; 5) transformative design; and 6) multiphase design.

Figure 11—Six most common mixed-methods research designs

1) The convergent parallel design



2) The explanatory sequential design



3) The exploratory sequential design



4) The embedded design



5) The transformative design



6) The multiphase design



Source: Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, pp. 69-70).

The distinct sequence of stages makes mix method designs tempting to researchers, especially as the two phases can be presented in distinct sections using their own terminology and analytical processes (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Consequently, an exploratory two-phase sequential mixed methods design (Figure 3) was used to conduct this study. This design consisted of two distinct phases: 1) the qualitative interviews and analysis of the interview material; and 2) the quantitative questionnaire (Creswell, et al., 2003). This process combined the initial qualitative phase and the following quantitative component of the study. The justification for this method was that the qualitative data collection and analysis provided a general understanding of the research issue. The subsequent quantitative data collection and analysis refined and explained the themes identified in the qualitative analysis in more detail (Creswell, 2009)

Table 4—Exploratory two-phase sequential mixed methods design

Phase 1			**Phase 2**		
Pilot testing of interview	Semi-structured interviews	Qualitative data analysis	Developing questionnaire & pilot testing	Performance evaluation questionnaire	Quantitative data analysis

This exploratory design was rigorous due the two separate stages of data collection (Creswell, 2009). The data had to relate and not to be independent so that the model could evolve from the first phase of data collection and analysis. The first sample of participants had to be different from the second phase in this exploratory design as the intention of the quantitative analysis was to generalise the results to a specific population. The sample of the second phase, therefore, had to be different and larger (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).

Phase 1 aided in understanding the contextual setting, which allowed the researcher to employ the results of Phase 1 to develop the tool to collect data in Phase 2 (Creswell, 2009). An online survey was distributed in Phase 2 to the organisations identified as cultural centres, both private and public. The finishing stage, which could be called Phase 3, integrated both qualitative and quantitative findings. These findings were also integrated and substantiated by relevant literature and theories. The results led to the development of an empirically based, theory-driven framework explaining the process of isomorphism in reverse among cultural centres in Finland.

Various challenges should be addressed when conducting a mixed methods research (Creswell, 2009). Table 5 presents a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research.

Table 5—Strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research

Strength	Weakness
• Answer a broader and more complete range of research questions. • Use the strengths of additional method to overcome the weaknesses in another method. • Provide stronger evidence for a conclusion. • Add insights and understanding that might be missed when only a single method is used. • Increase the generability of the results.	• Difficult for a single researcher to carry out both qualitative and quantitative research. • Researcher needs to have experience in both qualitative and quantitative approaches. • Requires time to implement data collection and to report data analyses. • Requires more funding, and more expensive than single method study.

Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 21).

The pre-existing evidence informing the measurement of both resource dependence and institutional pressures on private cultural centres was too limited to be enabled. Thus, conducting an explorative qualitative study to characterise the unique contextual settings of these private cultural centres was supported (Sofaer, 1999). The need to identify significant relationships between both private and public cultural centres supported the use of quantitative methods. Regression-based approaches helped determine the relative correlations of measured variables. This mixed methods research design provided rich conceptualisations of both institutional pressures and resource dependence and facilitated testing for meaningful relationships between them (Shah & Corley, 2006).

The sequential design of mixed methods research was simple and uncomplicated to carry out (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) but did have some intrinsic complications, including separation of the two phases (Creswell, 2009). Having two different stages resulted inevitably in a scarcity of time and resources that small-scale studies, for example, could not afford. In addition, Phase 2 cannot generally be prepared until the completion of the initial phase (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The research design of this study addressed these problems through early planning and proactive responses to the qualitative findings as they appeared, recognising the role they might play in the implementation of Phase 2.

This study involved neither a distinct inductive nor a deductive approach, no more than an abductive approach. It primarily relied on the view of inductive and deductive logics as reflecting each other (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Inductive theory was adapted to build new theory from data, and deductive theory was applied to finish the cycle by using data to test theory. I attempted to wear my theoretical lenses lightly to avoid assumptions about what was or was not to be found.

3.3 Collection of empirical material

This study relied on two data sources: 1) qualitative data from 20 semi-structured interviews with both employees and board members of four private cultural centres, along with follow-up e-mails and phone calls; and 2) quantitative data from a questionnaire sent to all cultural centres in Finland listed by Statistics Finland.

3.3.1 Phase 1: qualitative case studies

The first phase of this study included interpretive case studies, and its purpose was to examine the field of the private cultural centres and their resource dependency. Such issues cannot be addressed by only quantitative questionnaire methodology as a specific research strategy has a distinct advantage in answering distinct questions (Creswell, 2009). This study principally adopted a multi-case design that supports replication logic, regarding a set of cases as a series of experiments (Yin, 2014). I sought to select a series of case sites that were likely to extend the emerging theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).

There are many differing definitions of the case study. Yin (2014) considered it to be an empirical inquiry, Eisenhardt (1989) a research strategy and Wolcott (2002) a form of reporting. This study employed Hartley's (2004) definition of the case study as something more than a selection of method for collection of empirical material and analysis.

> '*A case study is a research strategy that examines, through the use of a variety of data sources, a phenomenon in its naturalistic context, with the purpose of confronting theory with the empirical world*' *(Piekkari & Paavilainen, 2009, p. 569).*

This study saw cases as meaningful but complex configurations of events and structures (Ragin, 1997). It perceived the social phenomena in the setting of organisations—here private cultural centres—that sufficiently paralleled each other to allow for comparisons and contrasts. Still, the focus lay on understanding each part in relation to the whole and not in dividing the whole into parts (Thomas & Myers, 2015).

The complicated essence of socially embedded institutions demands close examination, as Yin (1981) advocated, making case studies useful '*in a real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident*' (p. 98). According to Yin (2014), there are three different logics that can be used to select sites for holistic case studies: 1) critical cases to test a particular theory; 2) extreme cases where something rare occurs; and 3) revelatory cases likely to develop new insights into understudied phenomena. This study clearly fell within the scope of the third logic, namely, revelatory cases.

3.3.1.1 The interviews

Interviews were chosen as a method to collect qualitative data as the format allows for substantial exploration as two-way communication that provided in-depth descriptions of the topics in this study. Interviews make it possible to gather rich data from people in various roles and situations (Myers, 2009). Myers (2009) described three types of interviews: structured, unstructured and semi-structured. Structured interviews use predefined questions, and the respondents have restricted choices to answer them. Unstructured interviews have less-predefined questions and more open-ended questions intended to explore the opinions of the respondents in depth. Semi-structured interviews lie between these two alternatives. They have predefined questions, but the answers to the questions are not restricted, and it is possible to ask other questions during semi-structured interviews (Myers, 2009). Applying the technique of asking different questions (e.g. nondirective and directive) mitigates bias and provides a stronger grounding of theoretical insights (Yin, 2014).

The interview protocol was not designed around existing theory and terminology to not miss the key aspect of the informants' sense making by imposing predetermined understandings on their experience (Gioia, et al., 2012). For example, when asking a question about the organisational structure, it became clear that the informants did not use theoretical categories such as matrix, divisional and functional. During the interviews, I occasionally reoriented the questions by following emerging themes. The field notes were not written during the interview, so this activity would not give any clues to the informant. Writing of the field notes took place immediately after the interviews.

The process of asking questions was easy. Acquiring high-quality information was difficult. Occasionally, it was challenging to make the informants open up. It was especially hard to make the informants talk about more sensitive matters, such as how the board and the staff collaborated in house. An entry into a research field involves two separate phases, according to Seymour and Ingleton (1999). The first phase is negotiating with the respondents to conduct the research, and the second is gaining informed consent from the respondents. Trust is important to obtain high-quality answers. Consequently, I took time before the interviews to inform the respondents about my neutral role as a researcher and what the research was about. We also talked about the letter of consent, which all the respondents signed after the interviews. Presumably due to the trust I had acquired, managers and board members shared not-yet-official strategic information with me, and the staff shared information about informal behaviours and attitudes. The workers tended to tell different viewpoints than the managers.

I asked questions of all the cultural centres about both the definition and development of a cultural centre. Example questions included: What mission does your cultural centre fulfil? What are the key elements to successfully manage a private cultural centre? Explain the most important change in your organisation (organisational structure, management or artistic direction) in recent years. Is it you or the environment that dictates your mission?

I tried to capture differences in perspective and disagreements within cultural centres by talking to people with different assignments and experiences at each cultural centre. The diversity of the interviewees transcended gender, age, educational and professional background. The participants were individually interviewed, mostly at the location of the cultural centre in focus, except for three participants: one over Skype, one at the researcher's place of work and one at the respondent's place of work. The respondents chose all the places. The interviews ranged from 1 to 2 hours and were audiotaped and transcribed. Additional questions were generated based on the responses from the participants in a few instances.

3.3.2.2 The four cases

Case studies usually employ purposive instead of random sampling (Yin, 2014). Accordingly, this study selected not representative cases that could be generalised to apply in every scenario but rather cases that could confirm, challenge and extend the theories. The approach in this research was '*the* '*analytical generalization, in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study*' (Yin, 2014, p. 39). The strategic choice of cases greatly influences the generalisability of case studies (Johansson, 2003). The cases should also be instrumental and provide rich information (Stake, 1995). In practice, this implies that cases can be employed as instruments to acquire a deeper understanding of the cases themselves and the phenomenon studied.

After an empirical and theoretical examination of cultural centres in Finland, it became that the cases selected should represent at least four contexts as the cultural centres displayed noticeable variance. Furthermore, they should provide sufficient information. Some private centres only had one person maintaining them, so these particular cases would not have had enough respondents. This study focused on private cultural centres, so I wanted to choose cases that were completely private. In some cases, this was not that clear, such as a joint-stock company owned by the municipality or a joint venture of some sort. Consequently, these four cases were chosen, as they were also geographically widespread throughout the country.

Figure 12—Geographical locations of the cases

This case study was designed as an exploratory study to develop and define the study focus and to test the framework. Moreover, a practical aspect that influenced the selection of cases in this study was access to empirical material. This element was especially determinative when targeting the first case as Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo has long been regarded as a good model of maintaining a private cultural centre. The four cases chosen for this case study were Grand in Porvoo, Korjaamo in Helsinki, Telakka in Tampere and Ritz in Vaasa.

All the potential participants were first contacted by phone to discuss the possibility of collecting information on private cultural centres. If the persons contacted were in their opinion not adequate as interview objects, I was referred to another person. All the centres themselves selected the five persons to be interviewed. Once the interview respondents confirmed the date and time of the interview, a presentation of the study and the interview were sent by email, as an official invitation and verification of the interview.

Kulturföreningen Grand

Background: The joint-stock company Aktiebolaget Svenska Gården i Borgå was established in 1919 (Björklund, 2010). The aim was to build a Swedish building in Porvoo as there was a need for a place for Swedish NGOs to meet and enjoy culture. These local actors started raising money for the company build the house, and in 1934, they had the money they needed. The house was ready by the end of 1935. It was built for cultural performances and is situated by the town square in the centre of Porvoo. In 2009, a large extension was built for the restaurant in the cultural centre. Over the years, the house has served versatile uses, with various bars, restaurants, movie theatre and such in the focus (Björklund, 2010).

Organisational structure: In 1998, the NGO Kulturföreningen Grand was founded, and it started its activities as a cultural centre in 1999 (Björklund, 2010).

Mission: The purpose in clause the charter states that the aim of Grand is to develop and support the cultural activities of Fastighet Ab Svenska Gården i Borgå (the joint-stock company that owns the house) and otherwise develop different sorts of NGOs in the eastern part of Uusimaa (Björklund, 2010). To fulfil these purposes, the NGO Kulturföreningen Grand rents appropriate spaces from Fastighet Ab Svenska Gården i Borgå to rent, in turn, to NGOs, companies, private citizens and such. The spaces are rented for cultural activities.

Activities: Kulturföreningen Grand maintains the Luckan information point, serving the population of Porvoo and representing the Finland–Swedish culture and society in the region by offering citizen services and activities in Swedish in cooperation with other language and cultural groups (Kulturföreningen Grand r.f., 2017a). In 2016, Kulturföreningen Grand rented its main stage 150 times, as well as the other spaces 781 times (Kulturföreningen Grand r.f, 2017b). It does not have much cultural productions of its own; the cultural offerings at Grand are mostly produced by external actors. The number of external actors renting its spaces has grown in recent years. Kulturföreningen Grand still offers a wide variety of other services, such as ticket sales to performances in Grand and other places. The cultural offerings that take place in Grand are arts exhibitions, movies, a variety of trade shows, and music, theatre and dance performances.

Staff: Kulturföreningen Grand has six employees and an office on the first floor of the building (Kulturföreningen Grand r.f., 2017a). It also employs external technicians and janitors.

Economy: The total revenue of the NGO is about 290 000 euros, of which nearly 58% is derived from ticket sales, rents and other sales (Kulturföreningen Grand r.f, 2017b). The rest are subsidies, mostly from private foundations but also a smaller amount from the state.

Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo

Background: Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo (Culture Factory Korjaamo) is one of the largest private cultural centres in the Nordic countries (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017). Korjaamo was established in an old tram depot in the Töölö district in Helsinki in 2004. It has three concert or theatre venues and six smaller creative spaces for meetings and seminars.

Organisational structure: The joint-stock company Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo (Finder.fi, 2018) is part of Korjaamo Group Co., Ltd. (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017), which manages the Jääpuisto (Ice Park) skating ring by the Helsinki railway station and the Helsinki Allas sea pool in the Katajanokka district.

Mission: Korjaamo produces urban culture experiences and events, including music, theatre, visual arts and discussions (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017). It aims to be the broadest and most significant cultural centre in the northern region and emphasises newness, open-mindedness and interactions with its audiences and the global world.

Activities: Korjaamo produces around 400 arts events in music, theatre and the fine arts every year. It furthermore hosts about 300 private events (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017). Korjaamo had around 150 000 visitors in 2016. It annually hosts the Stage Theatre Festival, which showcases a selection of Finnish and international performances. The movie theatre Korjaamo Kino has a varied program, including premieres, opera, ballet, music and documentaries, as well as a movie restaurant. It also has a large lounge and cafe area. Korjaamo is a member of Trans Europe Halles, an European network of cultural centres promoting independent culture and encouraging new initiatives (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017).

Staff: Korjaamo employs approximately 20 professionals in production, sales, marketing, catering and customer service (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017). It also hires a substantial number of freelance professionals as restaurant workers and technicians.

Economy: The turnover of Korjaamo is approximately 4,5 million euros (Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, 2017). Ticket sales and rent revenues account for 15% of turnover, subsidies about 17%, and cooperation about 4%. Both the turnover and the number of visitors have grown in recent years. The rest of the turnover comes from restaurant sales.

Kulttuuritalo Telakka

Background: Three professional theatres in Tampere, Motelli Skronkle, Moraalia Teatteri and Ryhmä Fagerholm, were looking for a venue and combined to unify their theatres into one, called Teatteri Telakka (Teatteri Telakka, 2017). They found their venue 1996 in a 100-year-old grain magazine. In the rebuilt house, the theatre is on in the third floor, and a restaurant is on the first and second floors.

Mission: Initially founded as a theatre, Telakka today aims to combine different forms of culture, provide a place in the city where many things are possible and serve as a meeting place for a wide variety of cultural forms and people (Anonymous, 2016a).

Organisational structure: Telakka is a union of two NGOs and two joint-stock companies (Anonymous, 2016a). One NGO manages the theatre, and the other one is a support organisation for the theatre. The latter owns the house, which makes this cultural centre the only one of these cases that does not rent its venues from an external actor. The NGO that owns the house strives to financially support the theatre from the rent revenues. The same NGO also owns all the stocks in both companies. One company maintains the building, while the other one manages the restaurant. The latter also produces all the musical performances taking place in the house, as well as the art gallery.

Activities: Telakka has its own theatre (Teatteri Telakka ry, 2018), art gallery, music stage and cultural event activities (Anonymous, 2016a). Although the house was initially reconstructed as a theatre venue, it has been transformed over the years into a cultural centre with versatile cultural offerings.

Staff: Teatteri Telakka has six employees (Teatteri Telakka ry, 2018), while the restaurant employs a producer, a person responsible for the music offerings, four other employees and a number of cooks (Teatteri Telakka ry, 2018).

Economy: The theatre receives up to 90% of its turnover from subsidies from private foundations, the state and the municipality, while the rest comes from ticket sales (Anonymous, 2016a). The turnover is around 150 000 euro. The company with the restaurant Carneval Oy (Ravintola Telakka), has a considerably bigger turnover, but it does not get any subsidies, unlike the associations in this union (Finder.fi, 2019). The annual turnover 2016 was 1 535 000 euro.

Skafferiet Ritz

Background: Ritz was originally built as a movie theatre in Vaasa in the early 1950s (Anonymous, 2016b). It also functioned as a theatre and was empty for a while. Skafferiet Ritz has a stage and venue for artists, musicians, theatres and filmmakers to display their art.

Organisational structure: The NGO Skafferiet was established in 2008 and is the caretaker of Ritz (Skafferiet Ritz, 2017a). Skafferiet rents the venue from the owner, a private person.

Mission: Skafferiet r.f. aims to offer a stage and venue for artists, musicians, filmmakers and such to display their art (Skafferiet Ritz, 2017a). The goal is to be a uniting place for all sorts of culture-related ventures and to be a stage for both known and unknown arts.

Activities: Ritz has an average of 20 events in its venue monthly, and a total of 180 per year (Skafferiet rf, 2017b). It had an audience of 16 753 in 2016. In 2012, the number was 4 811. It has an active board of 18 people that met 19 times in 2016. This board attended every event of Ritz organised. Ritz relies mostly on volunteer workers and had 33 people including the board helping out at events. These active members get discounts on events at Ritz and invitations to member events and parties.

Staff: Ritz has one employee, a director of activities (Skafferiet rf, 2017b). This director is not responsible for practicalities during the events but instead has charge of marketing, booking artists, renting the venues and similar tasks.

Economy: The cultural centre has an annual turnover of approximately 220 000 euro, of which 22,7% is subsidies from private foundations and an equal amount from venue rentals. The rest comes from ticket and restaurant sales (Skafferiet rf, 2017b).

3.3.2 Phase 2: quantitative questionnaire

Data to understand the current state of cultural centres in Finland was gathered through a questionnaire distributed to all cultural centres in Finland listed by Statistics Finland (2017). The list does not contain trade show centres, association houses (*seurantalo*), village houses (*kylätalo*), multicultural houses, active foreign cultural centres and houses used only for theatre, museums, libraries, schools or sports. Houses for children's cultural activities (*lastenkulttuurikeskus*) are included in the list of Statistic Finland (2017).

This study focuses on private cultural centres, so a legitimate question is why the questionnaire was sent to all four kinds of cultural centres. First, there are not that many cultural centres in Finland, all in all, less than 200. Completely private centres number around 80. If I had not sent the questionnaire to all the private cultural centres, I would not have had enough respondents to make any justified assumptions. In addition, I would not have been able to pinpoint the centres in between (the hybrid and the governmental company centres) as no comprehensive lists on the ownership models of the Finnish cultural centres exist. Finally, if the aim is to point out how the private centres (and the hybrid) differs from the rest of the centres, there is a need of a comparison, which can not be done without material on the public and the government culture centres as well.

The existing list on cultural centres by Statistics Finland is mostly updated by the cultural centres' own reporting (Statistics Finland, 2017) and consequently has some shortcomings. I personally added a couple of cultural centres I knew exist, and of these, Ritz in Vasa answered the questionnaire. When sending out the questionnaire, especially to municipalities, I received quite a few answers from cultural centres I did not know existed as municipal employees forwarded the questionnaire to other stakeholders in their area. For the same reason, I also got answer from theatres and other entities that I did not count as cultural centres. I excluded the theatres from the list of answered questionnaires and included the prior group, resulting in a total of 189 cultural centres.

The content of the questionnaire was developed based on information obtained from the literature review, relevant theories (chapter 2) and the interviews. RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) offered constructs, such as environment, strategies and, of course, resource dependence. IT contributed the concept of institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991).

The pre-testing of the questionnaires was performed with a few chosen candidates, and the questionnaires were modified based on feedback from pilot participants. All the pre-testing of the questionnaires took place online in the same manner the questionnaires were administered to the study participants.

The mail sent to the cultural centres included all the necessary elements of informed consent and a link to an online survey in both Finnish and Swedish hosted by Survey Monkey (a commercial survey tool). In the questionnaire, the participants were asked if they consented to the terms of the research agreement in the cover letter. All but one gave consent. That respondent was not included in the analysis.

3.3.2.1 Population and sampling

The questionnaire was distributed over a period of two months (27 April–27 June 2017) to 194 cultural centres to ensure that as many cultural centres as possible were given the opportunity to provide feedback. Cultural centres were only expected to complete the questionnaire once. The respondents were not expected to report their names on the questionnaire. The position of the person answering the questionnaire and the name of the cultural centre was sufficient. The respondents were thus kept anonymous.

Survey Monkey has the capability to view results immediately, so the researcher was able to view how many had answered the questionnaire and encourage non-respondents to join. The initial e-mail collected only 45 responses, so reminders were sent to those who had not answered. A total of three follow-up emails were sent. This data collection process reached a desirable return rate of 56%. One reason for non-response seems to be that not all cultural centres considered themselves to be completely cultural centres. The mixed model centres could lead to a vague definition of their status, and the concept of a cultural centre did not seem to be clear everywhere.

Table 6—Online survey responses



The sample population was not limited to employees, trustees and such as cultural centres vary greatly. Some have staff, and some do not; some have a director, and some are directly beneath the cultural director of the municipality. This increased the likelihood of responses but may have diminished the participants' knowledge of the details of their institutions' processes.

The responses to the questionnaire were stored on Survey Monkey's secure server and later downloaded for analysis in SPSS. To cover the identity of individual respondents and the cultural centres, the IP addresses of the respondents' computers recorded by Survey Monkey were not used for analysis in SPSS. Instead, unique code numbers were given to all the respondents in the data set.

3.3.2.2 Measurements

The scales used and adapted in this research were in two response formats: Likert-scale questions and open-ended questions. For the questionnaire to be clear to all the respondents, the majority of measures in the study used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The open-ended questions were later dummy coded. The complete list of items can be found in Appendix B.

As stated earlier, early and late adopters of a practice face conflicting pressures from the institutional environment and as a result can implement the same practice in another way (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1987; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). It is believed that early adopters are mostly interested in the efficiency of the practice, whereas late adopters join for legitimacy purposes. This implies that early adopters are likely to implement the practice more substantially, while late adopters do so more symbolically, suggesting a non-conformity with the fundamental requirements of the practice. To classify adopters as early and late, the questionnaire respondents were asked when their cultural centre was founded.

3.4 Analysis of the empirical material

Mixed-methods data analysis demands insight into strategies used to analyse both qualitative and quantitative data (Graff, 2014; Creswell, 2009). The research questions in the qualitative data analysis involved generating theories and new ideas, explaining phenomena, exploring associations among perceptions, attitudes and experiences, and developing conceptual definitions, classifications and typologies.

At this point I would like to make a distinction between perceptions, which is what this empirical study investigates, and actual effects, as in behaviour. Perception puts us to some extent in contact with our external environments and with the aim of displaying the world as it is (Crane & French, 2005). This study has not investigated behaviour in a longitudinal way, rather the perceptions of the participants, in the approach to investigate responses to institutional pressures on organizations.

However, when analysing the quantitative data, various statistical techniques were used, such as descriptive statistics, univariate statistical analysis and multivariate statistical analysis. Summarising data using descriptive data allowed the researcher to understand the data trends (Creswell, 2009). Univariate analysis explored the variables one by one. The variables could be either *categorical* or *numerical*. When analysing at least two sets of variables, multiple dependent variables and multiple independent variables, multivariable statistical analysis was used. Analysing mixed methods data included both qualitative and quantitative data analysis, and the data were combined or integrated in the research. As stated, this research implemented a sequential design of mixed methods research, analysing the qualitative and quantitative phases in chronological order (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). When solely triangulating, the qualitative and quantitative parts may overlap more freely, or the empirical material may be both collected and analysed simultaneously. When focusing on a sequential design, the point is to let the first phase build into the following phase. In reality, the sequential design may not be so distinctly separated into two phases, but that is still the aim. This study will also strive to keep the phases separated, and thus also present the results in different sections – even though a triangulation strategy will also be applied.

3.4.1 Qualitative material

The analytic process of this study was iterative, with the aim to building and refine theory from rich case study research (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). The analysis moved from grounded coding of themes emerging from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), to connecting themes in the academic literature and then doing theory-driven coding of the data with concepts from the relevant literature. The process of analysing the qualitative data followed a three-stage process: 1) data transcription; 2) coding, and 3) analysis. The data were organised categorically and chronologically, reviewed repeatedly and continually coded during the data analysis process (Creswell, 2009). The following sections summarises the data analysis process followed in this study.

3.4.1.1 Data transcription

All the interviews were transcribed, and the interviews from the four (of five) cases I used were entered into a case study database. Accurate transcriptions of audio recordings were made using the Pages program and the service of a transcription company (total of 8 interviews). The creation of the transcriptions aimed to capturing whole statements by both the interviewer and the interviewee while not capturing insignificant utterances, such as *uhm* and *well*. A strict case study protocol was followed.

The respondents were kept anonymous and given a label from Respondent A to T. The respondents from Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo were labelled Respondents A–E, Kulturföreningen Grand Respondents F–J, Kulttuuritalo Telakka Respondents K–O, and Skafferiet Ritz Respondents P–T. There were nine female and 11 male respondents. The youngest respondent was born in 1988, and the oldest in 1947. One did not tell the year of birth. The M for year of birth was 1968, and the median was 1976. The respondents included board members, producers, directors, CEOs and COOs.

3.4.1.2 Data coding

The process of coding identifies justification statements and develops conceptual categories from them (Yin, 2014). According to Miles et al. (2014), the process of coding also involves analysis, so several codes have to exist before coding. This is what Miles et al. (2014) termed first cycle' coding. In the second cycle, the researcher can revise the codes. In this study, the initial collection of codes was developed from the conceptual framework and research question. This was deductive coding, according to Miles et al. (2014). During the first cycle, I developed codes such as resource dependence, organisational changes, organisational structure, economy, development and gaining resources more effectively. These first cycle codes gave me a starting point to analyse the data, and in the second cycle, I adapted and revised the codes during the analysis. During the second cycle, the first process of coding the material, revising the codes and generating new codes led to more than 200 codes altogether. Many codes did not have distinct boundaries between them. I, therefore, added annotations to most codes and combined and deleted codes where appropriate. Where there were unclear boundaries between concepts, I tried to clarify them based on the relevant literature and consequently ended up re-categorising some coded subsections of my data.

Figure 13—Classification tree



I used Atlas.ti software to develop pattern codes (Miles, et al., 2014) to categorise the primary codes into a smaller number of groups and themes. I next studied the outputs to see if any significant patterns emerged.

3.4.1.3 Data analysis

Qualitative researchers should begin analysing data as they collect it rather than after leaving the field (Miles, et al., 2014). When analysing the case data, I found a set of significant patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989). Next, I deployed analytical replication to see if the emerging relationships were confirmed or disconfirmed in the rest of the sample (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). The overall analysis of this study involved traveling among data, theory and existing research until a strong match between the data and the theoretical framework occurred. When traveling back and forth between data and theory, I identified, labelled and connected concepts to help explain the process of field-level changes due to institutional pressure and resource dependence. The analysis continued during the writing up of the empirical material.

According to Ragin (1997), a case-oriented researcher should focus on the various ways a common outcome can be attained. One should not anticipate causal uniformity but, rather, expect several large causal pathways in cross-case analysis. Different causes connected in dissimilar ways may lead to approximately the same result. Creswell (2009) observed that data analysis is an ongoing process conducted concurrently with data gathering, interpreting and writing the report.

Accordingly, once I collected data from the first interview, I started qualitative coding as the first step in my analysis. Many informant terms, codes and categories emerged early in the research. In this first-order analysis, I made little attempt to distil categories, so the number of categories grew quite high. As the research progressed, I started to seek similarities and differences among the many categories. This process eventually reduced the categories to a more manageable number. I then gave those categories labels or phrasal descriptors. At this point, I felt that I was a knowledgeable agent who could think at multiple levels simultaneously. This allowed me to start thinking about the data theoretically, not only methodologically. I next began moving among the emergent data, themes, concepts, and dimensions and the relevant literature to see whether what I was finding had precedents and whether I had discovered new concepts.

The data structure is a static picture of a dynamic phenomenon, so during the process, I focused on my aim to build a model grounded in the data. The resulting grounded theory model, therefore, should show the dynamic relationships among the emergent concepts that describe or explain the phenomenon of interest and makes clear all relevant data-to-theory connections. When bridging empirical data and theory, a conceptual leap, I sought to neutrally move

> *'from the mass of words and other data (the world of the field), through and beyond the mechanics of analysis to an abstract and explicit set of concepts, relations and explanations that have meaning and relevance beyond the specific context of their development (the world of ideas)' (Klag & Langley, 2013, p. 149).*

Data were coded and integrated according to the method described by Gioia et al. (2012). The method was developed to create models of how events happen in organisations. According to Gioia et al. (2012), this method clearly show how theories are generated from data.

The method follows a prescribed set of activities. First, the terms voiced by the interviewees are coded to themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) called first-order concepts (Gioia, et al., 2012). Next, these first-order concepts are related to theory to confirm whether they occur in the literature. Third, the first-order concepts are brought together to create more cumulative codes, called second-order themes. Fourth, second-order themes are then aggregated into aggregate dimensions. The relationships between the concepts are displayed visually to present the three different levels of abstraction in the data. Called the data structure, this visualisation helps show transparency in the analysis (Gioia, et al., 2012). The dynamic model (data structure) of this study can be found in Figure 14.

3.4.2 Quantitative material

The questionnaire, with data from both Likert-scale and open-ended questions, were analysed quantitatively. The quantitative data analysis occurred both during and after the quantitative phase of the study and followed a two-stage process: 1) preparing and 2) analysing the quantitative data. The following sections summarise the data analysis process followed in this study.

3.4.2.1 Preparation of the quantitative data

The data collected by the questionnaires were first coded in Microsoft Excel. After this, manual checks for accuracy were made. Identified errors were corrected, and then more checking occurred. The data were screened for outliers and missing data, and dummy variables was created for the open-ended answers (Tabachinick & Fidell, 2001). Missing data were handled by coding the data values that had missing responses with a missing value of 99 for numeric values. The final and corrected data were then transferred to SPSS (version 24) for analysis. Descriptive analysis was performed to profile the cultural centres and their socio-economic characteristics, productions and dependencies. All the variables included in the final analyses were taken directly from the individual survey questions and presented as binary, ordinal, nominal and discrete variables.

3.4.2.2 Data analysis

The quantitative data analysis was initially descriptive and included calculating Ms, percentages, medians, ranges and variances, as appropriate, for all variables. This analysis allowed the researcher to establish an initial understanding of the collected data. Descriptive analyses (e.g. M, SDs and median) were performed first to gain an understanding of the samples' characteristics and the response pattern for each question. Gaining insight in this furthered the understanding of the analysis needed for the associations between the variables.

The data were non-parametric, so Mann-Whitney U test was employed for the construct *responses to institutional pressures*. Mann-Whitney U test is the non-parametric alternative to the independent sample t-test (Corder & Foreman, 2014) and is used to compare two sample M that originate from the same population. Mann Whitney U test is used to test whether two sample Ms are equal.

Multivariate analysis was conducted on the construct of *the need for diversified funding* to analyse the relationships among a number of variables. The technique used was factor analysis, which allows reduction a data set by analysing the relationships between variables and grouping them under separate factors (Thomas & Nelson, 2001). Factor analysis assigns a weight to each item in a scale and, through repetitive analysis, reduces the items connected to a specific factor. Varimax rotation was used to generate orthogonal factors for the data set. Exploratory factor analysis detects the number of factors required to represent data and which variables influence each other. A factor matrix (table) is commonly used to present the relationships among variables and factors. This method of analysis also supplies a score (factor score) for each figure in the sample (Miller & Brewer, 2003). Exploratory factor analysis thus can reduce data. It can also be applied to check for validity, verifying whether the items being measured constitute a valid scale and they work together. Factor analysis, therefore, is effective at interpreting data and understanding the relationships within clusters of variables. The goal of exploratory factor analysis in this study was to assess the fit of the measurement model on the construct of *the need for diversified funding.*

Multinomial logit model was used with the constructs of *the need for diversified funding* and *environmental interdependencies*. It is a choice model devised from utility maximisation theories and is very useful when analysing data generated from more than two responses and using the logit link (Greene, 2000). Like the binary logistic regression model, multinomial logistic regression employs maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of a response variable (Madhu, et al., 2014). Multinomial logistic regression was used in this study to analyze data from the questionnaire to identify factors that have (or not) a significant impact on the need for diversified funding as well as for environmental interdependencies. A p-value of <0.05 was considered statistically significant. The dependent variable was cultural centre type, and this study was interested in the probability of the independent variables showing significant contributions between center types. The analysis then compared center types according to the variables in the constructs.

This study also used binary logistic regression for the construct *mission drift*. Binary logistic regression is similar to multinomial regression, except it only has two levels to its dependent variable, and multinomial regression has three or more. Binary logistic regression was used in this study to analyze data from the questionnaire to identify factors that have (or not) a significant impact on mission drift. A p-value of <0.05 was considered statistically significant. The dependent variable was private cultural centres, and this study was interested in the probability of the independent variables showing significant contributions on the construct.

3.4.3 Mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis

I sought to triangulate the data collection by using multiple informants and cross-checking information against the questionnaire data to avoid retrospective bias in the interviews. The qualitative research was performed first to identify different categories of institutional pressures, resource dependencies and strategies for private cultural centres. This analysis enabled testing the ideas with a larger group of cultural centres. This qualitative research enabled generating items for the quantitative research.

The qualitative findings presented an explanation or interpretation of the resource dependence and perceived institutional pressure among private cultural centres. The quantitative findings contributed statistical validation of both important factors and the variables affecting the perceived institutional pressure. When incorporating and discussing both the qualitative and the quantitative findings in more detail, this study was aimed at answering the research questions through an integrated viewpoint. The results from this parallel analysis were compared to allow an explorative theory to emerge. This step involved examining the ways the two groups of research findings were related to each other to get a better understanding of the research problem.

3.5 Changes in the research process

During the research, I found that not all the cases initially chosen were relevant. Indeed, one of the original five cases did not match the specifications of a private cultural centre as it did not offer diverse cultural offerings but only music. In line with Ragin (1997), I excluded this case after doing five interviews. I furthermore started doing only a case study, but after conducting the interviews, I felt there was more to discover and a specific need for a questionnaire. Hence, I chose the mixed methods approach as it is beneficial for studies aimed at elaborating and expanding the findings of one method using the other method (Creswell, et al., 2003).

When switching theoretical lenses with different assumptions, I had the opportunity to question my initial picture of the case. At first, I aimed to research the quality of the cultural content of private centres. I also wanted to study the impacts they have on their local community. I quickly observed that quality was hard to measure and could be a false indicator as all the centres, at least to some degree, rented their venues to external producers. In these cases, the quality of the cultural content did not reflect on the centres as much as when the centre themselves produced their own offerings. I also decided not to pursue the original topic of their impact on the local community, partly for the same reasons as with quality. Moreover, the data collected through the interviews did not measure this. In addition, the municipality had a broader role in the initial aim as my intent was to study whether these private centres were a sign of privatisation of municipal services. During the interviews, I noticed that none of the cases were a product of privatisation but, instead, resulted from private initiatives. The respondents did not have much to say on this matter, and I decided to change the scope of the study. The research questions thus were modified during the process, in accordance with Gioia et al. (2012), who emphasised the need to do so as the research progresses.

3.6 Trustworthiness of the study

This section describes how the trustworthiness of this study was ensured by addressing the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of this research.

3.6.1 Credibility

Credibility is the true value and interpretations of data (Polit & Beck, 2014) and the compatibility of the findings with reality (Shenton, 2004). The credibility of the informants' insights was enhanced by sampling multiple perspectives within each case (Langley & Abdallah, 2011) and interviewing employees and board members, including managing directors, chairpersons and staff. All 20 in-person interviews lasted 1–2 hours and were in depth. Unlike ordinary conversations, qualitative interviews usually are more focused, in-depth and detailed (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The aim of qualitative interviews is to acquire a deep understanding rather than abundant information on irrelevant matters. The interview respondents in this study were identified through three methods: they were identified by the researcher, they were introduced by key informants, and one respondent led me to other respondents. A major criterion in choosing the cases was their suitability for the study (Mason, 2002), which in this study was mainly that the centres should be venues in versatile artistic use.

The data collection was conducted in real time to mitigate any retrospective bias. It involved triangulation, which enhanced the credibility of the descriptions. To minimise observer effects, I tried not to intervene or offer any opinions or suggestions to the informants. All the places and times for the interviews were chosen by the interviewees. Follow-up questions were used during the interviews to ensure that the respondents' viewpoints were truly captured. I asked some questions that ultimately had no relevance (see section 3.5), but they did give me an overall picture of the field of cultural centres and helped me sharpen the focus of this study.

Museus (2007) observed that although internal and external validity are important considerations in the measurement and generalisation of findings in quantitative research, quality is assured by the degree of credibility and transferability of the findings and recommendations. To enhance credibility, explanations of my role, the study questions and context of the study were given to all the study participants and in the reporting of the study findings. Furthermore, the transcripts were checked constantly and thoroughly to compare data between codes and definitions, as suggested by Gibbs (2007). The presentation of negative or conflicting information also reflects on the credibility of the research findings (Creswell, 2009). The findings of the qualitative part of this research demonstrated both similarities and differences, establishing valid, realistic viewpoints among the respondents.

3.6.2 Transferability

According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), transferability is the extent to which the findings of a study can be transferred to or have relevance in other settings with same or similar conditions. Transferability is usually assessed by: 1) following research protocols consistent with the research analysis process; and 2) refining the research questions based on the literature review (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Quite often, case studies face criticism for a lack of transferability, although the background to this is studies using a single case. To increase the transferability of this study, multiple cases were used. Additionally, this study made clear from the beginning that its geographic scope was Finland - as there are some differences to Central Europe. It still should be emphasised that as in any case study research, the findings of this study are transferable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes (Yin, 2014). The study aim was to generalise a distinct set of results to broader theory. I further ensured transferability by providing a rich description of the details of the data collection.

3.6.3 Dependability

Dependability concerns whether the study can be repeated over time by different researchers with the same or similar participants and in the same or similar conditions (Polit & Beck, 2014; Yin, 2014). This repetition can be accomplished by documenting the evidence, using a research database and clearly presenting how the data were collected and analysed. The conditions, setting and people in other interviews still vary, so the data cannot be reproduced entirely (Shenton, 2004). Therefore, the research process, therefore, should be reported in detail for other researchers to be able to conduct similar work.

For this thesis, the research process was documented systematically, including the researcher's background within cultural centres, the conditions of cultural centres, the development of the research instruments, planning of the study, data collection and analysis, and interpretation and presentation of the results. The dependability was diminished as some informants were themselves clearly misled and wrong about matters of their own concern. To the benefit of this study, there were five interviews conducted in every case, which allowed detecting and rectifying deviant answers.

3.6.3 Confirmability

Confirmability is the objectivity, accuracy and relevance of the data (Polit & Beck, 2014). It emphasises uniformity between the respondents' information and interpretations of that data. To improve credibility and confirmability, four distinct cultural centres were used in data collection with qualitative interviews: Grand (Porvoo), Korjaamo (Helsinki), Telakka (Tampere) and Ritz (Vaasa). The idea was to achieve multisite collection of the research data. In addition, confirmability was enhanced in this study by giving detailed descriptions of the recruitment of the respondents, development of the interview guide and the analysis of the data. The questionnaire participants also completed a series of Likert-scaled questions to check the credibility of the study assumptions, contribute insights into the strategies and situations of the cultural centres and provide some basic information of both the respondent and the centre.

3.7 Ethical considerations

The research data were partly collected through interviewing 20 individuals belonging to the target group. The interviews were recorded as audio files. Audio file processing, creation of backups and data protection were planned and implemented carefully. The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed into text files. All personal data that may have allowed identification of the research participants were removed. The data collection methods and data content were carefully documented to enable data sharing. Basic information about each interview was included in the transcribed text files, as in this example:

Date of the interview:	5.8.2016
Interviewer (researcher):	Tomas Järvinen
Pseudonym of the interviewee:	Korjaamo 2
Occupation:	Head of programme

Age:	30–35 years
Gender:	Female
Place of the interview:	Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo, Helsinki
Length of the interview:	00:59:48

I also wrote field notes as a critical tool for doing reflexive and ethical research (Thompson, 2014). I acknowledge this is '*one of the least participatory things a researcher can do*' (Thompson, 2014, p. 252), but it can make a connection to the recognised issues and broaden how these are made sense of. In this way, writing field notes can ultimately change who benefits from the research. I wrote field notes immediately after the interviews, so this this activity did not have any effect on the respondents' answers.

The audio files of the interviews were destroyed after the original research was completed. The transcribed text files will be archived at the Finnish Social Science Data archive for research, teaching and learning purposes. The research participants were informed of the archiving before data collection.

To ensure informed consent for participation in in the survey and the interviews, a statement was provided during the first part of the questionnaire and interviews. It detailed the voluntary nature of the study, the expectations for the participants and the data protection measures. Preventive action according with contemporary research methods were taken to ensure the anonymity and the confidentiality of all the individuals and organisations taking part in the research project. The interview material was coded, and the participants' names and other identifying features were removed. In the 4th chapter, all the interviewees are referred to as respondents with a specific letter (A–T) when directly quoted.

3.8 Critical reflections on the research process

As is the case for most researchers, I have some difficulties explaining exactly how the process of analysis took place, in addition to trial-and-error attempts, discussions with my supervisors and my own vision of what were the right data. There is always '*an uncodifiable step that relies on the insight and imagination of the researcher*' (Langley, 1999, p. 707). Furthermore, misdirections in the research process emerged from several sources, including the researcher's own lack of sensitivity to incompatible observations and understanding of the social world. Although I had a background as a board member and vice chairman in a private cultural centre, that did not mean that I thoroughly know private cultural centres in general, which was no doubt apparent as an underrepresentation in my writing.

Face-to-face interviews have some limitations, particularly as the interviewer's presence might affect the responses. In addition, the people interviewed might not be equally articulate and perceptive (Creswell, 2009). The personal biases of the researcher might also affect the results. As the researcher in this study, my service on the board of one case, Kulturföreningen Grand in Porvoo, might have influenced my identification of the themes. Additionally, I was asked to join the board of the cultural centre Grand in Porvoo in the spring of 2010. One year later, I was elected vice chairman and functioned in that role until the spring of 2014, when I quit the board altogether. During that time, I got to know how the management of this private cultural centre functioned, with all its pros and cons. This study was started in the fall of 2014, which means I had no board responsibilities during the research.

The sample of cultural centres in the quantitative part of the study might also not be wholly representative of all cultural centres in Finland. The basis of the selection was a list gathered by Statistics Finland (2017), and as it stated, the list was merely composed of the available sources. During the research, I found additional centres not represented on the list, and there might be even more.

Furthermore, the interview findings helped delimited the scope of shaping the questionnaire. While reducing the size of the conceptual framework of the questionnaire into a manageable number of key variables, there was naturally a risk of model mis-specification.

IV RESULTS

This chapter presents the results from the qualitative data collected in 2016 (see section 3.3.1) and the quantitative data collected in 2017 (see section 3.3.2). The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part (4.1) addresses the qualitative data from phase 1. The second part (4.2) addresses the quantitative data. The third part (4.3) links the qualitative and quantitative parts to gain more insights into the relationships among the data. The data processing for each phase (qualitative and quantitative) is reviewed in detail, along with the study results. In this way, the readers can examine the thought process behind research decisions, minimising the researcher bias embedded in the research method.

4.1 Phase 1: qualitative data analysis

The first part of this results chapter presents the qualitative data. The results are situated within the participants' experiences of maintaining private cultural centres and are presented according to the themes that emerged during the analysis of the collected data.

The first-order categories are presented at the bottom of Figure 14, using the informants' terms, codes and categories (Gioia et al., 2012). The second stage (the circles), or the second-order themes (subthemes), are the categories that resulted from reducing the relevant categories (first-order) to a more manageable number. These new categories were given phrasal descriptors. At this stage, as the emerging themes started to suggest concepts describing and explaining the phenomena at hand, the second-order themes were distilled into second-order aggregate dimensions (themes 1–3). In this way, the data could be examined theoretically.

Every theme has its own section: 1) dealing with institutional pressures; 2) managing resource dependence; and 3) legitimacy and the environment. Each theme is connected to a research question. Figure 14 presents the themes and the subthemes in a dynamic model, as suggested by Gioia et al. (2012).

Figure 14—Classification tree with the themes and subthemes



4.1.1 Dealing with institutional pressures

Institutions act as forces upon individuals and organisations, creating social pressures and constraints and setting the limits for all things accepted and not accepted. Oliver (1991) provided a typology of responses to institutional pressure: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. The typology indicates a new institutional perspective as it highlights the deliberate capacity of organisations to strategically counter the demands of their environment. This section presents the respondents' view on institutional pressures.

This section is divided into four subsections: 1) institutional pressures; 2) isomorphism in reverse; 3) institutional entrepreneurs; and 4) finding a balance for maintaining a private cultural centre. The subsections are derived from the second-order themes in theme 1 from Figure 14, and the first three are based on theory, whereas the fourth is a combination of the first three. The data presented in this section (4.1.1) are related to subquestion 1.

4.1.1.1 Responses to institutional pressures

According to nearly every respondent, the private cultural centres mostly struggle with issues concerning money, product pricing, subsidies and lack of sufficient audiences. Those cultural centres that have their own restaurants seem to be very focused on how that business is succeeding as it is a cornerstone of their economy. Thus, current legislation is considered to be an influencing factor: '*Legislation per se, a framework like time, how long is your event allowed to continue, and how to handle the serving of alcohol and perhaps such general decrees*' (Respondent D).

The private cultural centres have sole liability for their economy, so a central issue among factors exerting pressure on the centres are ticket sales to their own productions. Even if the private cultural centres have considerable private or municipal funding, their offerings of cultural activities still rest to a significant degree on ticket sales. The centres, therefore, have to constantly rely on conscious risk-taking to attract audiences and aim to balance the cultural offerings between less risky and pioneering offerings.

> *'Overall, in Finland, they [ticket sales] have declined. For five years, maybe. Often, during the recession, people focused even more consumption than culture as it was inexpensive and produced good spirits. […] I believe that the future can be found in interesting cultural content. But perhaps so that this interest is*

weighed more and more every day, every night, every performance' (Respondent C).

The strategic response of private cultural centres seems to be straightforward defiance, according to the respondents. As they detect a problem, they consider the best solution, whereupon the decision is made.

One of the centres has experienced that the municipality has neither acknowledged it as a cultural actor, nor helped it in any way. In fact, in some cases, the municipality has made decisions that have directly hindered the centre's activities. Other houses in its cultural use have been shut down without sufficient warning, and no alternative venues have been pointed out for the centre. The municipality does financially support the centre's theatre but no other activities at the centre. Consequently, the centre does what it wants to do and does not comply with the guidelines of the municipality but rather defies them.

The second centre, with a quite substantial palette of activities, notices that many of its activities have to compete with every other private actor in the city. Although its activities are in line with its mission as a cultural centre, there are specialised private actors with much broader offerings of specific services, such as office rentals. The centre tried to rent offices to cultural actors, but as the offices of other private actors did not differ in any way, the rental prices were the decisive factor. The centre then decided not to rent any office space and rather go in for cinema activity, thus compromising and directing attention elsewhere.

The third centre highlights its cinema. The idea of the cinema, which they founded a couple of years ago, was to show alternative movies not displayed at the local private cinema. This other private cinema is part of a larger corporate group that does not reveal its movie repertoire in advance, which can leave the private cultural centre in a distressful situation. More than once, the centre has displayed the same movie as the local cinema, leaving it without sufficient ticket sales as the customers preferred the bigger cinema. According to the respondents, the centre still aims to continue to fill a void by showing movies that otherwise would not be seen in their city, thus defying the situation in their community.

The fourth centre sees a setback for itself as the municipality recently teamed up with a foundation to build a new hybrid cultural centre near it. The municipality has invested a substantial amount of money in the new hybrid centre and directed much attention towards it.

In addition, the employees of the municipality's cultural department have their office in the new hybrid centre, which means that many public cultural activities take place there. The private cultural centre aims to market the centre as something differing from the hybrid centre, such as smaller venues for smaller events, but there is a clear discontent among the respondents over this pressure the municipality has exerted on them. Their strategy is to defy by challenging.

4.1.1.2 Isomorphism working in reverse

Many respondents emphasise that they differ from public cultural centres as they can decide for themselves what to do next, whereas public centres might have to wait for decisions from above. The general opinion is that there is a noticeable difference in the model of executing activities by public and private centres. A few respondents had worked with public cultural centres, and they emphasise that employees of public centres do not have possibilities to make changes. When asked directly about possibilities for employees and boards to make changes in private cultural centres, the unanimous response was that both groups have big opportunities to do such.

> *'The municipal side implements decisions of the city government and the department of culture to do something. But if something does not work, the private [cultural centre] skips it [...]. That kind of plasticity is most important, as culture changes all the time, so if you think of a five-year plan, then everything always changes over time' (Respondent M).*

Private centres do not have to pursue existing strategies and detailed missions set out for them over a longer period. They can simply change whatever is not working in their repertoire and replace it with something that does. One of the centres rented office space and had a gallery but noticed it could not compete with all the other office renters in their environment and that its gallery did not attract the desired amount audience, so it simply quit both activities. It did a survey among local citizens and found there was demand for a cinema. Now, it has a cinema which attracts people and is economically more sustainable.

> *'On the private side, however, it is easier to react. If I, for instance, think about us, that if we observe a problem, well, let's sit down. We think about how to solved it, after which we solve it. Then it is solved' (Respondent K).*

A respondent concludes that private centres have to consider the flow of customers, which influences the decisions it makes. Even if there is a possibility to react beyond the frames of an accepted mission statement, it, however, is not a decision to be made based only on the preferences of the board or employees; the surrounding environment must also be considered. Private centres have no municipal safety nets, so they cannot face too many economic setbacks. The same respondents repeatedly mention the need to monitor every activity to prevent economic catastrophe. This seems to be said in awareness that most private entrepreneurs need to do so, but with an implication of differences with private centres, where the repertoire is constantly undergoing significant changes. None of the respondents subscribes to a unilateral view of cultural offerings, which increases economic risk and decreases the possibility for steady revenue. It, though, appears that many respondents view the scarce resources among private centres as a stimulus for better decision making.

> *'I feel it's an advantage, not having as good basic resources […] as the public sector. […] We have a better chance of doing things that are considered necessary for the development of this area. […] At the end of the day, the question is about people's expertise, and we have the chance to use a freelancer network quite widely, which may not be so easy in the public sector' (Respondent A).*

This economic pressure on private cultural centres, however, generates a need to be as effective as possible and to find a novel area for business. As a few respondents mention, they simply cannot afford not to do what they do efficiently. It, though, is not exclusively about doing things in a less expensive way. It is also about justifying the work they do in economic terms and finding their own niche in the market of cultural offerings.

> *'To find the right balance […] of a business model that is commercially sound enough, functional and sufficiently interesting, and would you say, divergent. […] We would want to depart from the traditional entertainment providers, in which can be counted, for instance, typical gig venues or even cinemas. Or even amusement parks, the producers of traditional municipal cultural services, […] including city libraries, city theatres, city cultural centres, city museums, city art museums and city orchestras. So from our point of view, there is an interesting area between these two worlds, that has something of each of these worlds but builds its own entity' (Respondent C).*

One respondent emphasises that from the very beginning, the centre's mission has been to not copy or adapt existing activities but to be a pioneer in everything. It reacts quickly and alters its plans if it, for instance, gets a hint of a new production abroad. This seems to be a general mission of all the private centres and can be understood as a prime agenda in most interviews. The main point is not only to have diverse cultural and arts offerings nor to alter the audiences' perception of arts but to find a new way to do so and fill gaps in the current offerings of leisure-time cultural activities.

Furthermore, a couple of respondents highlight that a private cultural centre is about doing what one is passionate about. The centre is a sort of a hub where whoever has an idea for a cultural activity can realise it—especially if they have a plan to finance it. The centre enables larger productions, not only specific cultural content such as concerts by the citizens. As one respondent put it, '*it is one of the riches of this house that it is a kind of amoeba, that there is no one opinion about what is done here*' (Respondent N).

There are differences in the cultural content of the houses. Especially those centres with theatres seem to be very strict as to what is displayed on stage. They carefully plan every detail about what they want to present next. To some degree, this applies to music offerings as well. One centre mostly rents its venue, giving it much fewer possibilities to steer the content. According to the respondents, the centre nonetheless steers the cultural offerings by giving the renters advice on when it is most fruitful to arrange what they want to arrange as the centre knows its annual repertoire. With this one exception, the rest of the centres carefully plan their repertoire in advance, having the advantage of arranging most cultural offerings themselves. These centres focus primarily on the content as this is the core activity of their centres.

> *'We have been […] talking for many years with each other, that we always put the content first. We do not put first the things people want from us, who wants what from us, but what we want to do ourselves, because we have noticed that we do still represent some kind of mainstream of humanity, as we are interested in these things. These things rise from social discussions or from things that just come into to somebody's mind. Then when we discuss these things together, the thing that is most interesting for us and what we decide to go for, is*

also unexpectedly what our viewers and the media find interesting, as we start doing it. We go with the content first' (Respondent N).

The respondents give priority to their opportunity to make decisions without, for instance, municipal regulations hindering them. Simultaneously, they perceive a responsibility to maintain the centre, which does prevent them from making any radical decisions. The balance between freedom and sole responsibility seems to be a driving force when deciding what to do next.

'A private culture house has more freedoms but at the same time more opportunities to apply for grants and [is] perhaps quite flexible without having such a major decision-making machine that mangles through things. But at the same time, it is also more vulnerable, as freedom is good, but you also have a responsibility to uphold' (Respondent F).

With this said, all the centres, according to the respondents, do take many risks when planning ahead.

4.1.1.3 Institutional entrepreneurs: a pioneer mindset

In the interviews, clear activities of the private cultural centres emerge: weighing how to use the economic resources at hand and finding more interesting and more efficient ways of doing things. Furthermore, there is a notable critical attitude towards the municipality's approach to cultural offerings, which is not considered to be the most efficient way of producing cultural activities. The municipality should instead, according to some respondents, facilitate activities at the grass-roots level and ensure their continuity. The idea here is to have a distinct distance between the cultural offerings and the municipal organisation and budget. This way, the money goes to the activities themselves, not merely to maintaining the public organisation. In addition, the lack of sufficient time resources compels private centre managers to choose the most efficient way of doing things as there is not time to do them insufficiently. Still, an openness among the respondents to new and exciting activities is highlighted:

'You should not get stuck stirring the same soup. You need to constantly track how the field changes. In that way, if something new and interesting comes along, you should get involved' (Respondent O).

The four walls of the centre are not considered to be a necessity; the constant focus on networks and joint productions emphasise the outgoing, expansive sphere of the private cultural centre. Nonconformity is highlighted as a niche to be versatile and offer what the municipality does not offer. The word *pioneer* is used frequently, emphasising a need for private initiatives to offer cultural services missing in the municipal palette.

> *'The word* meaningful *distinguishes this from entertainment in my point of view. I see that entertainment is really a different thing, and I myself enjoy entertainment, but it does not maybe generate significance in that sense or create new and renew stuff, but it is more of a replay. And that's why I use that word* meaningful*. And then with* impressive*, I mean that at best, some stuff becomes a phenomenon that grows in significance so much that a surface impact is created. It was what we were aiming at back then. […] I think that we were in some sort of pioneer role back then and then piloted in good and in bad a new type of operating model' (Respondent C)*

When asked what the reaction would be if the respondents' centres would cease to exist, there was surprising agreement in the responses. The recurrent answer was that one's centre itself probably would not leave such a drastic hole in society as some new group of private initiatives would take over its service. The need for culture among citizens is not questioned but, rather, the municipality's capability to satisfy this need. This is not to say that the respondents feel their centres do not have impacts on the society. Rather, instead of focusing on a specific centre, the attention is simply aimed at the cultural services in society as a whole.

According to several respondents, one of the biggest challenges for cultural centres is competition with local public cultural centres, which have municipal security and support. Then again, this competition is not solely viewed as a negative thing: '*It challenges to work harder, and to be a little more innovative when looking for new customers and to try to find ones true and own niche. So, despite being challenging, it's a positive challenge*' (Respondent H).

In other words, the respondents display a distinct pioneer mindset. Beyond being true to the mission, which is continually confirmed as producing versatile cultural and arts offerings to local inhabitants, the respondents aim to invent the way to do this. Their objective is to be part of a larger network and thus take advantage of what is happening in the field, but moreover, they seek to influence the field. As one respondent puts it, '*in that way, we have been involved and influenced and participated in that stream in what direction it goes*'. (Respondent E). The main issue is reinventing not art or culture but how to display it. The respondents repeatedly mention their ideas about changing the way to offer culture, even though they seem to be somewhat secretive about the outcomes:

> *'We have one project that will be explored for next year, and maybe it will happen if there is one event and a coffee shop elsewhere […]. And then I would be interested in this, like [an] event platform and the development of a production house model' (Respondent C).*

Private cultural centres appear to work in a democratic fashion. Both the cultural content and the economic prerequisites for offering it are continuously discussed together within centres by employees and the board. However, when a decision is made, everybody works on quite an individual level. One respondent even compares the responsibilities of their work with that of a private entrepreneur, only within the frames of a specific private cultural centre.

4.1.1.4 Finding a balance for maintaining a private cultural centre

When asked about leadership, all the centres unanimously explain that they work independently and in a democratic manner. The word *passion* is used frequently to explain the employees' approach to their work.

Private cultural centres need to be involved in the region's networks connected to culture. Not only culture is stressed but also business as the centres aim to get earnings through business. Even though self-sufficiency and business earnings are emphasised repeatedly, the importance of businesses not being too market driven is also highlighted. Private cultural centres must have their own vision about things.

> *'We aim to be involved in a living culture, so we can see what works and what is going on. That is how you are directly in contact with the customer base or to anyone who might be interested in coming there [to the cultural centre]. Something allures them there. Often it feels that it is this whole package of different opportunities that you can do there, that make people return' (Respondent O).*

The mentality of never giving up arises as an underlying subject among the respondents: '*After the first no, there will be 18 new attempts*' (Respondent A). The idea that centres might have to evolve over time and the problems they might face can just as easily be pointers towards how to do things more efficient.

One important aspect of managing a centre, according to the respondents, is grasping a clear picture of the mission and then choosing the right people for the right tasks to bring about that mission. The structures of an organisation can easily become fixed for a long period if they are not thought through at an early stage. If these matters are not balanced with the mission, there will not be any savings but rather the opposite.

There is also agreement on the idea of balancing cultural activities with business. Cultural activities are seldom a golden goose for the centres, so they need to balance their economy with their commercial operations, especially if public subsidies are low. The content of the cultural activities is repeatedly emphasised, even over the number of working hours the centre can put into projects. Wages usually are the biggest expenses, so this is also one place to make savings. Private cultural centres usually work with modest resources, so some respondents highlight the need for the employees to have an ideological rather than a monetary approach to their work. This is also supported in the idea of reinforcing a culture of new ideas and a readiness to experiment, as even if an experiment is not economically efficient, it might be mentally or socially efficient.

One cultural centre also relies quite heavily on volunteers, which creates a need to balance getting everything done that should be done without overburdening the volunteers. One respondent at this particular centre emphasised the importance

> *'that you find a team that is willing to use leisure time for meetings, do something sensible, come to events, make sure everything works. I mean, without volunteers and without all these students coming from somewhere in the world and happen to find here to [...] [us], without all these this would not work. It's a huge bunch that we depend on' (Respondent T).*

A central theme in the cultural centres seems to be acting respectfully towards all those, volunteers and staff, working for the common good. This is not to say that this is not important in other situations. Instead, the respondents mean that cultural centres are dependent on volunteers and, in many cases, underpaid staff, so they may easily find themselves in difficulties if motivation runs out.

The centres in this case study seem to have adopted very differing organisational structures. One centre is solely an association, with all volunteers, except for one employee, who arrange most of the events themselves. The board and other volunteers handle all the practical issues during events. The second case is also an association, but it does no event production at all. The employees, all three of them, handle every practical issue; the board merely makes decisions. The third case has a variety of organisations in its mix: two associations and two joint-stock companies. One association arranges everything related to theatre in the cultural centre. The other association is an endorsement association that owns the building and the two joint-stock companies and supports the theatre financially. One of the companies is the centre's restaurant, while the other company takes care of potential renovations of the house. The fourth case is a joint-stock company within a corporate group that aims to establish different cultural oases, such as the cultural centre, all over the city.

The respondents clearly reflect on their organisational structure. According to themselves, they adapt structures in agreement with their analyses of the best environmental fit and consider indicators such as ownership, development opportunities and activity characteristics a front seat while designing the structure. Furthermore, two centres do not have a specific leader—or a clear hierarchy, for that matter—and the two with leaders stress the importance of employees having independence in their work.

In summary, the respondents perceive institutional pressures from economic scarcity (ticket sales and restaurant business, in particular), municipal reluctance to collaborate and competing actors in the field. The respondents do not perceive any isomorphic pressures but, rather, emphasise their ability to make own decisions and strategic choices. They furthermore display a distinct pioneer mindset as institutional entrepreneurs, demonstrating both mission adherence and an ability to reinvent the administrative process and activities content. Finally, the respondents emphasise democratic leadership, endurance amid setbacks, the ability to balance cultural activities with business and creation of an organisational structure most suitable for their agenda.

4.1.2 Managing resource dependence

Every organisation has to interact with its environment and, therefore, is exposed to resource dependence to differing degrees (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This section on the qualitative results describes how the respondents view their dependence on different matters. This section is divided into six subsections: 1) the need for diversified funding; 2) developing a need for resources; 3) environmental interdependencies; 4) mission drift: a focus on earning more revenue at the expense of the core mission; 5) artistic autonomy and diversified funding; and 6) deregulated organisations. The subsections are derived from the second-order themes in theme 2 from Figure 14. The data presented in this section (4.1.1) is related to subquestion 1 and the main research question.

4.1.2.1 The need for diversified funding

Most of the respondents stress the need for diversified funding. Private cultural centres do not have a single source of revenue on which they can rely, so there is a recognisable need for other revenue. Furthermore, the subsidies private centres receive from the municipality and the state have to be renegotiated each year. This brings about insecurity as the centres never know what will come in the next year. As one respondent mentioned, a 7% decline in municipal subsidies they received one year might be quite significant. In addition, municipal grants cannot be immediately put to use as project ideas arise as municipal subsidies can only be applied during one period a year.

The centres do not think that the economic support from the municipality is sufficient. According to one centre, it does not get much municipal subsidies at all, and the centre that gets most points out that the municipality provides less than 10% of its annual turnover. A third centre does not get any direct subsidies, but the municipality supports local producers by giving a day in the private cultural centre for free. The sum the municipality pays for a day is less than the ordinary rent but still amounts to about 30 000 euros a year. Furthermore, according to the respondents, there seems to be a trend towards diminishing municipal support: '*Still, the support has now begun to decline. And it is what they have warned about, that they will sink. Fairly clear. Last five years…*' (Respondent E).

Municipal subsidies are calculated by presenting the quantitative figures of executed activities. This seems to cause discontent among private cultural centres as quality is hard to measure in such a manner. For instance, two centres point out that they offer experimental and pioneering theatre, so their expected audiences are not large. Still, afterwards, other municipal theatres and cultural centres put on the same play and manage to get bigger audiences as they have bigger venues and bigger marketing budgets, and the play was already introduced to the community by the smaller private centre. This is not to say that the respondents feel they need to change altogether. The concern is more about how they are perceived, especially by the municipality.

'I have felt, that it is surprisingly strong this [belief], that a cultural centre has to be the size of an institution in order to be a cultural centre. However, I myself think that the operator can also be clearly smaller' (Respondent L).

The pressure of having to compete with both public cultural institutions and other private, leisure-time competitors simply makes the respondents conscious of the economic reality in which they work. As several respondents mention, they need to figure out what they want to offer audiences, how to do it in a resource-saving way and how to get alternative funding to do so.

4.1.2.2 Developing a need for resources

Experiencing the pressure of scarce resources, all the centres feel compelled to develop a palette of revenues that covers their costs. There indeed is a variety of ways of managing this. As one respondent states, '*I guess you have to have some new ways to think about the finances and the other things, that you can keep it as varied as it has been*' (Respondent B).

One centre relies heavily on volunteers, making it possible to arrange events at much lower costs. The idea is to give the volunteers non-economic rewards (e.g. parties and discounts on tickets to events they do not work) and to offer a community for people who have moved to that area recently. The volunteers are obliged to work on a certain number of events every year and to be on hand if others fail, for instance, due to sickness. All the events the centre arranges, around 70% of all events, are solely handled by volunteers. The centre also maintains a restaurant during events, which generates revenues for the centre. The restaurant is also managed by the volunteers.

Another centre offers a platform for people to propose and develop project ideas and find external financing through the centre. This centre does not offer job positions to a wide extent but welcomes people who can build up their own employment. It also has a restaurant run by a separate company that donates money to the centre's theatre annually.

A third centre has built a corporate group around its activities, offering a wide variety of services, from the actual cultural centre to an outdoor pool and an ice-skating rink. It offers cultural activities at each venue, so it can share the costs of the employees who manage and market the cultural services they offer (theatre, music and cinema). The centre has restaurants at all three sites, which generate money for cultural activities. The same centre also does quite a lot of corporate business-to-business events, around 300–400 a year, mainly focused on consulting for other businesses. This activity provides around one-third of its annual budget.

The fourth centre has combined a separate information point and a meeting place with its offices. This centre offers a wide range of citizen services to the local community, from selling tickets to all kind of events across Finland to providing information on grants application and selling books and CDs. This allows the centre to get different revenue sources and still stay within the frame of its mission.

Nearly all the centres also do all sorts of collaborations with other organisations, giving them opportunities to get some revenue from these projects. These external projects mostly involve the local community and seem to include the centres in their activities in most cases. The projects thus are not only a method to finance salaries but also build on the mission of the centres.

Most centres have a wide range of freelance workers who bring expertise to the centre but no monthly wages. This way, the centres can afford to have experts do specific tasks the producers and managers on monthly salaries might not be able to do. These freelancers are always hired for certain projects, so the centre can choose which expert is the most suitable for a specific project, instead of having one expert on a monthly salary who must be versatile in a way most people simply are not.

One centre tried a new method to finance a new project and collected nearly 1 million euros through crowdfunding. This was a new experience, which the centre endorses. It still emphasises the need to have interesting content as citizens will not support financially a project that is not interesting to them.

> *'A very big […] significance it has in culture and content, as people are taking a stand with their own habits of consumption as to what they want to hear and experience. So, in that sense, it suits cultural projects very well. (...) It is expected to generate returns […]. I think it's about love for something that you want to support or a progress you want to support' (Respondent A).*

Three centres seem to aim to be more self-sufficient. None of the centres appears to think it could ever easily manage without subsidies from the municipality—or especially private funders, for that matter. Instead, these revenues constitute such a small portion of the total budget that all possible regulations and other demands accompanying such subsidies have less significance for their activities.

> *'We are constantly talking about our business, the way that we have developed it all the time so that we can, in principle, eventually think that we could do on our own' (Respondent P).*

The idea seems to be specifically to make each subsidy less important to the overall budget by developing a vast palette of differing subsidies. In this manner, centres can ensure that no one contributor has too much leverage over their activities. Accordingly, the respondents stress their independence in a variety of ways, including being as self-sufficient as possible.

> *'As it now starts to roll, and we begin to do it in a smart way, then slowly but surely, maybe we'll even be nearly self-sufficient. Absolutely' (Respondent T).*

One respondent has a plan for self-sufficiency: to create a mixture of different subsidies, to aim for box-office hits and to put aside money for a rainy day. This plan includes a measure to build up the budget for events arranged by the centre.

> *'Thus, the very smartest way to make a cultural home self-sufficient is to have a 20-30-year plan. Look for donations, put away money, and create your own foundation. And, on the other hand, create your own business that may be financed to 20% to 50% with ticket revenues and the other half or 1/4 with sponsorship and external foundations and so forth. Such a mixture is very good' (Respondent G).*

Furthermore, the respondents seem to enjoy that however they decide to cope with their resource dependencies is a matter of their own decisions. As one respondent states, '*and the funny thing about taking these risks is that it's the association that decides*'. (Respondent P). Most interviewees emphasise that they weigh every decision the cultural centre makes according to the resource-saving principle; whatever is being done, there has to be a more cost-effective way to do it. The interviewees do not seem to have any illusions of being avant-garde in a fashion that implies they are alone in their cultural offerings. Most respondents merely stress that whatever their cultural offerings are, they are not anything that has been done in their specific region or, in some cases, even the whole country. The interviewees emphasise that they seek to find more effective ways of doing what they do. As one respondent states:

> *'What is done in China is also done here, and we should be able to do it a little bit smarter. That, of course, we are all involved in this global change, but ... that's really fun, it's fun that you do not always do the same thing and keep in mind all the time to get enthusiastic all over again, and it's natural if it comes from the heart' (Respondent A).*

The overarching theme among the respondents is that they constantly search for more effective ways to do things, more fruitful ways to use the walls they have. Aware of the risks that come with being private, the centres nevertheless pursue efficiency.

> *'When you have more risks as a private actor, you have to think about how to get more benefit from this place, how to best use this' (Respondent P).*

The respondents display very visibly how they compare themselves with public cultural centres. They take pride in being more effective than their counterparts. They may get less subsidies then their public peers, but apparently, they find ways to manage without such public revenues—a necessity, given the circumstances. One respondent vividly puts it:

> *' If we think about it, there are eight cultural houses in the Helsinki area that are municipal. They use about 8 million euros in cash, roughly. … If it is approximately so, […] the city's subsidy or contribution is about 1 million euros per house. Then when I'm think about the contribution of the city here, that's 100,000 euros, […] well, in this sense, we are an effective organisation' (Respondent C).*

The respondents, however, do acknowledge their interdependencies on many stakeholders, such as the municipality and other organisations. The very core of their activities is ultimately built on external actors, such as freelancers, musicians and theatres, and a substantial part of their budget consists of various subsidies.

4.1.2.3 Artistic content first

Being forced to find a variety of resources to maintain a centre can shift the focus from the content to the revenues, which is called mission drift (see chapter 2.1.5). Instead of focusing mainly on the artistic content and how the audience perceives it, attention turns to changing the artistic content to increase revenue. This section presents the respondents' view on potential mission drift in their organisations.

When asked about their mission, most respondents conclude that the artistic content comes first. Whether professionals and amateurs on the stage, movies in the cinema or versatile cultural offerings, it is about what is displayed, not about making profits.

> *'It depends on how society works or where we think we could make an effort. [...] We would mostly like to be part of society, that way, and listen and see if there is something we can join. Because, we still see a culture centre as a ... there is a such social reasoning behind that we want to contribute something within culture' (Respondent H).*

Respondents from every centre mention that their mission is not to make money from the cultural content but to display art that makes a difference within the community. In fact, some respondents even emphasise their quest to not choose their cultural content based on any expectations to make profits.

> *'In short, it is empowering, not precautionary. That is to say, in practice, we search for such program offerings that others do not want or, in practice, what is not terribly productive in terms of ticketing' (Respondent C).*

In contrast, the minor possibility of making money on culture is constantly highlighted. As there is, according to the respondents, a marginal chance to make ends meet, so there is no need to aim for commercial success. One respondent even points out that what they do would not be possible to do if the goal was to make profits: '*This would not work if we would have a commercial interest*'. (Respondent Q).

Still, quite a few respondents imply that they have to conform to the rules of business to maintain their centres, although this conformity is never made their main focus. They simply stress that they have to comply with certain rules of business to have any chance of earning revenue.

> *'However, the purpose of culture is to understand, that is, it may be a bit too much idealistic to improve the quality of life in the whole community and not so much like an instrument of business. On the*

other hand, fortunately, there is so little money involved in culture, that it is not yet terribly ... business sharks have not been able to enter cultural field' (Respondent O).

However, this conformity with business approaches takes places through different measures and, in some cases, seems to affect the cultural offerings. A few respondents highlight the strategy of choosing cultural content that balances events expected to generate substantial profits and events that most likely will not generate much profits.

> *'We do more business there, in the way we organise concerts where we want people that pay a lot, as in entry, and then we get the money. And then we also have a lot of activities that do not, which in themselves do not give us any income, but they are still there' (Respondent P).*

The emphasis on the business side serves to make profits to maintain the cultural centres, not to only choose cultural content that makes profits. The respondents indirectly state that they choose to make money on other activities not explicitly directed at their core audience to then be able to provide a variety of cultural content, which is less expensive for the audience.

> '*In Europe, they have more, more private houses than here, and then they have often built up as […] [our centre], that you have a B2B side, that rent out spaces and so on, and the idea in most houses is that with the profit that you make […] You use most of it to make culture or in some way support society*' *(Respondent E).*

The cultural centres also aim to make profits on their restaurants, which are considered to be a service for customers and thus not a factor that affects the cultural content negatively. In fact, the main goal of the restaurants is also to be able to make the cultural content less expensive. As one respondent summarised this: '*Alongside the restaurant business, we produce cheap cultural experiences*' (Respondent C). The respondents unanimously dismiss the possibility of mission drift in their cases.

4.1.2.4 Artistic autonomy and diversified funding

Most respondents stress the importance of diversified, meaningful cultural offerings. Nevertheless, there is an underlying economy present in the actions of the centres.

> *'Sometimes you simply cannot give a Saturday night to an event that would be of big interest to you, but knowing that the economic*

structure of the whole house is in principle strict, it will cost a lot and you know that it will not bear its own weight. […] This we cannot do when we work within our framework' (Respondent O).

Although a handful of the respondents representing all the centres seems to be aware of an economic reality that dictates some choices concerning cultural offerings, they equally emphasise the possibility to choose cultural content that supports the whole. Instead of choosing merely artists who sell tickets or perhaps are more artistically interesting but most likely will not sell many tickets, the centres aim to build a palette of artists with both qualities.

> *'You need to select the right artist at the right time. It's definitely a really important thing, that you have a little knowledge about what kind of entertainment there is at the moment and complement it, I would say. Then you have the opportunity to ... the more successful events you have, the more events you have when you have a full house' (Respondent T).*

Several respondents believe that artists should be able to decide the content themselves, with no interference by the cultural centre. One respondent even mentions that if the centre has its own productions, he always tells the artists the budget in advance to create goodwill and understanding towards the imminent project. Another respondent state that he has different kinds of deals with the artists he books. Some get fully paid in advance; some gets a percentage of their normal fee and then share the ticket revenue. Others come solely on ticket risk. The point seems to be that these are deals made based on common agreement. The artists have the opportunity to decline, and if they come, they are aware of the deal. Cultural centres want to present a broad variety of artists, but given the economic reality of scarce resources, the centres handle situations with different deals. Additionally, all the centres rent their venues to external actors, thereby getting rent without risk and letting artists do whatever they want at the same time. Most of the centres still want to influence what they display and when.

Private cultural centres do try to get revenue from different sources, primarily to be able to display versatile cultural offerings. They want to preserve artistic autonomy without administrative intervention.

4.1.2.5 Deregulated organisation

Private cultural centres proudly state that they are less exposed to municipal regulations and control. However, according to the respondents, several regulations still apply to them, especially those centres that get municipal or state funding.

> *'One problem is a relation to ... an indirect reliance on […] [the] city. However, it is completely different than if politicians or officials would come and sit in our board. I am much more comfortable with this model' (Respondent G).*

All the centres nevertheless are self-governing and give priority to an open dialogue within the centre. The board or the director make the decisions, with a lot less external interference. The centres naturally are aware that they need to carry out some rules and regulations, but otherwise, it is up to them how to proceed in every issue at hand.

> *'It is the kind of a democratic organisation where anybody can basically come to suggest or say anything. It consists of a few companies owned by a supportive association' (Respondent O).*

As stated, private cultural centres would like to collaborate more with the municipalities, but most centres see collaboration with municipal institutions as somewhat problematic. The obstacles for such cooperation can be too many. As one respondent concludes:

> *'I would hope that this number of regulations and the way to work together with the public sector could be advanced, and then we could look for a common goal. That such fears should be reduced, and in addition to enthusiasm to work together, both parties should also strive to focus on solutions' (Respondent A).*

The state of Finland has many regulations that apply even to private organisations, according to the respondents. Laws, for instance, set the opening hours for restaurants, govern alcohol sales and establish specific rules for employment. These laws can hinder motivations to carry out activities in the private sector. Some respondents even state that some things do not get done due to regulation: '*I know really many things that fall because people have not had the strength to cope with that bureaucracy when they start something*' (Respondent E).

Most centres have designated individuals who are responsible for various issues and work very independently. They typically make their own decisions in their area of responsibility and attempt to streamline all the cultural offerings to have unity and not to obstruct the other activities happening in the centre.

> *'I'm responsible for that program, so I do it completely independently. […] So if I decide something, a show gets booked. Then I only check the electronic calendar that there is not anything overlapping […]. As I just said, everybody has their own areas of responsibility they are responsible for. […] We, so to speak, play Tetris. The square meters are limited, so we just need to […] adjust so there will be no overlapping and noise in order to not spoil each other's stuff' (Respondent O).*

The centres' boards make all the bigger decisions, as legislation in Finland requires. The employees nonetheless make decisions about running errands but report to the board. A dominant theme arising during the interviews is that all the centres believe in giving freedom to act and make decisions at almost every level of their organisations.

> *'We believe very strongly in our director. To have free hands. And we have underlined what things we want to be aware of. As for financial… major financing, they all come to the board. (...) The board is not unaware of any major investments or staff appointments, or ... […] we can talk very openly, and she also reports pretty well' (Respondent J).*

Furthermore, most respondents emphasise the courage of private actors. Their decisions are made quickly and are often bold, which is how they differ quite substantially from public institutions. The possibility to be at the surface of current trends vastly favours private actors, according to the respondents. This is a sort of discretion public centres do not have.

In summary, the respondents stress the need for diversified funding as revenue streams are small, and ticket sales insecure. Managing existing resources is also a central theme. The respondents develop their need for resources by multiplying their palette of revenue, using volunteers, restructuring their organisation, offering different services, collaborating with other organisations and using freelance workers and crowdfunding. Planning ahead and rethinking cost efficiency are also highlighted. The respondents are very clear that the artistic content is the most important, and the process of finding revenue streams and maintaining other businesses, such as restaurants, are only to enable the cultural offerings. According to the respondents, they support artistic autonomy but at times may choose the dates for different events to stage a variety of cultural activities in the short term and to enable better ticket sales. Finally, the respondents feel they have autonomy in comparison to the public centres. Although some regulations also apply to them, private centres are considered to be deregulated organisations.

4.1.3 Legitimacy and the environment

This last section on the qualitative results indicates how private cultural centres perceive themselves within their environment. This section is divided into four subsections: 1) positioning private cultural centres in relation to public centres; 2) environmental views on cultural centres; 3) part of society; and 4) privatisation of cultural services. These sections are derived from the second-order themes in theme 3 from Figure 14. The data presented in this section (4.1.1) are related to subquestion 3.

4.1.3.1 Positioning private cultural centres in relation to public centres

There clearly is not much collaboration or contact between the public centres and the private centres interviewed in this study. Some respondents mention working on a few productions at public centres, and some centres share artists on tour, but beyond these, the opinions of the public centres presented in this chapter appear to be merely based on hearsay. In addition, one private centre does not have a public cultural centre in the same town. As stated in the chapter 2, the literature chapter, organisations still tend to mold their organisational identities in relation to other organisations in their field (Strandgaard Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006).

The vast majority of the respondents think private entrepreneurs are responsible for the majority of cultural offerings in their community. Some consider the municipality to be the main cultural provider, a few feel that private entrepreneurs and the municipality share equal amounts of responsibility, and one sees no differences at all between private actors and the municipality in providing culture. The respondents all share the opinion that the municipality has an important role in supporting cultural activities. There are differences in this role; some stress the responsibility of the municipality to take the lead in cultural offerings, whereas some propose municipalities should merely act as facilitators.

> *'I see the role of the city […] as a facilitator. (...) The creation of opportunities is included in facilitation activities. That could mean spaces or resources. I do*

not see the city as a commissioner. I do not see that a city subscribes to a certain type of culture, let alone as the producer itself' (Respondent C).

Most respondents nevertheless think the municipality has a role in offering cultural activities to the community on a smaller level. Some opinions hold that the cultural offerings of a community might be jeopardised if they rested solely on the shoulders of the private entrepreneurs: '*I think it should be as it is now. To say that the fundament would ... be at risk if it were to be run private as they can stop doing it at any time*' (Respondent R).

Furthermore, the respondents seem to share a view that the municipality mostly offers culture due to the national strategy. The underlying opinion here is that even if the municipal cultural department emphasises the importance of offering diverse art to its community, regulations on a national level still dictate what is to be offered. This changes the foundation of what is to be offered, in a way not in balance with the actual needs of a specific local society. This dictating of the municipal cultural departments as to what is to be offered is in stark contrast to private cultural centres, which foremost offer what they think is needed in their particular region. As one respondent puts it:

> '*Well, municipal institutions have to offer art, to ... to be able to say on a national scale that art is offered equally to children and adolescents and adults, and drama and comedy, for example, on the theatre side. We do not in any way have any obligation to provide certain types of software or certain types of events*' *(Respondent N).*

Most respondents emphasise that their role as private organisations enables them to analyse their local society and plan their cultural offerings accordingly. If there is another cinema in the same town, the private cultural centre may aim to show movies that cannot be seen in that cinema. If there is another theatre, it does other plays. If there is a music hall, it offers other sorts of concerts. Their goal is to fill a void, not to duplicate what is offered elsewhere.

> *'We perceive ourselves that we play a significant role in the fact that we do [it] differently and from different starting points than these big municipal cultural institutions here' (Respondent N).*

Most respondents see their mission as filling a void as the current situation of public cultural offerings in their society has left large areas of culture blank. The idea is not merely to act as a supplement to public cultural offerings but to present an alternative culture to customers, a slight difference the respondents highlight.

4.1.3.2 Environmental view of private cultural centres

The respondents perceive their environment as consisting of the audience (the citizens) and stakeholders, such as the municipality, funders and collaborating organisations. Some private centres studied in the qualitative data, according to themselves, had distributed surveys to different stakeholder groups, while other had not. The data collected for this section, therefore, is grounded on the surveys completed by the centres and the respondents' own perceptions of situations.

According to the experience of the respondents, the environment of the private cultural centres in this study views them positively. Two centres, for instance, have received national prices for their activities, and one does a vast amount of consulting about how to run a cultural centre, implying an appreciation of the centres in their society.

Two respondents express the view that cultural activities will be even more important in the future as the amount of time people put into work decreases and demands for leisure-time activities increase. Beyond the change in working hours, one respondent highlights a shift in what people are seeking:

> *'People are more and more looking for intangible things in their lives, and the whole economy has turned from products to services and experiences, and we are part of that' (Respondent C).*

The centres strive to meet these desires and have gotten good feedback from many respondents on their success.

One indicator of a good environmental image is that as soon a centre starts the employment process, it seems to get many applicants. This response, of course, depends on the size of the city in which the centre is active, but according to the respondents, the number of job applicants is still vast in comparison to the amount of job applicants to other job vacancies in the same city. The same applies to the members in the board.

One centre is across the street from a shopping mall. According to one respondent, the former mall owner told them that as soon as the private cultural centre was established, sales in the mall rose several percent. Furthermore, three centres were founded in a part of the city without many activities but have significantly spurred activities in this area. As the centres aim to fill a void and act as leisure-time entrepreneurs, one respondent stresses the pioneer role the centres have played:

> *'We do things that are in the spirit of the time, and then the things we do also have some other meaning besides making the time go by. While monitoring our brand, the image has grown of us being… ... well, quite clearly, the urban culture people. So not cultural people, we are urban culture people, and then that that we are trying to do something that cannot be found exactly everywhere' (Respondent A).*

In addition, even if all the centres seem to get visitors from other regions and even abroad, the vast majority of the customers are local people, both from nearby municipalities and the municipality where the centre is. Private cultural centres clearly consider themselves to be providers of local services, as confirmed by the large number of local customers.

4.1.3.3 Part of society

Private cultural centres view themselves as making a difference in their societies. They all aim to keep their audience in focus, so they constantly monitor the needs and wishes of the surrounding environment through questionnaires to and direct contact with customers. All the cultural centres collaborate with other organisations and even with the municipality, although to a lesser extent. In the interviews, the awareness of the centres as part of the surrounding society emerges quite often. Although the centres consider themselves to be able to make their own decisions and provide activities for which they feel there is a need, the centrality of the society is emphasised. As one respondent states, '*it*'*s giving something to society, yes ... a culture house should try to find it as well ... fill a void in the city*'. (Respondent E).

The role private cultural centres play in society, according to the respondents, is not only to offer art experiences to citizens but, on a more fundamental level, to make cities more pleasurable. The void they are trying to fill seems to be tightly interlocked with values that make life more worthwhile for those living in the region. The respondents circulated a theme that involved demographic issues, such as population movements. During an interview, a respondent summarised this in the following manner:

> *'If you look from an economic point of view, then the economy is changing to something more intangible. If you look at the cultural point of view, then we are producing urban culture content experiences, services to the citizens. If you also look from the cities' point of view, then we are making cities more enjoyable places, where more and more people would like to move or enjoy' (Respondent C).*

The possibility to come and relax as if in one's own living room is emphasised by the respondents. The idea the cultural centres are trying to mediate is both about the cultural offerings and the chance to hang around in an environment of the customers' liking and to experience something that is not part of everyday life. As one respondent puts it, the cultural centre do represent everyday life but in a different, more enjoyable way. There is a versatility in the offering not found elsewhere.

> *'People often say that how wonderful when you can also drink red wine in this cinema, and it's great to be able to eat dinner here after the theatre, so that sort of easiness and relaxation. You can sit there with your children, and there is a sandbox next to you, and you do not have to show your ID card at the door, and you do not have to explain why your kids are at this restaurant table making noise because it's a part of this package' (Respondent A).*

Private culture centres also provide a more intimate feeling in both theatre and music events, according to the respondents, as the halls are smaller than big concert venues. Many artists seem to prefer to perform in these centres specifically because of these attributes. This same dynamic also applies to the audiences. Nevertheless, the respondents emphasise frequently that a cultural centre is 'more than its walls'. It is the work of the employees and the board members that form the interest in the house and its position in the society.

> '*It does require a certain kind of awareness. what do I think? For example, that here is in this house. What is the restaurant side doing? for example, our promoter, is aware of what is interesting, what raises interest*' *(Respondent L).*

As presented in section 3.3.1, private cultural centres have many visitors annually. Most respondents view the audience as the primary source of information on how their cultural centre is perceived in society.

4.1.3.4 Privatisation of public cultural centres

The respondents admit they are no experts on the privatisation of any municipal service, much less public cultural centres. Most nonetheless have opinions on the matter. On a general level, most respondents do not think privatisation of municipal services would serve the public benefit, as free-market forces, for instance, could ruin the level of healthcare in Finland today. Equally, the question about paying taxes for services not offered by the municipality anymore surfaced. However, most respondents do see a benefit in a shift away from the municipality being the sole provider of all the public services the cultural centre provides. As one respondent states, '*free competition, well that only develops business and is good for customers*' (Respondent H).

Collaboration between the municipality and the private cultural centre is often raised in the interviews. Although most respondents admit they have not collaborated with the municipality on any larger scale, there is the wish to do so. In addition, there are some interesting exceptions.

> *'We have consulted municipal cultural organisations, especially in business cooperation and marketing. Often, they may have outsourced the corporate co-operation and sponsorship for us to handle' (Respondent C).*

The respondents point out how very insufficient the financing of municipal cultural services is. Nearly all the respondents feel there could be higher municipal subsidies to private cultural centres, so a reoccurring view is that the municipality should either give substantially higher subsidies or buy services directly from centres.

> *'If the municipality would give us, say, 40,000 euros to do something one year, then we would be very happy. We would easily get anything done. But if the municipality tries for itself with 40,000 to do something, then it is one person employed. That person would not have anybody, even any money, any budget to use in his or her work' (Respondent R).*

The discourse during the interviews often centres on efficiency. The common view is that not every municipal institution should be privatised; instead, a decentralised model with some municipal services provided by private actors is desired. Furthermore, there is clear discontent about the marginal support private cultural centres feel they get from the municipality in return for helping municipalities in their missions. Awareness of the economic requirements of a public cultural institution and the number of the municipality's employees has further magnified the discontent about resources that could simply be put to better use.

4.1.3.5 Environmental interdependencies

Centres that receive state subsidies are encouraged by the state to engage in joint productions, according to one respondent. Even without such regulations, all the centres seem to be driven towards collaborations with other organisations. One centre built its own outdoor pool and, in the process, relied heavily municipal officials.

> *'I have to say that […] [the project] would not have come into being if the town had not have arranged a shared investigative person between all 12 different organisational units, that that helped us through the whole thing. Otherwise, it would not have been successful as there were a lot of things nobody had done before' (Respondent A).*

The respondents who work with the centres' musical offerings especially stress the need to have a good network of agencies. They are approached directly by artists as well, but the majority of the bookings happen through agencies. These agencies may cause complications as the cultural centres are very dependent on external artists, and the agencies find it very important to choose the right time for each artist to perform.

> *'We are working directly with foreign agents, but occasionally ... the main part [of the artists] comes through Finnish agents and then the fact that a foreign performer is brought to Finland, then it is always so, that he or she has certain periods when he or she is booked and when it is timely to come. The management [of the agencies] is thinking about when it would be fruitful to come to Finland' (Respondent D).*

On many occasions, the respondents bring up that they collaborate with other private organisations. They initiate new projects with other organisations, join existing projects and maintain networks that may help them in the future. This collaboration mentality also includes helping others and sharing ideas. Working within the leisure-time industry, the centres, of course, have a variety of competitors but nonetheless team up with a variety of organisations within the same industry. One respondent describes their view on collaboration:

> *'We are moving in the same direction as society, that when people change, and values change, and the way you do things change in a*

> *certain way: more and more to a kind of off-substance and more towards sharing. Not everyone needs to own everything, and we pitch things to each other, and […] we can work together' (Respondent A).*

Cooperation, though, does not come without difficulties. Some respondents point out that collaboration might consume many resources. Even if most respondents see collaboration as positive, a few would consider doing them if they had more resources, such as time. The clear minority that perceives cooperation negatively evidently had some bad experiences earlier in cooperation.

> *'Co-operation is usually good, but there is, of course, a risk that it will be very ... well, maybe bureaucratic, or heavy, or so, as there are very many instances to be involved and ... . There are more questions about practicalities, like who should finance what, and who tends to what, that ... it is faster and easier, with less friction if you do it by yourself' (Respondent Q).*

Many respondents also point out that their activities affect not only citizens but the value of the buildings in the neighbourhood. This, in turn, leads to a situation in which cultural centres seem to find it somewhat easier to team up in different ways with nearby businesses and returning customers.

In summary, the respondents do not collaborate much with public centres but still see themselves as offering the majority of the cultural offerings in their communities. Positioning themselves in relation to their public peers, private centres seem to have a mission to fill a gap in the municipality's cultural offerings. Furthermore, private centres react to their environment on a deeper level than municipal organisations. The respondents perceive the environmental view on their centres as positive. The private cultural centres feel very much part of society, with a mission to make cities more enjoyable. There are no signs of privatisation of public cultural centres. The respondents, however, perceive the need for a more sufficient way of administering cultural offerings, which private centres see themselves as doing much better. In addition, the respondents emphasise the need for collaboration with other organisations as they perceive themselves as having environmental interdependencies.

4.2 Phase 2: quantitative data analysis

This second part of the results chapter presents the quantitative data. These results are situated within the participants’ experiences of maintaining private cultural centres and are presented as a continuation of the themes emerging from analysis of the qualitative data. Every theme has its own section. This chapter starts with a simple curve of diffusion, and the whole section covers: 1) early and late adopters; 2) institutional pressures; 3) resource dependence; and 4) legitimacy and the environment. The last three themes are each connected to a research question.

The variables used in the different subchapters are presented in Table 7, divided by the centre type. The questionnaire that produced these variables can be found in Appendix B.

Table 7—Descriptive statistics of the data used in the quantitative analysis

Ownership	Variables	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std	Median
Private	**Affect / funders?**	33	1	5	3,21	1,364	3,00
	Affect / local inhabitants?	33	1	5	3,39	1,321	4,00
	Affect / municipality?	33	1	5	3,00	1,225	3,00
	Affect / State?	33	1	5	2,30	1,403	2,00
	Has the cooperation changed last years?	33	1	5	3,00	0,866	3,00
	Changed expectations of local inhabitants?	33	1	5	2,76	1,032	3,00
	Competition with private cultural sector?	32	1	5	3,00	1,295	3,00
	Contest Private/Public?	34	1	5	2,74	1,377	3,00
	Cultural offering because of commercial success?	32	1	5	2,81	1,230	3,00
	Economical affect / sponsorship?	33	1	5	2,18	1,103	2,00
	Economical affect / crowdfunding?	33	1	4	1,30	0,684	1,00
	Economical affect / inter-org. cooperation?	33	1	5	3,39	1,059	4,00
	Economical affect / municipal funding?	33	1	5	2,76	1,640	2,00
	Economical affect / private funding?	33	1	5	2,88	1,596	2,00
	Economical affect / taxes?	33	1	5	2,88	1,474	3,00
	Economical affect / volontary staff?	33	1	5	3,36	1,597	4,00
	Environmental pressure to change?	33	1	5	2,76	1,226	3,00
	Has the administration changed last years?	33	1	5	2,70	1,132	2,00
	How important is the inter-org. cooperation?	33	2	5	4,18	0,846	4,00
	Inter-organizational cooperation?	33	2	5	3,85	0,972	4,00
	More commercial activities?	32	1	5	3,09	1,376	4,00
	Need for change?	33	1	5	3,06	1,088	3,00
	Do you have own cultural offering?	32	1	5	3,59	1,132	4,00
	How dependent are you on renters?	33	1	5	3,36	1,454	4,00
	Valid N (listwise)	31					
Ownership	**Variables**	**N**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Mean**	**Std**	**Median**
Public	**Affect / funders?**	41	1	5	3,12	1,249	3,00
	Affect / local inhabitants?	42	2	5	4,02	0,715	3,00
	Affect / municipality?	42	1	5	4,05	1,081	4,00
	Affect / State?	42	1	5	2,62	1,248	2,00
	Has the cooperation changed last years?	46	1	5	3,24	0,766	3,00
	Changed expectations of local inhabitants?	46	1	5	3,15	0,842	3,00
	Competition with private cultural sector?	47	1	5	2,45	1,080	2,00
	Contest Private/Public?	5	1	3	1,60	0,894	1,00
	Cultural offering because of commercial success?	46	1	4	2,50	0,960	3,00
	Economical affect / sponsorship?	42	1	4	1,71	0,891	1,50
	Economical affect / crowdfunding?	42	1	3	1,19	0,505	1,00
	Economical affect / inter-org. cooperation?	42	2	5	4,00	0,963	4,00
	Economical affect / municipal funding?	42	1	5	4,29	1,195	5,00
	Economical affect / private funding?	42	1	5	1,86	1,049	1,50
	Economical affect / taxes?	42	1	4	1,83	0,853	2,00
	Economical affect / volontary staff?	42	1	5	2,31	1,115	2,00
	Environmental pressure to change?	46	1	5	3,30	1,008	3,50
	Has the administration changed last years?	47	1	5	2,91	1,213	3,00
	How important is the inter-org. cooperation?	46	2	5	4,48	0,809	5,00
	Inter-organizational cooperation?	47	2	5	4,21	0,883	4,00
	More commercial activities?	47	1	5	2,13	1,035	2,00
	Need for change?	46	2	5	3,59	0,884	4,00
	Do you have own cultural offering?	47	1	5	3,47	1,139	4,00
	How dependent are you on renters?	47	1	5	3,40	1,228	4,00
	Valid N (listwise)	3					

Ownership	Variables	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std	Median
Hybrid	Affect / funders?	6	1	5	3,33	1,633	3,50
	Affect / local inhabitants?	6	3	5	4,33	0,816	4,50
	Affect / municipality?	6	2	5	4,17	1,169	4,50
	Affect / State?	6	1	5	3,50	1,517	3,50
	Has the cooperation changed last years?	8	2	5	3,38	0,916	3,00
	Changed expectations of local inhabitants?	9	2	4	2,78	0,667	3,00
	Competition with private cultural sector?	8	1	5	3,13	1,246	3,00
	Contest Private/Public?	11	1	5	2,91	1,578	4,00
	Cultural offering because of commercial success?	8	1	4	2,25	1,389	2,00
	Economical affect / sponsorship?	6	1	5	2,00	1,673	1,00
	Economical affect / crowdfunding?	6	1	2	1,17	0,408	1,00
	Economical affect / inter-org. cooperation?	6	4	5	4,67	0,516	5,00
	Economical affect / municipal funding?	6	1	5	3,33	1,862	4,00
	Economical affect / private funding?	6	1	5	3,00	1,673	2,50
	Economical affect / taxes?	6	1	5	3,17	1,329	3,00
	Economical affect / volontary staff?	6	1	5	3,00	1,673	3,50
	Environmental pressure to change?	9	1	5	3,56	1,236	4,00
	Has the administration changed last years?	9	1	5	2,78	1,302	3,00
	How important is the inter-org. cooperation?	8	4	5	4,50	0,535	4,50
	Inter-organizational cooperation?	8	2	5	4,00	0,926	4,00
	More commercial activities?	8	1	5	3,25	1,753	3,50
	Need for change?	9	2	5	3,00	1,118	3,00
	Do you have own cultural offering?	8	1	4	3,13	1,356	4,00
	How dependent are you on renters?	8	2	5	4,00	1,069	4,00
	Valid N (listwise)	6					
Ownership	**Variables**	**N**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Mean**	**Std**	**Median**
Governmental company/ foundation	Affect / funders?	12	1	5	3,33	1,435	3,50
	Affect / local inhabitants?	12	2	5	3,50	1,087	4,00
	Affect / municipality?	12	2	5	4,00	0,853	4,00
	Affect / State?	12	1	4	2,00	0,853	3,00
	Has the cooperation changed last years?	12	2	5	3,58	0,793	4,00
	Changed expectations of local inhabitants?	11	2	5	3,55	0,934	4,00
	Competition with private cultural sector?	12	1	5	3,08	1,564	3,00
	Contest Private/Public?	12	1	5	2,42	1,621	2,00
	Cultural offering because of commercial success?	12	1	4	3,17	0,937	3,00
	Economical affect / sponsorship?	12	1	4	2,17	1,193	2,00
	Economical affect / crowdfunding?	12	1	2	1,25	0,452	1,00
	Economical affect / inter-org. cooperation?	12	1	5	3,33	1,557	3,50
	Economical affect / municipal funding?	12	1	5	3,75	1,422	4,00
	Economical affect / private funding?	12	1	4	1,67	0,985	1,00
	Economical affect / taxes?	12	1	3	1,58	0,900	1,00
	Economical affect / volontary staff?	12	1	5	2,08	1,564	1,00
	Environmental pressure to change?	12	1	4	3,00	0,953	3,00
	Has the administration changed last years?	12	1	4	3,00	1,128	3,00
	How important is the inter-org. cooperation?	12	3	5	4,42	0,900	5,00
	Inter-organizational cooperation?	12	2	5	4,08	1,165	4,50
	More commercial activities?	12	2	5	4,08	0,900	4,00
	Need for change?	12	2	5	3,58	1,084	4,00
	Do you have own cultural offering?	12	1	5	2,42	1,443	2,00
	How dependent are you on renters?	11	4	5	4,82	0,405	5,00
	Valid N (listwise)	9					

4.2.1 Early and late adopters

As stated, Rogers (1995) proposed a curve of diffusion of innovation to describe the process by which an innovation is disseminated over time. The curve presents five categories of adopters: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. Rogers (1995) suggested that the classification of adopters of an innovation be calculated by the normal distribution of the time of adoption. Applying the M, SD and median of this distribution, it is possible to categorise adopters into these five groups. The tests were conducted first-hand at private and public centres, so this thesis first presents the descriptive statistics for all four centre types. Three outliers were excluded from the descriptive statistics as two referred to their theatres, which were founded much earlier than the cultural centre, and one private cultural centre was built in 1892. As it is not clear when the cultural centre started as a cultural centre, although the house was built in 1892, it is too much of an outlier to not be excluded.

Table 8—Descriptive statistics on cultural centre types by year of founding

Ownership?		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Median
Private	**Year when founded?**	29	2002,28	11,467	1965	2016	2005
Public	**Year when founded?**	46	1993,72	10,739	1952	2015	1992,5
Hybrid	**Year when founded?**	11	1998,91	8,573	1985	2011	1999
Governmental company/found.	**Year when founded?**	12	1999,17	10,994	1981	2014	1998
All centers	**Year when founded?**	98	1997,50	11,266	1952	2016	1999

The cultural centres were founded in the following order (by order of founding year):
Public cultural centres (M = 1993, 72; SD = 10.739; median = 1992,50)
Hybrid cultural centres (M = 1998, 91; SD = 8.573; median = 1999)
Governmental organisation cultural centres (M = 1999,17; SD 10.994; median = 1998)
Private cultural centres (M = 2002, 28; SD = 11.467; median 2005)

Public cultural centres represent 46,9% of the sample and can be seen as the theoretical definition of the adopter categories of innovators (2,5%), early adopters (13,5%) and early majority (34%), resulting in a theoretical percentage of 49%. Furthermore, the hybrid (11,2%) and governmental organisation (12,2%) centres represent 23,4% of the adopters, and private centres 29,6%. This implies that the hybrid and governmental organisation centres are the late adopters, and the private centres are both late adopters and laggards, if the data fit perfectly into Roger's (1995) innovation diffusion model.

To test the fit with the data from the questionnaire, the data were regressed on time (calendar year of adoption) using MS Excel. When plotted on a cumulative frequency basis, the data on cultural centres' founding roughly follows a S-shaped curve. The following table illustrates the results.

Table 9—Cumulative number of adopters against time for cultural centres



The output of the innovation diffusion study implies that the cumulative distribution of adopters follows a sigmoidal pattern over time, so its variance can be explained using a logistic function. The data still had to first be tested for linearity. When checking the ANOVA table from SPSS, the linearity is .413, and deviation from linearity is .005. These results mean that the linearity assumption is not perfectly acceptable (linearity .413), but the data fit the linear model as the deviation from linearity is .005 (< .05). The data follow a linear model, which does not support the sigmoidal distribution claim as in Roger's (1995) innovation model.

Table 10—Cumulative number of adopters against time per centre type



The diffusion of innovation cannot be calculated by nonlinear regression (with logistic function) (Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1990), so this study answered this first quantitative result subsection qualitatively. When comparing these results to the M of all the centres (M = 1997,50) and the SD (SD = 11,266), public cultural centres are the innovators or the early adopters, hybrid centres and governmental organisation centres—with a small internal variance in time—are the early majority, and private centres are the late adopters. The results indicate small differences between hybrid and governmental organisation centres, and private centres are spread over a much broader era of time, so any other predictions from this data are assumptions.

4.2.2 Dealing with institutional pressures

In this section, the aim is to study whether cultural centres are exposed to institutional pressures. In the theoretical part of this study (2.1.4), institutional pressures are considered to take place as institutions exert forces upon individuals and organisations, developing social pressures and constraints and setting limits for acceptability. To examine institutional pressures, this thesis focuses on the variables presented after the hypotheses.

The hypotheses are:

H1: Public cultural centres experience more institutional pressure than private centres

H01: Public cultural centres do not experience more institutional pressure than private centres

The variables used in this construct are:

1) *Environmental pressure to change* (Do you experience that society places any pressures on your centre to change?)
2) *Changed expectations local inhabitants* (Have the expectations of the local inhabitants changed during the last years?)
3) *Need for change* (Do you feel you have a need to change?)
4) *Changes in the administration* (Has the administration of your cultural centre changed in recent years?)
5) *Affect/local inhabitants* (How do the following entities affect your activities: local inhabitants?)
6) *Affect/state* (How do the following entities affect your activities: the state?)
7) *Affect/municipality* (How do the following entities affect your activities: Municipality?)
8) *Economical affect/taxes* (How much do the following things affect your activities: taxes?)
9) *Affect/funders* (How do the following entities affect your activities: funders?)
10) *Contest private/public* (In your opinion, do you have to compete with municipal cultural services?)

All the variables were based on a 5 point Likert scale. Cronbach's alpha was used to establish the internal consistency and reliability of all the items. The reliability coefficient values are .707 for these 10 items.

Mann Whitney U-test

The results were analysed with Mann-Whitney U test as the data was partly skewed and not normally distributed according to Shapiro-Wilk test. Statistical significance is acceptable, at the 95% level. This study compared the medians of the Likert test survey, revealing the perceived view on institutional pressure between private and public centres.

The p-value is the estimated probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of a research question when that null hypothesis is false. For this thesis, the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in how private and public cultural centres identify institutional pressures. The null hypothesis is rejected if the p-value is smaller than $\alpha = 0.05$. Smaller p-values suggest that the null hypothesis is less likely to be true; in other words, there are differences in the perceived institutional pressure.

Mann-Whitney U test shows a significant difference in the perceived institutional pressure between the two cultural centres groups in the following four items (those with significant values).

Table 11—Mann Whitney U test on institutional pressures

Quantitative statistically significant results by center type (Mann Whitney U test)							
	Center type	**Median**	**Mean Rank**	**U**	**Z**	**p**	**R**
Environmental pressure to change	**Private**	3.00	34.11	564.500	-2.009	0.045	.226
	Public	3.50	44.23				
Affect / municipality	**Private**	3.00	28.14	367.500	-3.608	0.000	.417
	Public	4.00	45.75				
Need for change	**Private**	3.00	33.45	543.000	-2.261	0.024	.254
	Public	3.50	44.70				
Economical affects / taxes	**Private**	3.00	46.39	416.000	-3.071	0.002	.355
	Public	2.00	31.40				

Descriptive statistics show that public cultural centres (median = 3.50; M rank = 44.23) score higher on environmental pressure to change than private centres (median = 3.00; M rank = 34.11). Mann-Whitney U value is found to be statistically significant (U = 564.500 (Z =-2.009); $p < 0.045$), and the difference between the public and private centres is small (Z/sqrt N = R = .226). Furthermore, public cultural centres (median = 4.00; M rank = 45.75) score higher on affect/municipality than private centres (median = 3.00; M rank = 28.14). The Mann-Whitney U value is found to be statistically significant (U = 367.500 (Z =-3.608); $p < 0.001$), and the difference between public and private centres is considerable (R = .417). Public cultural centres (median = 3.50; M rank = 44.70) also score higher on need for change than private centres (median = 3.00; M rank = 33.45). The Mann-Whitney U value is found to be statistically significant (U = 543.000 (Z =-2.261); $p < 0.024$), and the difference between public and private centres is small (R = .254). Private cultural centres (median = 3.00; M rank = 46.39) score higher on economic affects/taxes than public centres (median = 2.00; M rank =

31.40). The Mann-Whitney U value is found to be statistically significant ($U = 416.000$ ($Z =- 3.071$); $p < 0.002$), and the difference between public and private centres is notable ($R = .355$). All the Z score are negative because the ordering of the groups is not taken into account by this test in SPSS (IBM, 2016).

These results suggest that there are slight differences between private and public centres. Public centres seem to have more institutional pressure from their environment and from their owner, the municipality, whereas private centres experience bureaucratic pressures. Thus, the results suggest rejecting the null hypothesis for these four items.

The size of the subgroups hybrid and governmental organisation is too small to test the significance of the M/median differences. As can be seen in the descriptive statistics, some characteristics in hybrid centres seem to be similar to private centres, whereas governmental organisations lean towards public centres. These claims are based on the differences in the Ms and SDs of the variable economical affect/taxes for private centres (M: 2.88, SD: 1.474) compared to hybrid centres (M: 3.17, SD: 1.329) and for public centres (M: 1.83, SD: .853) compared to governmental organisations (M: 1.58, SD: .900) and the differences in the Ms and SDs of the variable need for change for private centres (M: 3.06, SD: 1.088) compared to hybrid centres (M: 3.00, SD: 1.118) and for public centres (M: 3.59, SD: .884) compared to governmental organisations (M: 3.58, SD: 1.084).

4.2.3 Managing resource dependence

Every organisation has to interact with its environment and, therefore, is exposed to resource dependence to differing degrees (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In this section, I analyse how the respondents view their dependence on different matters. This chapter is divided into two subsections: 1) the need of diversified funding; and 2) mission drift.

4.2.3.1 The need for diversified funding

This subsection is aimed at studying whether private cultural centres are dependent on a broad diversity of revenue sources and thus exhibit more variation than public centres. Public centres are assumed to be dependent mostly on a single revenue sources and to thus exhibit conformity. According to the theories of homogeneity and heterogeneity, private cultural centres that are late adopters within their organisational field face institutional forces and have to adopt the current rules of set by the public cultural centres, the early adopters. This study, however, aims to point out that the dependence on diverse revenue sources among private cultural centres, unlike their public counter peers, can lead to heterogeneity. To examine the need of diversified funding, this thesis focuses on the variables presented beneath the hypotheses.

The hypotheses are:

H2: The type of perceived resource interdependence leads to a higher degree of resource diversification in private cultural centres.

H02: The type of perceived resource interdependence does not lead to a higher degree of resource diversification in private cultural centres.

The variables used in this construct are:

1) *Economical affect/private funding* (How much do the following things affect your activities: private funding?)
2) *Economical affect/voluntary staff* (How much do the following things affect your activities: volunteer staff?)
3) *Affect/funders* (How do the following entities affect your activities: funders?)
4) *Economical affect/crowdfunding* (How much do the following things affect your activities: crowdfunding?)
5) *Economical affect/sponsorship* (How much do the following things affect your activities: sponsorship?)
6) *Economical affect/municipal funding* (How much do the following things affect your activities: municipal funding?)
7) *Do you have own cultural offerings* (Do you have cultural offerings of your own?)
8) *Economical affect/inter-organisational cooperation* (How much do the following things affect your activities: Inter-organisational cooperation?)

All the variables were based on a 5-point Likert scale.

Factor analysis

The Cronbach's alpha reliability analysis score is only .569, so this study started with exploratory factor analysis, a statistical method that increases the reliability of a scale by identifying inappropriate items that can be removed. Thus, to reduce the amount of information concerning the diversification of resources, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. First, I selected the most important variables (8). Second, rather than relying on the eigenvalue criteria, exploratory factor analysis was performed to identify three dimensions in which resource diversification takes place. Maximum likelihood estimator was used as the extraction method, and these three dimensions were defined as independent of one another (i.e. they were not correlated as the solution was Varimax rotated).

Table 12—Factor analysis of the need for diversified funding

	Loadings			Communalities
	1	**2**	**3**	
Economical affect / private funding?	**0,559**	0,208	0,072	0,360
Economical affect / volontary staff?	**0,401**	-0,083	0,264	0,238
Affect / funders?	0,093	**0,995**	0,018	0,999
Economical affect / crowdfunding?	**0,633**	0,041	-0,054	0,405
Economical affect / sponsorship?	**0,603**	0,205	0,058	0,409
Economical affect / municipal funding?	0,112	0,266	0,108	0,095
Do you have own cultural offering?	0,072	0,082	**0,994**	0,999
Economical affect / inter-organizational cooperation?	0,015	0,131	0,171	0,470

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

According to Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988), the component pattern for a sample size of 100 is stable if the component contains at least four variable loadings of > 0.6, which table 12 presents. Eight questions related to the reasons for diversification of resources were factor analysed using maximum likelihood analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis show that the three factors explain 57,64% of the variance for the entire set of variables.

Factor 1 has high loadings for the following items: private funding, volunteer staff, crowdfunding and sponsorship. Hence, the factor is named *private funding* and explains 27.36% of the variance. The second factor derived has high loadings with affect/funders, so it is called *resource focus*. The variance explained by this factor is a further 15.87%. The third factor has high loadings with having one's own cultural offerings, so this factor is named *own resources*. The third factor explains 14.41% of the total variance. Substantively, these results identify three clear patterns of resource diversification among the respondents: 1) the importance of private funding (or not); 2) the importance of resource focus (or not); and 3) the impact of one's own resources (or not).

The communalities of the variables included are rather in between, except for the variables affect/funders and do you have own cultural offerings. This may indicate that the variables chosen for this analysis are only weakly related with each other. As there are only few and weak cross loadings, it is unlikely that reducing or increasing the number of factors would improve interpretability. Two items, municipal funding and inter-organisational cooperation, are still eliminated as they do not contribute to any factor structure and do not meet the minimum criterion of having a primary factor loading of .4 or above.

To meet the assumptions of multinomial logistic regression, some pre-analysis needed to be done. Multicollinearity was tested on the six remaining variables, producing VIF values of 1.114–1.378. This means that there are no multicollinearity symptoms. Levene's test of homogeneity of variances was also conducted to test for heteroskedasticity. The obtained values of Sig. variables are between .137 and .804, higher than the recommended level of .05. There is one exception: the variable volunteer staff has a Sig. value of .011, less than the level of .05. Still, as the majority of the variables are higher than the level of .05, it is concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity problem.

Multinomial logistic regression

Multinomial logistic regression was performed to model the relationship between the predictors and membership in the four groups (private, public, hybrid centres and governmental organisations). The traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance was employed for all the tests. Adding the predictors to a model containing only the intercept significantly improved the fit between model and data (X2(69, N = 91) = 104.572, Nagelkerke R2 = .755, p = .004). Goodness of fit was tested by conducting Pearson (p = .813) and deviance (p = 1.0) tests for the groups. According to both tests, the model is a good fit. As shown in Table 2, significant unique contributions are made by *private funding*, *voluntary staff*, *sponsorship* and *do you have own cultural offerings*. *Affect/funders* and *crowdfunding* are the only variables without significant, unique contributions (p = .971; p = .237, respectively).

Table 13—Predictors' unique contributions in multinomial logistic regression (N = 91)

Predictor	X2	df	p
Economical affect / private funding?	18,648	12	0,097
Economical affect / volontary staff?	45,316	12	0,000
Affect / funders?	4,547	12	0,971
Economical affect / crowdfunding?	11,599	9	0,237
Economical affect / sponsorship?	24,501	12	0,017
Do you have own cultural offering?	33,311	12	0,001

The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

Nagelkerke's R2 of .755 indicates a strong relationship between prediction and grouping. The overall success of predictions is 70.3% (56.3% for private centres, 82.9% for public, 100% for hybrid and 50% for governmental organisations).

For private centres relative to public centres (the reference group), the Wald test statistic for the predictor *private funding* on a 3-point Likert is 6.195, with an associated p-value of .013. The regression coefficient for private funding (3) is statistically different from zero for private centres relative to public centres, given that the five other predictors are in the model.

For private centres relative to public centres, the Wald test statistic for the predictor *volunteer staff* on a 2- and 3-point Likert scales (disagree and neither disagree or agree) is 6.671 and 5.978, with associated p-values of .010 and .014. The regression coefficient for voluntary staff (2–3) is statistically different from zero for private centres relative to public centres, given that the five other predictors are in the model.

The other four variables have no significant contributions on Likert scales with any number of points (1–5) for private centres. The other centre types have no significant contribution on any predictor. Except for governmental organisation relative to public centres, the Wald test statistic for the predictor sponsorship on 1- and 2-point Likert scales are 81.992 and 80.361, with an associated p-value of .000. Public centres are again used as the reference category.

The results of the multinomial logistic regression, therefore, suggest that the null hypotheses can be rejected. The regression coefficient for sponsorship is statistically different from zero for governmental organisations relative to public centres, given that the five other predictors are in the model.

4.2.3.2 Mission drift: artistic content first?

This section is aimed at studying whether private cultural centres are subject to mission drift. As stated in this thesis, mission drift occurs when organisations, in this case, private cultural centres, use more resources on getting resources than on the artistic content displayed (Jones, 2007). To examine mission drift, this thesis focuses on the variables presented after the hypotheses.

The hypotheses are:

H3: The type of perceived strategic options leads to a higher degree of mission drift in private cultural centres.

H03: The type of perceived strategic options does not lead to a higher degree of mission drift in private cultural centres.

The variables used in this construct are:

1) *How dependent are you on renters* (How dependent are you on external renters?)
2) *More commercial activities* (Are your activities primarily commercial?)
3) *Do you choose your cultural offerings on the basis of commercial success* (Do you choose your activities primarily because of commercial success?)
4) *Competition with private sector* (Do you feel you have to compete with the private cultural sector?)

All variables were based on a 5-point Likert scale. Cronbach's alpha was used to establish the internal consistency and reliability of all the items. The reliability coefficient values are .744 for these four items. Multicollinearity was tested, and the VIF values are between 1.337 and 1.796. This means that there are no multicollinearity symptoms. Levene's test of homogeneity of variances was also conducted to test for heteroskedasticity. The obtained values of Sig. variables are between .097 and .765, more than the level of .05. It, therefore, is concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity problem.

Binomial logistic regression

A logistic regression was performed to determine the effects on the likelihood of mission drift among the participants (private centres and all the other centres) due to the following variables: *how dependent are you on renters*, *more commercial activities*, *do you choose your cultural offerings based on commercial success*, and *competition with private cultural sector*. A .05 criterion of statistical significance was employed. Private cultural centres were used as the dependent variable, and all the rest of centre types were the referent group.

The logistic regression model is statistically significant (χ24) = 11.143, p = .025 (<0.05). The model explains 15.1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in mission drift. Binary logistic regression indicates that *renter dependency* and *commercial activities* are significant predictors of mission drift in private cultural centres. The other two predictors, *cultural offerings due to commercial success* and *competition with the private cultural sector*, are not significant. *Renter dependency* and *commercial activities* are significant at the 6% level (renter dependency: Wald = 7.282, p = 0.007; commercial activities: Wald = 4.094, p = 0.043). The odds ratio for renter dependency is 0.544 (95% CI: .349–.846), and for commercial activities is 1.611 (95% CI:1.015–2.557). The model correctly predicts 90.8% of other than private centres, and 28.1% of private centres, for an overall percentage correct prediction rate of 70.1%.

Table 14—Predictors' unique contributions in binomial logistic regression (N = 97)

	B	**Wald**	***p***	**Odds Ratio**
How dependent are you on renters?	-0,61	7,282	0,007	0,544
More commercial activities?	0,477	4,094	0,043	1,611
Do you choose your cultural offering on the basis of commercial success?	0,11	0,197	0,657	1,117
Competition with private cultural sector?	0,167	0,622	0,43	1,181
Constant	-0,681	0,754	0,385	0,506

Each predictor has five parameters as Likert scale measures. The results of the binary logistic regression, therefore, suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected.

4.2.4 Legitimacy and the environment

This section on the quantitative results shows how private cultural centre perceive themselves within their environment. According to the experience of the qualitative interview respondents, the environment of the private cultural centres in this study has positive effects on them. This chapter examines how respondents in the quantitative survey, representing private, public, hybrid and governmental organisations cultural centres, see themselves in relation to their environment. The environment is presumably perceived as the same as the cases in the qualitative research and consists of stakeholder groups, such as citizens, funders, municipalities and collaborating organisations.

4.2.4.1 Environmental interdependencies

This subchapter aims to study whether the cultural centres have large environmental interdependencies. As mentioned in this thesis, organisations are embedded in networks of both interdependencies and social relations. Organisations use resources gained from external relations as inputs to ensure survival. To examine how the cultural centres perceive their inter-dependencies, this thesis focuses on the variables presented after the hypotheses.

The hypotheses are:

H4: Cultural centres in general have a manageable environmental interdependence.

H04: Cultural centres in general do not have a manageable environmental interdependence.

The variables used in this construct are:

1) *Inter-organisational cooperation* (How much do you cooperate with other partners/organisations?)
2) *How important is inter-organisational cooperation* (How important do you describe this cooperation as?)
3) *Has cooperation changed in recent years* (Has cooperation changed in recent years?)
4) *Economical affect/inter-organisational cooperation* (How much the following things affect your activities: inter-organisational cooperation?)

All variables were based on a 5-point Likert scale. Cronbach's alpha was used to establish the internal consistency and reliability of all items. The reliability coefficient values are .717 for these four items. Multicollinearity was tested, and the VIF values are between 1.110 and

2.355. This means that there are no multicollinearity symptoms. Levene's test of homogeneity of variances was also conducted to test for heteroskedasticity. The obtained values of Sig. variables are between .769 and .886, more than the recommended level of .05. It thus is concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity problem.

Multinomial logistic regression

A multinomial logistic regression was performed to model the relationship between the predictors and membership in the four groups (private, public, hybrid centres and governmental organisations). The traditional .05 criterion of statistical significance was employed for all tests. Addition of the predictors to a model that contained only the intercept significantly improved the fit between model and data ($X2(42, N = 92) = 52.739$; Nagelkerke $R2 = .483$; $p = .124$).

Goodness of fit was tested by conducting Pearson and deviance tests for the groups. According to the Pearson statistic, the model is a good fit ($p = .774$), while deviance statistics suggest the same ($p = .916$). As shown in Table 13, no significant unique contributions are made by any of the variables.

Table 15—Predictors' unique contributions in multinomial logistic regression (N = 90)

Predictors	X2	df	*p*
Inter-organizational cooperation?	8,466	9	0,488
How important is the inter-organizational cooperation?	9,633	9	0,381
Has the cooperation changed last years?	12,609	12	0,398
Economical affect / inter-organizational cooperation?	20,081	12	0,066

The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

Nagelkerke's R2 of .483 indicates a moderate relationship between prediction and grouping. The overall prediction success is 58.7% (60.6% for private centres, 73.2% for public, 33.3% for hybrid and 16.7% for governmental organisations). The Wald criterion demonstrates that none of the variables makes a significant contribution on Likert scales of any points (1–5) for any of the centre types. The results of the multinomial logistic regression, therefore, suggest that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

4.3 Mixed method data

When the findings from multiple research methods study are triangulated, it can improve both the reliability and the validity of the study findings (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Doing so also allows describing relations between qualitative and quantitative findings.

This study adopted cross-method triangulation, where the qualitative findings (Chapter 4.1) and the quantitative results (Chapter 4.2) were both compared and cross-checked. This study thus could identify critical factors and unique information (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) about the effects of resource dependence on perceived institutional pressure. Table 16 presents a comparison of the qualitative and quantitative findings of this research.

Table 16—Comparative analysis of qualitative and quantitative findings

Theme	Critical factors	PHASE 1 Qualitative study outcomes	PHASE 2 Quantitative study outcomes
Dealing with institutional pressures	**The responses to instiutional pressures**	Demanding legislation Ticket sales Bad cooperation with the municipality Competition with private cultural sector Competition with municipality	Public center experience more pressure from the municipality and the environment Private centers experience pressure mostly from bureaucratic origin.
	Isomorphism working in reverse	Big difference between private and public Private centers can react faster More vulnerable than public centers The pressure alters the private centers to take risks and find new activities Mission to pioneer in everything More freedom and responsibility	
	Institutional entrepreneurs: a pioneer mindset	Aim at efficiency A wish for a more effective municipality Focus on activities and networks, not on their buidling To fill a void in the municipal cultural palette Aim at finding new activities	
	Finding a balance for maintaining a private culture center	Democratic leadership A clear mission & vision for the center Balancing culture with business Voluntary help A organizational structure that fits the center	

Theme	Critical factors	PHASE 1 Qualitative study outcomes	PHASE 2 Quantitative study outcomes
Managing resource dependence	**The need for diversified funds**	Finding a balance in the economy Insecurity and insufficiency in public funding Competition for audience Competition for grants with public institutions	The resource interdependence of the private centers does lead to a higher degree of resource diversification.
	Developing the need of resources	A mindset for diversified funding Voluntaries Restaurants and other businesses Collaborations with other organizations Freelance workers instead of steady workers Crowdfunding Vast palette of differing fundins streams Resource efficiency Piloting in new activities	
	Artistic content first	Differing opinion amongst private centers All revenues are for making more activities A balance between business and culture A balance between profitable and non-profitable culture Restaurant business for customer experience	Especially the renter dependence does point to a mission drift among private cultural centers.
	Artistic autonomy and diversified funding	Priority on artistic content Artistic freedom for the cultural content Venue renting gives the artist total freedom The centers merely balance when they display what they display	

Theme	Critical factors	PHASE 1 Qualitative study outcomes	PHASE 2 Quantitative study outcomes
Managing resource dependence	**Deregulated organizations**	Less exposed to regulations, but such exists Regulations that apply to all Democratic decision-making Possibility to make fast decisions	
Legitimacy and the environment	**Positioning private cultural centers in relation to public**	Main provider of culture in the community Municipalities still have a significant role in offering culture to the community Analyzing the community: what is needed? Filling a void in the community	
	Environmental view on the cultural center	Positive view on private cultural centers Cultural activities becoming more important Reviving the local community A vast majority of customers are local people	
	Part of the society	Surveys to the local people Networks with local organizations and municipality Making the community more enjoyable More intimate than big concert halles	
	Privatization of cultural service	Mostly a negative development Free competition could develop some things The municipal service ineffective as it is The centers could some things cheaper	
	Environmental inter-dependencies	A focus on collaborations New joint projects bring new revenues Cooperations can be resource consuming Additional value to the society	The cultural centers do have a significant environmental inter-dependence

Consistent with the qualitative interview results, the questionnaire participants in the quantitative research are able to share some perceptions of institutional pressures and resource dependence. In the results for theme 1 and institutional pressures, the qualitative results imply that private cultural centres experience institutional pressures from demanding legislation, such as laws dictating certain aspects of cultural centres' restaurant businesses. Ticket sales seem to be a constant pressure point for the private centres. This is probably connected to the competition the centres feel they had to endure, both within the private cultural sector and over municipal cultural offerings. Lastly, the private centres feel that cooperation with the municipalities could be much better than it is. Additionally, the quantitative results imply that public centres experience more pressure than private centres, mostly from the owners (municipalities) but also from the local communities. Private centres mainly experience pressures of bureaucratic origins, such as taxes.

Regarding theme 2 and resource dependence, the qualitative results suggest that private centres aim to secure diverse resource streams to balance in their economy. The centres also experience insecurity and insufficiency in public grants. Furthermore, given the competition for event audiences and for public grants with public institutions, the private centres feel that they have to aim for diverse funding sources. The quantitative results support the qualitative results: The resource dependence of private centres leads to a higher degree of resource diversification, especially among private funding and volunteer staff.

The qualitative results regarding theme 3, legitimacy and the environment, find that private centres have to constantly focus on collaborations. The respondents see that new projects could bring more revenue to the centre and add value to society. Nevertheless, some also think cooperation can be resource consuming as the roles may not be clear enough for the participating organisations, leading to more work than benefits. The quantitative results indicate that cultural centres have large environmental interdependencies, supporting the qualitative results. In general, the qualitative results provide a clearer picture of the pressures and dependencies the cultural centres experience.

V DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Overview

The final chapter of this study covers the discussion and future directions. In this last chapter, the findings of the study are discussed in connection to the theoretical framework. The contributions are discussed, along with the themes of the theoretical, methodological and managerial implications. Finally, study limitations and suggestions for future research are provided.

This study adopted a mixed-methods methodology. The conceptual framework was tested and validated using survey data collected from all the different types of cultural centres to confirm the critical factors from the quantitative results. The findings from both the thematic qualitative analysis and the quantitative survey analysis were then triangulated to confirm and validate the overall research findings for this thesis.

Based on the exploratory approach, this study investigated the effect resource dependence has on institutional pressures. To fulfil the aim of this research, a main research question was formulated as follows:

How do the type and level of resource dependence affect the perceived institutional pressures on cultural centres?

Three secondary research questions were developed to adequately answer the research question:

1) *How does field-level isomorphism affect the development of private cultural centres that have different resource dependence than public centres?*
2) *How does the perceived resource dependence affect the potential for mission drift in private cultural centres?*
3) *How do cultural centres' (all types) notions of their legitimacy affect their environmental interdependencies?*

The following subsections present the main findings answering each research question.

5.2 Research Findings

The guiding research problem of this sequential mixed-methods study focused on how resource dependence affects perceived institutional pressures. To answer the research questions, quantitative and qualitative research methods were used as methods of inquiry. The findings for each research question are discussed in more depth. This study will begin with presenting the findings related to the main research question and hereafter present the findings related to each secondary research question. The focus lies within the main research question, and the secondary questions merely support the main question.

5.2.1 How does type and level of resource dependence affect the perceived institutional pressures on cultural centres (RQ1)?

The findings on resource dependence allow for assessing the degree of the dependence. This study indicates asymmetrical relationship between public and private organisations, in which private organisations are more dependent on diverse funding sources than public centres. The latter group is mainly dependent on its main funder, the municipality. Diversification of resource dependence can be found among the private cultural centres. This implies that the assumption of this study is correct; the more dependent a cultural centre is on a single source of revenue, in this study, the municipality, the higher the degree of conformity it displays. Likewise, the more dependent a cultural centre is on diverse revenue source, the higher the degree of diversity it displayed. In other words, the conformity presented by IT (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) correlates with a single (or a few) source of revenue, whereas the diversity presented by RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) correlates with numerous diverse revenue streams.

Regarding private centres' dependence on public resources, the qualitative research finds that different private centres have varied perceptions of their dependence on public resources. Some private centres rarely rely on funding from the state. The private centres with the largest set of activities, though, tend to become more dependent on state funding as alternative sources of funding have become increasingly scarce, or these centres simply need a larger range of funding sources. The smaller private centres appear to be most dependent on funding from private foundation as they do not recognise many alternatives to these sources, except for the municipality. All but one of the private centres perceive themselves as getting too little funding from their municipalities. One says it did not get anything from its city. It, therefore, seems that municipal funding is not crucial to any one of them.

In the results in section 4.1.1.3, it can appear as if the respondents see a number of weaknesses in the resource dependence of private cultural centres, but at the same time, these dependencies can be regarded as opportunities for the cultural centres to act on. This view is very much in line with Pfeffer and Salancik's (2003) and Casciaro and Piskorski's (2005) argument that organisations use resources gained from external relations as inputs to ensure their survival.

In addition, the respondents circulate a theme of trying to aim for different and new revenue sources as they cannot rely on those they already have; in fact, many complain about the diminishing municipal funding. Thus, the focus on earning more revenue is merely to maintain the current goal of versatile cultural offerings. This is also in line with Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), who emphasised that an organisation may diversify its activities to shift its interdependencies from a few parties to many. Doing so moves the focus away from the focal organisation itself and enhances the organisational legitimacy (Oliver, 1991).

Additionally, the private cultural centres raise the issue of competition for event audiences with public institutions. Thus, even the concept of piloting in new activities surfaces as a strategical response to competition. This may also be a result of being late adopters as too many actors are looking for the same resources (Leblebici, et al., 1991).

The respondents clearly articulate the need for diversified funding sources, from crowdfunding to volunteers. All the private cultural centres aim to have a vast set of revenue streams, an aim not unfamiliar to businesses either. All the cultural centres have a business model that extended beyond offering a venue and cultural activities; restaurants are the most important businesses in this model. This follows the predictions of strategic options (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), in which the manager reduces resource dependence and maintains autonomy by diversifying revenue strategies (Froelich, 1999).

When comparing the findings with theory, it appears that the heterogeneity of the available services of the private cultural centre, is what grants the centre its particular character. In addition, the diversity of funding sources, such as venue rentals, alliances and grants, not only gives private centres economic security but also makes better use of their resources. Adopting different funding sources is how private cultural centres defy the institutional requirements challenging them (Oliver, 1991). It also strengthens the notion of management in private cultural centres being more active within the scope of RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) and less active in public cultural centres within the scope of IT (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Examining the quantitative and qualitative data, it seems that the assumption that private cultural centres are more diversified due to resource dependence holds true. This study could not find accurate measurements to analyse whether public cultural centres exhibit conformity, but much evidence points in that direction. Public centres do primarily depend on municipalities, which also apply most pressure to the centres. Furthermore, the comparison of diversification does find differences in private and public centres. The quantitative data, with smaller SDs in all the main study variables for public centres than private centres, suggest there is more homogeneity among public centres and more heterogeneity among private centres.

These findings, therefore, suggest that private and public cultural centres are on opposing ends of the spectrum of diversity and conformity. Resource dependence does increase diversity and IT conformity. However, the array of cultural centres is less structured than it appears. The alternative models—private, hybrid and governmental organisation cultural centres—have increased and become legitimate. This situation leaves the field of cultural centres in Finland somewhat divided.

5.2.2 How does field-level isomorphism affect the development of private cultural centres that have different resource dependence than public centres (SQ1)?

Current theoretical perspectives and theories, as those presented in this study, express constructs that help explain trends towards either isomorphism or isomorphism in reverse within an organisational field. The qualitative results do not imply any isomorphism among the private cultural centres. On the contrary, the private centres repeatedly emphasise being able to make their own decisions quickly and to react to matters as they choose. The findings furthermore show that all the private cases are internally vastly different in cultural content, structure and economy. In the case of the economy, a hint of restriction surfaces as some respondents say the grants they receive may come with certain restrictions. Especially the municipalities seem to want to influence some issues related to public funding, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) emphasised. Nevertheless, the centres do not collaborate with the municipalities in any wider sense, which implies that the level of these restrictions is quite low.

Private centres experience vast differences between them and public centres. They see public centres as much more restricted to municipal government, much more passive in reacting to situations and less likely to make changes of any sort. This is in line with the findings of Silvanto, Linko and Cantell (2008), which highlighted the political and common interests in the administration of the public centres result in restraining rules and practices, leading, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) described, to conformity. Based on the qualitative data, this study interprets public centres as more likely to advance towards isomorphism. As stated, the SD is smaller in all the main quantitative study variables for public than private centres, suggesting there is more homogeneity among the public centres. However, the qualitative data collected on this issue do not include any respondents from public cultural centres, so interpretations on public centres must be made with caution.

Private cultural centres, on the other hand, show no signs of conformity. The constant theme of piloting and pioneering during the interviews does not support isomorphism but rather isomorphism in reverse (Hambrick, et al., 2005). The question arises whether private cultural centres were ever really institutionalised (Leblebici, et al., 1991). As field norms and conventions become less restricting for private cultural centres, management seems to rely more on their own understanding of the situations the organisation encounters, resulting in actions derived from managerial decisions. This finding is in line with the concept of strategic option, in which the manager reduces resource dependence by managing dependencies (Davis & Cobb, 2010; Malatesta & Smith, 2014; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). As Oliver (1991) put it, organisations are active agents and may respond to institutional pressures in a variety of ways. Private centres are clearly applying the resistant strategy within the dimension of consistency in the institutional factor of content. They seem to experience that the exerted pressures are not consistent with organisational goals.

Figure 15—Homogeneity and heterogeneity of cultural centre types



Although private centres have no safety net in the municipality, they seem to be more willing to take risks and find new activities. This finding agrees with the assumption that organisations such as private cultural centres may use the avoidance strategy by hiding their nonconformity, shielding themselves from institutional pressures, and conversely by avoiding institutional rules or expectations (Oliver, 1991). The findings of this study furthermore imply that even if private and public cultural centres share a common purpose and, to a certain extent, a same set of activities, they may still exist in two separate fields. Alternatively, they have evolved into such different organisational types that they are in the process of creating new fields, a possibility also noted in earlier studies (Järvinen, 2017).

5.2.3 How does the perceived resource dependence affect the potential for mission drift in private cultural centres (SQ2)?

In terms of balancing the economy with diverse funding sources, the respondents do admit that they seek different funding possibilities, choose some artistic content due to its probability of economic success and incorporate a business side to their palette of activities. As Jones (2007) emphasised, mission drift may occur due to commercial activities. However, there is a unanimous view among the respondents on this resource focus as necessary to be able to display versatile cultural offerings. That is to say, a certain focus on earning more revenue at the expense of the core mission is present, but ultimately it is a means to an end: to be able to actualise the mission of the cultural centre. As most respondents said, the cultural field is not a lucrative field, but you can get by if you work for diverse funding.

As concluded by Jeter (2017), the state of mission drift in an organisation is inevitable, at least temporarily. If one were to consider merely the quantitative data, it could be concluded that there is a possibility of mission drift among the private centres as the quantitative findings suggest a heavy dependence on commercial activities and rentals, for instance. Still, the qualitative research, which was undertaken as part of triangulation with the quantitative findings, returned fairly different results. The quantitative results may be accurate in stating what the interview respondents claim: that private cultural centres have to rely heavily on a variety of funding streams. However, as earlier concluded, this does not contradict the ultimate aim to be able to exhibit a variety of cultural offerings. Accomplishing the cultural mission is the foundation of receiving grants, so the respondents at private cultural centres do not feel as that there is any mission drift. As Chong (2008) stated, arts organisations need to be cost effective and aim at diversified funding sources and efficient management structures to secure financial stability without being guided by money. The private cultural centres seem to be doing exactly this.

However, this does necessarily not exclude the possibility of mission drift. During the interviews, the respondents were aware they were representing their cultural centres and may have been less aware of potential mission drift in their centre. They all claim that they can react to new possibilities quickly, which implies a flexible mission statement. According to

Weisbrod (2004), such organisations are exposed to risk of mission drift. Furthermore, Froelich (1999) emphasised that resource diversification is per se a level of mission drift.

According to the findings, the key is to balance the activities with such content that helps the organisation to survive economically, alongside the core content. As the findings highlight, the cultural field is not lucrative, which implies that the methods to get the funding needed cannot only be those that fit the mission perfectly.

Figure 16—Balance between resources and mission



The organisations need to explore the outskirts of their mission to find ways to balance the economy. This suggests that the concept of mission drift is not measurable between different fields and, as Weisbrod (2004) stated, very hard to point out. Despite strong economic pressures, there remains a high commitment to aesthetic integrity. The private cultural centres do not completely abandon their focus on professional and aesthetic quality, even if they are more attentive to the need for economic resources.

5.2.4 How do cultural centres' (all types) notions of their perceived legitimacy affect their environmental interdependencies (SQ3)?

The private cultural centres are mostly surprisingly negative towards the municipalities. The common view seems to be that the private centres fill quite a void in the cultural field of their communities, but the municipalities do not sufficiently recognise or support this effort. The cultural centres all had some experiences of cooperation with their municipalities. Several respondents emphasise that the interdependence within such cooperation, coupled with complex organisational and administrative arrangements, generates problems as there is insufficient clarity about, for instance, specific job responsibilities. This may be a reason why the cultural centres work towards self-sufficiency, as many respondents proclaim. As Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) highlighted, organisations only maintain alliances with those that have the right resources. The respondents do not state that they want to end interdependency with the municipalities but that they want to diminish the power the municipalities have over them.

Regarding types of resources, this study finds that the municipalities, according to the interview respondents, seem to mostly need legitimacy support from the private centres but are not that dependent on the expertise. The private centres, in turn, are mostly dependent on economic support from the municipalities, but not that dependent on legitimacy support. This mutual dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) seems to give valid codes for behaviour by both the municipalities and the private centres (Scott, 2014). Even if the interdependency with the municipalities does not seem to be completely satisfactory to the private centres, the boundaries for this collaboration between the public and private sectors do appear to be suitable for both partners (Vickers & Yarrow, 1991) as the interdependency is continued.

The respondents see their position within their community as quite solid and appreciated and thus connected to high legitimacy. This position positively affects their engagement in inter-organisational cooperation, as legitimacy is a method to acquire and maintain resources (Suddaby, 2010). However, the status of the private cultural centres may also be a sign of cognitive legitimacy; that is, the local citizens simply might not know of any other way than that of the organisation (Suchman, 1995). Except for some cities with both private and public centres, there is not much competition or many alternative actors within the field. The respondents nevertheless emphasise their efforts to focus on what is happening in their communities and how to best respond to it—a successful way to proceed according to Webb (2017).

The environmental interdependencies also include inter-organisational cooperation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The study findings show that cooperation with other organisations is very important for both private and public cultural centres. It seems as if the centres use their legitimacy as the centres of cultural activities in their communities and aim to efficiently to build networks that provide completed artistic content (lower costs than making productions) and receive completed artistic content (more revenue for the centres' own productions), which is in line with the RDT view of networks (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). This inter-organisational cooperation increases mutual dependence among the cooperating partners, while it empowers cultural centres to create more value for lower costs and increases their legitimacy. In addition, the collective interpretation of this collaboration infuses value into the organisational outcomes (Suddaby, 2010). The collaboration adds to the moral legitimacy of the cultural centre, as the centre is seen to be doing what they should (Suchman, 1995).

The quantitative findings are hardly surprising and suggest that cultural centres do have significant environmental interdependencies, supporting the qualitative findings. The research material selected and interpreted for this subquestion indicates that no organisation is an island, and the core claim of RDT holds: every organisation needs to interact with its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The respondents still emphasise the needs to be effective and to foresee external demands, in line with Guo and Acar (2005), who proclaimed that organisations need to do so to not lose control.

5.3 Contributions of the study

The previous subchapters presented the findings of this research study based on the existing literature on RDT and IT. The following sections focus on the contributions of the findings. The section is divided into three parts: 1) theoretical implications; 2) methodological implications; and 3) practical implications. This division makes it possible to provide a distinct focus on each aspect. Still, there are apparent connections among the theory, methodology and practice in the current research. These three parts of the story are interwoven and build up each other, so the division into three separate parts is to some extent analytically counterproductive as they should be seen as a whole.

5.3.1 Theoretical implications

This study has aimed to further our understanding of the role of resource dependence in institutional change by exploring private cultural centres through a case study and four types of cultural centres in a more general questionnaire. While this research may not have found significant quantitative support for the themes that emerged in the qualitative phase, the mixture of the findings from the qualitative and quantitative phases of this research still has implications for advancing the conceptualisation of the joint resource dependence and institutional pressure phenomena.

IT and RDT are both organisational theories and aim to further understanding of organisations' operational context, with IT presuming an isomorphic approach, and RDT a strategical approach to gain resources. Integrating these theories, as this study has done, shows how a subject can be studied on a broader level. The empirical results linking the effects of resource dependence to a field in change are mixed. In other words, resource dependence and institutional change should be examined jointly to avoid incomplete pictures of the performance of the private cultural centres.

RDT guided this research as it contributed to the why and how of resource diversity, mission drift and organisational interdependencies in the field of cultural centres. RDT focuses on organisational environmental dependence as organisations do not only function through internal decision-making, mission goals or other processes but are equally shaped by resource environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). All the private cultural centres examined in this study rely on both public and private funders and are notably subject to resource dependency.

IT specifically explains how organisations respond to environmental pressures but overlooks their need for material economic resources. In an empirical context, this study demonstrates a real tension between IT and RDT, in the degree to which the private and public cultural centres differentially prioritise these two forms of pressures. RDT has mostly been employed to examine the use of alliances and collaboration to access to the resources required at a more organisational level. This research, however, suggests that resource dependence alters organisations' interdependencies and strategic responses. A resource dependence threat can transform change agents into driven institutional entrepreneurs. In this case, the actors are eager to set up new logics with disparate connections to legitimacy. Supporting among other the conclusion of Hambrick et al. (2005), isomorphic pressures can increase or decrease over time.

This study suggests that organisations are not entirely passive as IT proposes and do therefore not necessarily conform to the pressures laid upon them. Nor are organisations complete manipulators, as RDT suggests. The organisations in this study reveal the diverse traits of organisational actors and the nature of the pressures enforced upon them, but they also seem to possess a sort of political power. The private cultural centres can make sense of and change their environment and make strategical choices, including both compliance and resistance. This study does not disagree with earlier views of IT and RDT but expands these views by arguing that these two theories are both complementary and interdependent on many levels, such as when explaining homogeneity, heterogeneity, isomorphism and diversification.

Regarding the concept of mission drift, the findings of this study suggest great differences in acquiring the needed resources. This finding, in turn, suggests that the concept of mission drift is not measurable between different fields and, as Weisbrod (2004) stated, is very hard to point out in a specific field or a single organisation.

The study findings show that private cultural centres are devoted to shaping and reinventing their organisational field. They started out as late adopters of ideas and practices in an institutional field where public cultural centres are the early adopters, with authenticated mission statements. Private cultural centres nonetheless have proven to be resilient to isomorphic pressures, confirming that isomorphism also works in reverse.

5.3.2 Methodological implications

A PhD thesis presents a different set of challenges to the researcher. In this particular case, the challenge was that cultural centres are still a quite unexplored concept. In retrospect, the sequential exploratory mixed methods design seemed to be the best alternative approach for this specific research. Here also lies a methodological implication.

This research applied a mixed-method approach, in which qualitative data from interviews were supported with quantitative results. Both the results and the experiences from this research can support the building of future mixed-methods research design. In classifications of suitable approaches to conducting research, the same approaches may be presented in unrealistic ways. For instance, taking this research as an example, the sequential data collection was not all that practical. The qualitative data were collected before the quantitative data, as should be done in a sequential exploratory mixed methods study design. The analysis of the qualitative data began before collecting the quantitative data, as this study design prescribes. However, the analysis process was not completed before collecting the quantitative data, so the analysis did not sufficiently help the design of the quantitative data collection tool. The sequential approach did have some advantages, such as the few pointers the first phase contributed to the second phase. Still, the second phase and the hypotheses were mostly formed by the theoretical background at that time and considerably less by the first phase. The second phase did clearly suffer from the overlapping process, resulting in a questionnaire that did not sufficiently measure the themes that emerged in the first phase.

5.3.3 Managerial implications

In addition to these theoretical and methodological contributions, this study has some managerial implications. A number of such implications for private cultural centres arose as the data were analysed, interpreted, discussed and compared with the existing literature in earlier chapters. This section summarises these implications.

Two unfolding issues are the differing nature of the institutional environments of the cultural centres and organisations' strategic behaviour in this environment. Although this specific study focuses on a Finnish context, the results support some generalisations. These results serve to further our understanding of the effect resource dependence has on institutional change in organisation and the practical implications it might present.

Regarding separation of ownership and control, the study findings imply a division of cultural centres into four different groups (private, public, hybrid and governmental organisations), which all have their own specific pressures and strategies. The institutional backgrounds of these centre types lead them to act spontaneously in ways seen to serve their own interests without looking after any institutionalised interests in the matter. As stated by Lambert and Williams (2017), it is important to consider the ownership, governance and management structure before founding a new cultural centre.

As an organisational strategy and activity, inter-organisational cooperation could clearly improve both organisation growth and economic stability. Managers should consider inter-organisational cooperation as a way to achieve sustainable growth and stability. For resource scarcity, which seems to be the largest difficulty among private cultural centres, acquiring and allocating resources should be planned ahead while staying within the frames of the mission statement. The field itself is not lucrative, so exploring the outskirts of the mission statement offers possibilities to gain resources. Regarding mission drift, managers should stay aware of the balance between focusing on the core content of the mission statement and possibilities to gain resources from activities farther from the core content.

For decision making, this study implies that driven managers of private cultural centres lean towards different strategies to diversify resource streams and choose a strategic response to institutional pressures. Since private cultural centres may occupy only restricted resources, centre managers might be compelled to carry out a set of limited strategies, with very minimal possibilities for alternative action. Furthermore, decision making seem to be tightly connected to regional needs and expectations. Managers need to know the specifics of the communities where cultural centres are and make decisions accordingly. Regarding change, this important aspect of cultural centres is quite under-explored by earlier research. This study attempted to expand our understanding on this aspect as institutional change adds to the development of cultural centres in the contexts of Western societies.

5.4 Research limitations

Like all studies, this one has limitations that present opportunities for future research. The analysis of the study was restricted to four private cultural centres to more accurately capture institutional pressures due to resource dependence among private centres. In retrospect, one can admit that interviewing people from all four centre types would have presented more versatile data. In addition, the focus on private centres may have presented a bias that, in turn, may have altered the research outcomes.

On a general level, all research designs include compromises due to the practical limits of data collection. The small sample of this study was chosen to allow for rich examination of institutional change within resource dependence. Although this choice increased the probability of fresh and internally valid findings, it did so at the cost of generalisability and external validity. Furthermore, there were very little prior studies on the subject, which complicated the process of carrying out this study. It, therefore, was crucial that the study findings be subjected to rigorous empirical tests.

A comprehensive exploration of how institutional culture, particularly attitudes towards fundraising and revenue generation, has changed would require a broader range of interviews with both private and public centres. This study was limited to identifying the institutional changes the private cultural centres have implemented due to resource dependence. As stated in section 3.5 on changes in the research process, the impact of cultural centres on the local community was left unstudied but could have further elaborated the role of the centres.

The under-representation of both hybrid and governmental organisation cultural centres is another limitation of this study. The survey sample included mostly public and private centres. Future research could extend this study by giving hybrid and governmental organisation centres adequate opportunities to express their perceptions of ongoing institutional changes and resource dependence that may identify a distinctive pattern of novel practices.

Both the data and findings presented by this study were based on a single Western society context (Finland). This may have affected the generalisation of the outcomes to other societies. Further research in other Western and non-Western societies is needed to advance the understanding of the influence of resource dependence and institutional pressures in such contexts. The limitations discussed in this section do not imply that this study or its findings are insignificant or invalid. The limitations are merely presented for recognition and to emphasise the need for future research.

5.5. Recommendations for further study

I hope my study suggests additional research questions for scholars that want to better comprehend the association between IT and RDT. This study aimed attention at a specific group in a specific sector—the cultural centres—in a specific environment—Finland. To gain a more thorough understanding of the interplay between resource dependencies and institutional pressures, empirical research in other settings should be undertaken.

A stakeholder group absent from this study is professional artists. Further research could gain from investigating their interpretations of the conflicting pressures presented in this study. In addition, this study has not surveyed or interviewed other stakeholders, such as local citizens and businesses, which may have different opinions on both the changes occurring and resource dependence. Future research may take into account stakeholders' perception in this matter.

Furthermore, the findings on mission drift were drawn from qualitative data from four private cultural centres. Although the quantitative data built on these findings, I recommend additional research on this topic to determine whether the same findings are produced, or if these findings are unique to the four private cultural centres in this study.

Finally, involving more cases and survey participants is recommended. The 20 interview participants were sufficient for data collection (Creswell, 2009), but only four private cultural centres were examined. Although 106 responses to the questionnaire (56%) were sufficient, it is still quite a small sample. With a larger data set, the outcomes may have been different.

5.6 Concluding words

The question of the unprofitability of cultural offerings arose more than once during the interviews. Even if the private cultural centres had many successful events, the yearly average of events still seems modest. In fact, the respondents stated that a theatre simply cannot ever reach a profitable level in Finland. Could this unprofitability work somewhat to the benefit of the cultural centres as the low profits most likely decrease the amount of competition?

The balance of traditional cultural centre activities and commercial activities is an interesting lateral outcome of this study. How does declining traditional funding affect commercial activity? Does commercial activity diminish efforts devoted to traditional activities? Conversely, does decreased commercial activity lead to more contributions and public funding? Such self-supporting activities could be regarded as a modern form of legitimacy as the resource climate changes.

This study implies that managers face many challenges to balance both the content and the economy of private cultural centres. The results furthermore show that current managers seem to have adopted well to the uncertainties of private cultural centres within the field of Finnish cultural centres. Managers have adopted a variety of different methods to maintain their centres and reinvented their activities, as well as their resource palettes.

This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the emerging private cultural centres by showing that their activities are different from those enacted of the other centre types. This result highlights the need to focus on the ownership and the control level of cultural centres in future research.

REFERENCES

Aiken, M., & Alford, R. (1970). Community structure and innovation: The case of public housing. *American Political Science Review, 64*(3), pp. 843-864.

Aiken, M., & Hage, J. (1968). Organizational interdependence and Intra-Organizational Structure. *American Sociological Review, 33*(6), pp. 912-930.

Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2014). Problematization meets mystery creation: generating new ideas and findings through assumption challenging research. Em E. Jeanes, & T. Huzzard (Eds.), *Critical Management Research: Reflections from the field* (pp. 23-41). London: Sage.

Amaratunga, D., & Baldry, D. (2001). Case study methodology as a means of theory building: performance measurement in facilities management organisations. *Work study, 50*(3), pp. 95-104.

Ambrecht, J. (2012). *The value of cultural institutions.* Göteborg: Bokförlaget Bas.

Amenta, E., & Ramsey, K. (2010). Institutional theory. Em K. Leicht, & J. Jenkins (Eds.), *Handbook of Politics: State and society in global perspective* (pp. 15-39). New York: Springer.

Anonymous. (2 de 6 de 2016a). Interview with with person from Telakka. (T. Järvinen, Editor)

Anonymous. (28 de 5 de 2016b). Interview with with person from Ritz. (T. Järvinen, Editor)

Anonymous. (5 de 8 de 2016c). Interview with with person from Korjaamo. (T. Järvinen, Editor)

Barney, J., & Hesterly, W. (1996). Organizational Economics: Understanding the Relationship between Organizations and Economic Analysis. Em S. Glegg, & C. Hardy (Eds.), *Studying Organization. Theory & Method.* London: Sage.

Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. *Academy of Management Annals, 3*(1), pp. 65-107.

Battilana, J., Lee, M., Walker, J., & Dorsey, C. (2012). In search of the hybrid ideal. *Stanford Social Innovation Review, 10*, pp. 51-55.

Bennett, R. (2008). Marketing of Voluntary Organizations as Contract Providers of National and Local Government Welfare Services in the UK. *Voluntas, 19*, pp. 268-269.

Bennett, R., & Savani, S. (2011). Surviving Mission Drift. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 22*(2), pp. 217-231.

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (2008). The social construction of reality. Em R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Bielefeld, W. (2009). Issues in Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship. *Journal of Public Affairs in Education, 15*(1), pp. 69-86.

Björklund, M. (2010). *Svenska Gården i Borgå. 75 år i kulturens tjänst* (1 ed.). Helsingfors: Oy Nordprint Ab.

Blau, P. (1964). *Exchange and power in social life.* New York: Wiley.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bowen, G. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal, 9*(2), pp. 27-40.

Boxenbaum, E., & Jonsson, S. (2008). Isomorphism, diffusion and decoupling. Em R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism* (pp. 78-98). London: Sage.

Boyne, G. (1 de 2002). Public and private management: What's the difference? *Journal of Management Studies*(39), pp. 97-122.

Bozeman, B. (1987). *All Organizations are Public: Bridging Public and Private Organizational Theories.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Brancheau, J., & Wetherbe, J. (1990). The adoption of spreadsheet software: Testing innovation diffusion theory in the context of end-user computing. *INFORMS, 1*(2), pp. 115-143.

Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2005). *Företagsekonomiska forskningsmetoder.* Stockholm: Liber.

Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2011). *Business Research Methods.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Burns, T., & Stalker, G. (1961). *The management of innovation.* London: Tavistock.

Burns, T., & Stalker, G. (1961). *The management of innovation.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). *Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis: Elements of the sociology of corporate life.* London: Heinemann.

c, A. (5 de 8 de 2016). Interview with with person from Korjaamo. (T. Järvinen, Editor)

Cairns, B., Harris, M., & Young, P. (2005). Building the capacity of the voluntary nonprofit sector: Challenges of theory and practice. *International Journal of Public Administration, 28*, pp. 869-885.

Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint, absorption: a close look at resource dependence theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 50*, pp. 167-199.

Chavez, M., Stephens, L., & Galaskiewicz, J. (2004). Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits' Political Activity? *American Sociological Review, 69*(2), pp. 292-316.

Chew, C., & Osborne, P. (2009). Identifying the Factors that Influence Positioning Strategy in UK Charitable Organisations that Provide Public Services: Towards an Integrating Model. *Nonprofits and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 38*(1), pp. 29-50.

Child, J. (1976). *Organization design and performance: contingency theory and beyond.* Birmingham: Aston University.

Chong, D. (2008). *Arts Management* (4 ed.). New York: Routledge.

Choudhury, E., & Ahmed, S. (2002). The Shifting Meaning of Governance: Public Accountability of Third Sector Organizations in an Emergent Global Regime. *International Journal of Public Administration, 25*(4), pp. 561-589.

Christensen, L. (2007). *Experimental Methodology.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Cook, K. (1977). Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations. *The Sociological Quarterly , 18*, pp. 62-82.

Corder, G., & Foreman, D. (2014). *Nonparametric Statistics: A Step-by-Step Approach.* Wiley: Wiley.

Creswell, J. (2008). Editorial: Mapping the field of mixed methods research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 3*(2), pp. 95-108.

Creswell, J. (2009). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (3 ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.

Creswell, J., & Plano Clark, V. (2011). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research* (2 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Creswell, J., Plano Clark, V., Gutmann, M., & Hanson, W. (2003). Advanced mixed methods research designs. Em A. Tashakkori, & C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research* (pp. 209-240). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Czarniawska, B. (2008). How to misuse institutions and get away with it: Some reflections on instituinal theory(ies). Em R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism* (pp. 768-782). London: Sage.

Dacin, T., Goodstein, J., & Scott, W. (2002). Institutional theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special research forum. *Academy of Management Journal, 45*(1), pp. 45-56.

Das, S., Sen, P., & Sengupta, S. (1998). Impact of Strategic Alliances on Firm Valuation. *Academy of Management Journal, 41*(1), pp. 27-41.

Davidsson, P., Hunter, E., & Klofsten, M. (2006). Institutional forces: The invisible hand that shapes venture ideas? *International Small Business Journal, 24*(2), pp. 115-131.

Davis, G., & Cobb, J. (2010). Chapter 2 Resource dependence theory: Past and future. Em *Stanford's Organization Theory Renaissance, 1970–2000.* Online: Satnford.

Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). *Handbook of Qualitative Research.* London: Sage.

DiMaggio, P. (1986). Introduction. Em P. DiMaggio (Ed.), *Nonprofit enterprise and the arts* (pp. 3-13). New York: Oxford University Press.

DiMaggio, P. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. Em L. Zucker (Ed.), *Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environments* (pp. 3-21). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.

DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review*(48), pp. 147-160.

DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1991). Introduction. Em W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (pp. 267-292). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Drees, J., & Heugens, P. (2013). Synthesizing and extending Resource Dependence Theory. *Journal of Management, 39*(6), pp. 1666-1698.

Dunn, M., & Jones, C. (2010). Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: The contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 55*, pp. 114-149.

Eikenberry, A., & Klover, J. (2004). The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk? *Public Administration Review, 64*(2), pp. 132-140.

Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of management review, 50*(1), pp. 25-32.

Eisenhardt, K., & Graebner, M. (2007). Theory building from case studies: Opportunities and challenges. *Academy of Management Journal, 50*(1), pp. 25-32.

Emerson, R. (1962). Power-Dependence Relations. *American Economic Review, 59*(3), pp. 314-321.

Emirbayer, M., & Johnson, V. (2008). Bourdieu and organizational analysis. *Theory and Society, 37*(1), pp. 1-44.

Finder.fi. (2018). *Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo*. Acesso em 21 de 4 de 2018, disponível em https://www.finder.fi/Kulttuuripalveluja/Kulttuuritehdas+Korjaamo/Helsinki/yhteystiedot/1359133

Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. (1996). *Strategic Leadership: Top executives and their effects on organizations.* Minneapolis, St Paul: West Publishing Company.

Finnish Cultural Foundation. (15 de 11 de 2013). *Suomalaisten näkemykset kulttuurista 2013.* Acesso em 2 de 2 de 2014, disponível em Suomen Kulttuurirahasto: www.skr.fi/sites/default/files/Suomalaisten_n%C3%A4kemykset_kulttuurista_2013.pdf

Fitzgerald, S. (2010). *New times, new models. Investigating the internal governance models and external relations of independent cultural centres in times of change.* Maribor: Pekarna magdalenske mreže.

Fitzgerald, S. (2014). Independent culture? *Revista Antic Teater*(8), 6-7.

Fleishman, R. (2009). To Participate or Not to Participate? Incentives and Obstacles for Collaboration. Em R. OLeary, & L. Bingham (Eds.), *The Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas for the Twenty-first Century* (pp. 31-52). Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Fligstein, N. (1997). Social skill and institutional theory. *American Behavioral Scientist, 40*(4), pp. 397-405.

Fligstein, N., & McAdam, D. (2011). Toward a General Theory od Strategic Action Fields. *Sociological Theory, 29*(1), pp. 1-26.

Friedland, R., & Alford, R. (1991). Bringing society back in: symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions. Em W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis* (pp. 232-263). London: University of Chicago Press.

Froelich, K. (9 de 1999). Diversificiation of revenue strategies: Evolving resource dependence in Nonprofit organizations. *Nonprofit and Voluntary sector Quarterly, 28*(3), pp. 246-268.

Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. *Academy of Management Review, 24*, pp. 191-205.

Frooman, J., & Murrell, R. (2005). Stakeholder influence strategies: The roles of structural and demographic determinants. *Business and Society*.

Gamson, W. (1975). *The Strategy of Social Protest.* Homewood, IL: Irwin Press.

Gephard, R. (2004). From the Editors: Qualitative Research and the "Academy of Management Journal". *Academy of Management Journal, 47*(4), pp. 454-462.

Gerson, K., & Horowitz, R. (2002). Observation and interviewing: Options and choices in qualitative research. Em T. May (Ed.), *Qualitative research in action* (pp. 199-224). London: Sage.

Gibbs, G. (2007). *Analyzing qualitative data.* Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Giddens, A. (1976). *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies.* London: Hutchinson.

Giddens, A., Duneier, M., & Applebaum, R. (2007). *Introduction to Sociology. Chapter 1* (6 ed.). New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Gillmore, M. (1999). Implications of generalized versus restricted excgange. *Academy of Management Review*.

Gioia, D., & Pitre, E. (1990). Multiparadigm perspectives on theory building. *The Academy of Management Review, 15*(4), pp. 584-602.

Gioia, D., Corley, K., & Hamilton, A. (2012). Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology. *Organizational Research Methods, 16*(1), pp. 15-31.

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). *The Discovery of Grounded Theory - Strategies for Qualitative Research.* London: Weiderfeld and Nicolson.

Goffman, E. (1961). *Encounters: Two studies in the sociology of interaction.* New York: Macmillan.

Goodstein, J. (1994). Institutional pressures and strategic responsiveness: Employer involvement in work-family issues. *Academy of Management Journal, 37*(2), pp. 350-380.

Graff, J. (2014). Mixed methods research. Em H. Hall, & L. Roussel (Eds.), *Evidence based practice: An integrative approach to research, administration and practice* (pp. 45-64). Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning.

Greene, J. (2008). Is mixed methods social inquiry a distinctive methodology? *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 2*(1), pp. 7-22.

Greene, J., Caracelli, V., & Graham, W. (2008). Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs. Em V. Plano Clark, & J. Creswell (Eds.), *The mixed methods reader.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Greene, W. (2000). *Econometric Analysis* (4 ed.). Upper Saddle river, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K., & Suddaby, R. (2008). Introduction. Em R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism* (pp. 1-46). London: Sage.

Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. (2002). Theorizing change: The role of professional associations in the transformation of institutionalized fields. *Academy of Management Journal, 45*(1), pp. 58-80.

Guadagnoli, E., & Velicer, W. (1988). Relation of sample size to the stability of component patterns. *Psychological Bulletin, 103*, pp. 265-275.

Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. Em N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 105-117). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. Em N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (pp. 105-117). Thousans Oaks: Sage.

Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences. Em N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3 ed., pp. 191-215). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Guo, C., & Acar, M. (2005). Understanding Collaboration Among Nonprofit Organizations: Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network Perspectives. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34*, p. 340.

Gustafson, D., Sanfort, F., Eichler, M., Adams, L., Bisognano, M., & Steudel, H. (2003). Developing and Testing a Model to Predict Outcomes of Organizational Change. *Health Services Research, 38*(2), pp. 751-776.

Halonen, K. (2011). *Kulttuurituottajat taiteen ja talouden risteyskohdassa.* Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän Yliopisto.

Hambrick, D., Finkelstein, S., Cho, T., & Jackson, E. (2005). Isomorphism in reverse: Institutional theory as an explanation for recent increases in intraindustry heterogeneity and managerial discretion. Em B. Staw, & R. Kramer (Eds.), *Research in Organizational Behavior* (Vol. 26, pp. 307-350). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Hannan, M., & Freeman, J. (1975). The Population Ecology of Organizations. *American Sociological Review*, pp. 929-964.

Hannan, M., & Freeman, J. (1977). The population ecology of organizations. *American Journal of Sociology, 82*(5), pp. 929-964.

Hartley, J. (2004). Case study research. Em C. Cassell, & S. Symons (Eds.), *Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research* (pp. 323-333). London: Sage.

Hatch, M. (2013). *Organization theory: Modern, symbolic, and postmodern perspectives* (3 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heiskanen, I., Kangas, A., & Mitchell, R. (2015). *Taiteen ja kulttuurin kentät; Perusrakenteet, hallinta ja lainsäädäntö.* Tallinna: Tietosanoma Oy.

Helsingin kaupunki. (28 de 2 de 2017). *Kulttuurikeskuksen tilinpäätös vuodelta 2016*. Acesso em 14 de 5 de 2018, disponível em Päätökset beta: https://dev.hel.fi/paatokset/asia/hel-2017-001572/kklk-2017-2/

Hillman, A. (2005). Politicians on the board: do connections affect the bottom line? . *Journal of Management, 31*, pp. 464-481.

Hillman, A., Cannella, A., & Paetzold, R. (2000). The resource dependence role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change. *Journal of Management Studies, 37*(2), pp. 235-255.

Hillman, A., Withers, M., & Collins, B. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. *Journal of Management, 35*, pp. 1404-1427.

Hirsch, P., & Lounsbury, M. (1997). 'Ending the family quarrel toward a reconciliation of "Old" and "New" institutionalisms. *American Behavioral Scientist, 40*(4), pp. 406-418.

Hodgson, G. (2006). What are institutions? . *Journal of Economic Issues, 40*(1), pp. 1-25.

Hoffman, A. (1999). Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. *Academy of Management Review, 42*(4), pp. 351-371.

Hoffman, A., & Ventresca, M. (2002). Introduction. Em A. Hoffman, & M. Ventresca (Eds.), *Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives.* Standford, California: Stanford University Press.

Holm, P. (1995). The dynamics of institutionalisation: Transformation processes in Norwegian fisheries. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 40*, pp. 398-422.

Holm, P. (1995). The Dynamics of Institutionalization: Transformation Processes in Norwegian Fisheries. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 40*, pp. 398-422.

IBM. (7 de 9 de 2016). *IBM Support*. Acesso em 31 de 7 de 2018, disponível em http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21479010

Jamali, D. (2010). MNCs and International Accountability Standards Through an Institutional Lens: Evidence of Symbolic Conformity or Decoupling. *Journal of Business Ethics, 95*(4), pp. 617-640.

Järvinen, T. (2017). From one mission statement to two organizational fields: the effects of reverse isomorphism in private cultural centers. Em T. Johansson, & M. Luonila (Eds.), *Making Sense of Arts Management: Research, Cases and Practices* (Vol. 1, pp. 128-132). Helsinki: Unigrafia: University of Arts Helsinki.

Jennergren, P. (1981). Decentralization in organizations. Em P. Nystrom, & W. Starbuck (Eds.), *The Handbook of Organizational Design.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jeter , T. (2017). *Exploring Mission Drift and Tension in a Nonprofit Work Integration Social Enterprise.* Minneapolis: Walden University.

Johansson, R. (2003). Case Study Methodology. . Stockholm: Methodologies in Housing Research.

Johnson, R., & Onwuegbuzie, A. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. *Educational Researcher, 33*(7), pp. 14-26.

Jones, M. (2007). The Multiple Sources of Mission Drift. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Quarterly, 36*, pp. 69-86.

Kangas, A. (1988). *Kunta ja kulttuuri Kulttuuritoimialanin valossa* (1 ed.). Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus.

Kangas, A., & Pirnes, E. (2015). Kulttuuripolitiikan päätöksenteko, lainsäädäntö, hallinto ja rahoitus. Em I. Heiskanen, A. Kangas, & R. Mitchell (Eds.), *Taiteen ja kulttuurin kentät. Perusrakenteet, hallinta ja lainsäädäntö* (pp. 23-108). Helsinki: Tietosanoma Oy.

Kangas, A., & Ruokolainen, V. (2012). *Toimintamalli muutoksessa. Tutkimus kuntien kulttuuripalveluista.* Acesso em 3 de 1 de 2014, disponível em http://www.cupore.fi/documents/KuntienKulttuuripalvelut.pdf

Katila, R., Rosenberger, J., & Eisenhardt, K. (2008). Swimming with sharks: technology ventures, defense mechanisms and corporate relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 53*, pp. 295-332.

Kelly, J. (2007). Reforming public services in the UK: bringing in the third sector. *Public Administration, 85*(4), pp. 1003-1022.

Kingston, C., & Caballero, G. (2009). Comparing theories of institutional change. *Journal of Institutional Economics, 5*(2), pp. 151-180.

Klag, M., & Langley, A. (2013). Approaching the conceptual leap in qualitative research. *International Journal of Management Reviews, 5*, pp. 149-166.

Kleinbaum, D., Kupper, L., Muller, K., & Nizam, A. (1998). *Applied regression analysis and other multivariable methods* (3 ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury Press.

Konstsamfundet. (2016). *Beviljade understöd våren 2016.* Acesso em 10 de 12 de 2016, disponível em http://www.konstsamfundet.fi/images/stories/filer/V%C3%A5rens_beviljade_2016.pdf

Kuhn, T. (1970). *The structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2 ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kulttuuritalo Telakka. (2018). *Ravintola Telakka*. Acesso em 21 de 4 de 2018, disponível em http://www.telakka.eu/yhteystiedot/

Kulttuuritalo. (2018). *KULTSAN HISTORIA*. Acesso em 18 de 5 de 2018, disponível em http://kulttuuritalo.fi/tietoa-talosta/talon-historia/

Kulttuuritehdas Korjaamo. (2017). *Kaupunkikulttuuria, taidetta ja ainutlaatuisia tiloja*. Acesso em 14 de 6 de 2017, disponível em http://www.korjaamo.fi/fi/tietoa-korjaamosta/esittely

Kulturföreningen Grand r.f. (2017a). *Välkommen till Kulturhuset Grand!* Acesso em 14 de 6 de 2017, disponível em http://grand.fi/sv

Kulturföreningen Grand r.f. (2017b). *Grands annual report 2016.* Porvoo: Kulturföreningen Grand r.f.

Lambert, P., & Williams, R. (2017). Ownership and Governance of Urban PACs. Em P. Lambert, & R. Williams (Eds.), *Performing Arts Center Management* (pp. 120-141). New York: Routledge.

Lambert, P., & Williams, R. (2017). Preface. Em P. Lambert, & R. Williams (Eds.), *Performing Arts Center Management* (1 ed., pp. xi-xii). New York: Routledge.

Lambert, P., & Williams, R. (2017). The Professionalization of Performing Arts Center Management. Em P. Lambert, & R. Williams (Eds.), *Performing Arts Center Management* (pp. 1-19). New York: Routledge.

Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. *Academy of Management Review, 24*(4), pp. 691-710.

Langley, A., & Abdallah, C. (2011). Templates and Turns in Qualitative Studies of Strategy and Management. Em *Research Methods in Strategy & Management* (6 ed., pp. 201-235). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1967). *Organization and environment: managing differentiation and integration.* Boston, MA: Harward University Press.

Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1976). *Organizations and environment: Managing differentiation and integration.* Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Leblebici, H., Salancik, G., Copay, A., & King, T. (1991). Institutional change and the transformation of interorganizational fields: An organizational history of the U.S. radio broadcasting industry. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 36*, pp. 333-363.

Leitch, C., Hill, F., & Harrison, R. (2010). The philosophy and practice of interpretivist research in entrepreneurship: Quality, validation, and trust. *Organizational Research Methods, 13*(1), pp. 67-84.

Lenkowsky, L. (1996). Philanthropy and the Welfare State. Em M. Novak (Ed.), *To Empower People: Twentieth Anniversary Edition.* Washington D.C.: The AEI Press.

Lincoln, D., & Guba, E. (1985). *Naturalistic Inquiry.* Beverly Hills, California: Sage.

Lipsky, M., & Smith, S. (1989). Nonprofit organizations, government, and the welfare state. *Political Science Quarterly, 4*(104), pp. 625-648.

Lorentzen, A., & Van Heur, B. (2013). *Cultural political economy of small cities.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Machado-da-Silva, C., Guarido Filho, E., & Rossoni, L. (2006). Organizational fields and the structuration perspective: analytical possibilities. *Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 10*, pp. 159-196.

Macmillian, R. (2010). *The Third Sector Delivering Public Services: An Evidence Review, Working Paper 20.* Acesso em 24 de 4 de 2018, disponível em University of Birmingham: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/generic/tsrc/documents/tsrc/working-papers/working-paper-20.pdf

Madhu, C., Manukumar, H., Thribhuvan, & Bhimangouda, R. (2014). Phytochemical, nutritional and mineral constituents of Illiciumverum hook. *Wolrd journal of Pharmaceutical Research, 3*(2), pp. 2888-2896.

Maguire, S., Hardy, C., & Lawrence, T. (2004). Institutional entrepreneurshipin emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. *Academy of Management Journal, 47*(5), pp. 657-679.

Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. (2009). *Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malatesta, D., & Smith, C. (2014). Lessons from Resource Dependence Theory for Contemporary Public and Nonprofit Management. *Public Administration Review, 74*(1), pp. 14-25.

Malmberg, A. (2008). *Kulttuuritalo. Puoli vuosisataa tarinoita ja tapahtumia.* Helsinki: Art-Print Oy.

Manninen, M. (2005). *Säätiöt Suomessa.* Acesso em 2 de 5 de 2015, disponível em Cupore: http://www.cupore.fi/documents/saatiot_suomessa.pdf

Mason, J. (2002). *Qualitative researching* (2 ed.). London: Sage.

Mauss, M. (1966). *The gift: Forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies.* London: Cohen & West.

May, T. (1993). *Social Research. Issues, Methods and Process.* Buckingham: Open University Press.

Mazza, C., & Strandgaard Pedersen, J. (2004). From Press to E-Media? The Transformation of an Organizational Field. *Organisational Studies, 25*(6), pp. 875-896.

McCallin, A. (2003). Designing a grounded theory study: some practicalities. *Nursing in Critical Care, 8*(5), pp. 203-208.

Metcalfe, L. (1993). Public management: From imitation to innovation. *Australian Journal of Public Administration, 52*, 292-304.

Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *The American Journal of Sociology, 83*(2), pp. 340-363.

Meyer, J., Scott, W., & Deal, T. (1983). Institutional and technical sources of organizational structure: Explaining the structure of educational organizations. Em J. Meyer, & W. Scott (Eds.), *Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality* (pp. 45-67). BEverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Miles, M., Huberman, A., & Saldana, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Miller, G., Mcmullen, J., & Vogus, T. (2012). Venturing for others with heart and head: How compassion encourages social entrepreneurship. *Academy of Management Review, 37*(4), pp. 616-640.

Miller, R., & Brewer, J. (2003). *The A-Z of Social Research.* London: Sage.

Mills, C. (1949). Situated actions and vocabularies of motive. *American Sociological Review*(5), pp. 904-909.

Mizruchi, M., & Fein, L. (1999). The social construction of organizational knowledge: A study of the uses of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 44*(4), pp. 653-683.

Molm, L. (1990). Structure, Action, and Outcomes: The Dynamics of Power in Exchange Relations. *American Sociological Revieiw, 55*, pp. 427-447.

Mulcahey, K. (2000). The government and cultural patronage. Em J. Cherbo, & M. Wyszomirski (Eds.), *The Public Life of the Arts in America.* Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Museus, S. (2007). Using qualitative methods to assess diverse institutional cultures. *New Directions for Institutional Research, 136*, pp. 29-40.

Myers, M. (2009). *Qualitative Research in Business & Management.* London: Sage.

Nicholls, A., & Cho, A. (2006). Social Entrepreneurship: The Structuration of a Field. Em A. Nicholls (Ed.), *ocial Entrepreneurship. New Models of Sustainable Change* (pp. 99-118). Ocford: Oxford University Press.

Nienhuser, W. (2008). Resource dependence theory. How well does it explain behavior of organizations. *Management Revue, 19*(1-2), pp. 9-32.

North, D. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oliver, C. (16 de 1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. *Academy of Management Review*, pp. 145-179.

Ostrom, E. (2005). *Understanding Institutional Diveristy.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pache, A., & Santos, F. (2010). When World Collide: The International Dynamics of Organizational Responses to Conflicting Institutional Demands. *Academy of Management Review, 35*(3), pp. 455-476.

Pfeffer, J. (1982). *Organizations and Organization Theory.* Marshfield, MA: Pitman.

Pfeffer, J. (2003). Introduction to the Classic Edition. Em J. Pfeffer, & G. Salancik (Eds.), *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (2003). *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Piekkari, R., & Paavilainen, E. (2009). The case study as disciplinary convention: Evidence from international business journals. *Organizational Research Methods, 12*(3), pp. 567-589.

Polit, D., & Beck, C. (2014). *Essentials of Nursing Research: Appraising Evidence for Nursing Practice* (8 ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.

Powell, W. (1991). Expanding the scope of institutional analysis. Em W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The institutionalism in organizational analysis* (pp. 183-203). Chicago: The university of Chicago press.

Provan, K., Beyer, J., & Kruytbosch, C. (1980). Environmental linkages and power in resource dependence relations between organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 25*, pp. 200-225.

Ragin, C. (1997). Turning the Tables: How Case-oriented Research Challenges Variable oriented Research. *Comparative Social Research, 16*(1), pp. 27-42.

Rainey, H. (2003). *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* (3 ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Reale, E., & Seeber, M. (2010). Organisation response to institutional pressures in Higher Education: the important role of the disciplines. *Higher Education, 61*(1), pp. 1-22.

Rehn, A., Kivinen, N., Huopalainen, A., Tailas, J., & Mård, M. (2013). Great expectations: Turku as the European capital of culture 2011. Em L. Lindeborg, & L. Lindkvist (Eds.), *The value of arts and culture for regional development.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Renko, V., & Ruusuvirta, M. (2018). *Kuntien kulttuuritoiminta lukujen valossa IV: Kulttuuritoiminnan kustannukset 24 kaupungissa vuonna 2016.* Helsinki: Suomen kuntaliitto ja kirjoittajata.

Richmond, V., & McCroskey, J. (2009). *Organizational communication for survival: Making work, work* (4 ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Rogers, E. (1995). *Diffusion ov Innovations* (4 ed.). New York, NY: Free Press.

Rothman, M. (1980). *The evolution of forms of legal education.* New Haven, CT: Department of Sociology, Yale University.

Rubin, H., & Rubin, I. (2005). *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data* (2 ed.). Thousands Oaks, California: Sage.

Rushton, M., & Brooks, A. (2007). Government Funding of Nonprofit Organizations. Em D. Young (Ed.), *Financing Nonprofits: Putting Theory into Practice.* Latham M.D: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Ruttan, V. (2006). Social Science Knowledge and Induced Institutional Innovation: An Institutional Design Perspective. *Journal of Institutional Economics, 2*(3), pp. 249-272.

Ruusuvirta, M., & Saukkonen, P. (2014). *Kuntien kulttuuritoiminta lukujen valossa.* Acesso em 2 de 1 de 2014, disponível em www.kunnat.net/fi/Kuntaliitto/media/tiedotteet/2012/01/

Ruusuvirta, M., & Saukkonen, P. (2015). Taiteen ja kulttuurin kolmas sektori. Em I. Heikkinen, A. Kangas, & R. Mitchell (Eds.), *Taiteen ja kulttuurin kentät. Perusrakenteet, hallinta ja lainsäädäntö* (pp. 354-374). Helsinki: Tietosanoma Oy.

Ruusuvirta, M., Saukkonen, P., Ruokolainen, V., & Karttunen, S. (2012). *Kuntien kulttuuritoiminta lukujen valossa. Suomen kuntaliitto.* Acesso em 2 de 1 de 2014, disponível em www.kunnat.net/fi/Kuntaliitto/media/tiedotteet/2012/01/ kulttuurilukujenvalossa/Kuntien%20kulttuuritoiminta%20lukuina.pdf

Santos, F., & Eisenhardt, K. (2009). Constructing markets and shaping boundaries: Entrepreneurial power in nascent fields. *Academy of Management Journal, 52*, pp. 643-671.

Scheinberg, M. (2005). Combining New Institutionalisms: Explaining Institutional Change in American Property Insurance. *Sociological Forum, 20*(1), pp. 93-137.

Schiuma, G., Bogen, P., & Lerro, A. (2015). *CREATIVE BUSINESS MODELS: Insights into the Business Models of Cultural Centers in Trans Europe Halles.* Framtidens Lund, The City of Lund, Sweden.

Schmidt, V. (2010). Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'. *European Political Science Review, 2*(1), pp. 1-25.

Scott, W. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 32*, pp. 493-511.

Scott, W. (1994). Conceptualizing organizational fields: linking organizations and societal systems. Em H. Derlien, U. Gerhardt, & F. Scharpf (Eds.), *Systemrationalitat und partialinteresse.* Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Scott, W. (2002). *Organizations: Rational, natural, and open systems* (5 ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Scott, W. (2008). Approaching Adulthood: The Maturing of Institutional Theory. *Theory and Society*(37), pp. 427-442.

Scott, W. (2014). *Institutions and organizations* (4 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Scott, W., & Meyer, J. (1991). The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early Evidence. Em W. Powell, & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (pp. 108-140). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scott, W., Ruef, M., Mendel, P., & Caronna, C. (2000). Institutional Change and Health Care Organizations: From Professional Dominance to Managed Care. (C. Mazza, & J. Strandgaard Pedersen, Eds.) *Organization Studies, 25*(6), pp. 875-895.

Selznick, P. (1948). Foundations of the Theory of Organization. *American Sociological Review*, pp. 25-35.

Seo, M.-G., & Greed, W. (2002). Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A dialectical perspective. *Academy of Management Review, 5*(3-4), pp. 301-321.

Seymour, J., & Ingleton, C. (1999). Ethical issues in qualitative research at the end of life. *International Journal of Palliative Nursing, 5*(2), pp. 65-73.

Shah, S., & Corley, K. (2006). Building better theory by bridging the quantitative–qualitative divide. *Journal of Management Studies, 43*, pp. 1821-1835.

Sharif, S., & Yeoh, K. (2014). Independent Directors' Resource Provision Capability in Publicly-listed Companies. *Corporate Ownership and Control, 11*(3), pp. 113-121.

Shenton, A. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects. *Education for Information, 22*(2), pp. 63-75.

Sherer, P., & Lee, K. (2002). Institutional Change in Large Law Firms: A Resource Dependency and Institutional Perspective. *Academy of Management Journal, 45*(1), pp. 102-110.

Sherer, P., & Suddaby, R. (2018). Does Resource Diversity Confer Organizational Autonomy? Extending Resource Dependence Theory. *Unpublished Article*.

Shields, P. (1998). Pragmatism as Philosophy of Science: a Tool for Public Administration. *Research in Public Administration*(4), pp. 195-226.

Silvanto, T., Linko, M., & Cantell, T. (14 de 2 de 2008). From enlightenment to experience: cultural centers in Helsinki neighbourhoods. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, pp. 165-178.

Sine, W., Haveman, H., & Tolbert, P. (2005). Risky business? Entrepreneurship in the new independent-power sector. *Administrative Science Quarterly*(50), pp. 200-232.

Singleton, R., & Straits, B. (2005). *Approaches to social research* (4 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skafferiet rf. (2017b). *Verksamhetsberättelse och bokslut 2016 (annual report).* Vasa: Skafferiet rf.

Skafferiet Ritz. (2017a). *About us*. Acesso em 14 de 6 de 2017, disponível em http://www.kulturskafferiet.com/about/

Sofaer, S. (1999). Qualitative methods: What are they and why use them? *HSR: Health Services Research, 34*, pp. 1101-1117.

Sommerfeld, D., & Reisch, M. (2003). The 'Other America' after welfare reform: a view from the nonprofit sector. Em M. Kilty, & E. Segal (Eds.), *Rediscovering the Other America: The Continuing Crisis of Poverty.* New York: Haworth Press.

Stake, R. (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Statistics Finland. (12 de 2017b). *10.5 Kuntien kulttuuritoimen nettokustannukset tehtävittäin 2006–2016.* Acesso em 18 de 5 de 2018, disponível em http://pxhopea2.stat.fi/sahkoiset_julkaisut/kulttuuritilasto/html/suom0009.htm

Statistics Finland. (2017). *Kulttuuritapahtumat ja -keskukset: Suomen kulttuuritaloja ja kulttuurikeskuksia maakunnittain 2017. Tietokantataulukot.* Acesso em 15 de 3 de 2017, disponível em www.stat.fi/til/klt/tau.html

Statistics Finland. (2017). *Kulttuuritapahtumat ja -keskukset: Suomen kulttuuritaloja ja kulttuurikeskuksia maakunnittain 2017. Tietokantataulukot.* Acesso em 15 de 3 de 2017, disponível em www.stat.fi/til/klt/tau.html

Stenlund, K. (2010). *Effekter av byggandet av Kulturens hus i Luleå.* Luleä: Universitetstryckeriet.

Stigler, G. (2003). The theory of economic regulation. Em J. Pfeffer, & G. Salancik (Eds.), *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Storstad, O. (2010). *Kommunal kultursektor i endring.* Oslo: Norsk kulturrådet.

Strandgaard Pedersen, J., & Dobbin, F. (2006). "In Search of Identity and Legitimation. *American Behavioral Scientist, 49*, pp. 897-907.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques.* Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Streeck, W., & Thelen, K. (2005). *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suchman, M. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review, 20*(3), pp. 571-610.

Suddaby, R. (2010). Challenges for Institutional Theory. Journal of Management Inquiry. *Journal of Management Inquiry, 19*(1), pp. 14-20.

Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2009). Methodological issues in researching institutional change. Em D. Buchanan, & A. Bryman (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Research Methods* (pp. 176-196). London: Sage.

Svenning, C. (2003). *Metodboken.* Stockholm: Lorentz Förlag.

Taalas, S. (2010). *Kohti hybriditalouden haastetta. Keskustelua luavasta taloudesta Suomessa.* Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö.

Tabachinick, B., & Fidell, L. (2001). *Using multivariate statistics* (4 ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2003). *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research.* California: Sage.

Tausky, C. (1978). *Work organizations: Major theorethical perspectives.* Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock.

Teatteri Telakka ry. (2018). *Teatteri Telakka*. Acesso em 21 de 4 de 2018, disponível em https://www.teatteritelakka.fi/

Teatteri Telakka ry. (2018). *Yhteystiedot*. Acesso em 21 de 4 de 2018, disponível em https://www.teatteritelakka.fi/?page_id=3279

Teatteri Telakka. (2017). *Historia*. Acesso em 14 de 6 de 2017, disponível em http://www.teatteritelakka.fi/?page_id=819

The Cable Factory. (2017). *The Cable Factory, Info.* Acesso em 28 de 10 de 2017, disponível em http://www.kaapelitehdas.fi/en/info

The Swedish Cultural Foundation in Finland. (2017). *Beviljade understöd.* Acesso em 21 de 1 de 2017, disponível em Svenska kulturfonden: http:// beviljade.kulturfonden.fi/

Thomas, G., & Myers, K. (2015). *The anatomy of the case study.* London: Sage.

Thomas, J., & Nelson, J. (2001). *Research methods in physical activity* (4 ed.). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

Thomas, J., Nelson, J., & Silverman, S. (2011). *Research Methods in Physical Activity* (6 ed.). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.

Thompson, J. (2014). On Writing Notes in the Field: Interrogating positionality, emotion, participation and ethics. *McGill Journal of Education, 491*, pp. 247-254.

Thornton, P., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional Logics. Em R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism.* California: Sage .

Tolbert, P. (1985). Institutional environments and resource dependence: Sources of administrative structure in institutions of higher education. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 30*, pp. 1-13.

Tolbert, P., & Zucker, L. (1996). The Institutionalization of Institutional Theory. Em S. Glegg, & C. Hardy (Eds.), *Studying Organization. Theory & Method.* London: Sage.

Torch, C. (2010). Why independence? Em S. Fitzgerald (Ed.), *New times, new models. Investigating the internal governance models and external relations of independent cultural centres in times of change.* Maribor: Pekarna magdalenske mreže.

Townley, B. (2002). Managing With Modernity. *Organizations, 9*(4), pp. 549-573.

Townley, B., Beech, N., & McKinlay, A. (2009). Managing in the creative industries: Managing the motley crew. *Human Relations, 62*(7), pp. 939-1112.

Turun VPK. (2018). *Palokunnantalo*. Acesso em 30 de 5 de 2018, disponível em https://www.turunvpk.fi/palokunnantalo

Twombly, E. (2003). What factors affect the entry and exit of nonprofit human service organizations in metropolitan areas? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32*(2), pp. 211-235.

Ulrich, D., & Barney, J. (1984). Perspectives in organizations: Resource dependence, efficiency, and population. *Academic Management Review, 9*, pp. 471-481.

Vartanian, T. (2010). *Secondary data analysis.* Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Veblen, T. (2009). The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. (C. Kingston, & G. Caballero, Eds.) *Journal of Institutional Economics., 5*(2), pp. 111-132.

Vickers, J., & Yarrow, G. (1991). Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination. *The Academy of Management Review, 14*(4), pp. 516-531.

Webb, D. (2017). Trends in the Development and Operation of PACs. Em P. Lambert, & R. Williams (Eds.), *Performing Arts Center Management* (pp. 45-62). New York: Routledge.

Weick, K. (1989). Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination. *The Academy of Management Review, 14*(4), pp. 516-531.

Weick, K. (1995). *Sensemaking in organizations.* Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage publications.

Weisbrod, B. (1998). The nonprofit mission and its financing. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17*, pp. 165-174.

Weisbrod, B. (1998). The nonprofit mission and its financing. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17*, pp. 165-174.

Weisbrod, B. (2004). The pitfalls of profits. *Stanford Social Innovation Review, 2*(3), pp. 40-47.

Westphal, J., & Fredrickson, J. (2001). Who directs strategic change? Director experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change. *Strategic Management Journal, 22*, pp. 1113-1137.

Westphal, J., & Zajac, E. (1997). Defections from the inner circle: Social exchange, reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in U.S. corporations. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 42*, pp. 161-183.

Westphal, J., Boivie, S., & Chong, D. (2006). The strategic impetus for social network ties: reconstituting broken CEO friendship ties. *Strategic Management Journal, 27*, pp. 425-445.

Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming inaction through collective institutional entrepreneurship: Insights from regime theory. *Organizational studies, 28*(7), pp. 1079-1100.

Williamson, O. (1975). *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.* New York: Free Press.

Williamson, O. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. *Journal of Law and Economics, 22*(2), pp. 233-261.

Wolcott, H. (2002). Writing up qualitative research … better. *Qualitative Health Research, 12*(1), pp. 91-103.

Yan, A., & Gray, B. (2001). Antecedents and effects of parent control in international joint ventures. *Journal of Management Studies, 38*(3), pp. 393-416.

Yin, R. (1981). The case study crisis: some answers. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 26*(1), pp. 58-65.

Yin, R. (2014). *Case study research: Design and methods* (5 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CS: Sage.

Zilbert, T. (2002). Stories of Conflict and Conflict between Stories : Politics, Narration and Board Decision- Making. Papier présenté au Language and Politics in Organization.

Zucker, L. (1977). The role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. *American Sociological Review*(42), pp. 726-743.

Zucker, L. (1987). Institutional Theories of Organization. *Annual Review of Sociology*(13), pp. 443-464.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

1. Interview questions

What is your name?

Which cultural centre do you represent?

In which municipality is your centre located?

Do you give consent for usage of this interview material in my research?

Background

Can you tell me a bit about yourself and your job?

How long have you been involved with the cultural centre?

Where did you work with before this? (What trustee positions have you had?)

How can privatisation of a municipal cultural centre be managed?

What mission does your cultural centre fulfil?

What are the key elements to successfully manage an independent cultural centre?

How do outside influences impact your work and decision making in a cultural centre?

Which differences and similarities do you think there are between independent and public cultural centres?

Do you or the environment dictate your mission? Please elaborate.

Explain the most important change in your organisation (organisational structure, management or artistic direction) in recent years?

Are the challenges for leaders of art organisations different than the challenges for leaders of non-art organisations? If yes, in what way?

Are the challenges for leaders of independent cultural centres different than the challenges for leaders of publicly funded cultural centres? If yes, in what way?

What is your municipality's current cultural policy or strategy, and how does that effect your organisation?

What would you say is the balance of the cultural services offered by the municipality and independent actors?

In your opinion, does the municipality provide enough cultural services?

How would you describe the quality of the cultural services offered by the municipality?

Would you say the community needs the addition of cultural services offered by private actors?

Is the municipality offering the same amount of cultural services as 10 years ago?
What would you say the trend is for continuously offering cultural services in your municipality?
What is the current trend for offering any services in your municipality?
Does your municipality collaborate with actors from the third sector or the private sector? If yes, with whom, and in what?
Have you personally or your cultural centre been a part of a privatisation process of a municipal service? If yes, please elaborate.
How would you go about it if you were to privatise a municipal cultural centre?
If you were going to step down from your leadership role, what advice would you give the person filling your shoes?

Which is the most suitable organisational model for an independent cultural centre?
Which are the worst difficulties and biggest benefits of managing a cultural centre?
How are these difficulties and benefits connected to the organisational model?
Could you please describe the organisational model of your cultural centre?
Does your organisation create expectations and demands for you to live up to, or do you perceive that you are free to renew yourself?
If you had the opportunity to change the current organisational model, would you? What would it be, and why?
Would you say that current legislation facilitates the operation of any organisational model in your trade?
Would you say that current legislation hinders the operation of any organisational model in your trade?
How do you perceive people’s interest in participating as trustees in your organisation?
How do you perceive people’s interest in working as employees for your organisation?
How can a trustee influence the direction of the organisation?
How can an employee influence the direction of the organisation?
How would you describe the decision-making process in your organisation?
How is your cultural centre funded?
What does your private funding consist of?
In financing independent cultural centres, what division between public and private funding is most common in your experience?
If you could choose, what would be the optimal division between public and private funding, and why?

What are the motives of private parties to finance independent cultural centres?
What is your experience with the attitudes of the government and the municipality towards funding cultural centres?
What has changed in the attitudes of the government and the municipality towards funding cultural centres during the past 10 years?
What would you say the attitudes of the government and the municipality are towards the private sector or the third sector?
Please estimate the proportion of your income in 2014–2015 from the following sources:
1) Municipality
2) state
3) Other governmental agency
4) Private organisations
5) Ticket sales
6) Other
How much money are people willing to spend on culture?
What is the most feasible way to make the centre self-sustainable?

How the quality of cultural offerings in cultural centres be guaranteed?
How would you describe quality?
How would you say you are able to affect the quality of your services?
How would you say you are able to affect the quality of your cultural offerings?
What is public opinion about your cultural offerings at the moment?
How do you follow public opinion?
How would you describe the success of your qualitative cultural offerings?
How do you measure your success?
Which indicators do you take into account while measuring the success of cultural offerings?
How do you take feedback and other indicators into account while planning?
How do you make people return to the cultural centre?
What kind of experience is the audience looking for in your cultural centre?
How many people visit the cultural centre per day, week, month and year?
Where does your audience come from?
How is the audience engaged, and how do you engage the audience in planning the content of the cultural centre?
What is your past experience in arts and culture?

Is it important for officers and trustees of an arts organisation to have practical experience with an art form?

What are the impacts of independent cultural centres on the cities in which they operate?

How has the cultural centre has benefited the community (e.g. in finances, marketing or entertainment)?

Do you think the cultural centre has improved the quality of life in the community? If yes, how so? If no, why not?

Do you believe that the cultural centre is a necessary institution in the community? If yes, how so? If no, why not?

How do you think that the cultural centre could be a more successful and contributing member of the community? What are its shortcomings?

Do you believe the arts are important to the community's development and growth?

How does the cultural centre contribute to the community's development and growth?

If the cultural centre ceased to exist, how do you believe the community would be affected?

What are your hopes for the cultural centre in the future?

Final question

Do you want to add anything?

Appendix B

2. Questionnaire

Is your cultural centre:

1) Private
2) Public
3) Both—what kind of a combination?
4) A company/foundation/other owned by the municipality
5) Other; if so, what?

When was your cultural centre founded?

If you are a completely or partly private cultural centre (Likert scale, 1–5):

Do you think your preconditions for activities are different than for a public cultural centre?

Which are the biggest differences between a public and a private cultural centre?

In your opinion, do you have to compete with the municipal cultural services?

Do you think your mission is the same as your public counterparts?

All respondents (Likert scale, 1-5):

How well do you fulfil your mission, in your own opinion?

Do the local inhabitants think your activity is important?

Do the local inhabitants place expectations on you?

Have the expectations of the local inhabitants changed in recent years?

If yes, in what way? (open-ended question)

Do you feel that you have a need to change? (Likert scale)

Do you experience that society places any pressures to change on your centre?

Has the administration of your cultural centre changed in recent years?

Do you have cultural offerings of your own?

Do you rent your venues to external producers?

How dependent are you on external producers?

How much do you cooperate with other partners/organisations?

How important would you describe this inter-organisational cooperation to be?

Has your cooperation changed in recent years?

Are your activities primarily commercial?

Do you primarily offer cultural activities to the local environment?

Do you choose your activities primarily because of commercial success?
Do you feel that you have to compete with the private cultural sector?
Do you consider your activities and finances to be stable?
How do the following entities affect your activities: municipality, state, audience, local inhabitants, funders, external renters, artists, the cultural centre itself and any others?

How much the following things affect your activities (Likert scale): municipal funding, state funding, private funding, sponsorships, crowdfunding, inter-organisational cooperation, volunteer staff, taxes, other cultural offerings in the same area, state bureaucracy, external renters and anything else—what?

What are the biggest changes during the 5 past years? (open-ended question)
In what ways have your reacted to these changes?
What is your biggest dependency?
How do you cope with your dependencies?

How many employees do you have?
1) 1–2
2) 3–4
3) 5–6
4) 7–8
5) More than 9

What turnover do you have?
1) Less than 250 000
2) 250 000–500 000
3) 500 000–1 000 000
4) 1 000 000–1 500 000
5) 1 500 000–2 000 000
6) 2 000 000–2 500 00
7) More than 2 500 000. How much?

Are the costs of the venue maintenance included in your turnover (e.g. janitorial expenses)?
1) No
2) Partly

3) Yes

Do you have anything to add? (open-ended question)