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T O THE READER : PRAXIAL AND PRAGMATIST CRITIQUE IN MUSIC EDUCATION

This issue of the Finnish Journal of Music Education contains papers and commentaries presented at the joint MDG (*MayDayGroup*) and AWE (*Artist, Work of Art and Experience*) group symposium in Helsinki in June 11-15, 2000. The MDG is an international think-tank which aims to apply critical thinking to music education and to affirm the central importance of musical participation in human life (see, <http://members.aol.com/jtgates/maydaygroup/>). The AWE group, led by the Finnish philosopher Pentti Määttänen, is an informal interdisciplinary group of students and teachers from several art schools and universities in Finland whose connecting interest is art and pragmatism¹.

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The Helsinki meeting focused particularly on the MDG ideal no.5 (one of seven) according to which "music educators must establish and maintain contact with ideas and people from other disciplines". Claire Detels' paper opened the discussion on what the search for interdisciplinary connections might mean in music education. Detels targeted David Elliott's praxialism (see, Elliott 1995, *Music Matters*, Oxford & New York, Oxford University Press), which abandons the aesthetic concept as useless and misleading, when she suggested that aesthetics - and not athletics - is the best foundation for music education and for linking music to other realms of life and study.

¹ MOST OF THE PRESENTATIONS OF THE AWE GROUP WILL BE PUBLISHED LATER BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ART AND DESIGN IN HELSINKI.

Detels' message divides opinions. For Wayne Bowman who sees the need for developing softer boundaries, but not necessarily with the kind of aesthetic tools Detels puts forward, the view seems like 'money for old rope'. Bowman also, quite rightly, worries that the central elements of praxialism have been misunderstood. Elliott's 'doing' does - or at least in Aristotelian terms - should go "far beyond specialized technical skills" as *techne* and it is not just *poiesis*, simply getting something done. Differing philosophical schools arrive at distinct definitions of philosophy and although perhaps detrimental to a philosophical discourse it is absolutizing a particu-

lar view, Bowman's concern for possible anti-disciplinarity in the name of interdisciplinarity seems justified. One might also ask, why should music education have 'A Foundation' whether it is aesthetic or athletic?

Darryl Coan's response to the keynote paper suggests a re-modeling of teaching in which the chosen means for various ends are constantly tested, enriched with, and reflected against, students' experiences. The Deweyan ideas, that Detels seems to revitalize, are further examined by Lauri Väkevää who maintains that a naturalist starting-point makes the MDG action ideal No. 5 transparent, since all arts, including music, share the general condition for making sense in life and for transforming it. Juha Ojala continues Väkevää's pragmatist naturalist line of thinking arguing that interdisciplinarity in music does not need to lead to theoretical reductionism. "Folk psychology" and "scientific explanations" do not need to be set against each other in our search for workable solutions in music education. In practice, Ojala's suggestion would lead to antifoundationalism that I think would be the healthiest "foundation" for music education.

The other articles in this issue do not directly focus on Detels' paper but rather contribute more generally to the current discussions within the profession of music education. Bowman's paper, *Discernment, Respons/ability, and the Goods of Philosophical Praxis* is a response to the discussion that has been going on in the *Philosophy of Music Education Review* and to the question of the nature of the philosophy of music education. The interpretation of 'the aesthetic' that Thomas Regelski and David Elliott, for example, repeatedly share is commented on here by Pentti Määttänen. Thomas Regelski continues the praxial critique in his article on multiculturalism in music education suggesting that critical education, as derived from Habermas, can lead to a consensual musical world of meaning where cultural situatedness is transcended towards an understanding of that which is common rather than towards the particular. "A consensual world of meaning" might be a thinkable ideal though it seems that we need a great deal of education before the ideal becomes a reality; a reality that is not simply tolerance toward 'the other'. Consider the cultural differences between American and Finnish music educators' general attitudes toward the status

of rock music in school. How deliberately abstract or unintentionally ethnocentric this 'consensus ideal' might be, is a question that comes out in Bowman's, as well as Haussila's, paper.

The strong pragmatist charge that was characteristic to the MDG&AWE-symposium is continued in Sami Pihlström's paper and in Richard Shusterman's interview. Pihlström, a Finnish philosopher who was an invited speaker at the pragmatist AWE symposium, examines how art is part of the real world and can itself investigate the limits of the world it is part of. Pihlström distances himself from the Deweyan notion of art, presented by Väkevä and Määttänen (plus myself) and examines art and music as objects of Popper's World 3. He also takes a critical stance toward the AWE-group thesis that considers works of art as "rather experiences than objects". I leave it to the readers to decide whether Pihlström is reading Dewey - and the AWE thesis - in a way Dewey was afraid that most of his readers did. Dewey's disappointment was that his 'experience' was misunderstood and therewith his whole philosophy, which later led him to equating experience and culture that for him was at the same time psychological and collective, comprising of both artifacts and humans in their mutual inter-action. (See, Dewey LW 1, 361). In this sense Richard Shusterman's observation that "praxial theories too often tend to ignore the dimension of experience" applies, in my view, equally to some praxialists in music education. The choice of perspective, and whether or not it compasses both the first and third person aspect, seems to make some difference in music education.

Through these papers, FJME wants to continue discussion and concern for boundaries and focus in music education with those readers who could not attend the seminar. It is also a chance for those students and music educators who were present, but who could not follow the quick paper-reading due to language problems and the "crankiness" of philosophical views, to re-think and reflect critically upon the suggestions made.

On the behalf of the music education department at the Sibelius Academy and myself, I wish to thank Terry Gates and Thomas Regelski, the organizers of the MDG, for the opportunity for Finnish group members and music educators to take part in this international group discussion. I would also like to give special thanks to Richard

Shusterman for his inspiring presentations during the symposium and for giving us his valuable time for the interview. My sincere gratitude to Claire Detels, who was unfortunately unable to attend the symposium, but who with the agreement of her publisher, Bergin and Garvey, kindly gave the FJME permission to publish the keynote discussion paper. The paper was largely based on professor Detels' recent book *Soft Boundaries: Re-Visioning the Arts and Aesthetics in American Education* (1999).

HYVÄ MUSIIKKIKASVATUS- LEHDEN LUKIJA

Musiikkikasvatus-lehden vuoden 2000 numerot 1-2 sisältävät kansainvälisen MayDay-ryhmän ja kotimaisen AWE-ryhmän (Artist, Work of Art and Experience) symposiumin esitelmiä. MayDay-ryhmän ja AWE-ryhmän yhdistetty symposium pidettiin Helsingissä 11.-15. kesäkuuta. Seminaari keskittyi MayDay-ryhmän ideaaliin no. 5, jonka mukaan ”musiikkikasvattajien täytyy vakiinnuttaa ja ylläpitää kontakteja muiden alojen edustajien kanssa”. Claire Detels oli laatinut keskustelun alustukseksi esitelmän, joka oli kannanotto tähän ideaaliin. Hänen mukaansa erikoistuminen musiikin alueella rajaa toimintaa tarpeettomasti. Tämän julkaisun tarkoituksena on herättää omalla panoksellaan keskustelua musiikkikasvatuksen rajoista tai rajojen pehmentämisestä hieman laajemman musiikkikasvatuksen ammattikunnan keskuudessa. MayDay-ryhmän avoin keskustelu jatkuu ”netissä” johon kaikilla on vapaa pääsy.

MayDay-ryhmä on kansainvälinen musiikkikasvatuksen ryhmä, joka kokoontuu keskustelemaan muutaman kerran vuodessa pyydettyjen puheenvuorojen ympärille (ks. lähemmin, <http://members.aol.com/jtgate/maydaygroup>). AWE-ryhmässä on pääosin taidekorkeakouluissa tohtorintutkintoa suorittavia opiskelijoita, joita yhdistää kiinnostus pragmatismiin tarjoamiin filosofisiin näkökulmiin taiteen tutkimuksessa ja tarkastelussa. Tätä vapaaehtoista ja kaikille avointa ryhmää organisoi FT Pentti Määttänen. Koska Helsingin symposiumin kielenä oli englanti, pahoittelen

että myös lehtemme on tällä kertaa täysin englanninkielinen. Emme myöskään voineet julkaista kaikkia symposiumin esitelmiä, joten osa tullaan julkaisemaan myöhemmin.

Heidi Westerlund

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S OFTENING THE BOUNDARIES OF MUSIC IN GENERAL EDUCATION

This paper deals with the need to soften the disciplinary boundaries of music and the other arts in order to increase public understanding of their importance and improve coverage in K-12 and college education. Most of my remarks are taken from my recent book, *Soft Boundaries: Re-Visioning the Arts and Aesthetics in American Education*. As such, they are addressed mainly to music and arts education in the United States, but I believe they apply at least in some degree to arts education elsewhere in the world, wherever the "hard-boundaried" model of single-disciplinary specialization has been similarly influential. At least, I hope my remarks will be useful in starting off the dialogue over Mayday Group action ideal#5, "In order to be effective, music educators must establish and maintain contact with ideas and people from other disciplines." Responses are particularly welcome from those whose educational systems operate differently from the model I describe and critique below, so that the Helsinki conference may have representation and discussion from the point of view of many different countries and educational systems. I have divided my remarks into six main sections, as follows:

Part I Introduction: How and Why Music Needs Inter-disciplinary Connections

Part II How We Got Here: A Brief History of Academic Specialization and Its Effect on the Arts

Part III More Hard Boundaries: The Separation of History, Theory, Philosophy, and Practice in the Arts

Part IV A Really Hard Case: Fragmentation in the Musical Field

Part V Why the American Goals 2000 Standards Won't Help Music Education

Part VI A Better Way: Soft Boundaried Curricular Reforms in Music and the Arts

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How and Why Music Needs Interdisciplinary Connections

In 1983, cultural critic Christopher Lasch opened his speech to a conference of the future of music education with the following remarks:

I accepted the invitation to address this distinguished gathering, I confess, in the hope that it would give me the chance to talk about a number of things I have decided opinions about: Beethoven's over-use of the diminished seventh; his addiction to chords in root position; the canard that Schumann couldn't orchestrate; the critical neglect of Ludwig Spohr; the Brahms -Wagner controversy (I believe the Wagnerites were dead wrong); the need for more compositions featuring prominent but easy parts for the viola.

Lasch's remarks were tongue-in cheek; he actually went on to address the need for music and all humanities teachers to challenge the narrow consumeristic approach that has characterized education and life in late industrial society, instead of just participating in specialized professional debates. Unfortunately, Lasch's suggestion was neglected in the discussions following his lecture. In the context of a conference on music curriculum, it was easiest for the participants to focus on music alone rather than on the larger challenge of improving education as a whole.

The trouble is, under the single-disciplinary structure of many of our educational systems today, there is almost no opportunity to consider the connections of music to other disciplines and activities for teachers or students, because music is represented in that system as a highly specialized discipline separate even from other arts disciplines with which it has frequently been combined in historical and cultural practice. Specialization has led to extraordinary levels of virtuosity and complexity in musical performance, composition, and research, but it has also had the unfortunate effect of isolating music teachers and students from contacts with other arts specialists, other academic disciplines, and other life activities in general. The result of this isolation has been an ever widening gap between academic music specialists and the public which has, in turn, been devastating to public understanding and support for education in music and all the arts.

Why has this problem developed and what can be done about it? That is the subject of this paper. In my view the problem is structured into our educational system according to a paradigm of educational practice that has been increasingly dominant since the Renaissance: the paradigm of hard, virtually impermeable boundaries between academic concepts and disciplines. As I will explain in Part II, hard boundaries have worked well for the sciences but have had a fragmenting effect on the arts that has led in turn to their declining influence in general education. Not only have the arts been marginalized as single-disciplinary specialties taught mainly by and for specialists, but, as I will discuss in Part III, further specialization has resulted in a fragmented approach to teaching the individual art forms, such that artistic practices are taught out of context with their history, theory, philosophy, and vice versa. In Part IV I will discuss the negative effects that excessive specialization - actually fragmentation - has had on music education. Part V focuses on why the Goals 2000 National Standards for Arts Education in the United States have failed to improve the situation there, despite their stated goals for interdisciplinary inclusion of music and the other arts. Finally, in Part VI I will propose soft-boundaried reforms in curriculum and teacher training at the college level that will allow for the mainstreaming of music and the other arts into the pre-college curriculum, in addition to continued single-disciplinary education for specialists. My hope is that these reforms may lead to a permanent improvement in education in music, the arts, and the whole curriculum. My proposals are designed with American education in mind, but I hope they may stimulate discussion about plans and possibilities elsewhere in the world.

Before I proceed, I should make some premises and definitions clear. First, my soft-boundaried paradigm leads me to view music, not as an activity separate and distinct from all others, but as a social practice with links to many other human activities and values, and with especially strong historical and social ties to the other arts. By "the arts" I mean creative human expressions in sensually perceivable media such as music, painting, sculpture, and poetry, among others. Although the arts are defined and represented in contemporary Western educational systems as separate disciplines, they have more often than not been joined in historical and cultural practice around the world, in such traditions as dance, drama, opera, and, most

recently, film. They are also joined in the discipline of aesthetics, the study of human perception and judgment in all the arts and in other sensory experiences. Unfortunately, the recent dominance of the Anglo-American "analytic" approach to aesthetics has given the discipline a bad name outside of philosophy, at least in terms of its relevance to education. The arcane debates over the definition of "art" and other terms that have dominated the discipline of aesthetics since the 1950s have frankly offered little of value to teachers. Bennett Reimer and the Getty Education Institute for the Arts have promoted a softer version of aesthetics to music and visual arts educators, but that softer version has also drawn fire as being overly formalist and Eurocentric, as in David Elliott's *Music Matters*, which recommends a praxis-based approach to music education, focussed on doing more than thinking about it. While I understand the concerns of Elliott and others about the way aesthetics has been understood and taught, I think it is too important to leave out of arts education and education in general. In its broadest sense of making sense of sensory experience, aesthetics is not Eurocentric--there are Japanese, African, Indian, and many other aesthetic systems and approaches from which students have much to learn about the way we and others perceive the sensory realm. Actually, having aesthetics as a foundation and connection between music and the other arts avoids the Eurocentric trap that using historical canons as an organizing principle creates, wherein the traditional historical periods by which we date and analyze art forms are usually not relevant to non-Western cultures. Most important, I believe that aesthetic experiences, ideas, and discussion are essential to helping students understand the meaning of the artistic activities in which they engage. Without them, James Mursell warned in 1943, "Worthless materials may be used; routine procedures may be followed; emphasis may center narrowly on technical skills; the great literature of the art may never be opened up; nothing may be done to inspire and stimulate children to love and appreciate the beauty and the expressive possibilities of the art." Sadly, Mursell's warning reads today like a description of many American music education programs, focussed primarily on training future band directors for football game service with little or no concern for teaching general students about "the great literature" or "the beauty and the expressive possibilities of the art."

In my view, Elliott's focus on doing rather than studying music is not the answer to the marginalization of music and the other arts in our educational system. A far better answer, in my view, is to create a kind of music education that goes far beyond specialized technical skills; a music curriculum with stronger links to language and other arts, social studies, math, and science, than to athletics. I see aesthetics (NOT ATHLETICS) as the best foundation for those links. In fact, I would like to restore aesthetics to the position Immanuel Kant gave it, as one of the three central modes for human thought and judgment, along with scientific and moral reasoning. I believe it is, as Kant's contemporary Friedrich Schiller put it, "one of the most important tasks of culture to subject human beings to form even in their purely physical lives, and to make them aesthetic as far as ever the realm of Beauty can extend, since the moral condition can be developed only from the aesthetic, not from the physical condition." In other words, aesthetics offers far more than disembodied intellectual debates about concepts of art; it offers the experiential and intellectual key to connecting our minds with our bodies.

Because I believe aesthetics is central to our learning to understand music, the arts, and ourselves, I recommend using it from primary education through tertiary education as a fundamental basis for learning to explore how and why we hear, feel, think and create in music and other sensory experiences. With aesthetics positioned at the center of music education, music and the other arts can become more central as well: not in the sense of specialized pursuits taught by specialists primarily to and for other specialists, but as communally shared creative responses to human experience. Education in particular skills, canons, and concepts will remain at more advanced levels for the training of specialists, but in general education, music and the arts can and must become a mainstream, non-specialized concern.

How We Got Here: A Brief History of Academic Specialization and its Effect on The Arts

Since the scientific and industrial revolutions, human life has been characterized by increasing specialization: a tendency toward ever higher standards of competence for ever narrower goals. Ernest Gellner has defined this phenomenon as "single-purpose, instrumental/

rational activity," in which individuals define and pursue specialized goals with far greater efficiency and uniformity than is possible in the "multi-purposed" behavior of less technologically-advanced societies. In industry, specialization has brought us the production line and a constant growth of technology and new consumer products. In academics, specialization has brought us a proliferation of knowledge in every imaginable area of human thought, leading to ever increasing specialization as disciplines and subdisciplines expand beyond the ability of individual scholars to understand them. In music and arts education, specialization has brought us a system of separate disciplines, courses, and specialists for the teaching of individual artistic practices that have often been joined in the actual history of the arts.

Specialization has taken root in academics in part because the needs for and benefits of academic specialization are so obvious. With specialization, the knowledge and skills in a discipline seem to be constantly growing, as new generations of specialists and specializations arise. In his *History of Knowledge* (1992), Charles Van Doren explains the historical development of academic specialization:

The Aristotelian ideal of the educated person, "critical" in all or almost all branches of knowledge, survived for centuries as the aim of a liberal education. [but] The twentieth century has seen radical change in this traditional scheme of education. The failure of the Renaissance to produce successful "Renaissance men" did not go unnoticed. If such men as Leonardo, Pico, Bacon, and many others almost as famous could not succeed in their presumed dream of knowing all there was to know about everything, then lesser men should not presume to try. The alternative became self-evident: achieve expertise in one field while others attained expertise in theirs. Much easier to accomplish, this course led to a more comfortable academic community. Now an authority in one field need compete only with experts in his field.

While academic specialization has served a necessary role in the advancement of knowledge since the Renaissance, it has also become a potentially destructive force in cases where specialists have become so narrowly focused within their disciplines and subdisciplines that they have lost the ability to communicate their knowledge with others. In his book *The Moral Collapse of the University*,

philosopher Bruce Wilshire argues that specialization has become "professionalization," with the disciplines acting as elite closed communities whose exclusive "purification rites" answer identity needs of their own members, instead of advancing learning for the larger community.

The extremes of academic specialization described by Wilshire maybe considered "hard-boundaried" extremes. That is, they are based on a paradigm in which clear-cut boundaries between disciplines and concepts are automatically preferred to softer, more permeable boundaries, regardless of their validity or the educational results. The paradigm of hard boundaries has worked fairly well in scientific disciplines where strict definitions of experimental controls, variables, and results are essential to the growth of knowledge. In the arts and humanities, though, the results have been less fortunate. Because of the influence of the hard-boundaried paradigm over all academic disciplines in the twentieth century, faculty in the arts and humanities have come to emulate the hard-boundaried clarity of the scientific method with emphasis on quantifiable issues and methods, ignoring the more ambiguous areas of their disciplines. But there is one inherent ambiguity in the arts and humanities that cannot be evaded: their dependence on the communication and interpretation of ideas among other human beings: they must communicate to people if they are to be meaningful fields of study. When faculty in these disciplines become too specialized in their language and concerns, they lose the ability to communicate their ideas to their students and the public and along with that ability, lose their very meaning and purpose. Some recent statistics on education in the United States show that the arts and humanities have indeed lost meaning in the eyes of the public there. For example, a 1993 poll by the National Cultural Alliance showed that only 31% of the public regarded their role as "major;" whereas 57% said the role was "minor" and 11% said they played "no role at all." In the wake of four decades of the ColdWar-inspired math and science scare, arts education has particularly suffered. Today, in the United States, arts education at the primary and secondary levels is generally viewed merely as an enhancement to the main curriculum; consequently the arts are the first subjects affected when cutbacks of teachers and resources occur. Exposure to the arts in schools from age 5 through 13 is extremely limited in many if not most urban school

districts (though richer suburban schools sometimes have fully staffed arts programs). At the high-school level (ages 13-17), students are required to take only 1 of the 36 credits in the arts: a mere 2.8% of the curriculum. At the tertiary level, core requirements in the arts exist mainly for liberal arts students, and are often satisfied by one or two survey courses, i.e. 3-6 credits from a total of ca. 124, or 2.4 to 4.8% of the liberal arts curriculum. In colleges of business, engineering, agriculture, and forestry, other students may graduate with no arts courses at all; their limited core requirements in the humanities maybe filled by courses outside the arts. As for the related field of aesthetics, its inclusion in the curriculum is even more haphazard, limited mainly to elective courses at the tertiary level, taught mainly to philosophy majors by philosophers whose experience and knowledge of artistic practices may be extremely limited.

For decades, educational experts in America such Howard Gardner and Charles Fowler, have argued against the deterioration of arts and aesthetics education, with little or no result. In his posthumous *Strong Arts, Strong Schools* (1997), Fowler showed convincingly that learning about the arts helps students with a variety of essential human lessons, including finding out who they are, seeing themselves as part of a larger culture, broadening their perceptions, expanding their abilities to express themselves and communicate, escaping the mundane, developing their imaginations, and evaluating and making judgments. I believe we now have evidence, through the shooting tragedies at Columbine High and other American schools, that we have made a serious mistake in neglecting these essential human values and skills, and that the time is now ripe for a reemphasis in our schools of the arts and aesthetics, so that those values and skills can once again come to the fore of our educational program.

Unfortunately, the delivery system for education in the arts, both in the United States and in many other influential countries, is completely inadequate to the job of improving that education, even if public understanding and support are raised. The problem is that, under the single-disciplinary structure of these educational systems, the arts have come to be represented as highly specialized practices, largely unconnected to each other, to aesthetics, and to the

general curriculum. As we enter the twenty-first century, the time now appears ripe for a reemphasis of the arts in the schools and the life values the arts can teach us. Specialists are trained in college-level departments of music, visual arts (called "art"), drama, and dance, and are hired as single-disciplinary specialists to teach their art forms in the schools, when positions are available. But positions are rarely available for each specialty, and the specialists are not trained to teach about arts outside of their specialty. Most American schools end up with only a music and a visual art specialist, each of whom have very limited contact with the students. While many specialists do an outstanding job of teaching talented students to produce artworks and performances, but the results of their work are not fully shared by general students beyond the elementary years, the very students who arguably need education in the arts as much or more than the talented students. Too, there is little opportunity in the single-disciplinary instruction offered in secondary education to discuss artistic concepts, let alone to allow for the repeated experience and thought that leads to genuine understanding. Repeated calls by single-disciplinary conferences and specialists for increased coverage of their art form or the arts in general fall on generally deaf ears; such coverage would have to come out of the time currently spent on other disciplines.

The situation in colleges and universities is not much better. There, one or two basic courses in the fine arts usually suffice to fill fine arts or humanities distribution requirements, while upper-level courses in arts departments are taken only by students majoring in the disciplines. The relevance of the arts to general education is lost in this hard-boundaried system. Teachers of general subjects rarely have the opportunity themselves to learn about the arts in an interdisciplinary, integrative manner; like everyone else, they usually fill their few arts requirements by choosing among single-disciplinary survey courses, where they learn the history of only one art form. Those college students who are training to be elementary teachers usually have required music and art education courses that supposedly help them make up for the lack of arts instructors at the elementary level, but these courses are too specialized to counter the neglect of the arts with which pre-service teachers are otherwise faced; while those training for secondary level teaching usually receive no preparation at all for teaching about the arts.

As a result, teachers of general subjects for which music and the other arts should be central concerns (especially social studies and language arts teachers) are unable to incorporate them into their teaching; they cannot teach what they themselves have not learned. As for those trained as single-disciplinary arts specialists, they are equally unprepared to teach about the connection of their art form to other arts, other disciplines, and other life activities; instead they are left with formal and stylistic issues that frequently distract attention from the connection of the arts to life. Thus, many arts specialists focus their attention on identifying and teaching students with talent in their disciplines, through the few available electives in band, choir, and studio art, while the relevance of the arts to the Socratic task of understanding oneself, others, and the nature of existence is completely ignored.

Public ignorance of the arts is, of course, harmful to future funding and other support for public programs and education. It is also harmful for our mental and emotional health as individuals and as a society. If we view the arts in the largest sense as anaesthetic realm of sensory imagery, this is an era when the ability to recognize and interpret such imagery is essential to leading a thoughtful, disciplined life. In this highly technological age we have become consumers of sensory imagery in everything that we do, every thought that we have, every decision we make. Indeed, the actual aesthetic function of the human brain in imagining and objectifying experience is now reproducible on a massive scale by machines. The ability to function intelligently and morally in the midst of this computer-driven sensory immersion has become a greater challenge than ever, at least as great as the challenges of understanding modern science and mathematics. Without adequate education in the arts and aesthetics we cannot meet that challenge.

More Hard-Boundaries: The Separation of History, Theory, Philosophy, and Practice in The Arts

One of the worst aspects of specialization in music and arts education is the systematic separation of the teaching of artistic practice and performance from the intellectual teaching of the history, theory, and philosophy of those practices. Separating practical experience from intellectual inquiry in the arts is a serious mistake,

because practical experience of the sensual basis of art is a necessary key for opening the imagination of every student, talented and untalented, to questions about the meaning, purpose, and history of the arts. Separating practice from intellectual inquiry also results in an overly technical approach to making art among the artists and pre-college students - disconnected from questions about what the arts mean to us. At the pre-college level, the separation of practice from intellectual inquiry has led to a singular emphasis on practical issues of getting students "ready" for contests, concerts, and exhibits, and a neglect of philosophical questions and historical information that would add intellectual meaning to the performances. Then at the college level, many arts majors have trouble understanding why difficult and often dry history and theory classes are important to performers and artists at age 18, when they had no importance before.

The separation of experience from intellectual inquiry is only part of the reason we have failed to engage students and the general public in recognizing the importance of the arts to life. An equally important part of the picture is that intellectual inquiry has been further fragmented into separate areas of history, theory, and philosophy. Especially at the college-level, academic study in aesthetics courses (or in philosophy of art - the other common title for aesthetics-related classes) - is completely isolated from the study of history and theory, which are themselves fragmented among the separate art disciplines of drama, music, art (i.e. visual arts), architecture, film and dance. Each of these disciplines and subdisciplines have a tendency to develop their own organizations, journals, curricula and credentials, with the result that the perspectives of the specialists within them become increasingly narrow and parochial as their contacts with those outside their subdiscipline decline. As long as the hard-boundaried paradigm remains unchallenged, there is nothing to stop or even slow the proliferation of subdisciplines and the decline of contact of the irrespective specialists with the outside world.

For aesthetics, the single-disciplinary structure of our educational system has been particularly damaging. Far from its central position in both Kantian and Ancient Greek philosophy and education, aesthetics as an academic discipline is present only as a subdiscipline of philosophy rarely required of any students. This highly

specialized view of aesthetics as separate from history and experience of the arts has produced rigorous philosophical arguments about definitions of artistic concepts, just as specialized historical research about individual art forms and practices has produced a flood of historical knowledge. However, it has also had the effect of separating philosophical inquiry about the arts and aesthetics from education in the history and practice of the arts, to the detriment of philosophy, history and practice; and it has led to the neglect of aesthetic issues and values in the teaching of math, science, business, law, engineering.

The language and concerns of contemporary aesthetic discourse demonstrate the gap that excessive specialization can create between the scholars of a discipline on the one hand and students and the general public on the other. For instance, consider Jerrold Levinson's much reprinted and debated definition of a "work of art:"

X is an artwork+df X is an object that a person or persons, having the appropriate proprietary right over X, nonpassingly intends for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e., regard in anyway (or ways) in which prior artworks are or were correctly (or standardly) regarded.

Philosophers specializing in aesthetics will understand this definition as one of more intricate analytic attempts to identify precisely the necessary and sufficient conditions of a "work of art." However, in terms of making sense of the history and practice of the arts, the definition is almost useless. Certainly, it does nothing to help artists, teachers, or the public to understand what has happened and is happening in the arts and the culture; issues with which we very much need philosophical help.

There are just as many problems on the history side of this fragmented picture. For example, college-level courses in the history and appreciation of the arts generally consist of canonical histories of individual art disciplines: that is, the study of successions of "great" artists and artworks, often with exclusive emphasis on the Western tradition. Relying on canons to teach history in general is problematic, for it encourages students to memorize a traditionally accepted list of names and dates, rather than to attempt to understand historical relationships themselves. The emphasis on rote memorization is undoubtedly why so many students consider history "boring" and are unable to place the Civil War and other central historical

events in the right half-century despite repeated years of lessons on the subject. However, canonical teaching of the arts is even worse, because it leads to an inescapable paradox. On the one hand, there is no point in teaching the history of the arts before students are mature enough to appreciate "greatness," (the usual basis for the canonical status of a work) so pre-college arts education has remained fixated on practice to the exclusion of historical and philosophical inquiry. On the other hand, however, if history and philosophy of the arts are only dealt with later on, the message is that the study and understanding of the arts is not very important, and students lose the opportunity, available in other main stays of the curriculum to reinforce and deepen lessons learned in earlier years.

As a teacher of music history I know from painful experience how much the music-historical canon has lost touch with the reality of students who are being required to learn it. Even today this canon remains exclusively Western, despite the strong influences from Africa, Asia, and Latin America on musical developments throughout the century. The canon includes many names of composers whose music my students will likely never hear outside of a music history class, but it excludes such prominent names as Madonna, Elvis Presley, and John Coltrane, about whom students have many questions. I can add those names and other information to make the history more relevant to my students' concerns, but that is only a piecemeal correction. Again, the root of the problem is the isolation of history from philosophical inquiry: if it were not so isolated, some hard philosophical questions would be asked about the meaning and purpose of the information provided in these text books and conveyed in these survey classes. Actually, students already ask these questions privately; we just don't hear them and we don't provide the answers they need.

A Really Hard Case: Fragmentation in The Musical Field

Of all the arts, music probably suffers most from excessive specialization. Specialization is so advanced in the discipline of music that it is more properly called fragmentation: a fragmentation of the musical field into separate subdisciplines of musicology, ethnomusicology, music theory, composition, music education, musical aesthetics,

music therapy, music psychology, music sociology, popular music, music in general education, music performance, and conducting. Actually, it is difficult to list all the separate subdisciplines that currently fragment the musical field, because there are separate academic societies, journals, and programs for virtually every instrument and musical activity under the sun. Each specialty has a different perspective on what is important in research, education, and practice, with the result that music features more complex specialized methodologies, terminologies, and required courses than typically exist elsewhere in academia, a factor that further limits communication between specialists, their students, and the general public whose support they ultimately need.

Fragmentation also characterizes the curriculum of college-level music departments. Except where the small size of a music department disallows specialization, music departments are generally divided among musicologists, theorists, educators, conductors, composers and performers, all of whom offer separate courses and programs in their specialties. Pre-college education in music rests on specialization as well: music, like the arts, are considered to be under the purview of music and art specialists, who unfortunately may not be available on the teaching staffs of many schools. In fact, there is nothing in the system to limit specialization or its increase, regardless of the harmful extremes of fragmentation that can result. Like other groups, specialists in an area tend to try to maintain or increase the power and position of their specialty, even if that specialty is rendered less important by social or technological change. During the last century, changes in technology and society have altered the nature of musical knowledge, production and distribution. Yet because of the entrenchment of multiple groups of specialists on music faculties, music curricula have changed very little.

Ironically, the problems of fragmentation in our musical field are probably due in part to the comparative strength of general musical education in our past, in contrast with education in the other art-forms. That is, the long entrenchment of music in American education has allowed for longer and more elaborate layers of separate specialties to develop. American musical education goes back to the strong hymn-singing tradition of the colonial period, wherein singing schools and teachers taught parishioners how to sing the hymns of their liturgy without the help of the organs and profes-

sional choirs that had been the mainstay of European church music, at least until sixteenth-century Reformation leaders discouraged their use. Because of the strong hymn-singing tradition, the American colonies had a fairly literate musical culture, in which music was spread through published collections of psalms, and other settings of sacred texts that were learned in singing schools and performed in church. But the education offered in the singing schools was almost entirely practical and performance-oriented; that is, it was designed to produce adequate musical performances, rather than any more general understanding of music, and that focus has set the pattern for American musical education ever since.

By contrast, the scholarly study of music in musicology - which was highly influential on musical education in Europe in the nineteenth century - didn't gain a foothold in the United States until the middle of the twentieth century. A mere nine individuals established the American Musicological Society in 1934. Further, although American musicology grew after World War II, its influence was still limited by the tendency toward hard-boundaried specialization at that time, leading to the fragmentation of musicology into separate camps of history and theory, and the establishment in the 1960s of a separate discipline of music theory. The latter was largely populated by composers seeking patronage from universities after losing audiences to popular music in the first half of the century; once in the university they were assigned basic music theory classes for the teaching of Western tonal harmony. The limited knowledge and focus of most of these composer/theorists and their musicologist colleagues on Western music alone weakened the influence of both subdisciplines and led to the growth of the additional subdiscipline of ethnomusicology, the study of musical cultures outside the Western art music tradition.

With musicology acting as a late-arriving, fragmented influence on American musical education, the way was left clear for music educators to organize and develop their practical focus more effectively, especially after the founding of the Music Educators' National Conference in 1909 (originally called the Music Supervisors' National Conference, with the name change following in 1934) - the largest and most powerful of all arts education organizations. Throughout the twentieth century the MENC has been most success-

ful in promoting the use of large choruses, orchestras, and bands as the primary focus of music education at the secondary level. These large ensembles have been popular with administrators in that they were economical - large groups of students could easily be placed with a single instructor - and they were useful in promoting schools, through performances and contests. Under the large-ensemble model of music education, a single teacher could serve an entire school or even several schools, often teaching many more students at a time than was standard in other classes. Large-ensemble-based music education made it difficult for instructors to go beyond rehearsal and performance of simple music in a few limited genres, but this problem became largely invisible at the secondary level, because those students and teachers who might have preferred a broader form of music education were likely to have already left the system. Thus, the system worked to reproduce itself by encouraging and rewarding students and teachers that liked the large-ensemble-based approach, to the neglect of other musical skills and knowledge at both the K-12 and college levels.

Although choirs were the most common large ensemble in nineteenth century American schools, bands emerged as the dominant force in the twentieth century, in large part due to the use of marching band for the promotion of athletic programs. Unfortunately the increasing dominance of marching bands has drawn energy away from the broader array of musical and artistic traditions towards a singular focus on marching band repertoire, which then became a dominant focus of college-level music study as well; while the connections of music to other social practices and disciplines are completely neglected. Indeed, the dirty secret of many large college music departments is that many if not most music majors are high school band members recruited by means of scholarship money provided by well-funded college athletic programs with the expectation that the recipients will serve the programs' interests. In short, the power of athletics and of habit has kept American schools and colleges mainly in the business of producing bands and band directors, to the neglect of many other more culturally central musical activities and career skills.

The dominance of large bands is not the only fragmenting factor that has served to weaken American musical education. Rather, it

is the combination of all the fragmented perspectives of the various ensemble directors, performers, musicologists, theorists, and music educators that has created a field in which communication is difficult. While musicologists focus on arcane research into obscure facts about obscure music, theorists analyze pitch structures without reference to historical or social context and meaning, music educators perform statistical research about the relative success of educational models and methods, and performers struggle to keep alive traditions of European art music without understanding or teaching about their connections to other popular, American, and world traditions. Given their training and separate perspectives, journals, and conferences, members of these subdisciplines often have little to say to each other, let alone to teachers and students of other disciplines.

The fragmentation of perspectives and approaches in the musical field makes curricular reform very difficult, not only because of the lack of communication among subdisciplines, but also because of the tendency of each subdiscipline to protect its turf rather than to consider the problems and possibilities of education in music as a whole. As a result, American music departments have not kept up with the enormous musical changes in the world in the last half-century, especially the growth in music technology and musical multiculturalism. Our departments are still mainly organized around the studying and performing canonical works of Western art music from the common practice period (c. 1700-1900). The separate subdisciplines of music may not agree about much, but they are united in their conservative, formalistic approach to understanding music primarily as a set of structural relationships. With the rise of non-formalistic postmodern and feminist theoretical approaches in the 1970s, scholars in the literary and visual arts moved away from formalism to explore other, more culturally-connected forms of interpreting and understanding the arts. Those developments in turn have led to a softening of the literary and artistic canons in the direction of including study of non-Western and popular arts. In the music curriculum, though, the stunning growth and fusion of popular musics, world folk and art traditions, and "World beat" have yet to receive appropriate recognition in the American curriculum.

As long as musical education is so fragmented and isolated, it fails to have a real impact on education and life. As Benjamin Willis said back in 1954, we need to find a way to redirect our energies "to the stake of music in education and not to the individual music specialist's stake in education." In my view, that redirection must take account of music's connections to other disciplines and to life in general.

Why The American Goals 2000 Standards Won't Help Music Education

The omission of the arts in 1990 from Education 2000 - the United States' national program designed in the wake of the Carnegie Report in 1984 - was a shock that helped music and other arts educators there realize how badly they had failed to create public understanding for the importance of our fields. In response to this omission, a consortium of arts educators from music, visual arts, dance and drama joined together in 1992 to prepare a set of national standards for teaching the arts that were then incorporated into the final version of Education 2000, the Goals 2000: Educate America Act and passed into law by the United States Congress in 1995. Since 1995, national and state budgets have made funds available for grants to help implement the standards, and arts organizations such as the Getty Education Institute for the Arts and the Music Educators National Conference have actively promoted their use.

At first, the new standards seemed like an extraordinary step forward in arts education. The range of skills and knowledge called for in the standards went far beyond the traditional emphasis on practical skills; in fact, the general goals called for integration of intellectual knowledge in the theory and history of the arts with experiential learning at all grade levels and for special emphasis on interdisciplinary connections among the arts and other disciplines, as the following listing shows:

General Goals of the National Standards for Arts Education (NSAE)

- They [K-12 students] should be able to communicate at a basic level in the four arts disciplines-dance, music, theater, and the visual arts (dance, music, theater, and the visual arts. This includes knowledge and skills in the use of the basic vocabularies, materials, tools, tech-

niques, and intellectual methods of each arts discipline.

- They should be able to communicate proficiently in at least one art form, including the ability to define and solve artistic problems with insight, reason, and technical proficiency.
- They should be able to develop and present basic analyses of works of art from structural, historical, and cultural perspectives, and from combinations of those perspectives. This includes the ability to understand and evaluate work in the various arts disciplines.
- They should have an informed acquaintance with exemplary works of art from a variety of cultures and historical periods, and a basic understanding of historical development in the arts disciplines, across the arts as a whole, and within cultures.
- They should be able to relate various types of arts knowledge and skills within and across the arts disciplines. This includes mixing and matching competencies and understandings in art-making, history and culture, and analysis in any arts-related project.

Unfortunately, despite the integrative interdisciplinary nature of the general goals, the actual breakdown of the general goals into content and achievement standards at each grade level made no allowance for integrative, interdisciplinary implementation. Instead, all responsibilities for teaching the arts were left to single-disciplinary specialists in the various arts disciplines, as if schools commonly have specialists in all four disciplines, and as if students commonly take courses in each of those areas at every level - which is, as discussed earlier, far from the case. In practice, students are unlikely to be exposed to many of the standards, even in the arts that are covered.

For instance, take the nine content standards for music, including the activities of performing, improvising, composing, arranging, reading, notating, listening to, analysing, and evaluating music, as well as understanding relationship between music, the other arts, other disciplines, history, and culture:

Content Standards for Music, NSAE

1. Singing, alone and with others, a varied repertoire of music.
2. Performing on instruments, alone and with others, a varied repertoire of music.
3. Improvising melodies, variations, and accompaniments.

4. Composing and arranging music within specified guidelines
5. Reading and notating music
6. Listening to, analyzing, and describing music
7. Evaluating music and music performances
8. Understanding relationships between music, the other arts, and disciplines outside the arts
9. Understanding music in relation to history and culture

Is the student that fills their high school arts requirement with band going to get instruction in all these areas? It isn't very likely. Chances are, their ensemble experience will only cover content standard #2: "performing on instruments, alone and with others, a varied repertoire of music," and even that is questionable given the frequent absence of solo opportunities and the varied repertoire mentioned in the standard. Think: this student will fulfill their high school arts requirement while achieving none of the standards for the visual arts, drama, and dance, and only part of one of the nine standards in music!

The detailed breakdown of student learning expectations for the content standards shows even more clearly the unlikelihood of their implementation under current conditions. Consider, for example, the student learning expectations for Content Standard #9: Understanding music in relation to history and culture. The expectations that students in grades 9-12 (see below) will be able to "classify by genre or style and by historical period or culture unfamiliar but representative aural examples of music" seems unrealistically high even if music was a regular part of the curriculum (which is far from the case). This is not to say that teaching recognition of styles to middle-schoolers is inherently impossible, but it is highly unlikely under the current large-ensemble dominated curriculum. The fact is, the pragmatic handling of secondary and middle-school musical education through large ensembles has led to a singular focus on learning repertoire reserved for those ensembles, often without consideration of historical and theoretical issues of that repertoire, let alone other genres and styles. The occasional teacher who goes beyond this model exists but is not likely to be encouraged. Teachers who stick to a strict diet of rehearsal and performance, on the other hand, can receive regular administrative, parental and student approval for their tangible results in terms of concert, contest and athletic-event performances.

STUDENT LEARNING EXPECTATIONS FOR MUSIC CONTENT-STANDARD #9: UNDERSTANDING MUSIC IN RELATION TO CULTURE, GRADES 9-12

PROFICIENT

3.2.9. classify by genre or style and by historical period or culture unfamiliar but representative aural examples of music and explain the reasoning behind their classifications

3.2.10. identify sources of American music genres (swing, Broadway musical, blues), trace the evolution of those genres and cite well-known musicians associated with them

3.2.11. identify various roles (entertainer, teacher, transmitter of cultural tradition) that musicians perform, cite representative individuals who have functioned in each role, and describe their activities and achievements

ADVANCED

3.2.12. identify and explain the stylistic features of a given musical work that serve to define its aesthetic tradition and its historical or cultural context

3.2.13. identify and describe music, genres or styles that show the influence of two or more cultural traditions, identify the cultural source of each influence, and trace the historical conditions that produced the synthesis of influences

Because of their weaknesses, the Goals 2000 National Standards for Arts Education are unlikely to result in real improvement in American education on their own. Already, efforts to establish consistent testing for the teaching of these standards in the individual arts disciplines have floundered, because of the differences of what's available from one school to the next. Interdisciplinary testing according to the goals of the general standards would work far better, but there are no plans in the national agency which creates the tests (collectively known as the National Assessment of Educational Progress [NAEP]), to develop a more interdisciplinary approach. Apparently the hard-boundaried paradigm controls the thinking in Washington, D.C., as much as anywhere.

A Better Way: Soft-Boundaried Reforms in Curriculum and Teacher Training for Music and The Other Arts

The fragmentary, over-specialized nature of education in music and the other arts leads to a "vicious cycle," in which inadequate education for one generation leads to more inadequate education for the next. Breaking the cycle will require changes in the structure of the educational delivery system, starting with changes in how future teachers learn their subjects at the college level. In music, that means moving beyond the fragmentary nature of current college level music instruction to a more soft-boundaried, integrative approach in which students learn music history, theory and performance of music of a variety of cultures around the world in context with each other. In terms of the arts in general, it means a modification of the single-disciplinary structure of current arts education at the college level in order to allow for integrative interdisciplinary education in music and all the arts for future primary and secondary teachers.

The paradigm of hard-boundaried specialization must be changed if music is to be represented in our schools as an exciting, influential, and complex medium of communication, instead of the training ground for bands and choirs to which it has in many cases devolved. In my view, the key is a restructuring of the college-level curriculum for the academic side of music - the music history and theory programs - so that students can learn the history and theory of major musical styles in context with each other and with a greater connection to practical application of this knowledge in the classroom and in more specialized applied study. This restructuring would extend the fairly common "comprehensive musicianship" approach of combining theory and history instruction with practice for Western art music to include the study and practice of non-Western and popular musics that are mainly neglected in current education for college music majors.

The following 6-semester plan shows how music history, theory, and practice of music around the world can be integrated and made accessible to non-music students as well as to music majors. It is an intensive, 5-day-a-week program combining music history, the-

ory, and some practice. (It is assumed that applied performance and ensemble courses will remain available for more specialized practical training.) This particular plan is designed for American schools, where, I believe, knowledge of the development of Medieval, Renaissance, Baroque, Classical, Romantic, and Modern Western traditions and their cross-pollination with African, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Native American traditions is still important, along with learning about other prominent world traditions of folk, popular, and art music. In other countries, a similar plan would probably emphasize the development of musical styles within their own traditions, along with study of the cross-pollination of those traditions with those of other cultures, and with the fuller context of musical traditions throughout the world.

A brief look at the plan (see below) shows that there is far more coverage of the history and theory of other major world music traditions than is standard in Western educational systems. And, in addition to the classroom learning, there are weekly practicums which allow for practical application and experience of the multiple music traditions studied, using the contemporary technology that students will encounter in music-related job markets outside the university.

Given a new emphasis on contemporary knowledge and skills, core college music classes such as these could attract many students from other fields that use music, such as business, journalism, engineering, psychology, and electronics. To encourage their involvement and input, any of the last five semesters could be opened to all students, not just music majors, assuming they had the pre-requisite of Semester 1. This would make upper-division music courses available to general students on a similar basis as upper-division courses in English, history, and other subjects of general interest, among which music must be included if it is to be taken seriously. Wider participation of general students in music department course offerings could have the effect of increasing interest and involvement in music of general students during their college years and afterwards, as well as training music majors and professors in how to communicate with those outside of their discipline.

Plan for an Integrative Music Curriculum

Semester 1. History and theory of folk and popular musics around the world including folk songs, spirituals, blues, rock-and-roll, and world beat. Comparison of basic textures, scales and harmonic systems of different world musics, including the major-minor scale system and simple chord progressions of Western tonal harmony.

Practicum: Computer- and keyboard-assisted recognition of folk and popular music styles and forms; exercises in singing and composing in these styles.

Semester 2. History and theory of music to 1600, including ancient and medieval styles in Europe and Asia, and the emergence of European musical styles in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance.

Practicum: Computer- and keyboard-assisted recognition, singing and simple composition exercises of chant, organum, motets, and Renaissance counterpoint.

Semester 3. History and theory of music, 1600-1750, including Baroque European music, and music of the Americas during the first centuries of European settlement.

Practicum: Computer- and keyboard-assisted recognition of Baroque European and some American styles and forms; singing, playing (on keyboard) and composition of basso continuo, monody, fugues, and chorale settings

Semester 4. History, theory, and analysis of classical music, c.1750-1800, including intensive analysis of sonata form, rondo, song form, minuet, and theme-and-variations movements.

Practicum: Computer- and keyboard-assisted recognition, singing, and simple composition exercises in classical styles and forms, chord progressions, and modulations.

Semester 5. History and Theory of Nineteenth-Century Music.

Practicum: Computer- and keyboard-assisted recognition and analysis of nineteenth-century styles and forms; recognition, singing and composition exercises of Romantic-style songs and chamber music.

Semester 6. History and Theory of Twentieth-Century Music, including the global fusions of music in minimalism and World Beat.

Practicum: Computer- and keyboard-assisted recognition of twentieth-century styles; composition exercises in major styles of the century

Given the often limited background and slow progress of students on Western music history and theory as covered in the current curriculum, the expansion of that curriculum to include contemporary non-Western and popular musics may appear unrealistically ambitious. But, as Jerome Bruner has pointed out, the apparent slowness with which students learn may come from teachers assuming a "blank slate" model of education, and failing to recognize and deal with the knowledge and theoretical paradigms that students have formed before they reach the classroom. Following Bruner's suggestion, if we as music instructors recognize and connect with our students' interest and knowledge of popular music, we can do much to improve our students' learning, as well as bringing critical, philosophical questions about how and why any and all musical styles and all elements - not just pitch - work the way they do to the forefront of the classroom. Many instructors may find themselves learning about texture and rhythm from the more sophisticated ears of their students, which may lead to more enlivened analysis and discussion that in turn may influence future K-12 teachers to enrich their curricula with a broader approach than is currently practiced in the schools.

Just as a more integrated college music curriculum can positively influence music education at all levels, so college-level interdisciplinary education in the arts and aesthetics can help to mainstream the music and the other arts into general education, in away that the current single-disciplinary survey and studio classes in individual art forms cannot hope to achieve. The promotion of "discipline-based art education" (DBAE) by the Getty Education Institute in Los Angeles has been a step in the direction of integrative arts education; unfortunately the Getty Institute has had little influence in the field of music. In my view, what is needed is an interdisciplinary-based arts education (IBAE), wherein practice in all of the arts is related to aesthetic principles and cultural history. Interdisciplinary arts education could begin in the earliest grades with discussion and interpretation about the meaning of artistic activities carried on in and out of class, including those of other historical times and cultures. Study and experience of the arts would include many Western and non-Western traditions, as well as cross-disciplinary arts that are presently neglected in arts education. Discussions of the various art traditions would link issues of artistic style to the understand-

ing of the cultures and/or historical periods in which they appeared. Such discussions would not have to exclude popular arts that are enjoyed by the general public, such as television shows and music videos. Instead of alienating students by ignoring or denigrating the artistic experiences that have had the most meaning for them, teachers could draw on those very experiences to engage their interest in the arts of other times and cultures. Knowledge of the enormous variety of ways in which humans express themselves artistically could lead students to a more critical attitude toward the popular arts of their own culture, and a critical understanding of how and why they function so successfully. Such critical attitudes and skills are crucial to the ability to function as a thinking human being in the age of electronic media at which we have now arrived. Perhaps more than any past culture, our society literally requires us to be, as former Labor Secretary Robert Reich has put it, "symbolic analysts," and the arts are the most appropriate place to teach students how to read and interpret the symbols of our complex world.

The integrative, interdisciplinary approach presents difficult new challenges for teachers trained in a single art discipline, because they must learn how to integrate historical and theoretical issues with practice in a variety of art forms and cultures. In addition, general teachers of social studies, language skills, and even science and math must also learn to incorporate relevant knowledge and experience of the arts into their courses. One way to make the transition to a more interdisciplinary style of education is to develop interdisciplinary arts courses at the college level for future elementary/secondary teachers in general education. Such courses may be taught or team-taught by faculty interested and broadly educated enough to act as "interdisciplinary specialists." Interdisciplinary arts courses or minor degree programs should probably be required as a credential for teaching the high-school "fine arts survey" courses as well as for other general subjects - especially language arts and social studies. Interdisciplinary-trained arts teachers could also serve as consultants in their schools for developing special arts-oriented festivals celebrating particular cultures and historical periods, and for engaging with artists and arts activities available in the local community. Such special events and local opportunities should not substitute for regular arts education - as they often do - but they can be a very important part of general education if there is someone with

interdisciplinary arts expertise and interest to help with long-term preparation and integration. Having an arts educator who takes this kind of responsibility for the school can also help administrators, parents, and students recognize the importance of the arts to the overall educational quality at their school, so that cutting funding for arts education may become as unlikely as cutting athletics.

Many music specialists may be uncomfortable with the idea of interdisciplinarity, fearing that it will function to "water down the arts and to lessen the energy of the individual art forms," as Libby Chiu put it during the American debate over the National Standards for Arts Education. Some music educators argue, based on recent research about the "Mozart effect" of music on the intellect, that music should fight for representation apart from the other arts, because it has the best statistics on value for overall education. But this argument is instrumental and ultimately consumeristic; it views music education as serving the purpose of thinking faster, getting better grades, and making more money, rather than serving a broader purpose of enriching understanding and life. Besides, single-disciplinary education is no guarantee of depth, especially when it results in the absence of any coverage at all for some art disciplines.

Single-disciplinary music and other arts specialists also may fear that their jobs will be endangered by the interdisciplinary spread of knowledge and skills. I believe this thinking is short-sighted, like the fear among computer programmers in the 1980s that widespread use of personal computers would put out of business, instead of, (as actually happened), making them even more central to the economy. Similarly, it is far more likely that interdisciplinary, integrative reforms in arts education will raise recognition of the need for arts specialists as the nature and importance of their disciplines are more widely understood.

In my department at the University of Arkansas we have introduced an interdisciplinary course in the arts and aesthetics that is available to all students in fulfillment of core fine arts and humanities requirements, and that we hope to have required for all education majors. In our approach, aesthetics provides a foundation for understanding issues of form, content, style, and meaning in each of the

main art disciplines. The use of aesthetics rather than history as the structural foundation of the course allows for consideration of arts from all cultures and periods. Aesthetic grounding also encourages philosophical discussion of issues of art and aesthetics in contemporary culture, about which students will likely be most interested and aware. One can then extend the excitement of considering contemporary issues to the understanding of other art cultures of the past. The course structure also calls for some single-disciplinary consideration of art forms, so that complex issues of media and style are not ignored. Experiential exercises are used to enhance the understanding of each major art form, giving students the opportunity to relate historical and theoretical concepts to artistic creation or experience.

The course plan appears in the Appendix at the end of this paper. It begins with an opening unit on the arts and aesthetics in general, followed by discussions and experiential exercises in each of the main art forms, starting with drama, in an order that allows for cumulative understanding of how the arts work together as the course progresses. There is necessarily less emphasis here on canonical facts and dates, that often fill the time of arts survey courses without necessarily reaching the hearts of the students. In fact the course forces its instructors to look beyond the traditional academic treatment of the arts - which is not working - to create a new structure. Some terms and canonical figures have to go, but that maybe better than having them stay without being questioned. At the same time, the breadth of the course allows for more consideration of issues of value and meaning in the arts than is possible in single-disciplinary courses. The fact that all this can be achieved with only one three-credit course leaves room in most students' schedules for choosing an additional single-disciplinary course, a choice that can be better made after the interdisciplinary introduction. The course may also help future teachers of fine arts survey courses and all general subjects to incorporate interdisciplinary arts and aesthetics issues into their teaching.

Individual countries, states, and schools can be laboratories in which we try out various interdisciplinary improvements to education in music and the other arts. Through this process of curricular reform, we can and we must find ways to help students and the public bet-

ter appreciate the meaning and importance of music, the arts, and the whole breadth of sensory experience in the world, and prepare them to understand the even more challenging virtual realities of our future.

Our failure to provide integrative, interdisciplinary education in music and all the arts has resulted in the proliferation of disciplinary and subdisciplinary specialists that interact mainly with one other, and the neglect of the arts in general education. Ultimately, this approach leads to isolation and irrelevance. The way out lies in softening the disciplinary boundaries of music and reconnecting with the world.

Appendix

Syllabus: An Interdisciplinary Introduction to the Arts and Aesthetics*

*This course plan is based closely on the syllabus used by Professor Frank Scheide and myself for Humanities 1003 at the University of Arkansas starting in the Fall of 1998. It is assumed that the course plan will vary each time the course is taught depending on the backgrounds and interests of the teachers, the visiting artists, and the arts events available in the community.

UNIT I. Introduction to Aesthetics and the Dramatic Arts

Week 1. Introduction to aesthetic terms and issues

What is meant by art, the arts and aesthetics, and why are they (or aren't they) important to us?

Common classifications of media, disciplines, and forms in the arts
Discussion of formalist, emotivist, functionalist, and transcendentalist aesthetic traditions in arts from around the world

Plato, Aristotle, and the origins of Western aesthetics; mimesis and catharsis in tragedy and comedy

Week 2. Style, Culture, and Meaning in the Arts

Slide show and discussion on style and stylistic changes in Western vs. Eastern art traditions; "high" vs. "low" art forms; media and style in the pictorial arts

Realism and abstraction in Islamic, Byzantine, and Renaissance art
European vs. Chinese landscape painting

Abstraction in twentieth century painting: recent pattern art

Art and the museum (Discuss "museum culture" and its effect on aesthetic theory and learning.)

Experiential Exercise 1: Museum project (Bring a photograph or other representation of an artwork that you admire for display in class, along with a written statement of what you find meaningful about the work, to display alongside the work. Class members will tour and discuss exhibit, including comparison of the aesthetic tastes and perspectives represented.)

Week 3. Introduction to the Dramatic arts

Roots of drama from religious ritual to Greek drama; Plato vs. Aristotle on imitation and catharsis

Dramatic crafts: lighting, scene design, direction, acting, music

Experiential Exercise 2: Class rehearsal and performance of scene from Greek drama

Week 4. Drama Continued

Lecture on Asian dramatic styles, with emphasis on Japanese Kabuki theater

Experiential Exercise 3: Eastern vs. Western acting techniques

Week 5. Dance

Principles and techniques of dance; cross-cultural comparison of African dances and cultures with Western ballet

Experiential Exercise 4: Learning African dance movements and techniques

UNIT II. Visual, Musical, and Environmental Arts

Week 6. Visual arts

Opening hour: Midterm Examination on Unit I

Design as the common aesthetic principle in the visual arts

Media and style; individual style and creative vision

Guest lecture, slide show, and discussion with visiting artist

Week 7. Visual Arts continued.

Development of realism in Western painting, c.1400-1700; Discussion of James Burke's "Masters of Illusion" and John Berger's *Ways of Seeing*

Guest lecture, slide show, and discussion with visiting artist

Experiential Exercise 5: (Create and be prepared to discuss a small sketch or other work of visual art representing something in your environment and write a brief essay discussing the relationship of the abstract to the representational in your work. The medium maybe anything, including collage, sculpture, installation work, etc.)

Week 8. Musical arts

Experiential introduction to the musical elements and their use through humming and dance exercises

Sampling and discussion of musical styles, social function, and expression around the world -- chant, blues, raga, fugue

Week 9. Musical arts continued

Music in the concert hall -- sonata form and motivic manipulation

Music and culture in the twentieth century: jazz, rock, world beat, MTV, Cage and the avant-garde, serialism, minimalism, etc.

Experiential Exercise 6: Desert Island musical excerpts (Present and discuss a 1 minute excerpt of your favorite musical work with an analysis of its stylistic and expressive content, and the relationship of its style to its social function.)

Week 10. Environmental arts

How aesthetics applies to architecture and environmental arts -- designing and understanding the physical environment of a culture; the "sense of place"

Issues of media, technology, geography, and style in the early history of architecture: Egypt, Greece, Rome, China, Islamic, Gothic, Renaissance, and Baroque

Exploring the Ruins of Pompeii to Understand Ancient Roman Culture

Experiential Exercise 7. (Take an architectural tour of assigned sites in your town. Comment on the different styles, materials and histories of the buildings you see, and comment on what they say about the lives and attitudes of their architects and inhabitants.)

Unit 3. The Arts in the Twentieth Century

Week 11. Camera Arts: Photography and Film

Opening hour: Midterm Examination on Unit 2

Is photography an art? What effect has its development had on twentieth-century culture?

History and technology of photography

Experiential Exercise 8. Designing lighting for a photograph or film scene (The visual side of drama involves staging, scenery and, in film, lighting for emotional effect. In this exercise students will place lights to create various effects for a brief movie scene and discuss their intentions and results.)

Week 12. Film

The development of film technology

Editing techniques

Experiential Exercise 9: (In groups of 4-5, students will construct a brief film demonstrating various techniques of editing, after which the films will be shown and discussed with the class.)

Week 13. Shapes of the Present and Future

Installation, Performance and Feminist Art: Judy Chicago's *Dinner Table*

Computer art and virtual reality; aesthetic experience in the future

Week 14. Critics' Circle

In-class discussion and critique of assigned performances from outside class using terms and concepts from the rest of the semester

Week 15. "Bad Art Party"

This week we will end the semester with a more informal gathering at the instructor's home, in which we will share, explain, discuss and laugh at our favorite examples of "bad art," including discussion on what "bad art" means. Also the final take-home exam will be distributed, to be due on the final exam date.

References used in this article can be found in Claire Detels' book, *Soft Boundaries* (1999). Editor's note.

'DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN'? - A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO CLAIRE DETELS' HELSINKI DISCUSSION PAPER

Introduction

In the abstract, a more interdisciplinary orientation to music education is not the kind of proposal that should generate much controversy. After all, music education is already, by its nature, an interdisciplinary affair, drawing from music history, theory, performance, conducting, education, psychology, and much more. However, as Claire Detels' discussion paper helps make clear, interdisciplinarity means many different things to different people: and *what kind of disciplinary alliances need to be cultivated* and to *what ends are questions that are anything but uncontroversial*. Detels advocates disciplinary interactions among the arts, under the guidance of what she calls "aesthetics", and points to a number of problems she believes this will address. I will not speak to most of these issues, because I think many of them, like tension between aesthetics and athletics, are specific to the USA. But I do want to challenge some of Detels' basic assumptions, to question her particular strategies and recommendations, and to raise what I think are some important concerns about our understanding of interdisciplinarity.

I want to begin by saying I agree, and emphatically, with many aspects of Detels' assessment of the problem. Music education's hermetic isolation and inwardness is a concern of long standing for many of us, and softening boundaries, or at least making them more porous and less confining, is an important step in undoing the myopia that too-often characterizes our discipline. As well, I believe strongly in a place of prominence for "the arts" in general education, and in the need to integrate practical experience with intellectual inquiry. However, as my remarks here will make clear, I think Detels' enthusiasm sometimes gets the better of her, causing her to gloss over important considerations, to misinterpret and misrepresent crucial groundwork that has already been done, and to advo-

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cate ends without adequate consideration of means. In her haste to advance her soft-boundaried solution, she fails to grasp fully or represent accurately the vigorous debates already ongoing about the nature of the music education discipline. That is regrettable, because I think she fails to build on what we have learned from past mistakes – to make what she advocates articulate with issues, problems, and discussions on which we have made considerable headway.

Since the focus of this meeting of the May Day group concerns interdisciplinarity, though, it is worth noting that such misunderstandings and shortcomings go with the interdisciplinary turf, so to speak; and I will be surprised if our dialogue with members of Finland's AWE group this week do not present similar challenges, as we attempt to communicate across not just disciplinary, but cultural boundaries as well. Conversing across boundaries and from different epistemological histories is inherently challenging. I would hope, then, that we may be able to use the problems I will discuss here to think more carefully and in a more focused way about what interdisciplinarity entails, what it demands of us, and the kind of changes that may be necessary to begin to effect the kind of meaningful change we all agree needs to happen in music education.

Before proceeding, let's recall what the fifth "regulative ideal" advances. It urges that music educators need more contact with ideas and people in other disciplines, to overcome the narrowness and myopia that comes of isolation. Among the problems that attend the inward focus of music education scholarship and research is a tendency to see the ends of instruction as self-evident givens, and to restrict the range of problems we concern ourselves with to technical matters of how to achieve such ends more efficiently. Contact and interaction with other disciplines would change what we see as problems, as questions worth asking; it would force us to examine the ends and means of musical instruction, and by criteria other than technical efficiency; it would force us to communicate in language other than music-education-speak; and it would force us to explore perspectives other than, and communicate about things beyond, the immediate practical interests of teaching music in schools. Toward these ends, ideal number five advocates communication with others in the arts, but also, notably, in *the sciences*, in *other helping professions*, and with the *general public* as well. Detels' paper focuses

almost exclusively on the first of these, and as a result scratches only the surface of the ways we might benefit from interdisciplinarity . The questions associated with ideal number five also ask specifically *how* the range of knowledge can be broadened. Detel's paper implicitly advances one response: by adding "aesthetics", cultural history, non-Western, and popular music to existing program content. Only I tend to think this kind of "add and stir" approach will accomplish little in itself, and we need to strategize this issue more deeply. The other questions associated with this interdisciplinary ideal ask specifically how to reduce musical mimicry of extant instructional techniques by teachers; how to educate them to be more effective agents of innovation and transformation; and what might be done at the level of accreditation and certification to improve the general education of music teachers. On these pressing issues, Detels' paper is unfortunately silent: "unfortunately", because without focusing on such concrete, practical, and grounded problems, we risk engaging yet again in the kind of inconsequential curriculum restructuring project with which music educators are all too familiar. We need to be wary of structural approaches to problems that require systemic, transformative solutions. We need to ask what we really mean by interdisciplinarity, and how it works, when it does; to examine the distinctive kind of attitudes, beliefs, and practices necessary to sustain it; to ask whether and to what extent we want to try to circumscribe its range of potential outcomes; and to look at the way our discursive practices sustain the status quo and what kind of changes might be required were we to put them to work subversively and transformatively, yet constructively.

Detels has done a good job of describing the basic problem, at least as it manifests itself in the U.S.A. However, I disagree with her proposed solution: in part because it is strongly reminiscent of sincere efforts music education has made without much success in the past, and in greater part because I think it is too modest, attacking symptoms rather than problems. I will spend most of my time here responding to the assumptions and premises on which she says her paper is based, because shaky foundations have a way of compromising the integrity of everything we try to build on them.

Teaching old words new tricks: Can 'the aesthetic' be rehabilitated?

Since one of music education's most noteworthy efforts to break out of conventional ways of thinking and orienting in recent years has involved a careful critique of aesthetic ideologies, I am disappointed that Detels' paper makes so little effort to come to grips with the substance of that critique. I am also a little surprised, because an important part of what precipitated these aesthetic-praxial debates was the very hardening-of-the-boundaries she is so anxious for us to resist. The insularity of aesthetic doctrine, its exclusion of whole ranges of vital musical practice, its failure to accommodate music's inherently social nature, and its unacceptably restricted accounting of the range of the "properly musical" – these are precisely what the controversy is about.² The aesthetic-praxial debate is, in other words, a debate over conceptual, practical, and institutional boundaries; and as I see it, the praxial alternative is decidedly the more open and interdisciplinary of the two, at least as "the aesthetic" has been conceptualized in North American music education for over thirty years. Detels offers some definitions and premises intended to bypass these issues. Unfortunately, however, this makes for some fairly substantial difficulties.

² I HOPE THAT OUR INTERACTIONS WITH RICHARD SHUSTERMAN THIS WEEK MAY HELP US CLARIFY OUR THINKING ON THESE ISSUES, TO THE EXTENT THAT HE CLEARLY BELIEVES THE TERM "AESTHETIC" CAN BE USED IN A PRAGMATIC SENSE THAT AVOIDS THE PROBLEMS I DISCUSS HERE.

I am very disappointed, for instance, to see David Elliott and praxis-oriented philosophers so fundamentally misrepresented – as advocating "doing music rather than studying it." Nothing could be further from the truth: in fact, such reductive, dualistic accounts of music education's options (on which "doing" music on the one hand, and "studying" it on the other, are mutually exclusive and apparently exhaustive of our options) are precisely what praxial accounts are anxious to resist. Detels claims to understand Elliott's concerns, but I am not convinced. Moreover, while Detels is understandably critical of the occasional opacity of analytical aesthetics, she suggests Bennett Reimer and the Getty Institute are somehow "softer" – presumably a laudatory assessment, in light of the centrality of "softness" to her agenda. Only, and importantly, she gives us no real definition of what softness is to mean here – a rather significant omission, one would think. I hope she does not mean to suggest softness is somehow preferable to philosophical rigor, for instance: of that kind of softness, I submit, we in music education need less, not more.

If the idea of "softness" would benefit from further refinement, the paper's "aesthetic" claims beg for considerably more. Because of the immense amount of semantic baggage the word "aesthetic" has accumulated over the years, my personal conviction is that it generates far more confusion than it alleviates – or at least, that has been the case in North American music education. My personal strategy has been to stop using the word.³ I find I speak and think more clearly and am generally understood much better as a result. I find "music philosophy" and "philosophy of art" far more useful, and they keep aesthetic ideology in what I believe is its proper place: as a distinctive subset of broader philosophical inquiry into music and "the arts". Now, Detels and others will no doubt persist in using the word "aesthetic", but I hope they can be persuaded to be more cautious and judicious in their claims for it, more consistent and specific in its use.

³ I AM NOT INSISTING THAT EVERYONE FOLLOW SUIT. I DO SUGGEST THAT OTHERS GIVE IT A TRY: IT CAN BE QUITE REVEALING.

Detels tells us that she wants "aesthetic" to mean simply *the study of perception and judgment in sensory experience and the arts* – or for short, just *making sense of sensory experience*. On its face, this seems reasonable enough. One can stipulate whatever one wants, after all, and I'm not at all inclined to dispute that what words mean is both fluid and to some extent arbitrary. So what should it matter whether we take 'aesthetics' as foundational to the way we teach music and music education? Perhaps nothing, if we can assure the word gets used and understood only in a stipulated sense on which we all agree. However, North American music education's profligate use of the term over the years makes me dubious that such agreement is a realistic expectation.

Why does Detels advocate "aesthetics" when she knows the word is so contentious for some of us? I can only guess, but perhaps she wants us to accept that the term need not be encumbered by its historical affiliations. Like "art" itself, the notion of the aesthetic has evolved significantly over the years; and its various historical entanglements need not encumber its use today. It has moved on, and its use as a kind of catch-all for beauty, sense experience, and artistic judgment has become fairly commonplace. That may be. But I remain unconvinced that the term has shed all vestiges of its idealistic heritage, and is now sufficiently neutral and general to sub-

⁴ FOR INSTANCE, ALTHOUGH DETELS SUGGESTS THAT SHE UNDERSTANDS MUSIC AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE, HER COURSE SYLLABUS IN THE APPENDIX TO HER PAPER MAKES FEW IF ANY REFERENCES TO THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OR SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF ANY OF THE ARTS, LET ALONE MUSIC. MIGHT THIS BE A FUNCTION OF HAVING TAKEN HER ORIENTATION FROM AESTHETICS?

sume any and all reflection on sense-based experience. The word is not nearly as innocuous and pliable as Detels suggests.⁴

Perhaps it is also Detels' conviction that people who are appropriately 'soft-boundaried' should be more open-minded and accommodating about issues like this. Perhaps she believes that strongly defiant stances like that of praxis-based objections to the aesthetic rationale are symptoms of the very disciplinary rigidity she wants to challenge? Perhaps she feels it is not good "interdisciplinary form" to be so rigid and inflexible? Perhaps she feels all this fuss over the little a-word is one of those pointless philosophical issues like the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin, and that those of us who have difficulty accepting the aesthetic as foundational should get over our disciplinary rigidity then, and get on with life?

Because these are important misunderstandings, they probably warrant another attempt to explain. The fundamental issue, of course, is precisely the meaning of the term – and whether it can adequately accommodate things like music's plurality, fluidity, and sociality. Several casual understandings of "aesthetic" are commonplace and reasonable, but don't pack the kind of pedagogical punch advocates of aesthetic-this-and-that generally want to claim for it. One of these is a general concern with beauty. However, the kind of generalized beauty shared by sunsets, hairstyles, interior design, and symphonies turns out to be fairly fickle and insubstantial. Another is concerned with patterns of adornment, dress, or architecture: the kind of cultural stylistic convergences we find convenient to designate as, for example, "a Japanese aesthetic." This is primarily a sociocultural phenomenon, however, and does not implicate the deeper ontological or epistemological claims generally desired by those who advocate grounding music education in aesthetic value.

The aspects of aesthetic foundationalism that are most troublesome can be traced to its roots in the enlightenment project and in German philosophical idealism. In the wake of the demise in earlier forms of authority, the enlightenment project sought to construct new assurances of agreement by analyzing, systematizing, and giving a rational accounting for all human life and meaning. It effectively partitioned human life into various segments, each with its own intellectual norms and assumptions, modes of behaviour, rival

premises, and, often, incompatible attitudes. One of these was, of course, the aesthetic. And yes, it did occupy a place of prominence in Kant's philosophical system, as Detels points out. But the critique of judgment was Kant's third, and it sought to demarcate territory that remained after first reason and then moral ground had been thoroughly charted. So in a sense, aesthetic judgment consisted of leftovers, and to this day, many definitions begin negatively, by stipulating what the aesthetic is not. This leaves those of us in what we have now learned to collectively designate "the arts"⁵ in the awkward position of explaining how, although what we do is not primarily concerned with reason, it is nonetheless mindful in some sense; and how, although what we do is not primarily concerned with morality, aesthetic engagement nonetheless makes us more humane and ethically disposed.⁶ Detels' reference to Columbine High School is, I think illustrative of the very kind of claim impeded by this aesthetic legacy – and I don't think it entirely accidental that her claim seems to require considerably more support than she offers. Since elsewhere I have advocated conceptualizing music as an ethical encounter,⁷ please note that my intent is not to deny the ethical potential of music: my point is, on the contrary, that "aesthetic" theorizing often constitutes a barrier to such claims.

The other aspect of this project, its need to identify new ways to certify authority and enforce agreement, also leaves its substantial mark on the aesthetic. For, starting with none other than Baumgarten himself, the aesthetic judgment – by which he claimed to mean a "lower", sense-based kind of cognitive activity with some, though by no means all, the essential characteristics of knowledge – was conflated with the particular 'sensibilities' and dispositions of the aristocratic classes. In what one writer describes as a "corruption" of its meaning,⁸ Baumgarten brought the aesthetic into a discourse on "taste" (or, roughly, "preference"). The attributes that distinguished people with taste from those without it were, quite simply, the very politeness and restraint presumed characteristic of gentlemen of good breeding. Thus, appreciating right kind of art in the right way became a reliable indication of social status – a useful way of distinguishing 'haves' from 'have-nots'.

I trust all this is well known, but it provides a useful backdrop against which to recall the convictions at the heart of Kantian aes-

⁵ NOTE THAT THE IDEA OF THE ARTS AS A UNIFIED DOMAIN AROSE COEXTENSIVELY WITH THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT BEING SKETCHED HERE. INDEED, ONE OF THE CONSUMING TASKS OF MANY PHILOSOPHERS DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE WAS THE CREATION OF WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED TAXONOMIES OF THE VARIOUS ARTS, ORGANIZED IN TERMS OF ONE SET OF PUTATIVELY COMMON FEATURES, THEN ANOTHER. IT IS FAR FROM COINCIDENTAL THAT THE MOST CONSPICUOUS COMMONALITY AMONG THE ARTS WAS THEIR CONTRAST TO THE EMERGING DOMAIN OF "SCIENCE".

⁶ I NOTE WITH INTEREST DETELS' CLAIM THAT "AESTHETICS" WAS CENTRAL TO ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION. SINCE THE FIELD AS IT IS CONSTITUTED TODAY DID NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE UNTIL THE MID-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, I THINK IT MISLEADING TO SUGGEST THE HELENIC GREEKS ENGAGED IN AESTHETICS PER SE. THEY ENGAGED IN PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATION ABOUT MUSIC, TO BE SURE (EMPHASIS HERE ON THE SPECULATIVE, SINCE WHAT DETELS HAS IN MIND IS NOT THE DOCTRINE OF ETHOS AND ITS IMPORTANT ROLE IN PAIDEIA BUT RATHER THE PYTHAGOREAN-INFLUENCED STUDY OF MATHEMATICAL RELATIONSHIPS – AN UNDERTAKING THAT BORE STRONG RESEMBLANCES TO THE CONTEMPORARY DISCIPLINE OF SO-CALLED MUSIC THEORY, ABOUT WHICH DETELS IS NOT MUCH ENAMORED).

⁷ "MUSIC AS ETHICAL ENCOUNTER", THE CHARLES LEONHARD LECTURE: UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, APRIL

2000. FORTHCOMING IN THE BULLETIN OF THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN MUSIC EDUCATION.

⁸ ROBERT DIXON, *THE BAUMGARTEN CORRUPTION: FROM SENSE TO NONSENSE IN ART AND PHILOSOPHY* (LONDON: PLUTO PRESS, 1995).

⁹ THE PLEASURE THAT ATTENDS AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IS DECIDEDLY NOT SENSUAL, ON KANT'S VIEW ("NOT WHAT GRATIFIES IN SENSATION BUT MERELY WHAT PLEASURES IN FORM"). AESTHETIC GRATIFICATION THUS AMOUNTS TO A KIND OF 'QUICKENING OF COGNITIVE POWERS'.

¹⁰ BOTH REASON AND MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE "INTERESTED", IN THAT IT MATTER WHETHER OR NOT THEIR OBJECTS REALLY EXIST. DISINTERESTEDNESS (OF WHICH 'PSYCHIC DISTANCE' IS A LATER VARIANT) IN EFFECT DEPRIVES AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS OF MORAL OR RATIONAL STANDING BY CLAIMING AUTONOMOUS GROUND FOR THEM.

¹¹ THINGS LIKE CHARM AND EMOTION ARE CONTAMINANTS ON KANT'S VIEW, AND TASTE INFLUENCED BY SENSUAL GRATIFICATION HAS "NOT YET EMERGED FROM BARBARISM." THIS LATTER ASSUMPTION IS TO FIGURE CENTRALLY IN SCHILLER'S "AESTHETIC EDUCATION" PROJECT.

¹² THIS NOTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE IS ONE OF THE MORE TENACIOUS AND PERNICIOUS FEATURES OF AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY. IT FOLLOWS FROM AN ASSUMPTION, AS SHUS-

thetics, of which Detels seems to approve so enthusiastically. Aesthetic judgment was, on his view, rooted in a unique kind of cognitive pleasure that arises from the perception of form.⁹ Despite the purpose-like character of such form, it was ultimately without purpose. Aesthetic judgments were not at all concerned with practical issues, then ("disinterestedness" is the doctrine enshrining this claim¹⁰), and were completely independent of things like charm and emotion. This aesthetic attitude was not cognitively substantial, was strictly separate from practical life with its social, ethical, and political concerns, and could only be tainted by bodily response.¹¹ He went further, of course, contrasting "fine" arts with merely "agreeable" ones – of which music was a prime example in virtue of its sensory superabundance and intrusiveness. Thus, aesthetic experience became a kind of disembodied spiritual affair, an emotional, yet restrained inward response to an 'object' replete with "intrinsic" aesthetic value.¹² Although others from Schiller to Hegel and beyond would make important modifications and revisions to Kant's system, its dualisms, its purported universality, and its abstract, metaphysical character changed little. Despite ambitious, often extravagant claims for aesthetic experience and its putative educational benefits, the alignment of music with feeling rather than reason, with reception rather than production, and with polite restraint rather than sensual indulgence, remained salient features of aesthetically-inspired accounts. The "aesthetic" domain thus emerged as a pleasant, but largely innocuous affair: individual, self-oriented (i.e., "subjective"), autonomous and intrinsically valuable, where no real consequences attended changing one's likes, or perhaps having different ones instead. And as primary purveyors of such experience, the arts became feminized, frivolous, pleasurable adornments – without potency or significance in the real, social world.¹³

My primary objections to this Kantian and post-Kantian notion of the aesthetic, then, are (1) the philosophical idealism in which it is rooted, with its fondness for things cerebral, universal, transcendental, and absolute, and its suspicion of things material, concrete, and contingent; (2) its formalistic underpinnings which conspire to reduce the range of "music" to perceptible patterns of sound, and remove it from the social ecology that produces and sustains it; (3) its concern with receptivity above production, consumption above agency; (4) the over-determined dichotomy between music's sup-

posed insides and outsides, properties musical and the extramusical, where the latter are regarded as musical contaminants; and (5) its neglect of music's inherently social nature, and treatment of "the social" as a kind of contextual envelope into which a "music itself" somehow gets inserted; and (6) its unfortunate conflation with issues of taste and preference.

Now, Detels and others would doubtless be quick to point out that all this was hundreds of years ago, and that things have changed radically since then.¹⁴ And she would be right, of course. Only, I do not believe that claim can be sustained within the particular context of the philosophical literature from which the aesthetic education movement in North American music education has taken its guidance. For each of the concerns to which I just alluded remains conspicuously prominent there.¹⁵ The question, then, is whether, after centuries of use as the label for a particular orientation to art and natural beauty, the word can be effectively rehabilitated and made to serve as the label for inquiry into all those things "the aesthetic" was specifically crafted to exclude. Obviously, I have my doubts.

One of the most ambitious and far-reaching attempts to change the way people understand the nature of aesthetic experience along lines that meet the objections I have been outlining here is in the pragmatic philosophical work of John Dewey. He sought to reconfigure "the esthetic" in ways that would accommodate things, like change, action, agency, and so on, reclaiming for the arts and for music the cognitive and practical import of which they were deprived under the strangle-hold of philosophical idealism. By foregrounding dynamic experience of consummatory quality, and providing accounts of the relevance of such experience to life in general, not just the domain of art, Dewey's version of "esthetic experience" resisted both essentialism and the dualism at the heart of aesthetic theories of Kantian ilk. For him, "esthetic experience" consisted not in an ontological, formally determined class containing some unchanging essence or constellation of essences, but rather was profoundly processual, dynamic and experiential. It was not purely receptive, but consisted in a dialectically reciprocal relation between doing and undergoing, among what we might call making-action, doing-action, and reflecting-action.¹⁶ Nor was he at all inclined to participate in what Shusterman aptly calls 'the drive to aesthetic disembodiment': the

TERMAN OBSERVES, THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC, IDENTIFIABLE FUNCTION WHICH ART PERFORMS BETTER THAN ANYTHING ELSE, IT CAN "ONLY BE DEFENDED AS BEING BEYOND USE AND FUNCTION ALTOGETHER, AS HAVING PURE INTRINSIC VALUE" (9). IN THIS CLAIM TO INTRINSIC VALUE IS BORN THE IDEA THAT INSTRUMENTALITY OR EXTRINSIC VALUE IS A USEFUL WAY TO DISTINGUISH "GENUINE" FROM "LESSER" ART, OR INDEED, FROM NON-ART. THEIR ABUNDANCE OF INSTRUMENTAL OR EXTRINSIC VALUE IS OBVIOUSLY WHAT MAKES POPULAR AND COMMERCIAL MUSICS UNWORTHY.

¹³ THE BREVITY OF THESE REMARKS NECESSITATES SIMPLIFICATION. THE FACT IS, MANY "AESTHETIC" ACCOUNTS MOUNT CONCERTED EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR IT. SCHILLER, FOR INSTANCE, ARGUES THAT MAKING MAN (SIC) AESTHETIC IS A NECESSARY PREDECESSOR TO MAKING HIM MORAL — BASICALLY, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE HELPS CURE THE HUMAN ANIMAL OF HIS BASER (SENSUAL) INSTINCTS AND DESIRES. SIMILARLY, HEGEL IMPUTES TO THE ARTS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ADVANCING HUMANKIND'S EVOLUTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL Muddle HE CALLS "ABSOLUTE IDEA". WHILE EACH OF THESE ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS KANT'S EMPTY FORMALISM, NEITHER QUESTIONS OR DISTURBS ITS IDEALISTIC ROOTS.

¹⁴ TO PUT THIS CLAIM IN AN (INTERESTING, BUT MISLEADING) ANALOGICAL FORM: CRITICIZING AESTHETICS BECAUSE OF THE DURABILITY OF ITS KANTIAN ROOT

IS LIKE DISAVOWING THE WHOLE OF CLASSICAL MUSIC BECAUSE ONE THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF MOZART OR BEETHOVEN HAS BEEN EXCESSIVE. THE ANALOGY IS MISLEADING IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, NOT LEAST IN THAT A MORE PRECISELY PARALLEL ACTION WOULD BE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PARTICULAR CONSTELLATION OF STYLISTIC TENDENCIES AND VALUES UNDER WHICH MOZART AND BEETHOVEN LABOURED CONSTITUTE AN ADEQUATE STANDARD FOR GAUGING THE WORTH OF ALL THE WORLD'S MUSICAL PRACTICES. IN A DIFFERENT THOUGH RELATED VEIN, IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT SINCE THE "AESTHETIC" DOMAIN ORIGINATED AND DEVELOPED COEXTENSIVELY WITH MODERNITY'S PRACTICES OF ART, THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND ITS APPRECIATIVE ATTITUDE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A DISTINCTIVE DOMAIN, BUT SIMPLY AS BI-PRODUCTS OF THE PARTICULAR WAYS THE MODERN IDEA OF ART HAPPENS TO HAVE EVOLVED. TO THIS, SHUSTERMAN COUNTERS THAT GRANTING THIS HISTORICALLY DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP IN NO WAY ENTAILS THAT IT OBTAINS TODAY. SUCH AN INFERENCE, HE ASSERTS, "WOULD BE A RATHER CRUDE COMMISSION OF THE GENETIC FALLACY." RICHARD SHUSTERMAN, *PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS* (CAMBRIDGE: BLACKWELL PUBLISHERS, 1992) 48.

¹⁵ IN LEONARD MEYER'S AND SUZANNE LANGER'S THOUGHT, FOR INSTANCE: VIEWS THAT HAVE BEEN

segregation of corporeal and mental, motivated by a prudish suspicion of the former. And finally, Dewey's accounts allowed that such experience served a wide variety of practical ends, ends that were crucial to its worth and therefore incapable of being dismissed as "merely" utilitarian or instrumental.

Now, if what people generally meant by "aesthetic" or "aesthetics" were something like this, I would have considerably fewer reservations about it than I do.¹⁷ Only, my sense is that Dewey's impressive effort to rehabilitate people's understanding and use of the term did not really succeed; for, in North American music education, many, perhaps most people, persist in thinking of "the aesthetic" as something transcendental, universal, and unchanging – something for which humans are genetically hard-wired and which has existed without variation since the beginnings of humanity. On such a view, the various contradictory historical theories of the aesthetic are all attempts to describe this same substantial thing, and the most adequate understanding is therefore one that succeeds in eclectically combining the partial truths tapped in each. Accordingly, we attempt under the aesthetic rubric to conflate metaphysical and naturalist views, idealism and pragmatism, in ways that become ever more abstract, incoherent, and implausible – to say nothing of their dubious relevance to instructional practice.

But again, one anticipates a response: the task, therefore, should be to reach a more adequate understanding of "aesthetics", not to reject it or ignore it in hopes the confusion will go away. Actually, I agree with this point in part: only, I think a key component in this 'more adequate understanding' is the subsumption of aesthetics under philosophy of art. My reasons in brief are, first, that I am deeply committed to illuminating the distinctive social and corporeal roots of musical meaning and experience, and through them music's political, ethical, and semiological significance – its potency as a means for constructing and sustaining human identity, both individual and collective. And I believe the historical baggage of the term "aesthetic" – the fact most of its history has been devoted to demarcating its territory precisely as "other" to the social, the political, and so on – make it a significant impediment rather than a potential ally in this effort.¹⁸ Second, I think the aesthetic, even construed as "making sense of the sensory," tends to gloss over the uniqueness of the

particular *aisthesis* or sensory/bodily basis of music. Because "aesthetics" almost invariably draws us to the general rather than the particular – to abstract commonalities rather than concrete particularities – it gravitates to the view that aesthetic responsiveness (or in Detels' version, "sensation") is somehow generic across media and across senses. Now, obviously, both similarities and differences can be found between anything and anything else; and which one chooses to emphasize depends upon one's purposes.¹⁹ But I am strongly convinced that music education philosophy has for years occupied itself with the ways in which all the arts are doing basically the same thing, and that the need to understand the specifically-musical has, as a result, reached a state of considerable urgency.

MORE OR LESS UNCRITICALLY IMPORTED INTO MUSIC EDUCATION PHILOSOPHY.

¹⁶ TECHNE, PRAXIS, AND THEORIA?

¹⁷ WHICH IS STILL NOT TO SAY I WOULD ENDORSE AN 'AESTHETIC' ACCOUNT AS THE DEFINITIVE AND EXHAUSTIVE EXPLANATION OF MUSICAL VALUE. I ONLY MEAN TO SAY THAT DEWEY'S, BECAUSE OF ITS EXPERIENTIAL BASE AND PRAGMATIC COMMITMENTS, SEEMS TO ME TO AVOID MANY (THOUGH NOT ALL) THE HAZARDS OF AESTHETIC ORIENTATIONS.

¹⁸ ACTUALLY, TO ANTICIPATE A POINT I WILL MAKE LATER, I THINK THIS MAY ACCOUNT IN PART FOR DETELS' ATTRACTION TO "AESTHETICS" RATHER THAN THINGS LIKE CULTURAL STUDIES, FEMINISM, AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM FOR HER PARTICULAR VERSION OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY. PERHAPS PART OF WHAT LEADS DETELS TO CONFINE HER INTERDISCIPLINARITY TO "THE ARTS" IS THE AVERSION OF "THE AESTHETIC" TO THE SOCIAL AND THE POLITICAL?

¹⁹ SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES ARE NOT ONTOLOGICAL OR A PRIORI GIVEN, BUT HUMAN CONSTRUCTIONS. THE IMPORTANT QUESTION THEN IS NOT WHETHER SIMILARITIES OR DIFFERENCES EXIST, OR WHICH ARE MORE IMPORTANT, BUT WHAT ARE THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EMPHASIZING ONE OVER THE OTHER. ON THE POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF STRESSING SIMILARITIES OVER DIFFERENCES, PUTATIVE COMMONALITIES OVER DISTINCTIONS, CONSULT GAYS, BLACKS, THE ELDERLY, OR WOMEN.

Last, a very concrete practical or curricular concern, one I have brought to Detels' attention before, and whose potential severity can be substantiated by the first-hand experience of many: that the "aesthetic" commonality of all the arts will be used by decision-makers to justify the replacement of expensive musical instruction with the least expensive alternative – which might well be (utterly "soft-boundaried") aesthetic education. This very practical issue needs to be a significant concern of all aesthetically-oriented claims, even those of Deweyian lineage.

As a postscript to these remarks on concerns "aesthetic", note that even those in music education who advocate an aesthetic rationale are generally careful to distinguish between aesthetic education (or music's role therein) and "aesthetics" or the "discipline of aesthetics" *per se*. The reason, I gather, is precisely that these latter terms designate territory staked out by professional philosophers, whose interests are often, as Detels observes, more analytic than practical or educational. Reimer, for instance, makes a point of distinguishing between aesthetic education as he intends it and instruction that "involves teaching the concepts of that branch of philosophy called aesthetics."²⁰ Thus the development of aesthetic sensitivity, even for those who regard it as a foundational educational enterprise does not – or need not – involve studying aesthetics *per se*, or learning about that discipline.

²⁰ 1989, XII.

²¹ WRITING DIASPORA: TACTICS OF INTERVENTION IN CULTURAL STUDIES (BLOOMINGTON: INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1993) 17. THE TERM "STRATEGY" HAS A PARTICULAR MEANING HERE, TAKEN FROM MICHEL DE CERTEU, STRATEGIES, AS HE UNDERSTANDS THEM, BELONG TO "AN ECONOMY OF THE PROPER PLACE" AND TO THOSE "COMMITTED TO THE BUILDING, GROWTH, AND FORTIFICATION OF A FIELD". TACTICS, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS A "CALCULATED ACTION DETERMINED BY THE ABSENCE OF A PROPER LOCUS" (CHOW, 16). THE PROBLEM WITH WHICH CHOW IS CONCERNED, AND WHICH I AM SUGGESTING HAS RELEVANCE FOR DETEL'S ARGUMENT AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND SOFT-BOUNDEDNESS, IS "HOW DO WE PREVENT WHAT BEGIN AS TACTICS – THAT WHICH IS 'WITHOUT ANY BASE WHERE IT COULD STOCKPILE ITS WINNINGS' – FROM TURNING INTO A SOLIDLY FENCED-OFF FIELD . . ." (17).

²² HERE I ALLUDE TO AUDRE LORD'S WELL-KNOWN PHRASE.

Softness and hardness, boundaries open and closed: Rearranging furniture or knocking down walls?

I suggested earlier that I would have liked to have seen a closer analysis of the notion of "softness" in Detel's paper, especially as it seems, at least potentially, to be conceived as 'other' to things like depth, rigor, expertise, and so on – things music education has labored long and hard to achieve. Similarly, we need to think carefully about the relationships among specialization, disciplinarity, and elitism, lest we conclude wrongly that specialization is an inherent evil: that it inevitably compromises the ability to communicate, or that interdisciplinarity is simply anti-disciplinarity. In other words, we need to be clear what we are advocating in the name of interdisciplinarity, and why. I am specifically concerned about the potential for interdisciplinary intentions simply to recreate disciplinary configurations in different places. And I sometimes felt as I read Detel's paper that what was being advanced was not interdisciplinarity, but *another discipline*; not soft boundaries, but *different* boundaries. In another context, Rey Chow makes the important point that too often, when we "create new 'solidarities' whose ideological premises remain unquestioned," such new solidarities are "informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense."²¹ This is a point we would do well to think about. The profound power of the institutional apparatus to reduce genuine efforts for change to simply another version of "the same" is indeed cause for concern; and if we fail to problematize our role in that apparatus, the likelihood that "the master's tools" will simply reproduce "the master's house" is significant.²²

What I am suggesting is that what we presumably hope interdisciplinarity to accomplish is a change in the focus of our attention, but one made possible by a decentering of professional identity, where the ethical ground between categories is itself opened up, and where possibilities for new alignments and configurations – different kinds of discourse – are nurtured not just as temporary but as ongoing possibilities. Forgoing the comfort of familiar patterns of compartmentalization (whether institutional or conceptual) makes possible other kinds of linkages, other patterns of meaning. The challenge confronting any effort to soften boundaries, especially within the

context of the modern university, is to identify tactics that prevent new ground from becoming just another site for disciplinary rigor mortis to set in. I believe part of what we should have learned from previous failures to achieve the kind of realignments Detels advocates – and we have "been there" before, in the comprehensive musicianship and aesthetic education movements – is the extent of institutional resistance to such efforts. What is required, then, is the kind of understanding of soft-boundedness that will enable us to nurture it: to assure that it remains "soft bounded", though not at the expense of the kinds of gains that are only achieved through expertise.

Part of what troubles me about what Detels proposes is that she seems to have a such a clear notion of what such conceptual/disciplinary realignments should look like and what their outcome should be. And it strikes me that a more radical commitment to interdisciplinarity and soft-boundedness would be inclined to leave more open the particular configurations in which they might be expected to manifest themselves – to focus more upon the kinds of attitudes and dispositions that need to be nurtured in order to achieve durable and meaningful systemic change. What is at issue, then, is whether music-plus-integrated-arts-through-aesthetics is a genuinely interdisciplinary vision or whether it is sufficiently encumbered in convention that it might be better described as an alternative intra-disciplinary configuration.

If I may resort to some rhetorical questions to make the point, Why these particular disciplines? Is this new, or a different version of the old? Is it conceivable that the "strong historical and social ties" among the arts to which Detels rightly alludes have as much to do with the marginal status assigned such "impractical" and "irrational" undertakings in the technical-rational world as with their putative aesthetic commonality? If so, we should be wary of the possibility that what is proposed, albeit for entirely altruistic reasons, might achieve no more than bringing together all the feminized marginals in one place (a bigger, more populous ghetto?), leaving untouched and unaltered the kinds of discursive and institutional practices that make them marginal in the first place. Adding "the arts" to a disciplinary matrix and stirring will not necessarily advance interdisciplinary openness, and borders drawn in different places will be borders all the same.

²³ WHICH ABILITY IS HELD TO BE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT IN OUR EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, ALTHOUGH DETELS' DOES NOT TELL US WHY.

²⁴ PART OF WHAT IS "LOST" BY RENOUNCING 'HARD-BOUNDEDNESS' IS THE CERTAINTY THAT COMES OF PRESUMED TRANSCENDENTAL COGNITIVE PRIVILEGE. IT MEANS GIVING UP WHAT RORTY CALLS THE NEED TO "SEE THINGS STEADILY AND SEE THEM WHOLE." ACKNOWLEDGING THE SITUATEDNESS AND CONTINGENCY OF KNOWLEDGE, AND THE POTENTIAL VALIDITY OF ALTERNATIVE ORIENTATIONS - ATTRIBUTES, I BELIEVE, OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY - ESTABLISHES FOR PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY AND DEBATE A CRUCIAL AND ONGOING ROLE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. AS SHUSTERMAN OBSERVES, ONCE WE GIVE UP FOUNDATIONALIST VIEWS OF THEORY AND SEE IT AS SOMETHING "WHOSE ENCOUNTER WITH CHANGING SITUATIONS HAS NECESSITATED CONTINUAL ADJUSTMENT, CLARIFICATION, JUSTIFICATION, AND IMPROVEMENT; THEN THEORY'S ABIDING ROLE AS CRITICAL REFLECTION ON PRACTICE IS SECURE AND SEEMINGLY INELIMINABLE" (61). I HASTEN TO ADD THAT THE NATURE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY IS SUCH THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE DEBATE TAKE PLACE ON THE MORAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL GROUNDS REJECTED AND EXCLUDED BY MODERNIST AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY.

To return to my previous question, then, Why these particular disciplines? There are, already on the academic stage, areas that have made remarkable strides toward true and durable interdisciplinarity, to which it seems music education might well turn for invigorating alliances. I think specifically of cultural studies, women's and feminist studies, critical theory, and the like. Others, like cognitive science, are also forging links and attempting fascinating dialogues between disciplinary areas like philosophy, computer science, psychology, and sociology. The point, I take it, is to develop communication and dialogue with areas that may help us understand ourselves better and keep us growing as a profession.

Why soft-boundedness? And what practical outcomes should we expect of it for our students? If I understand Detels' argument, her answers are two. First is a Schillerian argument to the effect that it will make us more humane: that aesthetic sensitivity will pave the way for moral dispositions, helping reduce the kind of catastrophic failings of human empathy that lead to events like the shootings at Columbine High. And second is a claim to what is sometimes characterized as imagic literacy: the ability to "read and interpret the symbols of our complex world," as Detels puts it.²³ These are bold claims, but there is little in her arguments to theorize the linkage between the kind of study she advocates and these putative benefits. I suspect that mounting a convincing case would require a fairly ambitious revision of "aesthetics" as most people understand it.

Conclusions

One may well advocate interdisciplinarity (as I do) and yet question Detels' specific version of it (as I do, as well). Where boundaries are porous and permeable, they are likely to be contested as well. In fact, since soft-boundedness can manifest itself in any number of ways, ongoing critical debate is to be expected.²⁴ Hence, I hope the criticisms I have expressed here will not be mistaken for a conservative defense of the status quo, but accepted as part of an important debate about which bounds require softening, to what end, and how best to do it. A more integrated and less fragmented postsecondary music curriculum is a significant part of what Detels is advocating. On that issue she takes her place in a long line of others already on record as sharing that concern. However, I am neither so inclined

to be dismissive of the educational value of making music – even in large ensembles – as Detels appears, nor am I as confident that studying aesthetics and integrating arts instruction are the only or the best way forward for music education.

The hard-boundedness that Detels wants to change is indeed a significant problem for music education. We who make that field our professional "home" do need to work to make its boundaries more supple, and its members better informed by exciting developments in other fields – not just in "the arts" but beyond. One of the primary ends toward which this effort might be devoted is, I believe, the transformation of music education into a more multifaceted and inclusive discipline, one committed to the improvement of musical instruction with genuinely educational intent wherever that occurs. For this to happen, the current (hard-bounded?) equation of music education with status-quo-public-school-music-teaching would need to be subjected to serious scrutiny. Among the purposes for softening boundaries is, as I see it, the reconstruction of identity.²⁵ Music educators need to extend what "we" refers to, to make "us" more inclusive of "them", such that music education concerns musical instruction, inclusively and comprehensively: music teaching and learning, wherever and whenever it occurs, not just in state-supported primary and secondary schools. This will clearly require dialogue across disciplinary lines, and for that to succeed we need to strategize interdisciplinarity carefully.

²⁵ AS RORTY WOULD HAVE IT, LEARNING TO SEE OURSELVES AND OUR ENDEAVORS THROUGH CONTINUALLY RENEWED 'ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES', USING 'ALTERNATIVE VOCABULARIES' AS INSTRUMENTS TO DELIBERATELY EFFECT CHANGE.

However, our shared commitment to music education means disciplinary lines should not be effaced altogether. Interdisciplinarity is not anti-disciplinarity. We need to recognize that disciplines serve very real human needs and interests; that they do not inevitably entail fragmentation or inability to communicate; and that high degrees of specialization have important benefits as well as potential disadvantages. For interdisciplinarity to benefit music education, we need to think carefully about the kinds of dispositions it requires in order to flourish, and how current institutional configurations and professional habits impede or suppress them. Creating interdisciplinary dispositions entails nurturing attitudes that are not just tolerant of disciplinary interactions and excursions but see them as an essential part of our professional life. This would contrast starkly with the current state of affairs, in which our discursive categories

and the epistemological space they circumscribe are utterly clear, and unequivocally "right", and about which the only pertinent questions concern how to accomplish more efficiently what we are doing already. To commit to interdisciplinarity as I want to conceive it requires, to appropriate a vivid phrase from Rorty, learning to live the kind of life "that seeks to extend its own boundaries rather than to find its center."²⁶ It is not just about moving boundaries, but about reconceptualizing what boundaries mean and understanding how they work both to enable and to constrain inquiry. It entails learning not just to tolerate or accept the uncertainty and fluidity of a disciplinary knowledge for which there can be no "all" and whose construction is ever ongoing, but to savor the ethical space those realizations open up, capitalizing upon its potential to transform and vitalize our professional identity. In the end, then, I am less concerned about which disciplines we enter into dialogue with than the act of dialogical exchange itself, and the kind of questions it offers to open for consideration.

²⁶ RICHARD RORTY, "FREUD AND MORAL REFLECTION" IN J.H. SMITH AND W. KERRIGAN (EDS), PRAGMATISM'S FREUD (BALTIMORE: JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1986) 11.

etels shows well the enormity of the problem but underestimates, I think, the enormity of the challenge. For, affecting the kind of change that is required here will require challenging the profession's most fundamental premises and most cherished foundational assumptions, learning to speak across and beyond the ways we currently find comfortable and secure. And although I think alliances with the "other arts" through discourses guided by theoretical or philosophical inquiry²⁷ can play a constructive role in all this, the strong social and historical links among them to which Detels alludes may mean that other disciplines, further removed, offer more radical conceptual realignments – if that is what is wanted from interdisciplinarity, and I hope it is.

²⁷ NOTE THAT I USE PHILOSOPHY, RATHER THAN "AESTHETICS".

Last, I want to comment Detels' claim that specialization and fragmentation are to blame for flagging support for the arts, because of the gap they create between specialists and the general public. I am not convinced that such problems are inherent in specialization, and I believe the reasons for the problem are more complex than she suggests. Among these are narrow and rigid conceptualizations of musical experience and curriculum (often undergirded, note, by "aesthetic" ideological convictions). Equally significant obstacles are the value systems and epistemological politics of school cultures, to

which vital practices must conform if they are to claim educational validity in technocratic society. Given obstacles of such magnitude and intransigence I am not convinced the curriculum Detels outlines is capable of closing the gap. What it proposes still seems to me to situate students on the outside looking in (albeit appreciatively) on someone else's practice – instead of immersing them in authentic, meaningful, productive action. This latter kind of practical, down-to-earth engagement is what praxis-based pedagogy advocates: not "doing instead of studying" music, but mindful, productive agency, sensitive to a broad range of contextually-relevant concerns, and linked to real, embodied experience in the here-and-now world.²⁸ This kind of experience is important not just because it offers to bridge a communication gap (though I do think it better suited to this challenge than the study of aesthetics) but because the practical know-how at its heart constitutes a way of knowing and being-in-the-world unlike any other; one that is being rendered ever-more marginal by the ascendancy of technical rationality; and whose need in contemporary society is, as a result, more urgent than ever.

²⁸ THESE CHARACTERISTICS SUGGEST POTENTIALLY BENEFICIAL 'INTERDISCIPLINARY' ALLIANCES BETWEEN MUSIC AND OTHER AREAS OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE – ALLIANCES WHOSE PRIMARY CONCERN IS TO PROTECT SUCH KNOWLEDGE FROM THE ENCROACHMENTS OF TECHNICAL RATIONALITY.

Tiivistelmä

TRANSLATED
BY HEIDI
WESTERLUND.

Yhdyn monelta osin Claire Detelsin esittämään kritiikkiin jonka mukaan kapea-alaisuus ja joustamattomuus alalla synnyttää ongelmia ja kannatan hänen esittämänsä pehmeiden rajojen käsitettä. Tarve laajentaa eri alojen välistä vuorovaikutusta musiikkikasvatuksessa on todellakin yksi MayDay-ryhmään sitoutuvien perustavia ajatuksia. Alan joustamattomuus saa musiikkikasvattajat pitämään musiikin opetuksen tuotoksia itsestään selvinä ja näkemään sen ensisijaisena missiona hioa välineitä näiden tuotosten mukaisiksi: tämä "kuinka" orientaatio on räätälöity status quon vahvistamiseksi ja ylläpitämiseksi ja sitä kehitetään suuntaan jota kutsun tässä nimellä "music-education-speak".

Epäilemättä Pohjois-Amerikassa musiikkikasvatuksen tulee murtautua ulos kehittämistään alan rajoista. Olen kuitenkin vakavasti epäluuloinen Detelsin esityksen erityiskohdista. Kyseenalaista on edustaako muotoilu "musiikki ja muut taiteet ja estetiikka" tietä eteenpäin vai paluuta menneisiin ajatuksiin ja strategioihin. Väitän, että ilman tarkkaa ja kriittistä teoretisointia voimme onnistua vain luomaan erilaisia rajoja, ei pehmeämpiä sellaisia. Näin ollen tavoitteeni kohti eri alojen välistä vuorovaikutusta voi olla kunnianhimoisempi ja potentiaalisesti epävakavampi kuin Detelsin esille tuomat.

Tässä esseessä tuon esille perusteet omalle epäilykselleni, että "estetiikka" voisi tulla elvytetyksi tavalla, jolla Detels ilmeisesti haluaa meidän uskovan sen tapahtuvan. Viittaa tässä erityisesti vaikeuteen saada sana edustamaan asioita, jotka se on historiallisesti luotu sulkemaan pois. Näkemykseni on, että Detels esittää Elliottin ja muiden kehittämän praksiksen idean vakavasti väärin. Olen huolissani myös siitä, että kritisismi oman alan rajoista johtaa toimintaan alaa vastaan, sillä todellinen eri tieteen- ja taiteenalojen välinen vuorovaikutus voi onnistua vain jos ala on olemassa. Kysymykset, jotka jätän lukijoille, koskevat seuraavia seikkoja: mitä rajoja haluamme pehmentää, miksi, ja kuinka ja millä tavoin varmistamme, että alojen väliset dispositiot tulevat oman ammatillisen identiteettimme merkittäviksi ja kestäviksi piirteiksi - sellaisiksi että uudelleen hahmotetut näkymät eivät muodostu juuri sellaisiksi tekijöiksi jotka saavat alan kuolemaan.

C H A R I T Y B E G I N S A T H O M E : D I S C O U R S E A M O N G T E A C H E R S O F M U S I C

While reading Claire Detels' *Soft Boundaries*, I was struck by how we had come to many similar realizations (especially concerning music theory), though from completely different directions. Of course, that made it quite difficult in preparing my address. Every time I believed I had thought of something she hadn't, I would say, "Aha!" only to find it on the next page. While that aspect was mildly frustrating, my excitement began to grow nonetheless; if there are two of us thinking along the same lines, there are probably more. That I don't know who they are is one indication of why Professor Detels felt compelled to write such a book.

Is the traditional model of music theory instruction such a sacred cow that challenging it must occur behind closed office doors? Should music education majors study as much or more ethnomusicology as educational psychology? As much Pestalozzi as Maslow? It will be difficult for us to partake in meaningful discourse with other disciplines if we can't talk to each other about these types of questions. The theme of my time as provocateur is, Charity begins at home: discourse between music teachers. In order to begin, I must approach my topic by telling you something of my own situation. I relate this to you because it provides for you a real life example of how critical theory might work for you.

I am a music education generalist, somewhat rare these days in the US. As such I have no particular sub-specialty within music education. When I taught public school, I taught vocal, instrumental, and general music to kindergarten through twelfth grade, seeing all of those grade levels each and every day. When I began my doctoral work, a professor told me that I could not continue as generalist, that I must choose a specialty of either instrumental, choral, or general music. The reason given was that I would never get a job at the university level as a generalist. I ignored the advice though I found the comment interesting for its broad assumptions.

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USA

ubsequently, I was hired at a university precisely because I was a generalist. I replaced a retiree who had created a unique position over a number of years. I was to wear the hats of three areas: music education, music technology, and music theory, all of these at both the undergraduate and masters level (my university does not have a doctoral program in music education). Though I was to teach a music fundamentals class, my primary responsibility in theory would be the second year ear-training class. I was told I could teach the class any way I wanted, and was encouraged to experiment. I would like to mention here that our department has an excellent and extraordinarily collegial faculty, and an atmosphere that is conducive to experimentation.

The first use of critical theory was to problematize the current situation. I had realized during my own undergraduate years that traditional ear training bore little or no relationship to the ear skills of real music. I thought back to that undergraduate ear training and asked an important question, "Did that type of ear training transfer into real musical skills or musical connections?" The undergraduate ear training I endured was a rigorous mastery approach and a fine example of the traditional method, including various forms of musical (I use the term loosely) dictation and singing out of a book of short examples. I had to answer my question negatively, and when I asked the same of a number of colleagues the answer was, "not really."

As an undergraduate I easily and quickly passed all the ear training tests while I watched many of my friends languish and fail; some of them changed majors because they couldn't pass theory due to problems with the ear training. I recalled that those who passed the dictation and so-called sight singing tests passed them quickly. Most of the rest of the students did not improve a great deal—an interesting realization. What enabled a certain few to pass the tests and to pass them so quickly? The answer, I theorized, was that those who passed the tests were probably not enabled by the twice weekly drills, but because they already had the ability or skills to pass them and the drills may only have served to sharpen already held skills. Interesting again! It was time for some informal classroom research.

I gave three rounds of typical interval, melodic, and harmonic dictation tests to my sophomore ear training class. I carefully observed student behavior during the tests. From the scores and the observations I found three trends: 1) The students hated the tests. While I don't have research to prove it, that reaction is probably not unusual. 2) Certain students easily passed the tests while others did not improve at all over the course of the three rounds. This is important because it replicates the aforementioned situation. 3) The people who passed the test were humming the tune or the intervals softly (as I had done in the same situation).

This led to my first Action Ideal: Since students who can vocally reproduce the dictation examples pass the tests easily, then time would be better spent helping everyone to do the same. As a result of that early questioning, I began to experiment vigorously with my ideas. What is the usual percentage of accuracy that you are happy with from an a capella singing test? I'm only happy with 95-100% and the failure rate is almost nonexistent. In fact, after two semesters, my sophomore students are singing and aurally transposing one- to four-part pieces using note names and with or without the benefit of standard notation. Rather than being the ear training, dictation tests are only given at the end of the training to prove that it worked. It's a successful beginning, but only a beginning. I would add that about 50 percent of ear training time is spent on focused listening to music for purposes relevant to the course.

I have been head of music theory for the last two years and have been applying the same types of questioning, thinking, and experimentation in the teaching of music theory and harmony. I have far to go, but I find that by taking advantage of big-picture interrelationships and avoiding reductionism, I have been able to teach material in minutes that used to take hours. By shortening my talking time during a class and increasing emphasis on in-class group work and exercises where I can provide immediate feedback, a greater number of students have a far better grasp of the material. The average grade on most of my exams is a B, and my students will vouch for the fact that the tests are not easy. I have extremely low rates of absenteeism and failure within my music theory courses, not because the expectations are lower, but because students are helped in meeting expectations.

These results are real, but they are not miraculous. They have occurred because of constant review and evaluation of what I'm doing, daily formative evaluation of classroom success, careful interpretation of students' evaluations of my teaching, regular theoretical discourse with fellow faculty members, and a willingness to question the ways and whys of music theory and its pedagogy as traditionally practiced.

Axiomatic thinking

As Detels has pointed out, there are numerous philosophical and pedagogical problems creating the system of hard boundaries. In, with, and under these problems are myriad intricacies of thought and process which allow hard boundary thinking to feed upon itself, creating an endless loop of self-replication and making change difficult. One of these is the failure to recognize fallacious axioms that have stunted our collective growth.

An axiom is an idea that is widely accepted as truth. There are two difficulties in dealing with an axiom that is false. The first is that it generally survives as an unspoken entity, and is therefore not dealt with face to face. Second, to recognize an axiom at all requires being able to see the big picture. When music teachers don't see, or worse, ignore fallacious axioms (or just don't think), they misuse philosophies as recipe book methods (as sometimes happens with practitioners of the Kodaly and Suzuki approaches), or allow themselves to be lured into pseudo-methods by charlatans on a quest for fame or funding. Teacher trainers who are so sure that theirs is the only method may squash any sign of dissent in their students, who quickly realize that they don't have to think if they use the recipe.

In my opinion, the devotion to what Regelski correctly labels as "brand-name methods (1998)," and the failure to recognize fallacious axioms that undergird them, are the two major enabling factors of teachers' uncritical mimicry of their own teachers' techniques. Further, these traditions are passed from one generation to the next with little or no thought of their efficacy, spawning an ever-growing community of ignorance. As Detels (1999) points out, in music theory there is a tradition of approaching music almost exclusively from the vantage of the written score. James Mursell warned of the same

thing when he said, "The score...is an extraordinarily ingenious and serviceable symbolic scheme. But it reveals exceedingly little about the essential nature of music, and the less we permit its conventions to become the categories of our musical thought the better and more accurate that thought is apt to be (1964, 254)." Yet, the axiomatic thinking of heavy reliance on scores continues.

To illustrate this, I would like to point out just a few of the fallacious axioms on which many in the field of music apparently operate. One can undoubtedly think of others.

The advocacy axiom – One of the most astonishing currently accepted truths in music education, at least in the United States, is the idea that you need to convince people that they need music. Those who consider advocacy the main mission of music education are anxious to clutch at any straw to support their cause. A case in point is the so-called 15-minute Mozart IQ effect. Entire organizations' websites were dedicated to "see, we've been telling you this all along..." pages. Those have quietly faded away since the research was discredited (thinking people didn't believe it in the first place). Obviously, the motive behind the advocacy movement is to convince people they need music teachers, and why would you need to do that if such a thing were self-evident?

Penultimate whole axiom – There is an underlying axiom that one can define a "whole" of something, i.e., a whole era, a whole culture. The problem with this is that every "whole" is a part of something larger, of a continuum. One symphony is but a snapshot of one moment of the musical life of one composer, who is part of a larger picture, and so forth. In fact, there is no penultimate whole for human beings until the frontier of human experience is exhausted, and even that is part of a larger story.

The smaller, simpler axiom – This axiom purports that as you continue to reduce something to smaller component parts, the simpler those parts are – for example, the idea that the cell of a muscle is far less complex than the muscle itself. Actually, physiologists would tell you that nothing is further from the truth, that no level of physiological process is more or less complex than another. The difference between sciences and music theory is that our theoreticians seem

unable to grasp the notion that smaller is not less complex, but actually more problematic and inexorably more difficult to understand in terms of real music.

One of the biggest ironies in musical education, especially in music theory, is that we don't approach teaching music in the same way we approach music itself! If you were to give a private instrumental student a new repertoire work, would you approach the piece by saying, "Now, go through this piece, and only play the note A when it occurs on a semi-quaver?" Of course not, you would ask the student to play through the entire piece. If we approach real music from the top down, why do we approach music theory from the bottom up?

The way to defeat that axiom is to understand what "simple" really means in the context of learning, which is, "easily understood," or "quickly grasped." In order to grasp something quickly, there has to be a mental construct within a person that allows recognition; that construct is called musical experience. In tandem with experience is musical understanding. As defined by Leonhard, musical understanding is the "ability to bring accumulated musical learning to bear on the solution of musical problems (1972, 133)." Such a definition has nothing to do with separate structural elements or how to arrange them but with music in its full range of context. It is necessary that we debunk any fallacious axiom that we can. We cannot allow the pull of tradition to bind our hands. Question the tradition. As Richard Bernstein wrote regarding a position of Gadamer, "It is not *sufficient* to give a justification that directs us to tradition. What is required is a form of argumentation that seeks to warrant what is valid in this tradition (1983, 155)."

Addressing Action Ideal No. 5

I would like to address the questions of Ideal No. 5, after which I will offer a conceptual course of action.

To answer questions a and b concerning the how the range of knowledge can be broadened and from what disciplines we should draw, I suggest looking at it from another perspective. In order to avoid limiting individuals to crossing only certain disciplinary boundaries, I advocate drawing from various disciplines as they relate to music or

a work of music by virtue of what I call *Realms of Experience*, which are levels of human interaction. I see five Realms of Experience, all from which humans draw musical inspiration and meaning. These should not be seen as a hierarchy, rather, each realm gains or diminishes in importance depending on the situation. They are:

- Human experience – the organic experience of being a human
- Cultural experience – experience arising out of a cultural identity, or perhaps a world region
- Social experience – experience arising from social systems within a culture
- Interpersonal experience – experience arising from the interaction of individuals
- Inner personal experience – individual experience of a deeply personal nature

While music can be seen as drawing meaning and inspiration from all five realms, other disciplines may relate to music by virtue of one to three realms. For example, geography might indirectly relate to a type of music or musical work by virtue of either human or cultural experience. A culture's surrounding geographical characteristics determine the availability of certain raw materials for the creation of various types of instruments, or the development of different types of rituals of which music may be a part. Mathematics would probably not relate to music through inner personal experience, though poetry could. This approach is highly theoretical and I leave it to interested individuals to further explore what I believe are highly contextual and flexible possibilities for using Realms of Experience as a means by which to relate to other disciplines.

As to question d, I have one suggestion at this time. Education students in the United States are often required to complete a number of teacher training courses from a university's department or school of education. In the state of Illinois, these courses are often mandated by a state legislative agency and make up a significant portion of a student's teacher training. The problem with this training, at least in my experience, is that these classes consistently force arts education students to attempt to fit our round peg into the sciences' square hole, thereby producing gaps of common understand-

ing. This is counter-productive and I advocate substituting classes taught by arts professors that would help rather than hinder these future teachers' understanding of the nature of arts education and the importance of curricular planning.

Question c consists of three sub questions: 1) *To what extent can we free music teachers from uncritically mimicking their own teachers' techniques?* 2) *How can we free music teachers from uncritically mimicking their own teachers' techniques,* and, 3) *How can we free music teachers to develop rational reflective and effective personal teaching approaches based on new evidence, rather than on tradition alone?* I wish to answer each sub question separately in order to draw a distinction. If we first deal with how to free music teachers from uncritical mimicry of their own teachers' techniques, then the extent to which it could occur will be clearer.

Students usually recognize unsatisfactory teaching when they experience it because they can compare it to good teaching they have experienced. Unfortunately, for classes such as music theory, especially the ear training portion, inadequate may be the only model to which they're ever exposed, as the traditional model has been emulated for generations. It is difficult to think critically about something one doesn't understand. Due to the hard boundary thinking that occurs in the field of music, students who can't make the necessary musical and cognitive connections themselves will only preserve the current situation. If they're not able to imagine a way out, teachers will generally fall back on the model they know, even when they're critically aware it's not working (persistence of the traditional method of ear training should be proof enough of that).

If change must occur first at the teacher trainee level (those emulating the model) then I fear it's not possible or it would have happened by now. It follows, then, that it is the model that must change. The liberation of rational, reflective and effective teaching must happen first with those of us who educate teachers and it has to happen in all of our courses, not those in teacher certification alone.

Re-modeling: a conceptual course of action

One of the qualities that attracted me to the MayDay Group is the willingness of its leadership and its most active members to attempt to break free of the accepted way of thinking about musical learning and teaching. Such a departure takes thought, argument, and courage. Since it seems that students are destined to teach as they are taught, we teacher trainers must change the way we teach. We must re-model ourselves. No more "do as I say, not as I do"; they probably won't remember what you say. That is the central tenet of re-modeling.

I do not advocate tearing away complete curricula and starting totally from scratch. I am not calling for mass meetings of teachers toiling for hours to create new curricula for goals they cannot yet fully comprehend. Neither do I favor an additive process, whereby you keep doing everything that you're doing now and try to add more without undergoing any analysis of interrelationships or even considering a new topic's importance to your students. Such approaches are doomed to fail like the comprehensive musicianship movement of decades ago, or the multi-cultural movement of the 1980s. Why is it that we always see the pendulum when it is the furthest to the left or right when it balances at the center two times as often?

Instead, I would like for you to consider a means to the end that is gradual, long term, reflective, and formatively evaluative. You must be willing to experiment and to rethink the importance of each concept that you teach. Re-modeling, then, is

- A process by which lead teachers engage in purposeful, ongoing analysis and necessary alteration of what and how they teach (especially in light of recent writings in Critical Theory and Music Education).
- The purposeful open modeling of that process to the students.
- A model by which music and the other arts are treated and taught as the fluid, changing entities they are.

To that end, and I offer the following experimental model for approaching the arts, especially music, in a classroom situation.

What I have to offer should not be thought of as a method or a strict artificial sequence. If that's what you're looking for there are enough of those already on the market from which you may take your pick. Instead, think of it as a praxial-experiential continuum of meaningful interactions on a number of levels between you and your students, between your students and each other, between the whole group and music, and so forth. I hesitate to use the word "experiential" here because in some contexts it has a connotation of fuzzy incoherence and may conjure up notions of "feel good" activities that have no apparent connection to any musical reality. What I'm referring to has more to do with a Deweyan sense of continuity of experience – every experience living on in further experiences (Dewey, 1938).

identify for you five overall processes in the continuum. The word "process" in this context implies something ongoing or organic – an active rather than passive state.

Approach - In this process of the continuum you identify that which will be taught and evaluate why, practicing immanent critique and formulating action ideals (I refer you to numerous recent articles and papers on Critical Theory and music by Tom Regelski for a clearer understanding of those issues). It is crucial that the teacher go through this for every aspect of the curriculum, constantly reevaluating. In classroom practice it means that the teacher introduces the topic by informing the students of what is being studied, why it's being studied, and how it relates to their musical lives. Avoid teaching topics in terms of what you might see as natural musical consequence in and of themselves. As Leonard Meyer noted, "it is always possible that what is natural....may become culturally overlaid and hence inoperative (1956, 56).

In the university classroom that also includes relating to them something of the approach process that you are going through. I have been practicing this openness of process with students in all my classes. The first time it occurs with new students (especially graduate students) they are shocked and amazed to say the least. As the semester continues they become involved in the story of how their class is taught. Some individuals especially interested in the process even have questions for me in the hallway. The success of engaging in this process is reflected on my students' written evaluations of

my teaching with comments like, "He really tries to make the class meaningful."

Explore - In this process you explore the music in as rich a context as possible, listening, performing, discussing, and drawing information and perspectives from the field of music and outside the field of music, including the students' experience and knowledge from outside the class. It is important to help the students realize as many relationships as you can. In regard to fields or disciplines from which to draw I point again to my previously stated idea of Realms of Experience. The exploration process could complete itself during one class period or could take two or more class periods. Creative library projects and group projects make excellent exploration activities.

Synthesize - During the exploration process you should help students begin to develop a cohesive sense of the topic they're studying. In short, with your guidance they should begin to synthesize related information into a conceptual framework.

Reflect - The first person who should be reflective is the teacher. Analyze the first three processes of the continuum, consider how the processes unfolded. Review with the students what was gained through their work and proceed to carry out more exploration work to solidify important relationships for the students. This is the best time for a carefully constructed test. Evaluate success in meeting action ideals. Technically speaking, reflection should occur at all points on the continuum.

Extend - This process continues the reflective activity and leads the students to the next approach process.

have found that one of the most useful aspects of this continuum is that you can actually enter it at any point necessary for student understanding. If you are constantly performing critical evaluation of the ongoing situation in your classroom, you are aware that students may bring enough of their own knowledge and experience into the room to jump to different points on the continuum, or even make the leap to another important topic.

As a teacher you must be ready for this as it can happen within a space of a very few minutes, or even a few seconds. If you simply cover textbook material or slavishly follow one of the marketed recipes for teaching, you will either not recognize that such an important event has taken place, or you will feel compelled to ignore it so you can get on with the methodical mixing of your poison (i.e., "That's very interesting Anna, but let's get back to the exercise!").

As you become accustomed to planning this type of teaching, you will be able to layer multiple related topics, or *streams*, which move along the continuum at different rates. *Multi-streaming* is useful for any age or topic, but necessary for performance groups if you wish to do more than simply rehearse by authoritarian rule. This type of teaching requires a lot of work, but is rewarding in terms of student involvement, interest, and success, and the robustness of information it allows. I remind you again that you cannot simply "Jump Right In" to quote another's title. You cannot change everything at once.

You will likely not have time for too much research outside your classroom, so it must become your laboratory. This summer I received a \$5,000 grant to purchase a variety of MIDI wind and percussion instruments. I will use them for action research in the undergraduate instrumental methods course I teach. My students will learn how to use the instruments as one possible means of creating small alternative instrumental ensembles in their future schools in order to reach a greater number of students. They will be able to create ensembles of many types using the same instruments along with the experience and ideas their future students will bring. Included in the research proposal is a cost-free workshop for public school teachers in my area in order to share the insights we gain.

I'll offer one last example. In my music theory class this last semester, we invested a considerable amount of ear training and written class time over the course of several weeks watching a videodisc of a Metropolitan Opera performance of *Das Rheingold* and *Die Walkyrie*. We discussed numerous aspects of the work, the composer, the opera, the story and its performance. The students seemed to enjoy it all, but one moment stands out in my mind. At the moment in *Die Walkyrie* when Brünnhilde hands the fractured sword Nothung to

Sieglinde, the excitement on the stage, the emotion of the moment, and Jessye Norman's powerful voice ascending over the whole scene elicited a simultaneous audible gasp from nearly the entire class. One student said quietly, "Oh my God." Seeing it as a moment of synthesis, I asked the class if they'd like to see that scene again; they broke into spontaneous applause. A room full of nineteen-year olds applauding Wagnerian opera at nine-o'clock in the morning is a rather interesting phenomenon.

I have shared my personal perspective with you and have given you a sample of the type of transition you will need to undergo if you are interested. We still have a long way to go and years of change ahead. You need not go it alone, though. There are at least two of us out there and I suspect more. Join me in what Michael Young calls the "Curriculum of the Future" (1998) by working across our boundaries of specialization toward curricular principles of "breadth and flexibility, connections between both core and specialist studies and general (academic) and applied (vocational) studies, and... a clear sense of the purpose of the curriculum as a whole (1998, 79)," especially the music curriculum. It's time we started talking to one another.

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Tiivistelmä

TRANSLATED
BY HEIDI
WESTERLUND.

Yhä lisääntyvä, kaventava erikoistuminen ja rajat musiikin muo-
dollisessa opiskelussa ovat olleet mahdollisia sen vuoksi, että vääriä
aksiomeja, joiden varassa monet kentällä toimivat, ei havaita, sekä
siksi että toimintaa ruokkii yksilöiden kuuluisuuden ja rahoituksen
tarve. Väitän, että tällä dynamiikalla on epäedullinen ja monimut-
kainen rooli siinä prosessissa jonka tuloksena opiskelijat "epäkriit-
tisesti matkivat" omien opettajiensa tekniikoita. Tarkastelen tätä
monimutkaista aiheverkostoa tavoitteenani identifioida yleisiä tee-
moja. Tarkastelen MayDay ryhmän Ideaalin No. 5 ajatuksia ehdot-
tamalla "uudelleen mallintamista" käsitteellisenä toimenpiteenä.

NATURALIZING PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION

1. During the last decades, a growing distress has risen concerning the way analytic philosophers have outlooked important educational questions. However, the alternatives offered have not proved to be that promising, either. On one hand, the postmodernist or "postpositivist"¹ approaches have introduced epistemological problems with their relativist and/or politicist dispositions; on the other hand, the "historicists"² have uncovered matters mostly of academic interest.

From the educational standpoint, the disenchantment to the postmodern strategies makes perfect sense. Much of Western educational thought is still more or less based on the ideas of Enlightenment, which did not consider education as a multivaluate web of discourses, but as a rational enterprise aiming for the common good. Even if the ideals of rationality have been repeatedly shown the door in the postmodern debates, they keep coming back, because our educational system is still thoroughly based on modern ideas.³

It seems to me that many of the present problems in the philosophy of music education reflect these more general-level dilemmas in educational thought. Partly because of this, we still lack a way of philosophizing, which could provide a sound basis for a *pedagogical* line of thinking of music education. By "pedagogical" I do not just mean that this philosophy would deal with music in connection to instructional matters. Rather, I would welcome a more systematic viewpoint concerning the ways musical situations can be transformed into educative experiences (see also Väkevä 2000). However, I am ready to admit that this approach can no more (solely) lean on Enlightenment ideals. We need a position strong enough to cope with the postmodern world of constant change, but still preserve the gist of modern educational thinking.

2. My thesis is that this kind of a position has already been suggested, although practically neglected for decades. It can be traced back over a century to the philosophy of John Dewey. A similar notion has been recently proposed by Jerome A. Popp who, following the developments of several scholars in the fields of contemporary

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¹ I USE THE TERM "POSTPOSITIVIST" HERE IN A VERY GENERAL MANNER, AS REFERRING TO A DIVERSITY OF POSITIONS WHICH SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S HAVE TRIED TO FORMULATE OPTIONS FOR (1) POSITIVIST-FOUNDATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY, (2) REFERENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, AND (3) ATOMISTIC-REDUCTIONISTIC ONTOLOGY. (SEE E.G., LAUDAN 1996, CH. 1; MURPHY 1997, CH. 1; POPP 1998, CH. 1.)

² BY "HISTORICISTS" I REFER TO THOSE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHERS WHO ARE MORE INTO SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS AND REEVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS OF AUTHORITIES OF EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT THAN INTO ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTS, OR INTO POST-

MODERN DECONSTRUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL IDEALS.

³ FOR INSTANCE, ONE OF THE MOST VISIBLE NEW RATIONALISTS IN THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD, HARVEY SIEGEL (E.G., 1988), HAS TRIED TO SAVE THE ENLIGHTENMENT IDEALS BY CONNECTING THE EDUCATIONAL VALUES OF RATIONALITY WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL ABILITIES.

⁴ POPP (1998, 45FF., 71-76) DOES NOT SHARE THE VIEW OF "REDUCTIONIST" NATURALISTS WHO WANT TO ELIMINATE NON-SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS FROM PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY OF KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN THINKING. RATHER, REFERRING TO HIS APPROACH AS "TRADITIONAL" NATURALISM, HE URGES US TO REINVIGORATE THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL PREMISES OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY BY COMBINING THE NATURALISTIC BOTTOM-UP POSITION OF THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE WITH SOCIOCULTURAL-HISTORICAL TOP-DOWN APPROACHES OF THE HUMANITIES. A SIMILAR KIND OF AN APPROACH HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY JEROME BRUNER (1990), WHO WANTS TO WITHHOLD CULTURAL ANALYSIS AS PART OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN EDUCATION.

epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., Kitcher 1992; Stich 1990, Laudan 1996), puts forth a Deweyan "naturalized" program in educational philosophy as an alternative to what he calls "empiricist" and "relativist" approaches.⁴

A new line of discussion of Dewey's work has appeared in contemporary general philosophy (e.g., Stuhr 1993), as well as in the philosophy of education (e.g., Garrison 1993). This discussion seems to emerge from the heart of the current philosophical situation, as more and more scholars pay attention to the affinities between pragmatic and postanalytic ideas. There has also appeared a tendency to revitalize pragmatic ideas in the contemporary philosophy of music education. Probably more than others, the praxial philosophers of music education have connected pragmatists' notions of meaning and action to the views emerging from the "new" philosophical discourse of music.

I am not claiming that the praxial philosophies merely present us pragmatic ideas in new clothes. However, I do think that there can be found a pragmatic rationale, at times explicit but often implicit, behind many of the central ideas developed within praxial discourse. Furthermore, it appears to me that this pragmatic potential could be explicated and put into use in formulation of a general pragmatic-pedagogical view on philosophy of music education. I also think that Dewey's visions could provide a conceptual frame of reference upon which this view can be reflected.

What, then, could be the arguments in favor of adopting a Deweyan pragmatic naturalist approach in music education? Do we really have a need for a naturalized program in order to formulate philosophical standpoints of what appears to be a culture-relative and practical ingredient of human life? Surely, as Scruton (1999, 16-17) puts it, "music is not a natural kind", but a matter of human contribution?

Our philosophical approach can be only as strong as its epistemological footing. Even if we do not accept the traditional foundational terms, it is evident that – unless we subscribe to cultural relativism – *some* kind of justification is needed for *some* kind of general and acceptable scheme of how we can know and become knowledgeable. One problem with contemporary naturalism is that there is no such

view as *the* naturalist epistemology, even if there are similarities between its different subbranches (Laudan 1996, 155).⁵ In order to choose from these, we could follow the way of pragmatists. We could begin by weighing the options at hand and see where they lead us in theoretical as well as practical terms. However, this analysis must wait for another occasion.⁶ Here a heuristic lookout must suffice.

3. In Claire Detels' study paper for the present colloquium (Detels 2000), the integration problem of the Ideal No 5 is formulated as a concern for how to soften the boundaries between music education and other disciplines. Detels' commentary centers on this problem from the standpoint of interdisciplinary education in arts, with an eye for aesthetics and aesthetic education as the foundation links between various art subjects.⁷ Detels argues that more than just presenting our pupils musical things to do, we should teach them "how and why we hear, feel, think and create in music and other sensory experiences" (ibid.). Moreover, all arts should be seen as presenting us "communally shared creative responses to human experience" (ibid.). The communality of these responses should guarantee that our work is truly general music education.

Intended or not, Detels' arguments bring back certain central themes of Dewey's aesthetics. These themes hold certain epistemological underpinnings, which could illuminate the need of a naturalist position in understanding how we can be knowledgeable in music. The suggested position reminds us that the common substance of the arts is not to be found in artistic objects (or events), but within experience.⁸ We do not just *experience* things that we hold as art; at root, art is *experiencing*, an ideal way of transforming our relationships with natural environment into relationships possessing cultural significance.

For Dewey, the aspect of what Detels calls "sensory imagery" is always present in (a)esthetic experience, including the experiences which involve art objects (see also Holder 1993; Jackson 1998, 27-28).⁹ However, these sensory images do not represent any transcendental forms of any ideal (or symbolic) order; at root, they express the dynamics of our corporeal embeddedness in the physiological-natural environment, what Dewey calls the "enduring background of nature and human life" (LW 10, 241). This background works as the

⁵ ONE OF THESE SIMILARITIES IS THE CONCEPTION, ACCORDING WHICH THERE IS NO SUPER- OR EXTRANATURAL A PRIORI, IN WHICH OUR GRASP OF THE WORLD (AND OURSELVES WITHIN IT) IS BASED; ALL PROBLEMS, PHILOSOPHICAL AND OTHER, ARE EMPIRICAL (MÄÄTTÄNEN 1995). HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT ENTAIL A REDUCTIONIST EPISTEMOLOGY: PRAGMATIC NATURALIST APPROACH HAS TO BE DEVELOPMENTAL (OR GENETIC), BUT NOT NECESSARILY ELIMINATIVE (SEE PIHLSTÖM 1995).

⁶ WHEN THE TIME IS RIPE FOR THIS KIND OF AN ANALYSIS, I THINK THAT ONE OF THE BASIC CHOICES MUST BE MADE BETWEEN A REDUCTIONIST AND TRADITIONAL NATURALISM. DO WE ACCEPT DIFFERENT EPISTEMOLOGICALLY JUSTIFIED LEVELS OF EXPLANATION, A CHOICE, WHICH MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT TO RELATIVISTS' DIFFICULT CLAIMS FOR THE EQUALITY OF DIFFERENT WORLD-VIEWS, OR DO WE SETTLE FOR SOME KIND OF COMMON-SENSE NATURALIST FOUNDATIONALISM, WHICH OBTAINS A BASIC TRUST TO THE NATURAL PROCESSES, BY WHICH WE COME TO JUSTIFIED BELIEFS OF THE NATURE, AS WELL AS A BASIC TRUST TO THE SUCCESSFULNESS OF SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY (THIS KIND OF A NATURALISM IS SUGGESTED E.G., BY LAMMENRANTA [1993]). IN THE FIELD OF MUSIC EDUCATION, THE CHOICE HOLDS EVIDENT IMPLICATIONS TO THE WAY WE CONCEIVE MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AND MAKE OUR DECISIONS ABOUT THE PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF OUR TEACHING. FOR INSTANCE, CAN WE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF MUSIC AS SUCH? IS THERE MUSIC AS SUCH, OR

DO WE CONSTRUCT MUSIC IN OUR COGNITIVE PROCESSES? IF SO, IS MUSICAL MEANING NOT SUBJECTIVE? IF THIS IS SO, HOW CAN WE EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENT CULTURALLY SHARED WAYS OF PERCEIVING MUSICALLY INTENDED SOUND? DO THE MUSICS OF THE WORLD HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON INDEPENDENTLY OF OUR CULTURE-SPECIFIC WAYS OF DISCUSSING ABOUT THEM? SHOULD WE AIM FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS KIND, OR SETTLE FOR SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN MUSIC? IF WE DO NOT WANT TO RESTRICT OURSELVES TO EDIFYING DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHAT WE COULD MEAN BY DISCUSSING ABOUT MUSIC AND MUSIC EDUCATION, WE REALLY NEED A CONVINCING EPISTEMOLOGY OF BOTH.

⁷ DETELS DOES NOT REFER TO "AESTHETICS" IN THE SENSE OF 18TH CENTURY-ORIGINATED AESTHETICS OF TRANSCENDENTAL BEAUTY, BUT AS THE KANTIAN "EXPERIENTIAL AND INTELLECTUAL KEY" TO THE SENSORY REALM.

⁸ TO DEWEY (SEE E.G., LW 10, 25; LW 13, 17-30), EXPERIENCE IS NOT ABOUT A PERCEIVING SUBJECT EXPERIENCING THE WORLD. RATHER, THE TERM COVERS THE ORGANIC WHOLE OF TRANSACTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL ORGANISM AND ITS ENVIRONMENT. TO SEE EXPERIENCE AS TRANSACTIONAL IS TO EXAMINE IT FROM A HOLISTIC POINT OF VIEW, AS A SYSTEM OF NUMEROUS INTERAC-

material basis for all signification and thus should be conceived as the only plausible starting-point (though by no means an end) for naturalist explanations of musical experiencing.

According to Dewey, artistic form is developed within natural experiential relations, as the work of art is developed as *an* experience (see LW 10, chs. 2 and 6). This involves signification¹⁰, transformation of the things-at-hand into things-of-purpose. Because the basic *telos* of all experiencing is signification, art, as experience, is always about more than what Details calls "sharing the expressive aspect of life through the perceivable media". Artistic-(a)esthetic experience is an active cultural relationship where we try to grasp the full meaning of our encounters with the things within our life-world in relation to our pragmatic purposes. This also means that such experiencing is always situational, or contextual, and the context partly determines how we use art to transform our life-world into one of significance. In other words, although there is a general (maybe even universal, but *not* transcendental) (a)esthetic aspect in our dealings with art, we always experience the latter within our more or less differentiated life-practices, and this necessarily affects the ways our experiences evolve.

thus, we end us with a picture of art situated at the crossroads of subjective (basically corporeal) and sociocultural (or sociopragmatic) realms of experience. This implies a multileveled concept of experiencing. Following Määttänen (1993, 51) and Dewey (LW 1, 208), we could talk about experience as being "laminated" of layers or "plateaus", which possess increasing complexity and which are mediated by signification.¹¹ Art objects, like other objects that hold significance for us, enter into our life at the threshold of the transformation process. This process helps us to grasp the situations we are embedded in and turn them into assets of meaningful living. The latter indicates here more than finding a purpose for life: basically, it refers to the naturally developed and self-evolving program, which helps us to recreate our lives on individual, as well as on social level. Another term for this program is *culture*: following Dewey (see LW 1, 361-364), as well as certain contemporary cultural psychologists (see Boesch 1991; Fuhrer 1993; Lang 1993), we could say that human experience is a means of actualizing the potentials of our natural environment into the means of living, in which the way we

are situated within the natural system is transformed into ways for inhabiting it within the cultural system(s).

This discussion takes us to the heart of Deweyan naturalist epistemology. For Dewey, to really experience is to *make* things significant, which is the same as to *know* them and more than to just *feel*, or *share* them (however, the feeling is also preserved throughout the experience). This, in turn, means that there is an artistic, as well as (a)esthetic side in all signification. Art does not merely imitate life or vice versa: art is situated at the center of living meaningfully. Art is experience at its most constructive mode. In our artistic dealings we do not just produce and behold the expressive, or intrinsic qualities of what are culturally held as objects of art, but construct the work of art as *an* experience, which educates us in the basic terms of our experiencing. In a very basic sense, an artistic experience is an educative experience (see Jackson 1998, 5-6).

To Dewey, the crux of all experiencing is found in the way we deal with everyday problems, as they present themselves in different guises in different situations. It is a matter of *inquiry* (understood again in Deweyan way)¹² to sort out these problems in a way which can possess more or less (a)esthetic quality. The logic of "art-centered (a)esthetic experiences"¹³ does not differ from the logic of other experiences. It has to do with the way the terms of inquiry are fulfilled, and the way they "prepare [us] for later experiences of a deeper and more expansive quality" (LW 13, 28). Thus, also in all (a)esthetic experiencing, a process takes place, in which some indeterminate situation is transformed into a determinate situation (LW 12, 108). This process is going on continuously, as "our bodies are...solving endless problems of their...sustained existence" (Ryan 1995, 28). It is based on a constant interaction between reflecting agents and their environmental conditions where alternating phases of doing and undergoing produce cognitive results guiding future action. In the realm of cultural life (the third "plateau"), this process of signifying is utilized in the service of social ends. Put in combined Deweyan and Heideggerian terms, as cultural beings we formulate meaning in order to cope with the nature, as well as to understand our being-in-the-world in the shared, sociocultural realm where we find ourselves as selves.¹⁴ Art is no exception in this respect: at root, we practice and enjoy art in order to understand and live meaningfully.

TIONS, WHERE NO CLEAR LINE CAN BE DRAWN BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OBJECT, AGENT AND FIELD OF ACTION, KNOWER AND THE KNOWN. THE TERM "TRANSACTIONAL" IS USED BY DEWEY AND BENTLEY (IN DEWEY LW 16, 66-68, 96-97) AS AN INDICATION OF THE PROCEDURE OF EXAMINING EPISTEMOLOGICAL CATEGORIES HOLISTICALLY. THE PURPOSE OF THE TERM IS TO REMIND THAT ALL HUMAN ACTION TAKES PLACE "AS PROCESSES OF THE FULL SITUATION OF ORGANISM-ENVIRONMENT" (IBID. 97). SEE (IBID. 101) FOR A HISTORY OF THIS CONCEPT IN DEWEY'S THOUGHT.

⁹ IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT FOR DEWEY, THE REALM OF (A)ESTHETIC IS MUCH LARGER THAN THE REALM OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCING. IN *EXPERIENCE AND NATURE* (LW 1, 26), DEWEY MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARTISTIC AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE; THEIR DIFFERENCE IS "NOT ONE OF WORDS BUT OF OBJECTS". HOWEVER, I THINK THAT HE MAKES THIS DISTINCTION NOT BECAUSE HE HOLDS ARTISTIC AND (A)ESTHETIC AS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT KINDS OF EXPERIENCES, BUT BECAUSE HE WANTS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE REALM OF (A)ESTHETIC DOES NOT JUST CONCERN PERCEPTION OF (FINE) ART. FOR DEWEY, THERE IS AN ARTISTIC ASPECT IN EVERY EXPERIENCE TAKEN TO ITS FULFILLMENT; ART "REPRESENTS THE CULMINATING EVENT OF NATURE AS WELL AS THE CLIMAX OF EXPERIENCE" (IBID. 8). WHEN EXPERIENCING IN A WAY THAT ONE HAS AN EXPERIENCE, ONE ALWAYS ASSUMES - AT LEAST TO A CERTAIN DEGREE - BOTH ARTIST'S (OR ARTISAN'S) AND ESTHETIC PERCEIVER'S

ROLE. ALSO, IN ART AS EXPERIENCE (LW 10, 53), DEWEY REGRETS THAT ENGLISH LANGUAGE IS LACKING A WORD WHICH COVERS BOTH ACTIVE AND UNDERGOING ASPECTS OF ARTISTIC-ESTHETIC EXPERIENCING (THERE IS A LACK OF SUCH WORD ALSO IN FINNISH LANGUAGE). THE POINT IS HERE TO NOTE THAT AT ROOT, (A)ESTHETIC AND ARTISTIC MODE OF EXPERIENCING ARE DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. IT IS ONLY WITHIN A CULTURAL SETTING, WHICH VALUES ARTISTIC PRODUCTS SEPARATED FROM THEIR CONTEXTS OF USE THAT THIS DISTINCTION APPLIES (SEE ALSO SMALL 1977). INDEED, THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF ARTISTIC DESIGN AS THE SUBSTANTIAL WORK OF ART IS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS IN LIGHT OF THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH, AS DEWEY ALSO MAKES CLEAR.

¹⁰ BASICALLY, THIS REFERS TO MEANING-FORMATION, FORMATION OF GENERALIZED HABITS IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THE ENVIRONMENT (SEE TILES 1988, CH. 2), BUT IN HUMAN LIFE (AND POSSIBLY IN THE LIVES OF OTHER HIGHER ANIMALS) THIS MEANING-FORMATION IS DEVELOPED INTO MODES OF COMMUNICATION, BY WHICH WE ARE ABLE TO TURN OUR NECESSITIES INTO COMMODITIES.

¹¹ ACCORDING TO DEWEY (LW1, 208) THREE SUCH PLATEAUS CAN BE DISCRIMINATED. THE FIRST IS PHYSICAL, AND ITS PROPERTIES DEFINE "MATTER

it is not my intention to turn this discussion into a profound analysis of the ideas of Dewey's (or Heidegger's) pragmatism. Hence, I am not going to delve deeper than needed into Dewey's theory of art as experience. However, this short deviation into Dewey's thought serves to remind us that "traditional" naturalism quite naturally implies a multileveled (but not dualist) approach to the human epistemology, in which the bottom-up-approach of natural sciences combines with the top-down-approach of cultural sciences. If we want to understand experience, we need to understand it from both sides. Of course, to a naturalist, these approaches are not equal in genetic terms (after all, we are still basically social *animals*), but they are mutually important in order to grasp human life as *we know it*. This also goes with understanding musical experience and the way it could be turned into an educative experience.

4. Following Popp and others, I suggest that one way of getting rid of the epistemological riddles of empiricism and relativism¹⁵ could be by revitalizing Dewey's holistic program with its cultural naturalist epistemology, and by following its guiding ideas concerning the nature of human knowledge and its role in human experience, including musical experience. This way we could also get rid of some of the most difficult contradictions in our field, including the present problem of demarcation, which, at worst, forces us to rationalize the special significance of music with transcendental or just plain *ad hoc* justifications of musical value. Moreover, it could help us put forth a truly pluralist (but not relativist) program of music education, suggested already by Small (1977), and developed further in the discourse, which generally finds the significance of music education in musical transactions within cultural settings.

Were we to follow this line, we should concentrate on at least two main lines of inquiry in order to clarify what music could mean in pedagogical terms. First, if we take seriously the claim, according which nature is the only undoubtable *a priori*, we should pay serious attention to the results of contemporary science, especially to those of the cognitive (including sociocognitive) sciences. These, combined with a cogent naturalist epistemology, tell us how knowledge in, of and about music¹⁶ is constructed for the pragmatic needs of human life. This line of inquiry would basically follow Dewey's instrumentalist program of inducing from empirical data "the dis-

tinctive traits of situations within which the function of thought begins and eventually ends" (Thayer 1981, 170). The basic aim of this line of study would be to clarify the fundamental naturalist logic of the experiential situation, which works as the basis for all meaning formation.

The second project, mostly still ahead of us, would be to make visible the "intellectual history" of knowing in, of and about music. In other words, we should produce a contributory description of music's role in signifying life-processes by writing a *natural* history of music.¹⁷ Yet another, closely related, project would be to try to understand the ways people have "musicked" (see Small 1998, 9) in different phases of their history, that is, to write a *cultural* history (or histories) of music. From the standpoint of traditional naturalism, these projects are understood as continuous, but the latter can not be reduced to the first. The former clarifies for us, *why* people enjoy what we understand as music; the latter *how* and *in what terms* they have enjoyed it.

One sub-project, important but by no means primary, would be to find out how the use of linguistical concepts denoting what we call "music" has varied in history and varies at present. However, this approach is more important in making us aware of the roots of our ways of arguing of and about music than in helping us to understand how people know music and come to live musical lives. Thus, it does not suffice as a means of meta-analysis for a philosophy of music or music education. The linguistical distinctions we use in order to get a grip of what we are doing tell us nothing of the whys of our doings. The real distinctions are pragmatic, related to signifying actions, in which the materials which develop into musical experience are put in use and thus objectified as music. As such, musical action can not really be detached from other signifying actions. The "reasons for" music are entangled in complicated webs of reasons that we weave in order to make sense of our experiences. Even if there are, at root, natural explanations even for our most seemingly useless practices, the way we transform the natural conditions to conditions of growth vary with other cultural practices.

The integration problem expressed in the Ideal No. 5 could be made transparent by assuming a naturalist point of view, which follows Dewey in holding that all arts have common substance in the "gen-

AS A GENERAL CHARACTER". "THE SECOND IS THAT OF LIFE", AND PRESENTS QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES WHICH DEFINE THE "PSYCHO-PSYCHICAL". THE THIRD IS THAT OF "ASSOCIATION, COMMUNICATION, PARTICIPATION" AND PRESENTS "MIND AS INTELLECT; POSSESSION AND RESPONSE OF MEANINGS" (IBID.). THE UPPER PLATEAUS ARE NOT IN REALITY DISTINCT, BUT CONTINUOUS WITH AND EMERGENT FROM THE NATURALIST PROCESSES. FOR MORE ABOUT DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF THE EMERGENCE OF MIND, SEE THE DISCUSSION IN TILES (1988, CH. 4). SEE ALSO HOLDER (1993).

¹² IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF DEWEY'S THOUGHTS ON INQUIRY, AS THE CONCEPT IS WIDELY KNOWN. FOR A CLOSER LOOK, SEE DEWEY'S LOGIC (LW 12, ESP. CH. 6).

¹³ ACCORDING TO JACKSON (1998, 35) DEWEY MORE SUGGESTS THAN MAKES EXPLICIT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GENERAL (A)ESTHETIC EXPERIENCES AND "ART-CENTERED EXPERIENCES". THE LATTER INVOLVE ART OBJECTS, PURPOSEFUL DESIGNS WITH WHICH "THE ENJOYMENT DERIVED FROM THEM...IS INTIMATELY CONNECTED" (IBID.).

¹⁴ LIKE HEIDEGGER, ALSO DEWEY SUGGESTS THAT WE ACT AND THINK IN LINGUISTICAL REALM. HOWEVER, LANGUAGE, FOR DEWEY, DENOTES IN A VERY EXTENSIVE SENSE "THE MEDIUM, IN WHICH CULTURE EXISTS AND THROUGH WHICH IT IS TRANSMITTED" (LW 12, 27). CULTURE, UNDERSTOOD AS CONSISTING THE WAYS THE EXPERIENTIAL TRANSAC-

TIONS WITH (AND WITHIN) NATURE ARE APPLIED INTO SOCIAL USES, IS THUS PRIMARY ABOUT SYMBOLIC USE. DEVELOPMENTALLY, SYMBOLIC PRACTICES COME INTO BEING THROUGH THE USE OF NATURAL THINGS IN PRAGMATIC PURPOSES. (SEE E.G., DEWEY MW 9, 18-19; LW 12, CH. 3; MÄÄTTÄNEN 1993, CH. 11).

¹⁵ ACCORDING TO LAUDAN (1996, CH. 1), EMPIRICIST AND RELATIVIST STANDPOINTS ACTUALLY FOLLOW THE SAME PROBLEMATIC EPISTEMIC PRESUPPOSITIONS, WHICH MAKE THE LATTER MORE AN "END-GAME" THAN AN ALTERNATIVE FOR THE FORMER, AND THIS IS THE MOST PROMINENT REASON FOR FORMULATING A CREDIBLE NATURALIST EPISTEMOLOGY. FOLLOWING POPP (1998, 7), WE CAN POINT OUT ONE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE RELATIVIST CONFUSIONS ATTACHED TO THESE PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THAT THERE IS PRESENTLY GROWING A GENERATION OF EDUCATIONAL GRADUATE STUDENTS WHO HAVE "BEEN LED TO THAT THERE ARE NO THEORIES OF LEARNING OR TEACHING" BY "PROFESSORS WHO BELIEVE THAT TEACHERS CAN BE PREPARED THROUGH A PROCESS OF POOLED, ANECDOTAL STORIES GENERATED BY COLLECTIONS OF ASSORTED PERSONAL HISTORIES". THUS, POPP (IBID. 8) ARGUES THAT "PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN POSTANALYTIC PERIOD...MUST PLACE EVEN GREATER EPISTE-

eral conditions without which an experience is not possible" (LW 10, 217). Also, as Dewey (ibid. 217-218) put it, all arts can be conceived as a means of communication, the latter meaning here participation in shared formation of meaning. Thus, there is not a substantial difference between the ways we transform meaning within experience. The arts, music included, make up an important part of living meaningfully. In order to understand how this can be accomplished in educational terms, we have to know how and why this takes place.

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MOLOGICAL ON ITSELF THAN IT DID DURING THE ANALYTIC PERIOD".

¹⁶ SEE REIMER (1991) FOR CLARIFICATION OF THESE WAYS OF KNOWING.

¹⁷ A MAJOR PROBLEM HERE IS THAT THIS HISTORY HAS OBTAINED DIFFERENT FORMS IN DIFFERENT CULTURES. ALSO, AS WALKER (1996) HAS POINTED OUT, WE HAVE TO SOLVE THE ETHNOMUSICOLOGIST'S DILEMMA OF EMIC/ETIC-VIEWPOINTS INTO THE "MUSICS" OF DIFFERENT CULTURES.

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Tiivistelmä

Näyttää siltä, että nykyiselle musiikkikasvatuksen filosofialle voisi olla hyötyä naturalisoidun näkökulman omaksumisesta. Tällainen näkökulma ottaisi vakavasti nykytieteiden (erityisesti kognitiotieteiden) tulokset, mutta kiinnittäisi myös huomiota siihen sosiokulttuuriseen traditioon, joka rajaa musiikkikasvatusdiskursseja. Seuraavassa esitän ehdotuksen siitä, kuinka musiikkikasvatuksen ja musiikkikasvatustutkimuksen epistemologinen perusta voisi olla kehitettävissä deweylaisen naturalistis-pragmatistisen filosofian pohjalta.

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THEORY REDUCTION CONSIDERED HARMFUL?

Music is the sound of universal laws promulgated.

–Henry David Thoreau

I conclude that musical notes and rhythms were first acquired by the male or female progenitors of mankind for the sake of charming the opposite sex.

–Charles Darwin

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As you might suspect from the title and the quotations above, the goal of this paper is to raise discussion. The paper is based on an opening for discussion at the ninth MayDay Group colloquium, Helsinki, June 2000. The main premiss is the fifth MayDay ideal, which states: *“In order to be effective, music educators must establish and maintain contact with ideas and people from other disciplines.”* (The MayDay Group 1997)

¹ THE WORD ‘THEORY’ IS TO BE TAKEN HERE BOTH IN THE BROADER SENSE OF BEING IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE TO BE POTENTIALLY MANIFESTED IN VARIOUS FORMS OF ACTION (CF., E.G., OJALA 1999), AND IN THE NARROWER SENSE OF EXPLICITLY UTTERABLE, GENERAL CONCEPTIONS ACHIEVED IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. A DEEPER ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER. BUT IN BRIEF, THE LATTER IS SEEN AS APPLICATION OF THE FORMER IN EXPERIENCE – THEORY, IN TURN, AS “KNOWLEDGE” OF AND ABOUT PRACTICAL ACTION, ITS CONSEQUENCES AND BEING-IN-THE-WORLD IN GENERAL.

Interdisciplinary symbiosis requires harmonization of theories

Deriving from the ideal, it follows, that in order to be or become more effective as music educators and music education researchers, the theories¹ underlying our activities must be

- a) aware of
- b) in close collaboration with and
- c) in harmony with

current standings of all connecting fields of professional–musical and scientific– life. With ‘connecting fields’ I mean all the fields that are likely to contribute to research and development we pursue, and, vice versa, all the fields that could in one way or another benefit from our insight. The requirement also, and in particular, applies to the various and sometimes contrasting theories within different subfields of music and music education research.

It appears, that these connections do not take place, at least not to the point they could. As a result we are faced with the dangers of incoherent discussion with each other² and with members of other disciplines,³ confused terminology,⁴ empty concepts,⁵ illogical theoretical structures⁶ and ambiguous or dubious research results.⁷ And naturally, this is all a waste of resources and a great source for bad PR and frustration.

The theoretical disharmony, the imminent lack of systematicity and the difficulty of putting different research issues (problems, methods and results) into an encompassing perspective in the field of musicology, educational sciences and music education research is mostly due to

- a) our not *adequately* knowing and expressing what we mean by 'music', and 'education', to take the grand examples; and because of that,
- b) our pursuing research amongst a plethora of epistemological, theoretical and methodical conceptions of the subject matter, all considered equally applicable, which leads to results that reflect the evident problems of plurality; and because of both of these,
- c) our not being able to draw advantage of the accomplishments of the other, connecting disciplines.

That is, there is conceptual ambiguity due to several, mutually inconsistent conceptions of music education, which hinders us from pursuing intra-disciplinary synergy and interdisciplinary symbiosis.

Therefore, *first, we must find an enduring ontological and epistemological basis for our subject matter.* The success of what we do in selecting and shaping research problems critically depends on how we conceive music and education: What are music and education? Why are they? How do they operate or take place? What can be known *in, of, and about* them? Second, *only then we can choose or develop the methods of operation most suitable for basic and applied research in music education,* the distinction of which ought to become apparent from the ontology and epistemology of the subject matters. Third, and *reciprocally tied to the first two, we need an attitude and effort of harmonizing our theories with those of*

² E.G., SUCH AS IN THE ISSUE OF 'AESTHETICS' AS MAKING SENSE OF AESTHESIS VERSUS BEING BURDENED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF AESTHETIC ORTHODOXY, IDEALISM, TRANSCENDENTALISM, DISEMBODIMENT AND ONE-TIME TRADITIONS OF MUSIC PEDAGOGY

³ E.G., CONCEPTIONS OF ISSUES SUCH AS 'MUSICAL MIND', 'MUSICAL THINKING', ETC.

⁴ E.G., TERMS SUCH AS 'ARTS', 'CULTURE', 'CONSCIOUSNESS', 'INTENTIONALITY', 'IMAGINATION', 'MUSIC', ETC.

⁵ E.G., SUCH AS 'CREATIVITY' – A VALID DEFINITION OF THE TERM REMAINS TO BE FOUND.

⁶ SUCH AS IDEALISTIC AND TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF MUSICAL AESTHETICS

⁷ SUCH AS THE SO-CALLED "MOZART EFFECT"

other disciplines, which allows us to incorporate ideas of other disciplines for what they are, and for what they could be for us.

Lauri Väkevä (in this volume) addresses the ontological and epistemological issues while exploring the demand of naturalizing music education philosophy. While the concern here is more the theoretical harmonization, let me affirm that Väkevä's quest is not only welcome but necessary, in my opinion, since that would make it possible to apply the principle of interdisciplinary approach. With a naturalized foothold (and hard work), we can expect fruitful collaboration with other corroborating fields of research. And without a solid conception of these issues, one can only ask, where we are going.

As a consequence of both ontological and epistemological reevaluation of music education and the cultivation of the interdisciplinary principle, it can be assumed, that many key concepts and even a larger amount of minor concepts need to be either completely abolished or largely reformed. Hence, the terminology used would also have to change. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the ways research in music education is performed would face changes. This would apply to

- a) research issues or problems
- b) methodology
- c) politics of science in music education research
- d) practical arrangements of reporting, publishing, and conferencing
- e) tutoring / guiding / supervising undergraduate, graduate and especially doctoral students, and
- f) even academic position and their orientation

his might raise some objections or concerns. Do we want to pursue this? Or would we be happier with the *status quo*? We are still in the process of figuring out how we understand music and education and how they function, and in this task, really we ought to take into account what is happening or what has happened in other fields. Otherwise, we are lost at sea. The whole idea of culture is based on the originally beneficial idea of specialization and sharing tasks. Now, we have been through the discussion of the perils involved,⁸ but there are also the obvious benefits as long as we do not go

⁸ SEE DETELS IN THIS VOLUME.

to extremities. We do not need to reinvent the wheel. We just need to know how the wheel works so that we can build our wagon, or the wheel spokes.

Does theory harmonization result in reductionism?

One of the strongest paradigms in or conceptions of music education has for some time now been the praxial (or pragmatic) paradigm,⁹ which sees music as praxis and essentially tied to sociocultural practices. This has been a contrary view to the so-called traditional, aesthetic account of music, although it has also been argued that, to a certain degree, there might be a common ground between these approaches.¹⁰ This paradigm shift has been an empowering impact on music education philosophy and research. At the same time, we still have several other accounts of music, some of which might be useful for music education research, too. Let us consider the following case.

From the perspective of *psychophysiology*,¹¹ music could be viewed as neuronal activity of the auditory cortex, of cortical and subcortical areas activated by the auditory cortex and onwards to the activation of the motor cortex and subcortical motor areas. Music education, in this perspective, could be seen as an undertaking which takes advantage of the plasticity of the neuronal network, and pursues to guide the neuronal activity and to alter the synaptic weights towards desired directions by doing ethically what it takes. Do we need this explanation? Can music and music education be *reduced* to neuronal activity in this manner? Is this necessary? Or harmful?

I think it is necessary to take this approach of *neuromusical research*¹² into consideration, since it may be used to provide us, in one way, with the so-called *hard facts* as to the essence and operation—ontology and epistemology—of music and education. “There is an abundance of both musical and educational issues that in the future may well be approached by measuring the psychophysiological preperceptual abilities, as well as the tendencies to neural plasticity, in order to determine the possible and suitable solutions for educational and musical activities.” (Näätänen, Ojala & Ruismäki 1997, 15)

⁹ Cf., e.g., ELLIOTT, DAVID J (1995, 1996), REGELSKI (1996, 1998), VÄKEVÄ (1999).

¹⁰ Cf., e.g., SPYCHIGER (1997), VÄKEVÄ & OJALA (1999)

¹¹ THE REASON I BROUGHT UP THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT FOR MUSIC, IS THAT THE NEUROSCIENCES HAVE HAD A TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. “MANY PHILOSOPHERS HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM THE VIEW THAT PHILOSOPHY IS AN A PRIORI DISCIPLINE. -- CONSEQUENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN A REEVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEUROSCIENTIFIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH.” (P.S. CHURCHLAND 1986/1992, 5-6) WHEN CONSIDERING BOTH MUSIC AND EDUCATION AS COGNITIVE PROCESSES, THE IMPACT SHOULD BECOME EVIDENT ON PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION AND MUSIC EDUCATION RESEARCH, AS WELL.

¹² Cf., e.g., WILFRIED GRUHN (1999)

One might object by saying that both music and education are so complex and cognitively abstract, that psychophysiology in its scope of the microworld cannot be applied. But this is accepted within neurosciences: in studying higher functions in psychophysiology, problems are difficult and many methods are in their infancy. Evenso, a large body of results has been excavated, giving insight to the operation of the mind and proof of the strong foothold of the neurosciences. Can we accept that, for instance, both fields in question—in statu nascendi—can benefit from mutual understanding of each other’s research paradigms?

This does not mean that we should only regard music and education from the perspective of neuroscience and forget about the praxial ideas, rather the opposite. First of all, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. The main point is, however, that there is a whole variety of accounts we should consider. And all these should, to a certain degree of applicability be present in the considerations at the same time, if we are to successfully cultivate music education research, instead of strolling down the beaten path.

Is the call for naturalization of music education philosophy in contrast to the idea that music is a social construct? No, it is not. Viewing the social and cultural aspects of music is one perspective. Neuroscience provides another perspective, psychology of behavior another one and so on. All these perspectives contribute to the understanding of what music and education are about. Furthermore, the contributing disciplines do evolve and develop over time, and even new sub-disciplines may emerge that could be beneficial. In any case, there is a constant need for updating our connections and relations to these connecting disciplines.

FIGURE 1. A VARIETY OF ACCOUNTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN MUSIC EDUCATION RESEARCH. THESE PERSPECTIVES CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MUSIC AND EDUCATION ARE AND HOW THEY CAN BE STUDIED. WHERE WOULD IDEALISM FIT IN THIS?

Levels of explanation	Accounts for consideration in theoretical harmonization of music and education	Levels of human experience
"Higher" Level of man? →	Cultural theories / Politics / Economy... Social theories / Anthropology / Geography... Psychology of behavior / Biology... Neuropsychology / General physiology... Neurophysiology / Cellular physiology... Chemistry...	Cultural Social Inter- & inner personal Biological Natural
"Lower"	Physics...	

The following remarks concern the variety of accounts to be considered in the quest for theoretical harmonization of music education research (FIGURE 1). First of all, the various theoretical levels correspond to various levels of human (or animal) experience, as portrayed by Darryl Coen (in this volume). Second, this all may easily imply theoretical reduction. According to Patricia Smith Churchland (1986/1992, 278), the word 'reduction' "has been synonyme for 'insult and abuse', 'behaviorism', 'materialism', 'bourgeois capitalism', 'experimentalism', 'vivisectionism', 'communism', 'militarism', 'sociobiology' and 'atheism'." It has also gained bad ring partly because it has been strongly associated with a utopia of a scientifically unified, coherent body of knowledge, and logical empiricism and its idea of hypothetico-deductive justification. It has also been accused for giving physics and natural sciences a sovereign position over other sciences, resulting in exaggerated physicalism. One of the most common objections, regarding the human, has been that mental phenomena cannot be reduced to brain. But "[i]n the sense of 'reduction' that is relevant here, reduction is first and foremost a relation between theories. Most simply, one theory, the reduced theory TR, stands in a certain relation --- to another more basic theory TB. Statements that a phenomenon PR reduces to another phenomenon PB are derivative upon the more basic claim that the theory that characterizes the first reduces to the theory that characterizes the second." (Churchland 1986/1992, 278)

Now, unless we resort to transcendentalism or idealism, it is evident that we can assume that music and education exclusively operate 1) with our physical, social and cultural environments, 2) with us (as living organisms), and 3) with our minds in particular (as operating natural neural networks). If this is so, by what grounds could we ignore any of the accounts in figure 1? And not ignoring them, means incorporating, or at least mutually harmonizing the theories in terms of both ontology and epistemology.¹³ Regardless of the level of explanation, we should be able to relate theories of (at least) neighboring levels to each other, since phenomena on one level tend to be connected to the phenomena on the neighboring levels one way or another. Just as an example, it does not work to claim that music is a social construct as opposed to cognitive construct of an individual, since the origin of any social construct is the interaction of individuals, and one becomes an individual only in social context. We need

¹³ THIS DOES NOT IMPLY A ROMANTIC QUEST FOR STRICT HOLISM OR UNITY OF SCIENCE NOR ANY SORT OF GRAND THEORY OF EVERYTHING. THE NEED IS SIMPLY THAT OF UTILITARIAN HARMONIZATION, THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS DICTATED BY THE PRACTICAL RESULTS.

both sides of the coin, and the terminology ought to be there for our assistance, not for resistance. The same kind of reciprocal dependence applies for theories of behavioral psychology versus neuropsychology: one is useless, or at least inadequate without the other. In short, the theories at different levels of explanation form a *web of beliefs*.

Which theory then should be used for explaining which phenomenon? The important task is to find always the most suitable level of description (or node of the web of beliefs) in order to get the most elegant and efficient theoretical conception of the phenomenon. It would seem silly to pursue the reduction to the point that we should explain theories of jazz solos in terms of theories of molecular exchanges between neural cells. Simply, it is worthwhile having various levels of description, that is, theories of different levels of explanation, based on what is the purpose of explanation. In other words, theoretical reduction does not mean that theories of higher levels of explanation would be useless, just the opposite. Physics is no first science. Nor are cultural studies. The point is, that the different levels of explanation need to be in harmony with each other, but there is clearly no need to radical reductionism.

The second point is an anthropocentric one. One might be tempted to label the levels of explanation in figure 1 as levels of abstraction so that the "higher" cultural and social explanations are usually considered most abstract, while it is often assumed that reduction to "lower" physical explanation would make things least abstract and most concrete and tangible. But, abstraction means something that is (situated) far away (conceptually). As soon as we reach chemical levels we are faced with another direction of abstractness: not one of us has seen a molecule, nor an atom, nor a quark. If we study things that have to do with human life, such as music and education, it is very natural to start with the obvious level of explanation, hence the focus on psychology of behavior, or biological level in past empirical research. From a pragmatic point of view, this "level of man" is the level, on which we should be most effective. It is the level of pragmatic signification, and crucial scope of operation both in terms of life in general and science in particular. Science is supposed to serve this level. We have expanded the levels of explanation towards social and cultural theories, but how are we doing in the other direction?

Both top-down and bottom-up approaches need to be in balance, not in single studies, but in a larger scale. This is in concord with the need for naturalization, and especially that of traditional or temperate kind.¹⁴

¹⁴ Cf., e.g., MÄÄTTÄNEN (1993), POPP (1998).

The third point is anything but anthropocentric: if we take an encompassing approach to music, we should seriously start examining musical processes also as biological processes, to take one neglected example. This would entail the integration of biomusicology.¹⁵ Of course, animals have nothing they would call art or music in those terms, but who cares about the terms animals or any musicker would or would not use? Depending on our conception of music, we can examine it in situations regardless of whether the music-maker holds it as being musical situation or not. Our starting point in Western culture is a one that includes the concept of music, whatever we may understand with it. But we cannot get rid of that understanding; no purely emic¹⁶ approach to foreign cultures—or in this case other species—is possible. But that is not a problem, necessarily. It just creates another auxiliary addition to the theoretical framework, especially important perhaps, as it operates on the “level of man”. Comparing human music with the (possible) animal music would surely give new insight as to the processes involved, which would also be significant for music education.

¹⁵ Cf., especially WALLIN ET AL (EDS., 2000).

¹⁶ JUST AS ETHNOMUSICOLOGICAL APPROACH TENDS TO ENVELOPE THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF MUSICAL CULTURES, INCLUDING THE WESTERN ONE, BIOMUSICOLOGY APPEARS TO ENVELOPE ALL HUMAN MUSIC AS WELL AS MUSIC BY OTHER ANIMALS. IN THIS RESPECT, THE PARALLEL TO ETHNOMUSICOLOGICAL VOCABULARY IS NOT OUT OF QUESTION.

Towards a bigger picture

While the comprehensive harmonization of our theories of music education with those of other disciplines is a goal never to be reached, all practical purposes considered, the endeavour would nevertheless improve our chances in becoming more effective as music educators and researchers. It would certainly endow us more secure foundations of music education research from ontological, epistemological as well as methodological perspectives. At the same time it would provide us with inner synergy within music education and perspectives to relate various research issues within the domain of music education.

FIGURE 2. A VARIETY OF ACCOUNTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN MUSIC EDUCATION RESEARCH. THESE PERSPECTIVES CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MUSIC AND EDUCATION ARE AND HOW THEY CAN BE STUDIED. WHERE WOULD IDEALISM FIT IN THIS?




Figure 2 portrays certain aspects of this. For instance, it appears to be somewhat unclear what 'applied' versus 'basic research' in music education might entail: The closer to real-life situation of musical learning we get (such as classroom teaching or individual musicking, on the "level of man"), the more applied it is. This means that, for instance, the "statistical research about the relative success of educational models and methods" (Detels in this volume) performed by music educators would fall into applied music education research. On the other hand, the basic research stretches out to three directions according to the levels of explanation and further abstraction from the applied research. Cultural basic research deals with top-down issues, even political, economical and judicial issues involved in music education. Natural basic research, in turn, is involved with bottom-up issues such as those in neurosciences and pharmacology, for instance. Last but not least, the philosophical branch of basic research provides the omnipresent meta-level.

Expressing a detailed account of interdisciplinary harmonization is far beyond this talk, but I hope this has raised some doubts for or against the idea of intertheoretic reduction in music education research. To briefly summarize, we need a strong epistemological and ontological basis for what we do. At the same time, we need to make an effort to view our work in the perspective of other disciplines, place ourselves in a big picture, and incorporate what we need. Without this, we cannot be sure, where we are going.

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Tiivistelmä

JUHA OJALA

Artikkeli pohjautuu esitelmään, jonka pyrkimyksenä oli herättää keskustelua tarpeesta harmonisoida musiikkikasvatuksen parissa esiintyviä teorioita muiden alojen teorioiden kanssa. Teorialla tässä yhteydessä tarkoitetaan toisaalta käytännön toimintaan vaikuttavaa tietämystä, toisaalta tämän tieteellistä erityistapausta. Samoin tutkimus viittaa, paitsi organisoituneen tiedeyhteisön toimintaan, myös sen ulkopuoliseen oppimiseen.

MayDay-ryhmän viidennen ideaalin mukaan musiikinopetuksen ja -oppimisen tutkimus tarvitsee monialaisuutta. Musiikkikasvatuksen teorioiden on a) otettava huomioon sitä koskevien alojen ajankohtaiset saavutukset, sekä b) tehtävä yhteistyötä ja c) toimitava sopusoinnussa näiden muiden teorioiden kanssa. Muussa tapauksessa vaarana on epäkoherentti keskustelu, termistön sekavuus, käsitteistön tyhjiys ja teoreettisten rakennelmien epäloogisuus, epäselvät tutkimustulokset, huono julkisuuskuva ja toimijoiden turhautuminen.

Jos musiikkikasvatuksen ontologinen ja epistemologinen perusta on selkeä, voidaan jäsentää mitä perus- ja soveltava tutkimus musiikkikasvatuksen parissa tarkoittaa ja valita tai kehittää näitä varten sopivimmat menetelmät. Tässä tarvittava harmonisointi saattaa johtaa käsitteistön (ja terminologian), tutkimusongelmien, -asetelmien ja -menetelmien, tutkimuspolitiikan, -hallinnoinnin ja -ohjauksen ja jopa virkarakenteiden rajuunkin muutokseen.

Integraatio muiden tutkimusalojen kanssa viittaa helposti teoreettiseen reduktioon. Ei ole kuitenkaan tarpeellista saati välttämätöntä päätyä radikaaliin reduktionismiin. Oleellista on löytää käsiteltävän ongelman kannalta sopivin selittämisen taso ja pyrkimys eri teoriatasojen keskinäiseen harmoniaan: ainakin vierekkäisten selitystasojen on oltava suhteutettavissa toisiinsa. Kun kyseessä on ihmisen toimintaan liittyvä ilmiö (kuten musiikkikasvatus), on *luonnollista* operoida ensisijaisesti ihmisen toiminnan tasolla, esimerkiksi biologian (jopa biomusikologian) tai käyttäytymistieteiden tasolla. Tässä yhteydessä abstraktiivisuus viittaakin tasoihin jotka ovat toisaalta kulttuurisia ja toisaalta fysikaalisia. Sekä top-down että bottom-up -harmoniaa tarvitaan, jollei yksittäisen tutkimushankkeen parissa, niin ainakin laajassa mittakaavassa, ts. musiikkikasvatuksen paradigman kannalta. Tämä on edelleen sopusoinnussa kohtuullisen naturalisointitarpeen kanssa (ks. Lauri Väkevän artikkeli tässä numerossa)

DISCERNMENT, RESPONS/ ABILITY, AND THE GOODS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS

Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through 'experience'. Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip. This is what 'teaching' and 'learning' are like here. What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right.

- Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations II.xi -

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My karma ran over my dogma.

- seen on a bumper sticker -

Introduction

In a critical review of Thomas Regelski's "The Aristotelian Bases of Praxis for Music and Music Education as Praxis,"² Karen Hanson asks rhetorically of Regelski's essay, "Is it an instance of praxis? Does it exemplify the approach for which it pleads?"³ The reader is given no indication why these questions are raised, what their significance may be, or how they are supposed to articulate with the rest of her critique. However, it is clear that Hanson means to imply that Regelski's essay (a) should somehow have exemplified the praxial orientation it advocates, and (b) has failed to do so. The review is also silent on what seem to me to be two fairly significant matters raised by this rhetorical flourish:

- why an ostensibly theoretical exposition should be expected to exemplify praxial (and therefore, presumably, non-theoretical) attributes; and
- what a successful effort might be expected to look like.

These issues intrigue me, because they seem to want Regelski's essay to do something we do not usually ask philosophy to do. We do not

² THOMAS REGELSKI, IN PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW 6(1) 1998, 22-59

³ KAREN HANSON, IN PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW 7(2) 1999, 118-120. THIS QUOTE IS FROM PAGE 118.

usually expect, for instance, that an analysis of spirituality be spiritual. Nor do we ask that accounts of so-called aesthetic value be themselves sources of aesthetic gratification, or that music philosophy be musical. Why, then, should an essay on praxis be an instance of praxis? Equally important and even more intriguing to me is a further issue: assuming one grants, for the sake of the argument, the exemplification requirement, what might a praxial account of praxis look like? How would one write in order to exemplify philosophical praxis?

I explored Hanson's review for possible clues as to her stance on these issues – but largely without success, I am afraid. Perhaps notably, she does at one point criticize Regelski's arguments as "ethereal," in contrast to Philip Alperson's accounts which, in her words, at least "begin to suggest some workable practices."⁴ So part of what Hanson appears to want in an exposition of a praxial orientation to music education is a clear and explicit indication of 'practical' instructional strategies. On its face, that is a different issue than being an instance of praxis.⁵ But I mention it here because one of the further issues to which we may want to attend eventually is whether the demand for explicit, unambiguous, or clearly-workable practices (a very familiar theme in North American music education, by the way) is a reasonable expectation of praxial accounts. If not (and I have my doubts), perhaps part of what we can learn by examining the issue Hanson has raised concerns the kinds of 'workable-ness' or practicality appropriately and inappropriately expected of philosophical praxis.

⁴ *IBID.*, 120.

⁵ UNLESS, OF COURSE, ONE QUITE MISTAKENLY EQUATES "PRAXIAL" WITH "PRACTICAL". HANSON'S ARGUMENT IS TOO SKETCHY TO SAY WHETHER THIS IS WHAT SHE INTENDS, BUT IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THIS IS A WIDESPREAD MISUNDERSTANDING OF PRAXIS (ONE PARALLELED BY THE UNFORTUNATE EQUATION OF "PRAGMATIC" AND "PRACTICAL").

In what follows, I want to see whether Hanson's questions – regardless of their intent – can be used constructively. To that end I want to take up the notion of philosophy *as praxis*: What should a praxial approach to the practice of philosophy look like? What are its challenges? Its risks? And what kind of conditions might impede or threaten its success?

Should Philosophical Accounts of Praxis Exemplify Praxis?

Let us begin by asking the *question* that arises indirectly from Hanson's critique. Should Regelski's essay have been and example of praxis? Why or why not? That done, we can turn to what for me is the more interesting *question* of How?

I think a reasonable case could be made for a simple negative response to the *question* "Should it be?". To ask that an argument or explanation constitute an instance of what it advocates or describes is a rather unusual request. Again, we do not ask that descriptions of trees exemplify "treeness" or "green leafiness", or expect arguments advocating euthanasia to be themselves lethal. Language does not work that way, or at least it need not, or not always. On this view, a philosophical account of praxis is primarily a theoretical undertaking, a matter of careful conceptual analysis and systematic elaboration. And in such undertakings, exemplification is not at all a common expectation.

Alternatively, I suppose one might respond that exemplification is a philosophical option – a stylistic choice one might elect for persuasive or strategic reasons – but it is a discretionary matter, not a philosophical obligation. Responding this way allows that exemplification is a possible means to the end of persuading others of the virtues of one's position; but there is nothing inherent in the idea of praxis that requires its exposition be conducted one way rather than another, exemplificationally rather than analytically. On this view, Regelski might have chosen to write praxially had he thought it enhanced his argument's power or economy or cogency, but to imply that not electing to do so amounts to a philosophical failing is unfair and wrong – if that was Hanson's intent.

These two responses are predicated on different assumptions about what kind of thing philosophy is. The first response takes philosophy to be a theoretical undertaking and one's manner of writing to be primarily a matter of its logical consistency, clarity, and precision. Philosophy seeks truth, and style is beside the point. The second takes philosophy to be a means to the end of persuading others to one's view, and how one goes about that is a strategic matter the

justification for which is best gauged by whether one's view prevails. Philosophy is technique and style is a rhetorical tool.

But I want to advance a third possible response, one that grants Hanson's apparent point – although for reasons other than those she may have had in mind.⁶ On this view, there is indeed something in advancing praxis as a philosophical position that justifies a critic's demand for exemplification: something inherent in what praxis means, or is, that we should be able to detect in arguments advanced on its behalf. This view takes philosophy not as theory, not as technique, but as praxis. Philosophy as praxis posits a very different relation between what it seeks to achieve (its ends) and how it seeks to get there (its means, or in this case, what I have so far referred to as "style"⁷); and this should be manifest in the manner of presentation. As praxis, philosophy is a human social practice guided by standards and devoted to ends, none of which are absolute: its ends are multiple and subject to contestation, and what constitutes "right philosophical action" is variable and context-relative. From a praxial purview (as specifically opposed, again, to a theoretical or technical one) philosophical endeavor is guided by (and may be reasonably expected to evince) experientially-derived, character-driven skills and intuitions. To be a philosopher, then, is to be experienced in, and to have expertise in, ways of knowing, orienting, and acting that are distinctively philosophical and guided by distinctively philosophical dispositions. It is reasonable to expect, then, that a philosophical undertaking seriously committed to illuminating the distinctiveness of praxis will exemplify these unique dispositions in certain ways.⁸

Thus, one's position as to whether philosophy must exemplify aspects of what it advocates depends in interesting ways upon what one believes philosophy to be. But explaining what something as disparate and diverse as philosophy "is" is no easy task. In a recent effort to conceptualize music philosophy, for instance, Jorgensen enumerates what she calls "symptoms" of the philosophical.⁹ I take it that what motivates this strategy is precisely a wariness of absolutes and a recognition of the need to accommodate a plurality of valid understandings of philosophy – laudable concerns, to be sure. However, one would presumably like to know not just what the symptoms are, but whether the patient has the disease: what

⁶ "MAY HAVE HAD," BECAUSE HANSON OFFERS NO INDICATION OF HER REASONS.

⁷ I USE QUOTATION MARKS HERE, BECAUSE IN PRAXIS I TAKE IT THAT THE RELATION BETWEEN CONTENT AND FORM IS NOT A DUALISTIC AFFAIR. STYLE DOES NOT RELATE TO SUBSTANCE IN PRAXIS THE WAY IT DOES IN THEORETICAL OR TECHNICAL ENDEAVOR.

⁸ I AM NOT PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THIS PAPER IN JUDGING REGELSKI'S ESSAY ON THESE GROUNDS – GROUNDS WHICH, BY THE WAY, SHOULD BECOME CLEARER IN SUBSEQUENT PAGES. A BALANCED ASSESSMENT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO CONCEDE UNEVENNESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HANSON'S APPROACH SHOWS FEW OF THE DISPOSITIONS ONE WOULD EXPECT OF PHRONESIS – CRITICISM SHE CAN PRESUMABLY EVADE BY DISAVOWING ANY COMMITMENT ON HER PART TO PRAXIS.

⁹ AFTER NELSON GOODMAN, OBVIOUSLY. ESTELLE JORGENSEN, "ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD." HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MUSIC TEACHING AND LEARNING, RICHARD COLWELL ED. (NEW YORK: SCHIRMER, 1992) 91-101.

¹⁰ I WILL ARGUE HERE THAT IT MEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, RESISTING RIGID CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES, CLAIMS TO UNCONDITIONAL TRUTH, AND THE ADVERSARIAL PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICES WITH WHICH THEY ARE INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED. IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THINGS LIKE FLUIDITY, MUTABILITY, AND PERSPECTIVAL PLURALITY, A PRAXIAL PHILOSOPHY CLIPS ITS WINGS IN THE THEORETICAL AND TECHNICAL DOMAINS THAT ARE HOME TO ABSOLUTES. I GRANT THAT THIS MAY SEEM AN UNLIKELY CLAIM IN LIGHT OF THE WAYS "PRAXIS" HAS SOMETIMES BEEN DESCRIBED IN DEBATES IN MUSIC EDUCATION PHILOSOPHY, BUT INVITE THE READER TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND AND FOLLOW THE ARGUMENT.

¹¹ ACCOUNTS OF PHRONESIS OFTEN ASSOCIATE IT WITH "RIGHT ACTION". I ADD "AND JUST" BECAUSE THE "RIGHTNESS" OF PHRONESIS IS NOT JUST A MATTER OF GETTING SOMETHING TECHNICALLY OR PRACTICALLY CORRECT: ITS SOCIAL SITUATION MEANS RIGHT ACTION IS ALWAYS DEFINED IN PART BY ITS GOOD FOR THE COMMUNITY ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE AT HAND. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, MEAN TO APPEAL TO "JUSTICE" AS A UNIVERSAL ABSTRACTION HERE. WHAT IS "JUST" IS AS SITUATIONALLY-RELATIVE AS WHAT IS "RIGHT" IN THE VIEW I WANT TO ADVANCE. WHERE I USE 'RIGHT' ALONE, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IMPLICITLY TO INCLUDE THE DIMENSION OF 'JUSTNESS'.

is philosophy? To that question, it seems to me praxis is a most useful answer – although, I hasten to add, we have a lot to learn about what conceiving of philosophy as praxis implies for how we go about doing it.¹⁰

How Might We Expect to Find Praxis Exemplified in Praxial Philosophy?

Praxis and Phronesis

Before proceeding further, let me sketch my understanding of praxis: not because present company requires it, but because my answer to our second question has to build on that understanding. By praxis I refer to a kind of practical human engagement embedded within a tradition of communally shared understandings and values. It is, moreover, a mode of action through which participants constitute themselves, both as a community and as individual members of that community. Fundamental to praxis is phronesis, the ethical discernment by which agents gauge what course of action is right and just in a given situation.¹¹ Because praxis is socially-situated action, phronesis is crucially important, both in human terms and for the practice: that is, right action benefits both the individual and the socius, and conversely, wrong action is both an individual failing and detrimental to the practice.¹² But because social circumstances are highly variable, fluid, ever-evolving, and unpredictable, the right course of action can never be enshrined in general or invariant rules: it is matter of doing the right thing, at the right time, to the right person or people, in the right way, with the right intent, to the right extent, and so on. And as Aristotle observes with typical understatement, this is "not for every person, nor is it easy."¹³

Elliott describes praxis as a knowing-in-action, and, after Ryle, as a kind of 'know-how', as opposed to 'knowing-that'. These are apt and useful ways of putting it. It is important to note, however, that the productive knowledge of a skilled artisan is also a kind of know-how – one whose circumstances are not primarily social, and do not require phronesis. Phronesis is not just knowing-how, then, but also knowing-when, knowing-whether, knowing-to-whom, knowing-how-much, and knowing-in-just-what-way. It is situationally-specific and situationally-relative, such that the agent must decide

each course of action on its own merits – without resort to the kind of generalized knowledge that legitimately prevails in technical and theoretical fields.¹⁴ What constitutes right action in praxis is never self-evidently given, and cannot be determined by detached logical reasoning.¹⁵ Phronesis is experience- and character-driven, a function of who one is. The ethical-phronetic agent, then, is one whose experience makes her adept at surveying an uncircumscribable range of potentially relevant factors in a concrete situation; at identifying what from among these manifold particulars it is important to attend to or deal with; and at making the right choice from among unlimited consequent possibilities for action. As Aristotle comments in the Ethics, there are many ways to go wrong (both excesses and deficiencies) but only one right way.¹⁶

¹² IT IS DETRIMENTAL IN THAT IT DEDUCTS FROM, COMPROMISES, OR CORRUPTS THOSE INTERNAL 'GOODS' FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH THE PRACTICE EXISTS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL FAILING IS ONE THAT REFLECTS ON THE AGENT'S CHARACTER – A SHORTCOMING OF BOTH AGENT AND ACT. ON 'INTERNAL' AND 'EXTERNAL' GOODS, SEE NOTE 47.

¹³ NICOMACHEAN ETHICS [HEREAFTER EN] II(9). THE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF MY UNDERSTANDING OF PRAXIS (THOUGH NOT ITS OVERALL STRUCTURE) MAY WELL DIFFER SOMEWHAT FROM REGELSKI'S. REGELSKI STATES, FOR INSTANCE, THAT PRAXIS IS "CENTRALLY CONCERNED WITH THE CRITICAL AND RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF BOTH MEANS AND ENDS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT 'RIGHT RESULTS' FOR PEOPLE" (P.28, EMPHASIS ADDED). I, ON THE OTHER HAND, AM LESS INCLINED TO EMPHASIZE THE "CRITICAL AND RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE" COMPONENT SINCE, THOUGH CLEARLY ESSENTIAL, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO FUNCTION 'CRITICALLY' AND 'RATIONALLY' IN PRAXIS PER SE. ACCORDINGLY, I AM INTERESTED TO EMPHASIZE PHRONESIS, THE ETHICAL DETERMINATION OF RIGHT ACTION OR RIGHT RESULTS WHICH, BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULARITY OF EACH CONCRETE SITUATION, MAKES ITS DETERMINATION NOT SO MUCH CRITICALLY OR RATIONALLY – IF BY THESE IS MEANT REFLECTIVELY AND LOGICALLY – AS INTUITIVELY (ALTHOUGH I NEED TO ADD QUICKLY THAT I DO NOT MEAN BY INTUITION ANYTHING MYSTICAL OR MAGICAL – THESE ARE INTUITIONS BORNE OF EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE).

I stress the social embeddedness, the plurality of potential actions, the open-textured, almost indeterminate quality, and the character-driven nature of phronesis because it seems to me they are what is most distinctive about it, and because phronesis is what distinguishes praxis from theory and from technique. Indeed, it is precisely the erosion of this distinction, the reduction first of theory and then of praxis to technique, that concerns most contemporary advocates and adherents of praxis.¹⁷ The fundamental point of praxial philosophy is the distinctiveness, irreducibility, and necessity of practical judgment to human thriving.

The distinction between practical and technical/theoretical judgment is crucial, then, and what distinguish the former from the latter are:

- the undecidability, in praxis, of the right course of action by technical or universal rules;
- the concreteness and groundedness of praxis, and the necessary priority of the particular;¹⁸
- the consequent centrality to praxis of questions, questioning, and discernment; and
- the distinctive responsibility these facts place upon the individual agent – in contrast to the systematic and sequential guidance offered by predetermined procedures or methods.

¹⁴ ETHICAL CASES, ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE, "DO NOT FALL UNDER ANY ART OR ANY LAW, BUT THE AGENTS THEMSELVES ARE ALWAYS BOUND TO PAY REGARD TO CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE MOMENT AS MUCH AS IN MEDICINE OR NAVIGATION." EN II(2).

¹⁵ INSTEAD OF DOING GOOD AND JUST THINGS, WRITES ARISTOTLE, MOST PEOPLE "TAKE REFUGE IN THEORIZING; THEY IMAGINE THAT THEY ARE PHILOSOPHERS AND THAT PHILOSOPHY WILL MAKE THEM VIRTUOUS; IN FACT THEY BEHAVE LIKE PEOPLE WHO LISTEN ATTENTIVELY TO THEIR DOCTORS BUT NEVER DO ANYTHING THEIR DOCTORS TELL THEM." EN II(4). THIS PASSAGE MAKES CLEAR THE UNSUFFICIENCY OF THEORY TO PHILOSOPHY, WHILE ALSO SHOWING ITS NECESSITY.

¹⁶ "[T]HERE ARE MANY DIFFERENT WAYS OF GOING WRONG . . . BUT THERE IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE WAY OF GOING RIGHT." EN II(6). YET IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEE THAT THIS 'MEAN' COURSE OF ACTION, THIS 'ONE WAY OF GOING RIGHT' IS "NOT ONE THING, NOR IS IT THE SAME FOR EVERYBODY . . . [T]HE RIGHT AMOUNT WILL VARY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL." EN II(5).

¹⁷ SEE FOR INSTANCE, JOSEPH DUNNE'S BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND: PRACTICAL JUDGMENT AND THE LURE OF TECHNIQUE (NOTRE DAME: NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997).

From the relative security and stability of the technical-theoretical perspective to which praxis stands opposed¹⁹ such attributes are lacks or defects; and this disavowal of categorical abstraction and acceptance of contingency are sure signs of soft-headedness. But praxis is not a deficient version of *techne* or *theoria*, and cannot be evaluated by those standards. Nor is it a primitive kind of judgment for which logical substitutes are available and should be sought. Phronetic power of discernment is experiential knowledge that is *essential* to right action in the here-and-now, real-time, social world, where the ends to which our actions are directed always have significant consequences yet can never be pre-scribed or pre-determined. To engage in praxis is thus to commit to particularity and concreteness, to forego the comfort and neatness of abstractions and procedural codes, and to put one's *self* "on the line", so to speak. This is the respons/ability (responsibility & response-ability) of the praxial agent: her resourcefulness and quickness in taking stock of a novel situation and embarking on the appropriate course of action. The skilled practitioner, for all her practical expertise, may have difficulty explaining why a particular strategy is the best one in a particular situation, yet she deploys her practical judgment with adeptness and swiftness that will forever elude the theoretician or technician.

Practical judgment, then, operates in a space outside the field divisible into subjects and objects, or hard-bounded concepts; or perhaps we might rather say, after Geraldine Finn, that it operates in an ethical space *between* them. Finn writes of what she calls "the question which *is* ethics",²⁰ and describes the authentically-ethical encounter as "[a] praxis which will cost me something if it is effective"²¹ precisely because it puts both knower and known into question. On Finn's view, the truly ethical encounter takes place only when categorical assumptions are bracketed, when the security of rules, regulations, and procedures is relinquished in an attempt to encounter the "other" in its concrete particularity – rather than as an instance of something already known. The point is similar to Adorno's claim: "Objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder. Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance, I have no way but to break immanently . . . through the appearance of total identity. Since that totality is structured to accord with logic . . . whose core is the principle of the excluded middle, whatever will not fit this principle, whatever differs in *quality*, comes to be desig-

nated contradiction."²² Both Finn and Adorno seem to be pointing to what might be called the potential tyranny of the category; to be arguing for a mode of being present to 'the other' without reducing it to an instance of something else; and to be arguing against "a representation which relieves us of the ethical responsibility of attending to . . . [its particularity] and inventing our relationship with it."²³ Several points warrant special note here: first, that this ethical/phronetic presence to particularity demands considerable effort or psychic investment of the agent, and is to that extent closely linked to character; second, that this demand to think anew is rich in transformative and reconstructive potential – both for the agent and for the attendant knowledge-action. And third, this attitude or disposition sounds very much like the sustaining root and the source of the transformative potential implicit in the fifth Action Ideal's appeal to interdisciplinarity, and taken up by Claire Detels in her argument to "soft boundaries."²⁴ The potential value of interdisciplinarity and soft-boundedness lie, I am saying, in their promise to nurture phronetic dispositions of the kind that keep praxis alive and growing, ever creating and recreating itself. The nature of practices is such that the rightness of an action is never beyond question, because practices never have their goods or goals fixed for all times. Phronesis, the ethical discernment that guides right action in such highly variable conditions, is a practice's life's blood.

Phronesis and Philosophy

The question, of course, is how we might expect all this to manifest itself in specifically philosophical praxis. Not surprisingly, phronesis will figure centrally in my answer. Philosophy guided by phronesis, I submit, would manifest dispositions like openness to contingency, plurality, and fluidity. And these dispositions would also entail suspicion toward claims advanced as conceptual shortcuts to ends deemed self-evidently good – as substitutes, that is, for phronetic discernment (or in other words, as technical means to avoid engaging 'the other' on its own terms). We would also expect to see careful attention to, and concern about, what is due to whom, under what circumstances, and so on. We would expect to see people's efforts devoted to goods internal to the practice rather than to personal gain, or at the least, to see efforts directed to personal gains of the kind that simultaneously benefit the practice. We should see, in

18 AS MARTHA NUSSBAUM PUTS IT, IN "THE DISCERNMENT OF PERCEPTION: AN ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RATIONALITY." MARTHA NUSSBAUM, *LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE* (NEW YORK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1990).

19 I QUESTION THE STRATEGIC WISDOM OF HAVING SET UP "THE AESTHETIC" AS THE OPPOSITE OF ('OTHER' TO) PRAXIS IN OUR DEBATES WITHIN MUSIC EDUCATION. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE 'AESTHETIC' VIEW ARE MORE CLEARLY APPARENT, IT SEEMS TO ME, IF SITUATED WITHIN THE THEORIA-TECHNE-PRAXIS CONSTELLATION. THAT IS, THE 'OTHER' TO PRAXIS IS THEORIA AND TECHNE. I SPEAK TO THIS CONCERN MORE EXTENSIVELY IN NOTE 56.

20 "THE SPACE-BETWEEN ETHIC AND POLITICS: OR, MORE OF THE SAME?" IN ELEANOR GODWAY AND GERALDINE FINN (EDS.) *WHO IS THIS WE?: ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY* (MONTREAL: BLACK ROSE BOOKS, 1994) 101-116.

21 *IBID.*, 113-14.

22 *NEGATIVE DIALECTICS*, 5.

23 *IBID.*, 108.

24 THIS REFERENCE IS TO AN "ACTION IDEAL" OF THE MAYDAY GROUP IN MUSIC EDUCATION, WHICH ADVOCATES CONTACT WITH IDEAS AND PEOPLE FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES. PURSUANT TO THIS IDEAL, CLAIRE DETELS WROTE A DISCUSSION PAPER ENTITLED "SOFTENING THE BOUNDARIES OF MUSIC IN GENERAL EDUCATION," TO WHICH I REFER HERE.

other words, an active interest in sustaining community: an intersubjective concern for action that is right and just – action that attempts mutuality, openness, cooperation, respect, and fairness. We should see respect for exemplary achievement, acceptance of the authority of tradition over personal predilections or idiosyncratic whims,²⁵ and keen interest in helping others become more discerning of the traditions that ground the practice. And since practices never have their goals and ‘goods’ fixed for all times, we would expect to find vigorous debate about these goals and goods, tempered, of course, by awareness of the provisional nature and potential fallibility of claims advanced.

²⁵ TO THIS, WE SHOULD PROBABLY ADD A CAREFUL CONCERN FOR WEIGHING VARIOUS COMPETING POINTS OF VIEW IN LIGHT OF THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE ADVANCED BY EACH.

To engage in philosophy in a spirit of phronesis, then, may entail accepting as one’s guide something like what Habermas calls the “ideal speech situation” or the spirit of “communicative action” – where participants engage in free and frank debate devoted to consensus building. Although Habermas has described this in many ways over the years, the following is particularly congruent with the key points in my argument:

Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. In the course of successfully taken abstractions, the core of generalizable interests can then emerge step by step.²⁶

²⁶ “RECONCILIATION THROUGH THE PUBLIC USE OF REASON: REMARKS ON JOHN RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM” IN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY XCII:3 (MARCH, 1995) 117-18.

Key to Habermas’s account is the point that people constitute themselves, both as individuals and collectively, through communicative relations. The ethical agent, the agent of praxis, is inconceivable without such relations. A central concern of praxis, then, is the maintenance of the social norms or human institutions, and through them, coherent personal identities.²⁷

²⁷ THIS LAST OBSERVATION I OWE TO JOSEPH DUNNE. BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS, 1997) 177.

This commitment to a 'dialogical form of practical reason' founded in full awareness of others' perspectives is laudable, and richly suggestive of ways *phronesis* should manifest itself in philosophical praxis: most notably, openness and inclusiveness, commitment to taking up the view of the other, and pursuit of social or collective solidarity. And yet, certain features of Habermas's particular account seem at odds with the position I have begun developing here. Habermas's overall objective is a rationality capable of generating universal norms in the moral and political spheres, norms capable of grounding a strong justification of democracy over authoritarian governance. Confronted with the radical plurality of 'goods' in postmodern society, he looks to communicative discourse for rules and regulations that will help avert relativism. Only, it seems to me, Habermas's moral concern lies primarily with duties and obligations in a society where "rights" now take priority over the competing "goods" of Aristotelian praxis. So extensively is his view informed by critique that reason, rationality, and abstraction come to upstage the particularity and concreteness I want to claim for *phronesis*. For all the attractiveness of his appeals to open and free dialogue, then, the prominence of rules and regulation in Habermas's system²⁸ and its ultimate quest for universality detract from its utility as a model for the pursuit of philosophy with *phronetic* spirit as I want to portray it.

²⁸ HIS COMMITMENT TO FULL AND OPEN DEBATE IS LIMITED BY "RULES OF DISCOURSE" WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, RESTRICT PARTICIPATION TO SUBJECTS WITH "COMPETENCE" TO SPEAK AND ACT. THUS, THE WAY COMPETENCE IS DEFINED AND CIRCUMSCRIBED, AND BY WHOM, BECOME POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME ISSUES. THIS ISSUE IS HARDLY UNIQUE TO HABERMAS'S ACCOUNT, HOWEVER, AS WE WILL SEE SHORTLY. IN FAIRNESS TO HABERMAS, IT SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS SYSTEM ALLOWS THAT THE SAME RULES CAN AND MUST BE IMPLEMENTED DIFFERENTLY IN EACH DIALOGUE SITUATION — HOW THE RULES ARE APPLIED, IS, ON HIS VIEW, A FUNCTION OF PHRONESIS.

²⁹ PIERRE BOURDIEU MAKES A POINT NOT UNRELATED TO THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HABERMAS AND GADAMER I ALLUDE TO HERE. "PRACTICAL SENSE," OR HAVING "A FEEL FOR THE GAME," HE SAYS, IS A "QUASI-BODILY INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD." AND, "BELIEF IS THUS AN INHERENT PART OF BELONGING TO A FIELD. IN ITS MOST ACCOMPLISHED FORM ... THAT OF NATIVE MEMBERSHIP ... IT IS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO WHAT KANT ... CALLS 'PRAGMATIC FAITH', THE ARBITRARY ACCEPTANCE, FOR PURPOSES OF ACTION, OF AN UNCERTAIN PROPOSITION..." THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1990) 66-67. WHAT INTERESTS ME IN THIS STATEMENT IS ITS REJECTION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PROPOSITIONAL AND ITS EXPLICIT ENDORSEMENT OF THE NECESSITY OF THE BODY — WHICH IMPLICATE, I THINK, A FUNDAMENTAL

The hermeneutic orientation of Gadamer, on the other hand, while it shares many of the important attributes of Habermas's notion of dialogue, seems more reflective of the *phronetic* requirement for ongoing interpretation and reinterpretation, construction and reconstruction, without a secure method or ultimate point of arrival.²⁹ As I understand Gadamer, philosophy is an unending series of interpretive acts directed by nothing more (or less) durable or reliable than a deep desire to know. Philosophy, "doing things with words", is a fundamentally practical undertaking engaged in the pursuit of full understanding of others and simultaneous modification of one's own grounds for understanding. Gadamer's philosopher is very much a participant, then, never a mere observer or a purveyor of technically-derived truths; and what hermeneutics tries to do is reconstruct authentically what happens in understanding, assiduously avoiding the assumption of a privileged or superior vantage point. Thus, says Gadamer, understanding is an *event*, and like all

UNCERTAINTY THAT CAN-
NOT PERMIT PHRONETIC
SKILLS TO BE SET ASIDE
IN PRACTICAL ENGAGE-
MENT.

³⁰ "HERMENEUTICS AS
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY," IN REASON IN THE
AGE OF SCIENCE (CAM-
BRIDGE: M.I.T. PRESS,
1981)109-110.

action, "always remains at risk." It is "an adventure, and like any other adventure is dangerous" – while at the same time affording "unique opportunities. It is capable of contributing in a special way to the broadening of our human experiences, our self-knowledge, and our horizon, for everything understanding mediates is mediated along with ourselves."³⁰ Accordingly, as praxis, the philosophical act of interpretation consists not in the application of a technique, but always and unavoidably draws upon, even as it deepens, one's perceptiveness, responsiveness, flexibility – dispositions that are hallmarks of phronesis as I understand it through Aristotle.

My brief characterizations of Habermas and Gadamer suggest two somewhat different orientations to praxis, two temperaments that, despite a common commitment to praxis, diverge in important ways and suggest different attendant phronetic dispositions. Both Habermas and Gadamer are interested in perspective-taking and the achievement of common ground. But where Gadamer emphasizes the inherent ongoing riskiness of acts of interpreting and understanding, Habermas focuses on giving and criticizing reasons for holding particular claims, with the eventual intent of finding something more secure and durable – something, I suggest, more like theory than praxis. Thus, an interesting kind of dialectical tension: between the theoretical and technical deployment of rational philosophical tools on the one hand, and the phronetic discernment constitutive of philosophical praxis on the other; between deliberation on the one hand, and right action on the other. In the next section we will encounter this same dialectical tension from a somewhat different perspective.

Pluralism, Standards, and Standardization

Another interesting way to explore the question of what traits an essay that is an instance of philosophical praxis should exemplify, is to turn to Regelski's own essay: to examine assertions he makes about how praxis pertains to music and music education, and to apply those claims to the practice of philosophy. If his claims for praxis are valid, they should characterize philosophical as well as musical praxis. Thus, for instance, we would expect philosophical praxis to be concerned with "practical, down-to-earth matters – as opposed to metaphysical [ones]..." (p.22). On that criterion, I think

Regelski does quite well, although, having characterized his writing as “ethereal”, Hanson would almost certainly disagree.

It would be interesting to attempt an exhaustive evaluation of Regelski’s essay by the criteria implicit in his own arguments; but that is not our purpose here.³¹ Instead, I want to focus on a handful of claims he makes specifically with regard to the openness, inclusiveness, and pluralism of praxis, and thus, I submit, of phronesis. On the arguments advanced by Regelski, we would expect philosophical praxis to show evidence of a belief that philosophical ‘goods’ – the criteria by which ‘right’ philosophical ‘results’ are determined – “[vary] considerably from one person or human situation to another and over history”; and indeed, that there can be “no singular or ‘standard’ instances of” right philosophical results – since philosophical praxis is not guided by the “standardized techniques, practices, or outcomes of *techne* and *poiesis*” (p.28). Moreover, we should find evidence of the expressed conviction that the ideals which guide philosophical praxis “cannot take the same form for all people, places, and times because ‘right results’ vary considerably according to the specifics of situatedness” (p.29). Indeed, each individual’s philosophical praxis is, on the claims Regelski advances, “very...idiosyncratic” (p.30). Thus, praxial philosophy is “perfectly at home accounting for the pluralism of values” engaged by philosophy of all kinds (p.42), philosophy undertaken “... in relation to an infinite range of possible ‘goods’ or intentions” (p.47).

Now, I alluded earlier to the kind of phronetic dispositions implicated by the concrete and unpredictable circumstances of praxis – dispositions like flexibility, provisional convictions, acceptance of contingency and fallibility. Regelski’s claims to an infinite range of goods, and to the absence of standardized techniques and outcomes seem to point in those same directions. However, I wonder if Regelski is comfortable – or the rest of us, for that matter – with the degree of openness and tolerance implicit in these claims, when applied specifically to philosophy. I raise that question with Hanson’s challenge in mind,³² and in view of Regelski’s conspicuous opposition to aesthetic accounts of music and music education. When it comes to philosophy, his openness and tolerance only goes so far. Might this apparent contrast be what prompted Hanson to ask her rhetorical questions?³³ It is worth reflecting on this issue, since too much open-

³¹ IF REGELSKI’S ESSAY IS NOT CONSISTENTLY SUCCESSFUL IN EXEMPLIFYING PHRONETIC DISPOSITIONS AS I HAVE TRIED TO ILLUMINATE THEM HERE, HANSON’S CRITIQUE IS CLEARLY UNSUCCESSFUL, RAISING THE INTERESTING QUESTION: WHICH IS MORE GRIEVOUS, REGELSKI’S OVERSIGHTS OR HANSON’S IMPLICIT CLAIM TO BE EXEMPT FROM SUCH CONCERNS?

³² THAT IS, DOES REGELSKI’S ESSAY EXEMPLIFY THE OPENNESS AND TOLERANCE THAT ONE MIGHT EXPECT OF A PRAXIS-BASED ARGUMENT?

³³ I BELIEVE DOGMATIC STANCES – THOUGH THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT REGELSKI’S ESSAY IS DOGMATIC – DO CONTRADICT THE SPIRIT OF PHRONESIS IN IMPORTANT WAYS: A POINT THAT WILL BE TAKEN UP LATER.

³⁴ THE "NERVE OF THE PRACTICE" IS A VERY USEFUL PHRASE APPROPRIATED FROM FRANCES SPARSHOTT.

³⁵ TO PUT IT RATHER COARSELY, THE ISSUE HERE IS HOW "GLADLY" PHRONESIS IS PREPARED TO "SUFFER FOOLS." IT SEEMS THAT EVEN (OR PERHAPS, ESPECIALLY?) THIS IS A DETERMINATION THAT MUST BE REFERRED TO PHRONETIC DISCERNMENT.

³⁶ THIS IS, IN A SENSE, LIKE QUALIFYING FOR CREDIT, OBSERVES REGELSKI (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION): IF ONE DOESN'T ALREADY HAVE IT, ONE CANNOT GET IT. IT ALSO WARRANTS COMMENT THAT ITS IRREDUCIBILITY TO METHOD IS AMONG THE MORE IMPORTANT REASONS FOR PHILOSOPHY TO EXEMPLIFY PRAXIS: THE DEEPEST SIGNIFICANCE OF PHRONESIS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE CAN BE GRASPED ONLY THROUGH EXEMPLARY INSTANCES OF IT.

³⁷ A WISE COMPOSER COLLEAGUE OF MINE ONCE COMMENTED THAT IT TAKES AT LEAST FIFTEEN YEARS TO BECOME A COMPOSER. ONE WONDERS IF THE SAME APPLIES TO PHILOSOPHY – BUT SUSPECTS IT DOES. AGAIN, THE WORDS OF PIERRE BOURDIEU RESONATE: "[O]NE CANNOT ENTER THIS MAGIC CIRCLE BY AN INSTANTANEOUS DECISION OF THE WILL, BUT ONLY BY BIRTH OR BY A SLOW PROCESS OF CO-OPTATION AND INITIATION WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A SECOND BIRTH." THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, 68.

ness and plurality can erode the consensual 'nerve'³⁴ at the heart of any healthy practice.³⁵

The tension between Regelski's endorsement of openness, pluralism, diversity, idiosyncrasy and the like, and his conspicuous reluctance to exercise such dispositions when it comes to aesthetic ideology opens up an important point for consideration. The claim that phronesis must somehow accommodate an extraordinarily broad range of philosophical intentions and actions gives us just half the picture; for, recall, the action with which phronesis is specifically concerned is 'right' and 'just' action. And rightness and justice are meaningful only within traditions, relative, that is, to standards of practice. While praxis recognizes plurality, then, 'many' does not and cannot mean 'just any'. The adeptness or resourcefulness which enable right philosophical action must always answer to standards of philosophical practice. Only, importantly, the rightness of a particular action is best gauged by those for whom phronesis has become a way of being: who are adept and resourceful when it comes to knowing what to attend to in novel situations, and when, and how; and what is due to whom, and in what degree – practical philosophical know-how that cannot be transmitted theoretically or executed technically.³⁶ Those who have, through extended immersion and apprenticeship in philosophical practice, developed an intuitive sense of its nerve; a keen capacity for problem detection; a deft ability to distinguish the promising lead from the dead end; a tacit understanding what is due to whom and when; a reliable sense for how far to pursue an argument, and when it is satisfactorily concluded – they are the ones whose actions embody the standard, the ones to whose authority neophytes must submit if they are themselves to achieve practical fluency.³⁷ This may sound exclusive, but a practice that is all-inclusive is no practice at all. And it may sound elitist, but it is only to recognize the fact and the peculiar importance of expertise to praxis. In any event, I think a reminder of the ways we would expect such phronetic expertise to manifest itself should allay most fears of elitism.

The dialectical field to which we have been alluding, this tension between the necessity for standards on the one hand and the impossibility of standardization on the other, is precisely the context in which the phronesis at the heart of expert philosophical praxis must

be placed. Philosophical expertise is no assurance of success. Each start, even for the expert, is a new experience with new potential hazards: a renewed quest for ever-elusive right action with nothing more secure to guide it than one's sense of the nerve of the practice (yet, at the same time, something profoundly unattainable without that sense). Accordingly, we should expect to see convictions carried confidently yet not dogmatically; lightly though not diffidently; fluently, as befits experience and expertise, yet at the same time with respect for the fragility and uncertainty of the philosophical quest, and awareness of other perspectives, other potential 'goods', other potential courses of right and just action. These same dispositions should also manifest themselves in patience and respect for the sincere philosophical efforts of others – if not always their ideas³⁸ – in light of the inherent difficulty of philosophical praxis.³⁹ This is hardly to suggest that such dispositions be unconditional or limitless, since praxial convictions must, given the nature of praxis, resist absolutes and universals, manifest wariness toward non-relatives, and evince impatience with such things as dogma, authoritarian posturing, and rigid, hard-boundaried thought. Yet, on balance, we should expect to find in phronetically-guided philosophy respect for contingency, and acceptance of the genuine efforts of others as part of a shared philosophical quest in which individual successes always benefit the practice as a whole. Key, then, are attitudes of mutuality, civility, caring, and responsibility – both to other individuals and to the practice through which personal and collective identity are constituted.

Conflict and Conversation

Yet, conflicts are inevitable, since debates over such matters as right action and whose action is right have an ineliminable political dimension. The inevitability of conflicts, however, must not distract us from two facts of fundamental importance: first, the obvious necessity of accommodating and constructively resolving them where possible; and second, the crucial role they play in keeping practices viable and vital. Conflicts are important to traditions, part of the machinery by which they define and reconstitute themselves over time. Rigorous debate is the means by which we expose flawed ideas, and those that withstand careful critical scrutiny are stronger and more resilient for having been so criticized, scrutinized, and

³⁸ I AM SUGGESTING AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING TOUGH ON IDEAS AND BEING TOUGH ON THOSE WHO HOLD OR ADVANCE THEM. WHETHER THE FORMER NECESSITATES THE LATTER DEPENDS UPON WHETHER FORMER ARE ADVANCED WITH PHRONETIC AND COMMUNICATIVE INTENT.

³⁹ THE PHRASE 'PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS' HERE IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH 'PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE' – AT LEAST AS THE LATTER IS WIDELY ENGAGED IN AT PRESENT. I RESERVE PRAXIS FOR A SPECIFIC KIND OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE: THAT GUIDED BY PHRONESIS.

refined. Thus, philosophical disagreements are not signs of weakness or cause for embarrassment, but indications of vitality. We should welcome robust, vigorous debates over such important issues as standards of evidence, meanings and interpretations, and the like, accepting them as valuable opportunities for growth and advancement. A living tradition is, in Alasdair MacIntyre's words, "an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."⁴⁰ But a phronetically-motivated philosophical praxis would strive to focus its debates precisely on the kind of goods that constitute and offer to advance the practice, resisting or suppressing those that weaken it. Among the latter:

⁴⁰ ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, *AFTER VIRTUE* (NOTRE DAME: UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS, 1984) 222.

- the kind of adversarial philosophical practice motivated more by personal gain than the advancement of the practice;
- criticisms advanced without a sincere effort to understand the view in question or the assumptions on which it is based;
- peremptory efforts to foreclose discussion by power or position alone;
- deployment of ad hominem and other such tactics, which divert and obfuscate rather than clarifying issues; and
- exploiting phronetic openness and vulnerability to individual advantage by treating them as weakness.

⁴¹ CONSIDER ALASDAIR MACINTYRE'S (IBID., 278) DESCRIPTION OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL EFFORTS AS "A WORK STILL IN PROGRESS, AND IF I CAN NOW PROCEED TO CARRY THAT WORK FURTHER, IT IS IN CRUCIAL PART BECAUSE OF THE GENEROUS AND PENETRATING WAY IN WHICH MANY PHILOSOPHERS . . . HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THAT WORK BY THEIR CRITICISM."

Above all, I think, we should expect to find in phronetically-directed philosophy evidence of firm commitment to the pursuit of truth, clearly tempered by the recognition that truth is not a timeless absolute, and willingness to subject ideas to the ongoing project of collective refinement. We should expect to see convictions held firmly, yet flexibly and provisionally, accepting both change and conceptual shades of grey as fundamental preconditions to the possibility for philosophical growth.⁴¹

The metaphor of conversation is often used to characterize these dispositions, and it is a good fit in many senses. A conversation is a kind of ongoing quest for mutual agreement about concerns which may

change during its course. Conversations are sustained by attitudes of vigilance and agility, give and take, and are arrested or aborted by authoritarian posture. The conversational attitude requires openness, a willingness both to engage the other and to allow one's views and convictions to be challenged: a lack on both sides.⁴² To converse with another is always to grant her the right to call what I say (and who I am) into question, and is at the same time to acknowledge her concerns as worthy of a serious answer. Conversation requires an empathetic appreciation of the concrete needs and beliefs of the other: a willingness to modify one's own stance, as the other does the same, in hopes that through mutual reconstruction of our respective views we can achieve and sustain a new consensual understanding. Conversation is rendered possible, then, by attitudes of connection and mutuality, rather than separation and opposition.⁴³ And where disputes threaten discourse, it is important that rivals be able to assess their respective positions by their own standards, but using their rivals' characterizations. The ability to state a rival's view in terms acceptable to her or him would thus seem a minimum condition for entering into a conversational exchange.⁴⁴ In many of its broader features, I concede this description resembles Habermas's idea of communicative action. Only, a "speech situation" can only be truly "ideal" – in the non-Platonic, utopian sense – if it takes its bearings from moral/ethical concerns rather than formal or procedural ones.⁴⁵

Threats to Phronesis

Having speculated at length about how phronetic dispositions might manifest themselves in philosophical discourse, it may be useful to think briefly about what non-phronetic discourse might look like: to address explicitly the kind of conditions and assumptions that impede or threaten philosophical praxis, by failing to recognize or engage in philosophy *as praxis*. What often happens is that philosophy's external trappings and marginalia are mistaken for the genuine article, such that one engages in an activity that mimics philosophy's easily-perceived yet peripheral attributes while neglecting its more fundamental concerns. An obvious manifestation of this mistake is the apparently wide-spread assumption that philosophy is simply expressing and arguing about opinions. Just as grievous is a tendency to invert the priority of style and substance, such that

⁴² AN IMPORTANT PART OF WHAT OPENNESS TO 'THE OTHER' DEMANDS IS RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF 'GOOD' – WHICH CALLS INTO QUESTION ONE'S OWN CONCEPTION, REMINDING ONE (IMPORTANTLY) OF THE PARTIALITY, SITUATEDNESS, OR CONTINGENCY OF ONE'S CONCEPTION.

⁴³ CAROL GILLIGAN ARGUES THAT THE LATTER (SEPARATION AND OPPOSITION) TEND TO BE CHARACTERISTIC OF MALE DISCOURSE AND VALUES, WHILE WOMEN ARE MORE INCLINED TO EMPHASIZE CONNECTION AND COMMONALITY.

⁴⁴ AND WHERE A CRITIC IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ARTICULATE THE VIEW HE OR SHE OPPOSES IN TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PERSON WHOSE VIEW IT IS, THERE IS GOOD REASON, I THINK, TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF MOTIVATIONS AND TO REFUSE TO ENGAGE THAT CRITIC CONVERSATIONALLY.

⁴⁵ PUT DIFFERENTLY, THE SOURCE OF THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION SHOULD NOT BE ONE'S RELATION TO THE PRACTICE IN WHICH ONE IS INVOLVED, BUT RATHER THE RELATIONSHIP TO CONCRETE OTHERS ESTABLISHED BY THAT PRACTICE.

⁴⁶ AND AN ATTENDANT INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH THE PHILOSOPHICALLY SUBSTANTIAL FROM THE TRIVIAL – INDEED, OFTEN, THE INABILITY TO DISTINGUISH PHILOSOPHICAL FROM NON-PHILOSOPHICAL PURSUITS.

⁴⁷ MACINTYRE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF MODERN POLITICS AS "CIVIL WAR CARRIED OUT BY OTHER MEANS" (IBID., 253) MIGHT AS ACCURATELY APPLY TO MANY PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGES.

⁴⁸ OR PERHAPS MORE TO THE POINT, TAKING MUTUALITY FOR A SIGN OF EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITY. THE DIFFERENCE PARALLELS THAT BETWEEN CONVERSATION AND ARGUMENT.

⁴⁹ THIS DISTINCTION AND THE POINT ABOUT MODERN INDIVIDUALISM ARE CENTRAL POINTS OF ALASDAIR MACINTYRE'S ARGUMENT IN AFTER VIRTUE. EXTERNAL GOODS ARE THOSE THAT SERVE INDIVIDUAL GAIN. INTERNAL GOODS ARE THOSE FOR WHICH THE PRACTICE EXISTS, AND WHOSE ACHIEVEMENT BENEFITS BOTH THE INDIVIDUAL (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY IN THE SAME WAYS AS THE PURSUIT OF STRICTLY EXTERNAL GOODS) AND THE COMMUNITY.

⁵⁰ THIS, BECAUSE PRAXIS REQUIRES LOCAL FORMS OF COMMUNITY IN ORDER TO THRIVE.

⁵¹ IT IS INTERESTING AND WORTHY OF REFLECTION THAT EVEN THE MOST POSITIVISTIC OF RESEARCH METHODS ALLOW FOR STATISTICALLY-ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF ERROR.

arcane vocabulary and rhetorical flourishes usurp the proper place of clarity and cogency in philosophical discourse. Also troublesome is engagement in analytical projects without regard for the ways they potentially articulate with the efforts of others in the philosophical community. Behind each of these problems is a failure to grasp the nerve of the practice,⁴⁶ a failing often traceable to the apprenticeship process so crucial to phronesis.

Beyond such individual failings lie a number of systemic conditions and assumptions with considerable potential to weaken and corrupt philosophical praxis:

- the prominence of individualism,
- the hegemony of technique,
- the reduction of philosophy to theory,
- the refusal of standards, and
- insularity.

The threat posed by modern individualism has already been alluded to several times in this paper. I have criticized the adversarial approach to philosophy, in which insufficient or insincere effort is made to grasp the point of one's rival, since, in any event, the point of engagement is primarily to prevail or discredit one's opponent.⁴⁷ Typical of this orientation is the dogmatic, authoritarian stance that I have argued is antithetical to phronesis: a refusal to acknowledge or consider the contingency and fallibility of one's own purview, and a consequent inclination to engage in philosophy as a blood sport where the end of victory justifies whatever means are necessary to achieve it. By refusing the mutuality essential to communication⁴⁸ and by pursuing philosophy for external rather than internal goods,⁴⁹ such dispositions and pursuits exert seriously detrimental impact on philosophical praxis.⁵⁰ Often complicit in such situations is the positivistic presumption of objective validity or Truth, a position of superiority and power founded in a putative rationality presumed to elude one's rivals. Unwavering convictions of objectivity, then, serve to justify a refusal to put one's self or one's views into question;⁵¹ for refusing to attempt to meet the other on neutral ground; and for insisting that the 'other' speak one's own language and converse within conceptual and value frameworks that are one's own. Praxis and phronesis are clearly impossible where such dispositions prevail.

Closely related to the assumption of objectivity is the view of philosophy as a technique through which one achieves truth by adherence to rules of syllogistic logic. On this view, engaging in philosophical discourse is a function of one's mastery of technical skills, an assumption that absolves the would-be philosopher of any necessary ethical obligation. As a rule-governed activity,⁵² successful philosophical practice consists in successful rule-identification and rule-following. Contingency and shades of grey are contaminants or impediments, obstacles to be transcended by robust technique and method/ological rigor. The technical view of rationality thus seeks to marginalize or eliminate the fact of human agency, denying both the possibility and need for a distinctive 'practical knowledge' within which ends must be discovered and rediscovered rather than being self-evident and fixed for all times.⁵³ Not surprisingly, the technician believes technique is superior to and a necessary replacement for the vagaries of phronesis. The primary criterion by which technical rationality gauges philosophical efficacy is its capacity to yield 'clearly workable practices,' a view with which, I hope it is clear, praxis has considerable difficulty.

The equation of philosophy with theory (that is, its reduction to theory) is an equally serious and vexatious problem for phronesis.⁵⁴ Closely related to the technical view in its detachment and presumed detachability from the concrete, particular world, theoretical knowledge is widely deemed superior in virtue of the immutability and universality of the truths of which it is the presumed purveyor. And yet, since the world of human intentions and actions is anything but general, invariant, and law-like, phronesis is the indispensable guide by which we navigate the concrete, the particular, the processual here-and-now. This is not to suggest that theory cannot inform praxis, a functional relationship that figures centrally in Regelski's essay,⁵⁵ but it is to urge that theory can never replace practical knowledge; that practical knowledge is no defective version of theory; and that making our way in the human world requires the grounded, down-to-earth guidance that is only available in phronesis. Praxis is no purveyor of timeless truths, nor is phronesis the view from everywhere. Understanding is an event, and a risky one at that; one to which the phronetic agent relates not as impartial observer, but as present-tense, embodied participant. Phronesis always finds itself caught up in the midst of things, then: questioning, guiding, feel-

⁵² APPEAL TO "PRINCIPLES" OFTEN AMOUNTS TO THE SAME THING.

⁵³ WHAT THE TECHNICIST VIEW OMITTS ARE PRECISELY "THOSE ONGOING MODES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY WITHIN WHICH ENDS HAVE TO BE DISCOVERED AND REDISCOVERED, AND MEANS DEvised TO PURSUE THEM." THE WORDS, APPROPRIATED FROM ANOTHER CONTEXT, ARE ALASDAIR MACINTYRE'S (AFTER VIRTUE, 273).

⁵⁴ NOTE THAT WHERE REGELSKI'S ESSAY STRESSES THE ROLES OF TECHNE AND THEORIA WITHIN PRAXIS, I AM STRESSING THE POTENTIAL THREATS THEY POSE. MY STRATEGY IS MOTIVATED BY THE CONVICTION THAT WHAT DUNNE CALLS "THE LURE OF TECHNIQUE" (INCLUSIVE, BY THE WAY, OF THEORY, WHICH IN MODERN TIMES HAS BECOME PREDOMINANTLY TECHNICAL) HAS ALL BUT EXTINGUISHED OUR RECOGNITION OF PRAXIS — WHICH LEADS TO THE PROFOUND NEGLECT OF CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR ITS EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT, AND, MORE SERIOUSLY STILL, TO OUTRIGHT DENIALS OF ITS EXISTENCE.

⁵⁵ I BELIEVE WE DIFFER ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEORY OR CRITICAL REASON CAN DIRECT PRAXIS — A DIFFERENCE OWING, PERHAPS, TO REGELSKI'S INCLINATION TO HABERMAS. SEE ALSO NOTE 12, ABOVE.

ing its way forward. The point is that doing philosophy is no merely theoretical undertaking: for words always entangle us in countless connections with other words and meanings. Navigating such connections and meanings is an act to which phronesis is essential, and an act at which phronesis excels.

We have talked at some length about the dialectical tension between the necessity for standards and the impossibility of standardization in phronesis. Among the most serious threats to phronesis and to philosophical praxis is the tempting assumption that, to repeat a phrase I used earlier, 'many' means 'just any', such that philosophy is a cluster of symptoms attached to nothing substantial. But an unbounded and unrestricted pluralism is nothing but abject relativism, the view that 'anything goes'. On that view, philosophy is whatever anyone wants or needs it to be, and virtually any expository or critical undertaking deserves to be recognized as an instance of philosophical practice. Clearly, this kind of unbounded pluralism is inimical to philosophical praxis, fostering such unfortunately widespread notions as:

- philosophers "just do pretty much what I do when I let my mind wander";
- philosophies are things one simply chooses on the basis of subjective predilections, and there is no explaining or debating such preferences;
- since one becomes a philosopher or does philosophy by an act of arbitrary will, just about anyone can do it; and
- to appeal to or insist upon adherence to standards is to assume a stance that is unjustifiably elitist and exclusionary.

In North American music education there are relatively few philosophical models, and those of us who are drawn to philosophy are often self-taught. Opportunities for the kind cognitive apprenticeship essential to the development of phronetic skills and vital philosophical praxis are, unfortunately, rare – a concern which should be taken very seriously by the profession. The fact that it is not attests further to the severity of the problem.

I conclude this brief survey of threats to phronesis with disciplinary insularity, because it seems to me that interdisciplinary discourse is essential to keeping this ethical space open, to nurturing phronetic respons/ability and flexibility. By engaging others in conversation and learning to see ourselves through their eyes, we subject our beliefs and convictions to scrutiny and challenge, unsettling things in ways that render professional growth and transformation possible. Thus, while disciplinary content is obviously a relevant consideration in initiating disciplinary alliances and dialogue, such content may ultimately be less important than the attitudes and dispositions implicated by interdisciplinarity itself. If that is so, we would do well to seek out exchanges and interactions with areas of inquiry for whom interdisciplinary encounters are already well-established and highly-valued features of the intellectual landscape: areas currently making 'cultural waves', such as cultural studies, women's studies, and critical pedagogy and theory. Conservative exchanges within conventional disciplinary alliances will not accomplish what we need. What we require is the kind of dialogue that subverts disciplinary complacency, helping us ask more meaningful and significant philosophical questions – questions of the kind that are essential to vitalizing music education's philosophical community and securing philosophy's rightful place of priority within professional discourses. The relationship between phronesis and interdisciplinarity, then, is intimate and important: for it is precisely to phronesis that we must turn for guidance when customary concepts, disciplines, principles, schemes, and conventional ways of seeing things fail us, impeding our efforts to find our way in novel terrain.

Wrapping Up

Recent scholarship in music education has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the ways praxis manifests itself in music and education. But it is also useful, I think, to examine the nature and significance of practical judgment outside musical or educational contexts – where the idea of praxis can be disentangled from musical and educational issues. The 'triangulation' achieved by juxtaposing musical, educational, and philosophical praxis helps highlight what practical knowledge entails apart from its instantiation in particular practices. It helps remind us that praxis is not uniquely

⁵⁶ PERHAPS "CONTEMPORATIVE IMMATERIALISM" WOULD BE A GOOD WAY TO CHARACTERIZE THE CORE VALUES OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM?

⁵⁷ I THINK IT UNFORTUNATE THAT PRAXIS AND AESTHETIC HAVE EMERGED AS OPPOSITES IN MUSIC EDUCATION (ALTHOUGH THEY ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED IN MANY SENSES), BECAUSE THIS HAS TO AN EXTENT LED TO PEOPLE PERCEIVING PRAXIS AS A NEGATIVE VIEW – I.E., "NOT AESTHETIC" OR "ANTI-AESTHETIC". THIS IS UNFORTUNATE BECAUSE IN THE FIRST PLACE, PRAXIS IS A POSITIVE ORIENTATION WITH INTERESTS FAR BROADER THAN THE ARTS OR ISSUES OF AESTHETIC VALUE. IN THE SECOND PLACE, IT HAS CAUSED PEOPLE WHOSE AESTHETIC CONVICTIONS WERE ONLY VAGUELY ARTICULATED TO FORM AN UNDERSTANDING OF PRAXIS AS VAGUE "OTHER" TO THE VAGUE "AESTHETIC" – HARDLY A PROPITIOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS! FINALLY, I WOULD URGE CAUTION AMONG THOSE OF US CRITICAL OF AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY, LEST WE IMPUTE TO IT A UNITY AND COHERENCE IT DOES NOT HAVE. WE NEED TO EXERCISE CARE TO CRITICIZE NOT SO MUCH "THE" AESTHETIC AS THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF SUCH ORIENTATIONS THAT ARE AT ODDS WITH PRAXIS AND PHRONESIS – AND TO STRESS THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF SUCH OVERSIGHTS.

concerned with issues of musical instruction, and that novel though its vocabulary and emphases may be to music educators, praxis is not so much a "new" way of knowing, but rather one of our oldest: practical, reliable, and essential to making our way in the world of human social practices. Not just 'at home' with plurality, fluidity, unpredictability, and change, but uniquely-suited to concrete and novel circumstances, practical judgment is and always has been crucial to the conduct of human affairs. Thus, advocates of praxis should not be seen as radical insurrectionists attempting the overthrow of aesthetic orthodoxy; their greater concern is simply to remind us of the significance of capacities and abilities we have always had, and knowledge those with exceptional practical expertise have always had in abundance. Praxis's quarrel with aesthetic ideology is, from this perspective, a function of the latter's idealistic⁵⁶ gravitation to abstraction and universality, its propensity to taking rather than making, and its consequent tendency to obscure the crucial facts of music's social situatedness and practical nature.⁵⁷ Human practices and the practical/ethical knowledge that guides them are resilient, but not infinitely so. The dispositions that enable phronetic discernment can be suppressed, even extinguished by practices, belief systems, or institutions that fail to recognize their value or create conditions necessary to their flourishing. That, I believe, is the fundamental issue behind praxis-based challenges to aesthetic ideology, and is what justifies Regelski's intolerance toward the aesthetic rationale for music education – which is where we began this essay.

My primary intent here has not been to vindicate praxis – or to vindicate Regelski, for that matter.⁵⁸ Rather it has been to explore the character of phronesis, specifically as it relates to philosophical discourse in music education. Having concluded that exploration, I am persuaded that phronetic dispositions are essential to the practice of philosophy in music education. I am not sanguine about their current health or long-term prognosis, however. Living in an era where technical rationality and individualism reign supreme, and working within a profession that valorizes 'the practical' (i.e., the technical)⁵⁹ seemingly above all else, it seems to me imperative we learn to engage in philosophy in ways that foreground phronetic skills and dispositions. For it is only by doing that that we will achieve the kind of philosophical community that can make good on its rightful claim to professional significance.

I will not reiterate here the list of attitudes, dispositions, and conditions that have been associated with the spirit of phronesis in this paper. I will, however, point briefly to what I think are the central issues with which we need to be concerned. First, we in music education philosophy need to work hard at finding the right (phronetic) balance between the dialectical polarities of openness to and tolerance of difference, on the one hand, and the maintenance of standards on the other: between the need for new ideas and perspectives, and the need to preserve and care for the nerve of philosophical practice; between novelty and tradition; between creativity and authenticity; between accepting or encouraging differences, and maintaining solidarity. Obviously, there are no maps that can tell us how to do this. But that, of course, is precisely the point of phronesis. And fortunately for us all, technical or theoretical tools do not exhaust the cognitive resources at our disposal.

Second, it is important we recognize that the unavailability of a method for phronesis means it must be learned and transmitted through exemplary instances: thus the importance of exemplification. We in music education philosophy need to work diligently and self-consciously at exemplifying phronetic dispositions in our discourse and in our writing, an effort that, as Aristotle warned, is not easy. The dearth of opportunities for training, the overwhelming 'how-to' emphasis of our curricula, and the scarcity of models are each very serious obstacles to philosophical praxis in music education. And creating and maintaining a viable philosophical community is a daunting task in the face of forces like technical rationality and individualism, forces that deform people's views of what philosophy is, even as they relegate it to ever-increasingly marginal status.

Third, we would do well to note that what has been here described as phronetic openness, communicative intent, and the like, are coded "feminine" within the framework of current epistemological politics, and are easily attacked as softness or derided as confusion. The very vulnerability necessary for phronesis can be turned against the *phronimos* by the unscrupulous, mistaken for weakness or indecision by those for whom the lure of technique's (false) claim to superiority has proven too seductive to resist. But we must not settle for the relative comfort of reason-driven, universalist discourse in prax-

⁵⁸ AGAIN, JUDGED AS AN INSTANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PRAXIS (WHICH WAS NOT NECESSARILY HIS INTENT HERE, BUT ARGUABLY SHOULD BE IN FUTURE EFFORTS) REGELSKI'S SUCCESS IS MIXED. SPECIFICALLY, HIS DIDACTIC, SOMETIMES SEEMINGLY DOGMATIC TONE IS AT TIMES AT ODDS WITH THE CHARACTER I HAVE WANTED TO CLAIM FOR PHRONESIS (ALTHOUGH I MUST STRESS AGAIN THAT PHRONETIC OPENNESS IS NOT LIMITLESS, AND IS NECESSARILY INTOLERANT OF THE ASSUMPTIONS IMPLICIT IN MANY AESTHETIC ACCOUNTS). ON THE OTHER HAND, I FIND LITTLE THAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS PHRONETIC IN HANSON'S REMARKS, AND AM INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THEY REPRESENT THE KIND OF ADVERSARIAL PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE ABOUT WHICH I HAVE COMMENTED NEGATIVELY IN THIS ESSAY.

⁵⁹ THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT. ON THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW, KNOWLEDGE CONSISTS OF TWO KINDS, THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL. PRACTICAL KNOW-HOW, IN TURN, CONSISTS IN BOTH TECHNICAL AND PRAXIAL/PHRONETIC FORMS. OUR CONTEMPORARY USES OF "PRACTICAL", HOWEVER, TEND TO ASSUME THE MECHANICAL MEANS-ENDS STRUCTURE OF TECHNIQUE: TO THE SERIOUS DETRIMENT OF OUR APPRECIATION OF THE ETHICAL, QUESTION-CENTERED KNOW-HOW THAT IS PHRONESIS. THUS, THE ISSUES THAT PREOCCUPY MUSIC EDUCATION, IN NORTH AMERICA AT ANY RATE, TEND TO BE TECHNICAL CONCERNS ABOUT "HOW TO" MOST EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVE MUSICAL ENDS DEEMED SELF-EVIDENTLY DESIRABLE, AS OPPOSED TO ETHI-

CALLY-INFLUENCED PRACTICAL QUESTIONS LIKE "WHETHER," "TO WHOM," "UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES," "HOW MUCH," AND THE LIKE.

°° I BELIEVE THIS HAS DIRECT AND PROFOUND SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WAY WE TEACH PHILOSOPHY TO PROSPECTIVE MUSIC EDUCATORS. IT SHOULD FOREGROUND QUESTIONS, NOT ANSWERS, AND ATTEMPT ABOVE ALL ELSE TO DEVELOP HABITS AND DISPOSITIONS THAT ARE PHILOSOPHICAL IN NATURE — RATHER THAN PROMOTING THE PASSIVE CONSUMPTION OF PRE-ORDAINED 'TRUTHS'.

ial realms where phronesis claims rightful sovereignty.

Last, we need to insist on an understanding of philosophy as something properly done, not consumed: as praxis rather than commodity.⁶⁰ Philosophy is a human practice, a process guided by practical-ethical knowledge. It is crucial that we recognize, honor, and nurture phronetic excellence in music education philosophy, and that we discourage, and work cooperatively to eliminate, developments and conditions that threaten to undermine it. Since, by its nature, we cannot prescribe the directions right and just philosophical action will take, it is imperative to keep its full range of options and valences open: resisting shortsighted demands that would reduce it to the "clearly workable," and refusing to acquiesce to the forces that would reduce it to mere theory.

Tiivistelmä

TRANSLATED
BY HEIDI
WESTERLUND

Aloitin esseen kysymällä, mitkä saattaisivat olla perusteet hakea praksista tarkastelevasta filosofisesta kirjoituksesta itsestään tapausta jonkinlaisesta praksiksesta: Onko järkevää odottaa, että essee praksiksesta tuo esimerkinomaisesti esiin praksiaalisia tai froneettisia dispositioita joista se on kiinnostunut? Ja jos näin on, niin miksi? Päädyn siihen, että siinä missä filosofointia pidetään praksiksena, mikä on täysin puolustettavissa oleva kanta, voi olla järkevää vaatia sitä. Tämä taustanani etenen kysymällä, millainen on praksiaallinen lähestymistapa filosofointiin? Mitkä ovat sen haasteet? Sen riskit? Ja millaiset olosuhteet hidastavat tai uhkaavat sen menestystä? Kysymyksissäni viittaan praksiksen fronesiksen keskeisyyteen tai eettiseen sensitiivisyyteen. Koska fronesis kantaa huolta oikeista ja oikeudenmukaisista teoista erinäisillä inhimillisen toiminnan alueilla ja on läheisesti yhteydessä luonteeseen, se vaatii avoimuutta, joustavuutta ja syvää tuntua käytännöstä. Sellaisenaan fronesis ei ole avoin säännölle, metodille tai tekniikalle ja asettaa erityisiä vaateita tekijälleen. Väitän lisäksi, että tähän liittyy dialogisessa muodossa oleva käytännöllinen järki, joka pohjautuu täyteen tietoisuuteen muiden näkökulmista ja omistautuu esittämään toisen näkökulman sosiaalisen ja kollektiivisen solidaa-

risuuden vuoksi. Fronesis kehittää käytännön sisäistä hyvää ja vastustaa kaikkea mikä heikentää sitä. Froneettisesti motivoitunut filosofinen praxis pyrkii keskittämään keskustelunsa juuri niihin hyviin, jotka kehittävät käytäntöä vastustaen niitä, jotka heikentävät sitä. Kaikkein vakavammat uhkat filosofiselle praksikselle ovat: 1) ilmeinen individualismi ja vihamieliset lähestymistavat, jotka asettavat ulkoisen hyvän käytännön sisäisen hyvän edelle; 2) filosofisen diskurssin hegemoninen tekniikka, joka redusoi filosofian tekniikaksi tai teoriaksi; 3) käytännöllisten arvioiden ja eettisen näkökulman korvaaminen teknisillä ja sattumanvaraisilla standardeilla; 4) käytäntökohtainen kapea-alaisuus. Meidän tulisi löytää froneettisesti ohjautuneessa filosofiassa kunnioitus kontingenssia kohtaan ja huomioida muiden aidot pyrkimykset osana jaettua filosofista pyrkimystä, jossa yksilölliset onnistumiset aina hyödyttävät käytäntöä kokonaisuudessaan. Keskeistä on vuorovaikutuksen, kohteliaisuuden, välittämisen ja vastuun asenteet sekä muita että koko käytäntöä kohtaan minkä kautta henkilökohtainen ja kollektiivinen identiteetti rakentuu. Vastavuoroinen jännite standardien tarpeellisuuden ja toisaalta standardisoitumisen mahdottomuuden välillä tekee froneettiset dispositiot olennaisiksi musiikkikasvatuksen filosofisessa praksiksessa. En ole niinkään vakuuttunut niiden tämänhetkisestä hyvinvoinnista tai pitkäaikaisesta ennusteesta. Eläessämme aikana, jolloin tekninen rationaalisuus ja individualismi valtaa alaa, ja toimiessamme alalla, joka on ennen muuta sankarillisesti 'käytännöllinen' (tekninen), hedelmällisen filosofisen praksiksen luomisen ja ylläpitämisen haasteet eivät todellakaan ole rohkaisevat.

“CRITICAL EDUCATION,” CULTURALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM

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The idea of multiculturalism presents important challenges to society and thus to schooling. However, despite considerable lip-service by opportunists, it is often not taken seriously enough. Instead it has become a catch-all term for a variety of different bandwagons; an almost meaningless buzzword justifying and incorporating a host of sometimes dysfunctional or counterproductive, sometimes competing or conflicting, sometimes self-serving, even one-sided educational and musical practices. Because music is central to the commonsense idea of “culture,” many music educators have recklessly gone along with this momentum. However if schooling is to contribute to the needs of our society, then music teachers need to take a critical stance on the role and value of music in life and thus of its reasonable place in schooling. To this end I will first undertake a critical examination of the *theory of culturalism* upon which multiculturalism depends, drawing freely from Jurgen Habermas and earlier thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School of Critical Theorists. Then I shall make some observations and suggestions concerning both music education and multiculturalism.

Towards A Critical Theory for Music in Education.

In 1922 the Frankfurt (Germany) Institute for Social Research was founded. In its early wave, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer undertook a critical analysis of Western history beginning with the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer saw Enlightenment thinkers as having put into motion two incompatible tendencies, both the legacy of the seventeenth century “age of reason.” On one hand was the *rationalism* of philosophical idealism stemming from Descartes; and on the other was the *scientific materialism* that arose from the *empiricism* of Francis Bacon and Galileo (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972). Subsequent critical theorists have agreed that the ideal of Enlightenment reason was subsequently distorted by both Western positivism and Marxist scientism into the illusory, narrow and therefore humanly delimit-

iting *technical rationality* that sees knowledge in terms of control. In this, critical theorists are uniformly critical of both capitalism and communism. Later theorists, such as Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and particularly Jurgen Habermas, developed these ideas further and in this analysis, I have been influenced by Habermas' reconstruction of the earlier critical theorists.²

² ONE TARGET OF HABERMAS' ON-GOING CRITIQUE HAS BEEN THE POSITION OF EARLY CRITICAL THEORISTS. THUS HE HAS RECONSTRUCTED MUCH OF THEIR THINKING IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. (PUSEY 1987, 32F.)

The expression "critical theory" itself originated in a 1937 essay by Horkheimer (1992) that compared "traditional" and "critical theory." The former he saw as associated with the logical positivism that had evolved from Enlightenment empiricism and its false claims to objectivity. Traditional scientific theory, in this view, had become ideological in its claim that "facts" are detached from theory or other social and historical circumstances. Furthermore, when positivist theory is applied to society and individuals, the human condition is misrepresented as ahistorical, law-like and unresponsive to change. Even worse, these law-like regularities promote a technology of social engineering used by a powerful elite that dominates people at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Later critical theorists, particularly Habermas (1971), have started with a critique of logical positivism and its use as a technology for social control. Against the positivist claim that causal laws and facts are entirely free from social influences, Habermas has argued the importance of taking the lifeworld and human interpretations of it into consideration in any knowledge claims. Social scientists, in this view, need to participate in the lifeworld to fully understand it (Habermas 1988). Effective, non-coercive communication and true knowledge in this view both depend on understanding the lifeworld inhabited by others and the subjective interpretative categories by which they make sense of it. Such communicative competence for Habermas is central to any knowledge claims. However, Habermas and other critical theorists are as critical of unreflective subjectivity as they are of the positivist ideology of objectivity. Simply put, humans are too easily lulled into self-deception and *false consciousness* by a host of ideological influences that dominate and control their thinking—for example, positivism or culturalism.

Critical theorists, therefore, engage in ideology critique by which false consciousness can be rationally analyzed and valid knowledge

rationally justified and communicated. In this view, particularly as advanced by Habermas, all persons affected unanimously must agree, under conditions of free and uncoerced dialogue (“communication acts”), that the truth of the knowledge in question is in everyone’s best interest. What is true, then is not absolutely or objectively true in the sense the positivist would have us believe; rather, knowledge is true in terms of critical discourse between historically situated individuals (Habermas 1984, 1987). The social facts and logic involved rescue true knowledge from being arbitrarily relativistic. This social logic in turn leads to social action plan for change agency among those affected—a strategy that seeks to overcome the domination of ideological constraints through the mutual coordination of mutual needs and interests. “Critical knowledge” (i.e., emancipating knowledge) thus empowers people to be free agents, in charge of their own intentions and thus of what is uniquely human (Habermas 1971).

This all too brief summary of critical theory serves to highlight several important issues in the debates over multiculturalism in schooling. For example, it is reasonable to observe that the impetus by a ‘subculture’³ for freedom from suppression by dominant groups can lead to single-minded or one-dimensional thinking that can be problematic. Subcultures are by definition minorities, and thus by their very nature point to certain taken-for-granted ‘facts’ as evidence of subordination by the dominant group. Each minority argues from the interpretive categories of its own lifeworld according to an assumed common perspective at the basis of its institutional affiliation. The resulting institutionalization of thinking⁴ resists whatever is seen as imposed by the dominant or other groups. Activists within each group, then, undertake vigorous critiques of dominant ideologies and paradigms, and agitate to restore freedom of agency to the subculture as against by other groups, dominant or other minorities.

This advocacy is perhaps understandable. But from the critical standpoint it fails to acknowledge that, despite the shared perception of subjugation, various subcultures zealously compete among themselves in legitimating their own institutionalized interests. And, as far as individual members of such a group are concerned, such institutionalized legitimation risks replacing the controlling

³ THIS COMMON LABEL WILL BE USED FOR ITS FAMILIARITY, BUT SHOULD NOT BE MISCONSTRUED AS CONFIRMING CULTURALIST ASSUMPTIONS.

⁴ THIS ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL THINKING IS BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE, ESPECIALLY THE SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAY REALITY ARTICULATED BY BERGER AND LUCKMAN (1967).

ideologies of dominant social forces with those of the subculture. The social knowledge and lifeworld of each subculture thus become institutionalized as the paradigmatic reality to which all members owe deference. Thus in advancing its own agenda, many marginal members of the subculture end up disempowered as individual agents or, in any case, alienated.⁵ Furthermore, because each subculture is hindered by institutional paradigms from understanding the interpretative categories and lifeworlds of other groups, each legitimates and advances only its own institutional needs in direct opposition to the needs of other groups in the larger society, minority or dominant. As part of their "politics of recognition" (Taylor 1992), then, various subcultures typically advance their own interests at the expense of others under the banner of multicultural music education.⁶

In a complex society, as a result, the conflicting needs and interests of subgroups can not be satisfied as long as other groups make their own competing claims, and curriculum for music must be approached on bases other than as menu of discrete "tastes" chosen for sampling according to arbitrary criteria. Habermas in particular has been critical of this colonization of the lifeworld into autonomous institutionalized spheres (e.g., Habermas 1970, Habermas 1994). He looks instead to the rational reintegration of society by socializing free, responsible and moral agents whose communicative competence results in a non-arbitrary *practical rationality* upon which agreement can be reached on interpretation of universal human needs and interests (Habermas 1984, 1987). This would be, then, the task of any critical theory of education.

Critical Education and Music Education.

The empowering of teachers with regard to the social and pragmatic consequences of curriculum has been called "critical education" (Carr and Kemmis 1986) or "critical educational science" (Carson 1992, 102). Sociologist Joel Spring summarizes the movement in these words:

Critical theorists find fault with both liberal and neo-conservative positions on the economy and education. . . [C]ritical theorists emphasize an education for democratic empowerment, which simply means

⁵ FOR EXAMPLE, INNER-CITY STUDENTS WHO SHOW MORE INTEREST IN CLASSICAL MUSIC THAN IN EITHER THEIR OWN ETHNIC MUSIC OR THE MUSIC OF THE YOUTH SUB-CULTURE, OR WHO OTHERWISE THRIVE ON THE 'CULTURE' OF THE SCHOOL, ARE OFTEN SEEN AS TRAITORS BY THESE SUBCULTURES. (GREGORY 1992).

⁶ CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING: AN AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSIC EDUCATOR FROM A MAJOR NORTHEASTERN US CITY, A CHICANO ORCHESTRA DIRECTOR, AND A NATIVE AMERICAN ELDER SPOKE ON MULTICULTURAL MUSIC TO A GROUP OF COLLEGE-LEVEL MUSIC EDUCATORS. THE FIRST TWO ROBUSTLY ARGUED FOR THE INCLUSION OF 'THEIR' MUSIC IN THE SCHOOL BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE SELF-IDENTITY FORMATION OF 'THEIR' RESPECTIVE YOUTH. SINCE THESE TWO GROUPS TOGETHER CAN CONSTITUTE THE MAJORITY IN MANY URBAN SCHOOL, THE ISSUE OF HOW THE MUSIC OF EACH COULD BE INCORPORATED IN A SINGLE CURRICULUM, OR IN WHAT PROPORTION TO OTHER MUSIC WAS NOT RAISED BY EITHER SPEAKER. THE NATIVE AMERICAN, IN CONTRAST, DISCOUNTED THE SELF-IDENTITY, "POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" THESIS BY ARGUING THAT THE MUSIC OF HIS PEOPLE WOULD AND SHOULD BE LEARNED ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH TRADITIONAL USES. HE DID NOT EVEN ADVOCATE TEACHING TRADITIONAL MUSIC IN THE RESERVATION'S OWN SCHOOLS BECAUSE IT SHOULD NOT BE DIVORCED FROM SOCIO-RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND, IN ANY CASE, BECAUSE NON-NATIVE AMERICAN MUSIC TEACHERS COULD NOT BEGIN TO DO JUSTICE TO IT. INSTEAD HE

ADVOCATED THE VIRTUES
OF LEARNING EUROCENTRIC
MUSICS IN RESERVATION
SCHOOLS.

giving students the knowledge and skills they need to struggle for a continued expansion of political, economic, and social rights. Of utmost importance is making students aware that they have the power to affect the course of history and that history is the struggle for human rights. (Spring 1991, 31)

The goal of this critical theory of education, Spring continues, is to help students develop "a critical awareness of the social and political forces in society." This critical agenda, he concludes,

appeals to many people because it offers the hope that education can lead to action as opposed to passive acceptance of the status quo. Traditional methods of education might result in equality of opportunity, but they do not necessarily result in people trying to end those things that block the opportunities of all people. For critical feminists, critical pedagogy is a method for heightening awareness of the causes of female oppression. For critical integrationists, critical pedagogy is considered a method for educating people to struggle to end all forms of racism. For the critical pluralist, critical pedagogy will prepare people to work to end the sources of discrimination and prejudice in society. (Spring 1991, 148)

In a critical education, then, discrimination, domination or prejudice against any group would be constrained, but so would claims to exclusivity promoted by subcultures that result in the loss of self-determination by other affected subcultures. Similarly, critical education empowers students with regard to the impact of their own subcultures.⁷ On the other hand, any true (non-arbitrary) interests at the basis of subcultural affiliations would need to be accorded due respect and emancipated from any larger institutional subjugation. Many musics, then, would serve curriculum without advancing the cultural identity or agenda of any particular group as against others.

⁷ FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE TRADITIONS DENY WOMEN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY.

This poses a significant challenge for schools in general and for music teachers in particular. To begin with, the dominant cultural institution has been the Eurocentric Fine Art of 'high' musical Culture advanced by the "cultural patriarchy" (Abrahams 1986) of university schools of music and conservatories, and imitated in public schools by teachers trained by the patriarchy. It will certainly be nec-

essary to protect and insure this important tradition; but this music cannot be allowed any longer to dominate education to the exclusion of other musical cultures studied and understood as rational exemplars of concretely shared experience, values and praxis.

Critical music education will require music teachers who—in addition to usual concerns for musical competence—are critically aware of and communicatively competent with respect to the multiplicity of lifeworlds encountered in schools. Such critical awareness would necessitate developing several capacities and habits: (a) identifying the assumptions, paradigms, problematics or *epistemes* of social institutions and ideologies (of any kind, from any source) that threaten to dominate the conduct of music, education and music education; (b) critically analyzing these models of education and music in terms of their potential for inducing false consciousness; (c) framing alternative models or modifications; (d) adjusting or adapting these to the curricular and other instructional needs revealed by a pragmatic analysis of each particular teaching-learning situation; and (e) becoming “reflective practitioners” (Schon 1983; Schon 1987) by critically evaluating results against expected outcomes (Regelski 1997). To begin with, however, such critical awareness and communicative competence requires a critical perspective concerning the separate yet related issues of “culture” and “music.”

A Critique of Culturalism⁸

First, then, critically aware music teachers need considerable insight concerning various theories and limitations of the *culturalist* perspective of society and of the many uses of the ideas of *culture* that come with unexamined assumptions concerning education in general and music education in particular. A connected framework of propositions distinguishes the theory of culturalism from other sociologies such as structuralism and functionalism. It is largely upon the theory of culturalism that most problems and arguments connected with multicultural (interculture; panculture; transculture, etc.) are based. Thus its nature and limitations must be made clear.

To begin with, the culturalist perspective accounts for culture in terms of the symbols, artifacts, and intellectual products that embody the shared values and habits of a group. Each sociocultural

⁸ THIS DISCUSSION OF CULTURE AND CULTURALISM IS DRAWN FROM BOUDON AND BOURRICAUD (1989), BARROW AND WOODS (1988), AND BARROW AND MILBURN (1986).

entity is seen as creating a certain basic personality and mind-set that is passed on to successive generations as traditional knowledge and praxis; as the “essence” of what it means to belong to that group. Secondly, each such group is seen as a unified or holistic cultural entity, the corollary being that different societies therefore represent necessarily distinct cultural viewpoints. The third contention of culturalism sees the value system of a given culture as to some degree delineated and determined by the values of dominant groups in the society. These cultural values, themes, heritages, traditions, resources, biases and blinders are transmitted to subsequent generations and to other new and marginal groups (e.g., immigrants) *as received* knowledge and values. However, the fourth tenet of culturalism recognizes that certain dissimilar values can co-exist as coherent social structures within a society. These “patterns of culture,” as Ruth Benedict called them, are complementary and thus interconnected in their influence over society. Finally, culturalism sees individual consciousness itself as relative to and determined by the culture. Reality is seen, therefore, through the lens, so to speak, of the culture which, being self-created, is thus symbolic in its meanings and values.

Culturalism echoes (or perhaps creates) the “common sense” perspective about culture and cultures. But it has certain weaknesses and problems, not the least of which is that its pervasiveness promotes a persuasiveness that, not unlike ideology, can induce a false consciousness by which social issues are interpreted in a one-sided manner. And because teaching and schooling require socio-cultural interpretation, the limitations of the culturalist paradigm are of direct relevance to teachers. In general, then, the entire edifice of culturalism needs to be critically analyzed and put into rational perspective by music teachers.

For example, the emphasis on the essentialism and homogeneity of cultures is misleading for complex, pluralistic societies. According to sociologists Raymond Boudon and Francois Bourricaud (1989),

it is only at the price of a great over-simplification that we can admit the idea of common values and imagine that these values are more or less administered to all by way of socialization. In fact, individuals are never exposed to the culture of a society as such. That cul-

ture is already no more than a simplification and a rationalization produced by certain actors, such as priests, intellectuals, or, according to the case, some fraction of the elite. As for individuals, they undergo complex processes of apprenticeship the contents of which depend upon their environment, which is variable. That is why culturalists are obliged to introduce the idea of subculture to characterize the value systems appropriate to sub-groups. (Boudon and Bourri-caud, 95).

Likewise, the assumption that any given subculture is uniform in the homogeneity of its own essentialism is equally over-simplified. In the critical view, then, whatever values or traits may be held in common can often be quite superficial in terms of group identity. For example, the shared values associated with a certain ethnic or religious heritage are not necessarily the major or controlling factor in the lives of most people. And, in fact, individuals either tend to change group identity according to the situations in which they find themselves at the moment, or refuse easy typification.⁹

A second critical point is that the theory of the transmission of "cultural heritage" (or primary socialization) portends exactly the kind of law-like determinism that critical theory associates with the ideology of positivism. Culturalism thus rationalizes as somehow natural and unavoidable that normative cultural values are passed on intact to new generations and other newcomers. This "transmission" theory, then, implicitly recognizes the inevitability and thus the determinism of social or cultural conditioning. Taken literally in the common sense view, then, the individual has few or only inconsequential choices for personal agency. For culturalism, significant variation from cultural norms is seen as deviance or heresy, and most cultures actively work against the possibility of either individual freedom, or of consequential change in its institutional paradigms. Thus culturalism clearly has difficulty accounting for unmistakable examples of adaptive, ahistorical, asocial, transformative change where entirely new values arise and dictate a revolution of consciousness and practice. The value of such change should be apparent. It is of particular importance if schooling and teachers are to be seen as agents of social progress and individual empowerment rather than as 'establishmentarians' of the status quo controlled by a particular power elite, including those leading various minorities.

⁹ FOR EXAMPLE, AN AFRICAN AMERICAN CONCERT PIANIST MAY IDENTIFY WITH EURO-CENTRIC CONCERT MUSIC MORE THAN WITH RAP, SOUL, JAZZ OR RHYTHM AND BLUES, BUT CAN CONSCIENTIOUSLY SERVE ON AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMMITTEE THAT PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY GROUPS.

Finally, the holistic uniformity and essentialism of culture and cultural systems is greatly overstated. While reality is necessarily mediated by symbolic systems such as language, art or music, culture is not a signifying totality by which symbolic mediation is projected on its members *tout court*. "Apart from culture," then, "what must be called social reality also exists (Boudon & Bourricaud 1989, 97)," and in dealing with such reality, schools and teachers can be expected to mitigate, modulate and arbitrate competing cultural values. Thus rather than uncritically engaging in the sociocultural conditioning advocated by this or that cultural group, critical education puts the intentionality of human action at the center of its activities.

¹⁰ "ACTION" IS DISTINGUISHED IN PHILOSOPHY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN GENERAL, FROM THE BROADER SENSE OF "BEHAVIOR." ACTION IS INTENTIONAL; IT INVOLVES PURPOSES THAT SIGNIFY VALUES. IT IS A "TRYING TO" ACCOMPLISH CERTAIN ENDS OR VALUES. THUS ACTION IS BOTH MEANINGFUL AND LARGELY MINDFUL. BEHAVIOR, ON THE OTHER HAND, INVOLVES RESPONSES OR REACTIONS THAT ARE HABITUAL, REFLEXIVE OR PERFORMED WITHOUT MUCH THOUGHT OR PLANNING. THUS PERFORMING MUSIC IS AN (INTENTIONAL) ACTION THAT INVOLVES CONSIDERABLE (TRAINED) BEHAVIOR. SEE DIPERT (1993) FOR AN ANALYSIS IN RELATION TO THE ARTS.

¹¹ OBJECTIONS CONCERNING "THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY" ARE NOT AT STAKE HERE, ALTHOUGH DIPERT (1993) DEALS WITH SUCH OBJECTIONS SUCCESSFULLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ROLE OF INTENTIONALITY IN CREATING ART AND ARTIFACTS.

Intentionality involves a reaching out towards certain human needs that, while socially situated, need not be seen as culturally dictated or determined. While "behavior" can be conditioned, human *action* is, by definition, intentional and not determined by law-like forces.¹⁰ Intentionality can bypass simple social or cultural determinism and uniformity because it permits a reaching beyond ideological or otherwise socially dictated horizons. Among other things, this accounts precisely for significant differences between individual members within an identifiable subculture. And such individuation would seem to be a minimum condition for social products, each of which at some time had no precedent. And, indeed, it is precisely this intentional quality that has been identified with artists and artisans (Dipert 1993).¹¹

With these shortcomings and simplifications of culturalism in mind, then, music education and schools can be seen as agencies not simply of *transmitting* the traditions of institutional and cultural status quo—dominant or minority—, but of challenging, clarifying and mediating competing values with a view to *transforming* individuals and society. In this view, schooling would promote the kind of self-actualizing empowerment that frees the individual to go beyond socially limiting and dominating conditions through a productively pragmatic dialectic of the individual and society, the contingent and the universal. I shall return to these themes after turning to my second condition for a critical music education, which involves a significant reconsideration of music itself.

Praxial Music and Culturalism.

If we are to presume to teach something, we must be clear as to what "it" is. Therefore, even though music teachers feel that the answers are obvious, they need to ask, What is music?, When and how does it come into existence?, and What is music good for? Taking the nature and value of music for granted is dangerous because the public and politicians do not understand these issues in the same way, or at all! In fact, music education finds itself beset with a host of problems precisely to the degree it takes for granted the nature of music and its value to the individual and thus to society. Thus, as Swanwick recommends:

No credible theory of music education can be sustained without an insightful analysis of music as an essential strand in the fibre of human experience. No sensitive practice of music education can take place without at least an intuitive grasp of the qualitative nature of musical response. No effective policy-making on curriculum content and evaluation or student assessment can be managed without a conscious awareness of what is central to musical experience. (Swanwick 1988, 3)

To thus understand the nature and value of music in the most universal of human terms, music needs to be considered from the widest perspectives of its individual and social use. As ethnomusicologist John Blacking counseled:

By discovering precisely how music is created and appreciated in different social and cultural contexts, and perhaps establishing that musicality is a universal, species-specific characteristic, we can show that human beings are even more remarkable than we presently believe them to be . . . and that the majority of us live far below our potential, because of the oppressive nature of most societies. (Blacking 1973, 116)

And, as Blacking also points out, once we "know what sounds and what kinds of behavior different societies have chosen to call 'musical'" (5) then "we can no longer study music as a thing in itself" because "research in ethnomusicology makes it clear that musical

things are not always strictly musical, and that the expression of tonal relationships in patterns of sound may be secondary to extra-musical relationships which the tones represent (25).” The very concept of “music” thus profits from being considered from the perspective of ethnomusicology. “Attention to music’s function in society is necessary,” according to Blacking, if the musical structures themselves are to be understood and appreciated—even if we are interested mainly in what music *is* rather than what it is *used for* (26).

Blacking’s conclusions, of course, simply reinforce the general perspective of the sociology and anthropology of art and music (Kaemmer 1993; Blaukopf 1992; Layton 1991; Shepherd 1991; Zolberg 1990; Adorno 1976) and point to the need to make an important pragmatic distinction between an “aesthetic” philosophy of music and its value, and a “praxial” philosophy of music and its value (Regelski 1997; Elliott 1994). Traditional rationales for music education have focused almost exclusively on the idea of “aesthetic education.” The aesthetic paradigm for music education has achieved the kind of hegemony that in practice functions as an ideology. It asserts that the proper purpose of including music (and art) in schooling is to promote aesthetic responses. Music—at least “good music”—is seen as a Fine Art that exists to be listened to for its own sake rather than regarded as a social praxis. Thus it is defined as having a formal or expressive aesthetic essence which, when properly “school-*ed*,” is contemplated in a disinterested, “purely musical,” autonomous fashion, and results in an aesthetic response (Reimer 1970; 1989).

Against this view of music as a matter of aesthetic contemplation is what Alperson called “a praxial view of art.”

The praxial view of art resists the suggestion that art can be understood on the basis of some universal or absolute feature or set of features such as . . . aesthetic formalism. . . . The attempt is made rather to understand art in terms of the variety and meaning and values evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures. (Alperson 1991, 233)

Alperson does not argue that the idea of aesthetic *experience* in relation to works of art needs to be abandoned but, rather, that “*the*

truths and values of art are seen rather to be rooted in the context of human practices . . . , forms of human activity that are defined (in part) precisely in terms of the specific skills, knowledge and standards of evaluation appropriate to the practice (Alperson 1991, 233-34)."

Specialists in the visual arts have also questioned the premise of art as being for aesthetic contemplation according to contemporary sensibilities and definitions of Fine Art. For instance, one critic of the so-called 'culture' of Art museums, writes:

Virtually the only art made to be exhibited in galleries (as opposed to perhaps serving as decoration in galleries) is the art of our own recent history, that is, Western art since the late eighteenth century. In some measures, we have attributed to the art or artifacts of all times the qualities of our own: that its purpose is to be contemplated . . . Egyptian tomb furnishings and Renaissance altars—to say nothing of African art—are routinely exhibited in art museums without a clear examination of even the most basic questions: Can they be regarded as art in our sense? Were they made by people who thought of themselves in terms that correspond to our definition of "artist"? . . . We are too far from the voices of the original owners and makers, too locked into the perspectives of our own culture to presume to be faithful to the object in any exalted way. (Vogel 1990)

A similar challenge has been raised recently for music by calling into question the problematic idea of institutionalizing "masterworks" of musical "art" by enshrining them in museums called concert halls (Goehr 1990).

A praxial philosophy of music seeks instead to understand "just what music has meant to people, an endeavor which includes but is not limited to a consideration of the function of music in aesthetic context (Alperson 1991, 234)." Considered in this frame of reference, philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff considers "works of art" to be "objects and instruments of action. They are all inextricably embedded in the fabric of human intention. They are objects and instruments of action whereby we carry out our intentions with respect to the world, our fellows, ourselves, and our gods. Understanding art requires understanding art in man's life (Wolterstorff 1980, 3)." However, this does not mean making art so mundane that it is

meaningless. As Alperson writes,

the issue is not that of changing the emphasis from "high art" to "low art." The difference is more radical, since a praxial philosophy of music will consider the production, study and appreciation of music in contexts where the aesthetic qualities of music are less central to the practice, where we are thinking of music in the context of social rituals, the function of music as a heuristic device for scientific and philosophical theories, the use of music for the communication or enforcement of social norms, the use of music in music therapy, and so on. (Alperson 1991, 234)

The question, therefore, is not so much a question of What is good music? but, rather, What has music been found to be good for, and why? As social historian Christopher Lasch has written: "the artistic impulse has taken refuge in the rarefied realm of art for art's sake. It is no wonder that the fine arts have lost popular favor; nor are they likely to recover it by a last-minute attempt to make themselves useful. The issue is not how to make art useful but how to make useful activities artistic (Lasch 1984, 42)." Wolterstorff suggests this answer: "Serving as object of the action of contemplation is but one among other ways in which works or art enter, in fact and by intent, into the fabric of human action." More importantly, he adds, "works of art equip us for action. And the range of actions for which they equip us is very nearly as broad as the range of human action itself. The purposes of art are the purposes of life (Wolterstorff 1980, 4)."

A praxial philosophy thus understands music "in action," for in fact music is a praxis, an action, a 'doing' or 'making'. Thus "music" is best regarded not as a noun, or a collection of "works." It is a matter of "musicing" (Elliott 1991) in all its manifold forms and types, wherever it is found, under whatever conditions. A praxial philosophy of music, then, studies the varied forms, types and conditions under which "musicing" arises. By its very existence, musicing has self-evident value and purpose as human action and has a central role to play in life and education.

This necessitates broadening the concept of “music”¹² and its value beyond the currently institutionalized paradigms of ‘high’ Art and cultural elitism, or any other forms of sociomusical divisiveness or separatism, such as we find when, for example, it is asserted that “white musicians cannot play the blues in an authentic way ...” (Rudinow 1998, 161).¹³ Such a broader understanding of “music” and what it means in human life thus extends well beyond the aesthetic essentialism of autonomous music (Bowman 1994) to praxial musics—of all kinds and from many places—that are relative to human actions and thus human meanings.

It is not necessary to examine the musical life of every social group to discover in the broadest sense what music is good for? Anthropologists such as Alan Merriam (1964) have already done this. But such ‘goods’ should be kept in mind in any judgment of What is *good* music?, for—to paraphrase Forest Gump in the movie of the same name—good is as good does. Therefore “good” music can be determined only in connection with what it is “good for” and thus in terms of how well a particular music serves a particular human good. It is in this sense, then, that the “classics” are those that continue to serve certain human needs and interests that are seen to be good for the fullest realization of life. Rather than continuing to view musics on some sort of a vertical hierarchy, with aesthetic ‘high’ Art Music at the top and ‘low’ popular, ethnic or folk musics at the bottom, we should understand musics as arrayed along a horizontal continuum according to the wide variety of human ‘goods’ served by different musics.¹⁴

However, some ‘goods’ are deceptive and their uncritical acceptance can induce false consciousness. Thus critical theorists warn in particular against music becoming the focus of an institutionalized *culture industry* where cultural products become commodities sold simply for financial gain and acquired to show that one is “cultured,” and where the masses at any level of the socioeconomic ladder are kept in a state of false consciousness. This *commodification of culture* is at the heart of the pointed objections of early critical theorists to the use and abuse of music as a type of socioeconomic domination or control (Adorno 1976; 1973; 1967; Horkheimer 1992) and must always be guarded against.

¹² BECAUSE IT IS SO INTEGRAL A PART OF SOCIAL PRAXIS, MANY LANGUAGES DO NOT EVEN HAVE A SEPARATE WORD FOR “MUSIC.”

¹³ RUDINOW SUMMARIZES THE POSITION OF AMIRI BORAKA (LEROI JONES) IN THOSE WORDS, BUT PROVIDES SOMETHING OF A PRAXIAL ARGUMENT AGAINST SUCH ETHNOCENTRISM: “I THINK THAT IF WE WISH TO AVOID ETHNOCENTRISM, AS WE WOULD WISH TO AVOID RACISM, WHAT WE SHOULD SAY IS THAT THE AUTHENTICITY OF A BLUES PERFORMANCE TURNS NOT ON THE ETHNICITY OF THE PERFORMER BUT ON THE DEGREE OF MASTERY OF THE IDIOM AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERFORMER’S USE OF THE IDIOM IN PERFORMANCE.” (167)

¹⁴ FOR EXAMPLE (AND AT THE RISK OF OVERSIMPLIFYING WHAT THERE IS NOT SPACE ENOUGH TO ARGUE HERE), THE SO-CALLED “CLASSICAL CANON” CAN BE SEEN TO SERVE CERTAIN RATIOCINATED AND RATIOCINATING ‘GOODS’ OF A RATHER RESTRICTED BUT NONETHELESS IMPORTANT NATURE. SIMILARLY, WE MIGHT SEE ROCK MUSIC AS SERVING TO REAWAKEN THE ADOLESCENT IN ALL OF US AND JAZZ AS ALLOWING US TO SAVOR THE ‘GOOD’ OF REHEARSED SPONTANEITY. THEATER MUSIC, SUCH AS OPERA, BALLET AND MUSICAL SHOWS, OBVIOUSLY COMBINES MUSIC WITH OTHER EXPRESSIVE ‘GOODS’ AND SERVES AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PRAXIAL INTEREST THAN, SAY, CONCERT MUSIC OF ANY KIND. VARIOUS KINDS OF FOLK AND ETHNIC MUSIC, THEN, SERVE ‘GOODS’ ASSOCIATED WITH THE CUSTOMS OF SUCH GROUPS, AND ‘OCCASIONAL

MUSIC' WILL CONTINUE TO BE DRAWN FROM ALL SUCH SOURCES ACCORDING TO THE 'GOOD' SERVED BY THE OCCASION. THUS 'GOOD MUSIC' FOR WEDDINGS WILL BE MUSIC THAT SERVES THE PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS OR SOCIAL 'GOODS' INVOLVED.

¹⁵ SEE REGELSKI (IN PRESS) FOR DETAILS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A MUSICAL PRAXIS CONSIDERED AS A DISTINCT IDIOM VS. IN TERMS OF THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS THAT BRING FORTH VARIOUS IDIOMS, STYLES AND PREDICTABLE USES FOR MUSIC.

¹⁶ MORE SPECIFICALLY, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS NO CORRECT OR IDEAL VOCAL PRODUCTION. TONE IS CORRECT ACCORDING TO THE PRAXIS INVOLVED. THUS THE SINGING, SAY, OF THE JAPANESE NOH DRAMA IS ENTIRELY UNIQUE AND VALID IN COMPARISON TO A JAPANESE PERFORMER SINGING WESTERN OPERA OR ART SONG. EACH REQUIRES ITS OWN PRAXIALLY DISTINCT MUSICIANSHIP AND MUSICALITY.

¹⁷ THE CONCEPT OF "STYLE" IS ROOTED IN THE ASSUMPTIONS OF MUSIC-FOR-ITS-OWN-SAKE. IN FACT, MUSICAL "STYLE" IS TO CLAIMS FOR AUTONOMOUS "MUSIC" WHAT "SUBCULTURE" IS TO THE OVERSIMPLIFICATIONS OF "CULTURALISM." THUS THE NOH DRAMA AND WESTERN OPERA ARE NOT DIFFERENT "STYLES" (OR EVEN "TYPES") OF MUSIC; THEY INVOLVE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PRAXIS THAT ELICITS

Musical 'Goods' and the Determination of Musical Meaning.

That musics exist to serve human praxis of one kind or another, however, points to the importance of values or qualities that are relevant to a specific musical praxis. However, such praxially specific musical values should not be equated as being simply "styles" of performing, as though they are simply variant instantiations of "purely" artistic or musical qualities that are autonomous and thus transcendent. To the contrary, praxially specific values are those musical attributes that are most directly relevant to and thus inherent to a particular musical praxis. In this respect, a musical praxis is not some instantiation of a disembodied ideal of "music" that theories of "pure" aesthetic or musical qualities would have us believe.

Each praxis—whether considered as an idiom or style, or in terms of the purposes for which the musicing arises¹⁵—is unique in its particulars and meanings. Thus we should no more expect to hear a conservatory trumpet tone quality or static rhythm from a jazz performer than we would to hear a jazz sound or swinging rhythms from a soloist in Haydn's *Trumpet Concerto*—although Wynton Marsalis is able to negotiate the praxis of both with excellence—thereby giving warrant to this argument. Similarly, while Jessye Norman can be expected to use her considerable musical prowess in one way to serve the human meanings served by *Amazin' Grace* or spirituals, different purposes or 'goods' need to be served when singing opera or Mahler.¹⁶ The implications of this thinking for music education in schools and universities is considerable.

To begin with, music would be understood broadly as a praxis serving certain general and recurring human 'goods'—which is to say, the meaning and value of any music is inextricably tied to the human purposes served. Second, each musical praxis would be understood in terms of the musicianship and other musical demands of the 'goods' it serves; that is, by its praxially specific musical qualities, not those central to another praxis.¹⁷ For example, country fiddling would not be held up to conservatory standards, or vice versa. Third, sufficient musical competence with the particular musical values of any given praxis would be developed so that the student can be empowered fully enough to know of, choose and savor its 'goods'.¹⁸

Without the chance to improvise, for example, students are unlikely to learn of its virtues. Fourth, no particular 'good' would be typified as inherently better than other musical 'goods', at least as far as the sociology of music and musical valuing is concerned. Grand Opera, therefore, would not be seen as inherently better ('higher') than, say, Andrew Lloyd Weber. Fifth, qualitative distinctions can reasonably be made *within* a musical praxis and such comparisons might even be a reasonable component of the overall "esthetic"¹⁹ of 'goodness' involved. Thus the discrimination that a church choir performed the notes correctly with a pleasing tone and in tune is certainly a requirement of "good" church music. However, fixed hierarchies of value or general value typifications would be discouraged. Thus, for example, no claim would be made that "pure music"—viz., symphonic or chamber music—has more or better musical 'goods' than, say, opera with its entertaining plot, scenery and costumes—which is the snob appeal of the distinction some musicians make between 'opera lovers' and 'music lovers'.

Finally, and in consequence of the foregoing, a broad enough array of "other" musics should be sampled to a degree of reasonable competence in order for students to understand "their own music" *critically* in terms of its limitations and benefits as praxis. Here, "their own music" could mean the ethnic music that influenced their primary socialization (e.g., music associated with ethnic celebrations and customs); or it can refer to their present musical 'taste' for "youth" music, or whatever else they musically take for granted!

There are two separate but compatible warrants for musical breadth, and both follow from the idea of a *horizon* which, even in ordinary discourse, refers to a perspective beyond which one cannot possibly see. To begin with, for the same reason that travel in a foreign land can be educational, any musical 'horizon' is understood all the more profoundly when it is thrown into relief or comparison with another horizon (Blacking 1973, ix-x). Thus, "I understand the community, culture or tradition only in the 'moment' of doubt, dialogue, and question, that arises as my horizon meets the horizon that encircles the object of interpretation, be it a person, a culture, a text" (Pusey 1987, 61).

DISTINCT MUSICAL VALUES. THUS THEY ARE DISTINCT "MUSICS" NOT DIFFERENT STYLES OR TYPES OF "MUSIC."

¹⁹THIS SHOULD NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD AS ENTAILING THE NEED TO BECOME FULLY EXPERT IN A MUSICAL PRACTICE, OR TO EARN THE ROLE TYPIFICATION "MUSICIAN" IN ORDER TO BE MUSICALLY ACTIVE WITH AND FOR MEANING. CRITERIA OF EXCELLENCE SHOULD BE KNOWN AND PRACTICED TO A DEGREE NECESSARY TO SAVOR THE PRAXIS. THUS AN INDIVIDUAL NEED NOT BE ANY MORE A "PROFESSIONAL MUSICIAN" TO PLAY JAZZ FOR PERSONAL PLEASURE, SAY, THAN AN AMATEUR GOLFER NEEDS TO BE A PROFESSIONAL TO PLAY GOLF FOR RECREATION. TO A DEGREE, IN FACT, THE STATUS OF FALLING SHORT OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF 'PERFECTION' IN BOTH CASES IS PART OF THE INTENTIONALITY THAT KEEPS PEOPLE "PRACTICING," INCLUDING PROFESSIONALS. SEE REGELSKI (IN PRESS).

¹⁹ "THE ESTHESIC DIMENSION": [W]E DO NOT 'RECEIVE' A 'MESSAGE'S' MEANING... BUT RATHER CONSTRUCT MEANING, IN THE COURSE OF AN ACTIVE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS." "THE WORD 'ESTHESIC' WAS [PAUL] VALÉRY'S NEOLOGISM [COINED IN HIS INAUGURAL LECTURE FOR THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE IN 1945]... HE PREFERS IT TO 'AESTHETIC' IN ORDER TO AVOID POSSIBLE CONFUSIONS, AND ON SOUND ETYMOLOGICAL GROUNDS . . . ENJOYING, CONTEMPLATING OR READING A WORK, MUSICAL PERFORMANCE, AS WELL AS SCIENTIFIC AND ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO MUSIC ARE,

DE FACTO, SITUATED ON THE SIDE OF THE ESTHESIC." (NATTIEZ 1990, 12; ITALICS IN ORIGINAL)

²⁰ WHILE WE STAND TO GAIN THE MOST ACCORDING TO THE "STRANGENESS" OF THE MUSICS WE ENCOUNTER, WE ARE ALSO MOST LIKELY TO INTEGRATE MUSIC IN LIFE BY BEING ENABLED TO AVAIL OURSELVES OF THE KINDS OF MUSIC PRAXIS MOST ACCESSIBLE IN OUR SOCIETY. THUS A PRACTICABLE CRITERION FOR CURRICULUM WOULD BE TO WORK TOWARDS AN AWARENESS OF PRACTICABLE ALTERNATIVES FOR MUSICAL PRAXIS WITHIN OUR SOCIETY, MORE THAN TEACHING TOWARDS THE PRAXIS OF DISTANT SOCIETIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE SAME WAY A FOREIGN LANGUAGE IS LEARNED TO ADVANTAGE EVEN WITHOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF USE IN SITU, OTHER MUSICS CAN BE STUDIED TO ADVANTAGE—AGAIN, IF ONLY TO THROW INTO 'CRITICAL' RELIEF THE FAMILIAR MUSICS WE TAKE FOR GRANTED. AS THE 'WORLD' OF MUSIC BECOMES MORE INTERNATIONAL, HOWEVER, WE MAY REASONABLY EXPECT MORE AND MORE INTERPENETRATION OF MUSICAL THINKING, AND WITH IT CERTAIN MUSICAL PRAXES MAY ALSO SERVE UNIVERSAL HUMAN NEEDS IN ADDITION TO (OR MORE THAN) LOCAL ONES.

A second objective for reaching beyond current musical horizons is the benefit of tempting students with the possibilities that other musics hold forth additional and altogether different 'goods'.²⁰ Performing from contemporary graphic notation, for example, opens new musical possibilities for students at all levels. Such alternatives promise to increase the freedom and ability of students to choose to be involved with musics other than those they favored when they entered school. Such breadth of musical schooling, however embryonic or preparatory, prepares students to be more fully empowered as agents of their own musical destinies. Instead of being concerned with music that reinforces the *primary* socialization of students in the home, community and via the media, music teachers would instead be concerned with the kind of *secondary* socialization provided by schooling that increases musical options and thus the potential for active musical satisfaction in life. Schooling in music would enable students to understand the personal and genuinely human values lost when a musical culture becomes a cult and excludes more people than it includes.

Such a "cult-ification" of musics through the kind of rationalization that makes them economic commodities is exactly the problem critical theorists have seen (e.g., Zuidervaart 1991, 77-78 on Adorno) as illogical and ultimately irrational. It entails a loss of freedom both inside and outside the 'cult' or 'culture,'—and this is no less true of, say, Romanticism or raga than it is of reggae, rap or rock. Thus, as Swanwick writes in defense of understanding music from what he calls an "inter-cultural" perspective, "music is free to travel and, just like language, is continually being refashioned, adapted, reinterpreted—to create 'new human values', to 'organize thought', to 'transcend' the limits of local culture and personal self (Swanwick 1989, 111)." A praxial philosophy of music, however, also brings music back to earth from the lofty heights of aesthetic or purely musical abstraction and thus holds forth the promise, at least, of coming "to life" *in life* for students. With this "grounding," then, music is somewhat less free to travel in fact because it must traverse musical boundaries that, in defining each musical praxis, are somewhat similar to ethnic, racial, national and religious boundaries—and everyone knows the mischief those create!

Music as uniquely and universally human.

What it is to be human transcends any particular manifestation of being human. Thus every particular musical praxis reveals certain unique dimensions of humanness. Acknowledging this variety within in human unity is, however, not the same as acknowledging that musical values are fully autonomous and that by decontextualizing music it becomes universally accessible. Thus we can agree with Swanwick when he observes that music, like language, can “have some independence from social context.” But his further claim that, “in time the territorial origins of music lose their significance as musical process themselves become accepted on their own terms” (112) resembles claims made for the autonomy of aesthetic qualities and the transcendence of aesthetic experience.²¹ An uncritical acceptance of an idealist autonomy and transcendence for musical values uncritically results in rendering music in the abstract terms that risk making the study of it anesthetic.

The praxial view reveals, in part, that music and musical meaning exist and are powerful only to the degree that they are praxially situated. It is precisely the inherent relation to a particular praxis that determines the most profound relevance of any music. Therefore, the meaning of any music—the intentionality of its agency—is inextricably wed to praxially contingent musical values and procedures. These praxially contingent values and procedures are, however, variations on the theme of universal human musicality, just as writing systems have varied the universal human capacity for language-making and using. But even though the idiom-bound ideas and images of any language are not autonomous enough to be understood fully outside the praxis *in situ* of the language group, many are capable of being grasped to the benefit of outsiders—not in arbitrary translation, to be sure, but through a significant level of participation that reasonably approximates the intentionality of the praxis (e.g., reading literature in a second language).

The possibility that in some respect music can reach beyond a particular context needs to be acknowledged and explored. Otherwise music can only be regarded as absolutely situated and thus incapable of being understood or valued outside of the originating contexts (cultures, subcultures, etc.) that give rise to it²² —and this includes

²¹ THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EXISTENCE AND AUTONOMY OF PURELY “MUSICAL” AS OPPOSED TO PURELY “AESTHETIC” QUALITIES STILL MAINTAINS THE “PURITY” OR DISEMBODIMENT OF MUSICAL QUALITIES FROM PRAXIS. THIS CLAIM FOR MUSICAL ESSENTIALISM STILL DENIES THE PRAXIAL CONNECTIONS THAT ETHNOMUSICOLOGY DEMONSTRATES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT MUSICAL VALUES—INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WHAT SWANWICK CALLS “PROCEDURES”—THAT ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH PRAXIS CANNOT BE PUT TO OTHER PRAXIAL USES. HOWEVER, ONCE SUCH VALUES ARE THUS DECONTEXTUALIZED, THEY ARE NOT LONGER AUTHENTIC, NO LONGER MUSICALLY WHAT THEY WERE IN MEANING. SOMETIMES THIS CAN RESULT IN A NEW AND AUTHENTIC PRAXIS—FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE “BLUES” BECAME “JAZZ” OR WHEN “GOSPEL SONG” BECAME “SOUL.” BUT ALL ‘JAZZY’ MUSIC—WHERE JAZZ PROCEDURES ARE USED FOR OTHER PRAXIS, SUCH AS A FILM SCORE—IS NOT “JAZZ.” THIS DISTINCTION IS RELATED TO THE ISSUE ADDRESSED BRIEFLY IN N. 16 AND DESERVES ITS OWN SEPARATE ANALYSIS.

²² SEE THE ASSERTION QUOTED EARLIER THAT WHITE PEOPLE CAN’T PROPERLY PLAY THE BLUES; OR, FOR ANOTHER EXAMPLE, CONSIDER THE CLAIM THAT JAZZ BELONGS IN BARS AND IS NO LONGER “JAZZ” WHEN MADE IN A SCHOOL OR ON A CONCERT STAGE.

the Eurocentric canon. Thus, among other problems, it would never be possible to move any music out of one time, place, culture or sub-culture and into the classrooms of another except as the abstract study “about” musical praxis. No glimpse from “inside” the musical praxis or culture could ever be either given or gotten. And performance of, say, Balinese *gamelan*, Japanese *koto* or African drumming, would amount to musically “empty” forms of technical behavior—a mere invoking of the techniques without the musical meanings which are inevitably tied to the originating praxis. As Habermas, following Max Weber, has pointed out (see Pusey 1987, 47-60), the benefits of the rationalization by which science, learning, and art were set free of the control of princes and popes are nullified when such rationalization narrows our field of action to specialized fields pursued as technologies or techniques for their own sake—and this applies as well to music.

²³ SEE N. 5.

²⁴ SUCH A TECHNICAL MANUAL EXISTS (CHRISTOPHER Y. BLASDEL, THE SHAKUHACHI: A MANUAL FOR LEARNING TO PLAY SHAKUHACHI, TOKYO: ONGAKI NO TOMO SHAR CORP., 1988). THE ‘ART’ OF THIS INSTRUMENT, HOWEVER, SIMPLY CANNOT BE ATTAINED IN SEPARATION FROM THE TRADITION OF ZEN. CORRESPONDINGLY, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE STUDY OF THE INSTRUMENT UNDER PROPER CONDITIONS IS ONE AMONG SEVERAL WAYS OF ‘PRACTICING’ ZEN.

²⁵ THERE IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME MUSIC MIGHT BE SO CONTEXT-BOUND THAT IT CANNOT (OR SHOULD NOT) TRAVEL AT ALL. THE RARENESS OF SUCH MUSIC NO MORE DISCOUNTS THE PRESENT THESIS THAN THE RARENESS OF ‘PURE’ MUSICAL AUTONOMY JUSTIFIES AESTHETIC CLAIMS FOR THE AUTONOMY OF THE EUROCENTRIC CANON.

²⁶ I HAVE ARGUED ELSEWHERE (1996) THAT THE “CLASSICAL CANON” OF WESTERN MUSIC WAS IN FACT ORIGINALLY PRAXIAL AND DESPITE THE AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY ATTACHED TO IT, REMAINS PRAXIAL (1997).

On one hand, then, there is considerable truth in the notion that, as a Native American once told a group of music educators,²³ “You can never know what our *Song to the Homing Pigeon* means to my people.” Similarly, there probably is no way that certain African drumming and dancing can ever embody for non-indigenous Africans (including, by the way, African Americans) the musical meanings experienced even today from the hundreds of different tribal musics in Africa. On the other hand, no matter how well a Westerner learning the Japanese *shakuhachi* flute masters its technical demands,²⁴ no amount of abstract study about Zen can compensate for the praxial role of that instrument in the monastery culture. However, if that flute is used as a vehicle for the ‘practice’ of Zen “in action” (i.e., *Zen praxis*)—which is the only way a true knowledge of Zen is gained or used—, then some praxial musical meaning can arise. And, of course, a music can be “reconstructed” in terms of a re-situated or newly contextualized praxis; for instance, the uniqueness of, say, Finnish rap music.

The contextuality of music, thus, is not necessarily absolute or determinate, but familiarity with its originating conditions is essential.²⁵ Thus we must seek the musical meaning reasonable to the praxis. Appropriating music to strictly musical ends falsifies it and denies its true human significance.²⁶ Thus the music of the *shakuhachi* flute is inherently, which is to say praxially, “meditative” in the same way

that a certain kind of African drumming is “hypnotic” or “trance-inducing.” Whether playing or listening, then, the musical meaning of either is lost if the music is attended to or produced with the disinterested, rationalizing, discriminating, intellectualizing contemplation advocated by either aesthetic or “purely musical” theories of meaning. Furthermore, the experience of listening to (or watching) a Japanese drumming ensemble, such as “Kodo,” in concert is likely to be entirely different than the meanings experienced by the performers.²⁷ The same distinctions between the different values experienced by performers and audiences can often apply, though in different ways and degrees, to all kinds of “concert music,” including (maybe especially) the “classical” canon of western Art Music.²⁸

²⁷ THIS GROUP IS NOT SIMPLY AN ASSEMBLAGE OF “PROFESSIONAL” PERFORMERS; RATHER, IT IS A GROUP WHOSE MEMBERS SHARE A VERY INTENSE LIFE WORLD WHERE DRUMMING IS PRACTICED AS A “SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE” OR “SPIRITUAL PRAXIS” (VIZ., AS “-DO” IN JAPANESE) IN THE SAME WAY, AS, IN MARTIAL ARTS SUCH AS JU-DO AND AI-KI-DO. THUS WHILE “CONCERTS” MAY BE “PERFORMANCES” IN TERMS OF AUDIENCE INTENTIONALITY, THEY ARE ALSO IMPLICATED WITH A CERTAIN SPIRITUAL INTENSITY AND INTENTIONALITY ON THE PERFORMER’S PART. THE SAME CAN BE AT STAKE IN, FOR EXAMPLE, “SECULAR” CONCERT PERFORMANCES BY GOSPEL CHOIRS (A VIDEO OF ONE SUCH PERFORMANCE SHOWS SOME “PERFORMERS” WITH TEARS BROUGHT ON BY RELIGIOUS FERVOR DESPITE THE SECULAR CONTEXT).

²⁸ AND THIS IS THE CASE, I WOULD ARGUE, EVEN WHERE THE LISTENER IS AN EXPERT PERFORMER WHO AT THE MOMENT IS ENGAGED IN THE DIFFERENT PRAXIS OF “JUST LISTENING” AS A MEMBER OF AN AUDIENCE (SEE REGELSKI, IN PRESS).

²⁹ FROM THE PRAXIAL VIEW, AT LEAST, A GREATER CAPACITY FOR SUCH ‘DECONTEXTUALIZATION’ (I.E., “RATIONALIZATION” AS WEBER [1958] CALLED IT) DOES NOT INFER GREATER ‘GOODNESS’ IN ANY ABSOLUTE SENSE. IT ONLY MEANS THAT SUCH MUSIC—E.G., THE EUROCENTRIC CANON—IS MORE ABSTRACT AND THUS INHERENTLY MORE REMOTE FROM THE EVERYDAY LIVES OF MOST INTELLIGENT PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT “INSTITUTIONALIZED” OR OTHERWISE ACCUL-

On the other extreme, if the contextuality of music is understood as absolute, as though nothing of musical value or interest could transcend the situated praxis; or if the value of a music is said to reside solely in the benefits it confers to institutionally or culturally embedded individuals; then music would be culture-bound and altogether inaccessible to others. But in fact many musical values or features that arise in connection with a musical praxis are not necessarily exclusive to that practice. Therefore some reasonable degree of transcendence from the particulars of time and place is probable and such values can sometimes serve similar or even other musical ‘goods’ in other contexts, for other peoples.²⁹ For example, following the music of “Kodo” or the *shakuhachi* flutist, we might re-conceive (i.e., re-cognize) music as a meditative type of praxis or spiritual discipline that involves a ‘loss of self’ or individual ego; where, in other words, music is valued as an ‘altered state of consciousness’ precisely because it avoids the analytic abstractions and rationalizations (Weber 1958) of estheticians, music theorists and historians.³⁰ The possibility is worth considering, in fact, that students and other neophytes may initially experience some enticing degree of such meditative enchantment from music until pedantry gets in their way; then many quickly lose further interest.³¹ This is not to deny an important role for the mindfulness appropriate to any praxis. In fact, the “practicing” of just such musical values is what enables the individual to transcend those aspects of Self that are otherwise limiting, and thus to glimpse or share in a humanness that is more social, more universal.

TURATED. IT IS AN ACQUIRED AND PRACTICED "TASTE" (ANALYZED IN SUCH TERMS, FOR EXAMPLE, BY WENGERER 1992) NOT A TRANSCENDENTAL "GOOD" AND IS NO 'FINER' THAN THE REFINEMENT AND DISCERNMENT AVAILABLE WITH ANY PRAXIS. A FURTHER ISSUE CONCERNING THE CANON WOULD BE TO DETERMINE TO WHAT DEGREE, IF AT ALL, SUCH "CLASSY" MUSIC WAS EVERY A MATTER OF "DISINTERESTED" CONTEMPLATION, OR WHETHER, AS I HAVE ARGUED (1996), THAT IT HAS TO SOME DEGREE ALWAYS SERVED A PRAXIAL SOCIAL FUNCTION, ESPECIALLY FOR THE SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS AND VALUES OF THE RISING MIDDLE CLASS—AND ASIDE FROM ITS "RATIONALIZATION" BY AND FOR PROFESSIONAL MUSICIANS (WHICH, IN ANY CASE, CAN ALSO BE SEEN IN PRAXIAL TERMS AS THE "SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY" [BERGER AND LUCKMAN 1967]).

³⁰ SOME WARRANT FOR THE 'MEDITATIVE' ROLE OF MUSIC CAN BE ADDUCED FROM THE WIDESPREAD USE WITH UNIVERSITY MUSIC STUDENTS OF BOOKS SUCH AS ZEN AND THE ART OF ARCHERY, BY EUGENE HERRIGEL, AND MANY OTHERS THAT TAKE THE SAME 'MEDITATIVE' OR 'RIGHT BRAIN' APPROACH TO PERFORMANCE PEDAGOGY. HOWEVER, THE "NO-MIND" OF ZEN SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH A "MINDLESS" COMATOSE STATE OR SHEER AUTOMATICITY OF RESPONSIVENESS. RATHER, IT IS INTENSELY

The Universal-Relative Dialectic and Music.

The point of musical schooling, then, would be to engage students in one or more musical practices in a way and to the degree that dysfunctional musical exclusivity is minimized or avoided. For example, since most music outside the European canon is not notated, any student can profit from significant musical praxis that does not involve a score. Similarly, practicing the social instruments used in particular forms of musical praxis also allows entirely new insights that can benefit the musical and thus human sensibility of any student. Thus we can agree with Swanwick that the goal of music curriculum should be "not to transmit an arbitrary or limited selection of idiomatic values but to break out of 'restricted worlds of culturally defined reality'" and to promote instead the "imaginative criticism [that] is the special task of formal education: bringing ideas to consciousness, asking questions, probing, trying things out (Swanwick 1988, 115, 117)."

One additional role for the music teacher, then, is to function as a cultural critic and mediator (Nadanner 1985) in helping students learn "what is universal to human existence" on a transcultural or pansocial level (Hamblen 1986). As one arts educator has pointed out:

[A] universal-relative dialectic exists between what is universal and what is relative in art. This dialectic generates that valuable paradox of 'enlarging the range of our recognition of human sameness as it appears in human differences'. (Hamblen 1986 quoting Redfield 1971)

Some human experiences are more or less universal and are suited to being embodied through art (Blacking 1973, 112-13). As Blacking writes,

we shall learn more about music and human musicality if we look for basic rules of musical behavior which are biologically, as well as culturally, conditioned and species-specific. It seems to me that what is ultimately of most importance in music cannot be learned like other cultural skills: it is there in the body, waiting to be brought out and developed, like the basic principles of language formation. (Blacking 1973, 100)

Human experience is doubtlessly “processed” or otherwise “filtered” or influenced by uniqueness of the environment and other situational variables (Hamblen, 73, 75-76; Bruteau 1979). These result in praxial and other contingent distinctions. However,

[u]niversal themes, qualities, and functions should be studied as to how they relate to and satisfy needs common to all humans. . . Cultural interpretations and responses to art should be studied as a function of socially learned expectations. . . The universal aspects of a cross-cultural arts form are most easily accessible, cultural aspects less so, studying art as a discipline in a particular culture even less so, and so on. (Hamblen 1986, 73-74)

Thus, Blacking is correct at least in one sense when he affirms that, “music *can* transcend time and culture” because, “at the level of deep structures in music there are elements that are common to the human psyche, although they may not appear in the surface structure.” (1973, 108-09; his emphasis).

While “teachers cannot be expected to be skilled in all the musics of the world,” as Swanwick points out, “they must be sensitive to many and skilled in at least one.” Such musical sensitivity, he notes, arises from “receptive attention coupled with an understanding of the universality of musical practice and a recognition that idiomatic variations arise out of a common human theme, best rendered as a verb, an impulse ‘to music’ (Swanwick 1988, 116).” This brings us once again to Elliott’s description of “musicing”—in other words, it brings us to music as praxis. To be musically educated is thus to have been granted the possibility of choice of personally meaningful musical praxis. Only then, through the choice of musical action, can music “come to life” or, more precisely, back to the life that is its and our source of Being.

Conclusions

Habermas, particularly in his later writings, has seen art as a significant example of social logic and communicative rationality that is the antithesis of technicist positivism.³² Just as language is used on the assumption of the rational competence of other people, so Habermas sees art and music as being made and used on the rational

MINDFUL, BUT IN A NON-EGO FOCUSED WAY.

³¹ THUS STUDENTS OF ANY AGE WHO UNDERTAKE THE SELF-STUDY OF AN INSTRUMENT RARELY QUIT. AND BECAUSE SUCH INSTRUMENTS (E.G., PIANO, GUITAR, HOME ORGAN, ELECTRONIC KEYBOARDS, MANDOLIN, OCARINA, DULCIMER, AUTOHARP, ACCORDION, ETC.) CAN BE LEARNED WITH SELF-SUFFICIENT ENJOYMENT, THEY CONTINUE TO BE PLAYED IN LARGER NUMBERS THAN INSTRUMENTS THAT REQUIRE ACCOMPANYING PARTS FOR SATISFACTION.

³² HOW IRONIC THAT SUCH POSITIVISM HAS ATTAINED IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY IN MUSIC EDUCATION RESEARCH, PARTICULARLY IN NORTH AMERICA.

assumption of its sociality. Music has the advantage of lacking the discursive and propositional knowledge of language but is nonetheless rational in its production and in the social rationality it elicits from other humans. Thus Habermas sees it and the other arts as exemplars of what is most rationally human and possible. However, he seeks to reverse the rationalization that has resulted in music becoming so autonomous and regulated by abstract norms that it excludes rather than includes meaningful praxis in life. To him, such exclusion of lifeworlds is the epitome of irrational thinking. Therefore, much like Dewey, he seeks a rational reintegration of art and life. It is this aspect of his critical theory applied to problems of multicultural music that suggests some directions school-based music teaching can take to make a *critical* human difference.

First, a music teacher should be an effective cultural mediator. Thus, rather than subscribe to or prescribe a curriculum that leaves ethnocentric assumptions unchallenged, the music teacher should “be sensitive to the relationship between cultural and social forces experienced by . . . students” and should “help students negotiate for themselves the most appropriate interaction between home culture and the dominant society (Nadanner 1985; 52).” Second, the music teacher should ‘practice’ the conditions of a critical theory of education. These require a capacity for successful analysis and a critical awareness of the limiting and narrowing influences of institutionalized cultural traditions and ethnocentric assumptions. Third, music educators should model and promote tangible musical learning that is “in the best sense of the term re-creational: helping us and our cultures to become renewed, transformed” (Swanwick 1989, 119) through the vitality of its applicability to individual musical praxis. Fourth, the music teacher should approach music in all its varied and rich manifestations throughout the world as a vital materialization of human action—of humans Being and Becoming—which embraces all forms of musical praxis as potentially valuable, including but not restricted to the practice of “just listening” (Regelski 1998). Finally, music teachers should advance a dynamic musical pluralism that deals productively with the creative tension and “nervous wariness” (Smith 1983, 27) brought about by encountering unfamiliar musics and cultures. Thus music teachers need to constantly concern themselves directly with the dialectic of the universal-relative meanings of music, and especially with the dialectic

of understanding self through understanding others. These steps would go a long way towards the integration of music in life that Habermas sees as the foundation for living life fully and rationally.

As musical horizons become more comprehensive or inclusive, they become or more humanly rational and profound. Only then can the particularity of contingent situatedness and cultural exclusiveness give way to a consensual world of meaning that is ever-wider in scope. I hope this vision is tempting enough to lure us away from the present tendency toward increased cultural isolation and exclusiveness by the uncritical acceptance of the multicultural bandwagon.

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Tiivistelmä

Monikulttuurisuus musiikkikasvatuksessa on laajasti kannatettu, mutta varomattomasti itsestäänselvänä pidetty. Sen tärkeys yhteiskunnalle edellyttää, että tarkastellaan kriittisesti kulturalismin teoriaa johon monikulttuurisuus nojaa. Jürgen Habermasin ja muiden kriittinen teoria pitää yksilöiden elämismaailman ja heidän erilaisten kulttuuristen tulkintojensa ymmärtämistä tärkeänä. Se kuitenkin pitää sisällään myös ajatuksen, että ei-reflektiiviseen subjektiviteettiin tyytyminen johtaa vallitsevien ja ajattelua kontrolloivien ideologisten vaikutusten vuoksi helposti itsepetokseen, väärään tietoisuuteen ja vapauden katoamiseen. Näin 'alakulttuurien' halu vapautua dominoivien ryhmien alistamisesta voi johtaa sekä siihen että alistetaan yksilöt heidän alakulttuurinsa ideologialle että alakulttuurien ylimustasukkaiseen kilpailuun legitimoida omat intressit. Opetussuunnitelma on tällöin joko tämän tai tuon ryhmän taistelukenttä, tai että tämän tai jonkin toisen musiikin sisällyttäminen siihen on vain symbolista ja näin ollen keinotekoista. Erityisesti Habermas on kritisoinut sitä, että elämismaailma kolonialisoidaan autonomiseksi, kilpaileviksi vaikutusvallan ja dominaation alueiksi päätyen etsimään sen sijaan käytännöllistä rationaalisuutta, jonka avulla voidaan saavuttaa yleisiä inhimillisiä tarpeita ja intressejä koskeva yksimielisyys. Kasvatuksen "kriittinen teoria" etsii tällöin yleistä perustaa ja vastustaa sosiaalista fragmentoitumista. Tämän henkinen kriittinen kasvatus vastustaa ylivaltaa tai sortoa minkään ryhmän puolelta tai sitä kohtaan. Se myös vastustaa sellaisia alakulttuurien vaateita, jotka johtavat toisten vaikutuksenalaisten alakulttuurien itsemäärityksen katoamiseen. Kriittinen kasvatus myös ohjaa oppilaat vastustamaan heidän oman alakulttuurinsa dominaatiota. Musiikkikasvatuksen tehtävänä on tällöin kytkeä oppilaat yhteen tai useampaan musiikilliseen käytöntöön sillä tavalla ja syvyydellä, että epäfunktionaalinen musiikillinen eriytyminen ja kapea-alaisuus minimoidaan tai vältetään. Kriittinen musiikkikasvattaja on tietoinen institutionalisoituneiden kulttuuristen traditioiden ja etnosentristen oletusten rajoittavista ja kapeuttavista vaikutuksista ja palvelee kulttuurisena kriitikkona ja välittäjänä. Tällöin musiikki ei ole itseriittoinen kulttuurinen tuote vaan musisoinnin prosessi, jonka kautta yksilö uudistetaan ja jonka kautta yhteiskuntaa samalla transformoidaan.

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AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: A PROBLEM IN PRAXIALISM

Meanings do not travel with words. An expression is often used quite differently in different contexts and by different writers. This holds also for the term 'aesthetic experience'. Roughly speaking there are two kinds of conceptions of aesthetic experience which I call Kantian and Deweyan.

By Kantian conception of aesthetic experience I mean disinterested pleasure aroused by something beautiful (Kant 1978, A 16/B 16). Kant looked for subjective generality that is not based on concepts (ibid., A 18/B 18). This kind of aesthetic experience is also transcendental in the sense that the ability to judge something to be beautiful transcends sense-experience. Generally speaking transcendentalism means that there are formal structures of reason and understanding, concepts and categories, which determine our ways of experiencing the world and our habitual behaviour. The formal structures are first, *a priori*, and the experienced world (or the world as experienced) is constituted by virtue of these structures. The reason is independent of any sensual conditions, and that is why it is called pure.

Deweyan naturalism is an opposite conception. Our rational abilities must have an explanation that is based on natural and cultural evolution. The nature is first and we as thinking beings are still natural beings. Culture is a phenomenon created by natural beings. Reason does not transcend sense experience in Kantian sense. Formal structures of reason, our conceptual capacities are not independent, they have their origin in our interaction with the natural environment which, during the emergence of human culture, has changed into a combination of natural and cultural environment. (See Dewey 1984.)

The conception of aesthetic experience that is formulated in the framework of this kind of naturalism cannot be based on transcendental conditions of perception. From this point of view it is a directly opposite notion to the Kantian view. But this is also the point where the clear differences stop and confusions begin to emerge.

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Kant insisted that the pleasure arisen by beauty should be disinterested pleasure. One reason for this is, apparently, the strive to get aesthetic judgement on a transcendental *a priori* basis. Also John Dewey speaks about disinterested pleasure but on a completely different ground. According to Dewey an aesthetic experience is not subordinated to operational thinking. It is a consummatory experience, an end in itself and not a means for some other experiences. There is an element of fulfilment in it. But there is no element of transcendentality in the Kantian sense on the word. It is a good experience that is desired for its own sake.

Dewey emphasizes particularly that not absence of desire and thought “but their thorough incorporation into perceptual experience characterizes aesthetic experience, in its distinction from experiences that are especially ‘intellectual’ and ‘practical’” (Dewey 1980, 254). The desires are fulfilled in the perception itself (*ibid.*). Dewey mentions features like cumulation, tension, conservation, anticipation and fulfilment as formal features of an aesthetic experience (*ibid.*, 145) and defines form as the operation of foreseen fulfilment (*ibid.*, 137). In an aesthetic experience there is the sense of qualitative unity (*ibid.*, 136), it is *an* experience.

Detachment from operational thinking does not entail detachment from practical activity in general. It does not entail some kind of escape into independent pure consciousness. Dewey maintained (Dewey 1946, 18) that meaning is use. The child learns the meaning of a hat by learning to use it. And in the same way the child learns the meaning of the word ‘hat’, by learning to use it. Every perceptual experience is intellectually interpreted, and this takes place with the help of meanings. The meanings attached to an aesthetic experience as a perceptual experience are basically habits of action, use. The interpretation takes place in a framework of the practical social world because that’s where the meanings reside.

Dewey’s Aristotelian background

Dewey’s conception has its roots. He criticized Aristotle in many ways, but there are also similarities, especially in the analysis of human practical activity.

Aristotle's philosophy is thoroughly teleological. Movement and change are always directed to a goal, *telos*. Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis* is based on this notion. He said that in *poiesis*, productive activity, the *telos* is separate from the activity itself (Aristotle 1925, 1140b6-7). A boat, for instance, is the *telos* of the activity of building the boat. In *praxis*, on the other hand, the *telos* is the activity itself. *Praxis* is something that is done for the sake of the *praxis* itself.

The highest *telos* for human beings is, according to Aristotle, good life, happy life (ibid., 1097a30-1097b8). To have a good and happy life is the best *praxis*. There is no purpose of life that would "transcend" the life itself. And one element of happy life is to have good experiences. Aristotle mentions things like friendship, political life (which in those days meant something quite different), justice and enjoyment. Aristotle realized that good experiences may be different. The word 'good' has many uses like the word 'to be' (ibid., 1096a23-25). Separate and self-sufficient good, if there were such a thing, cannot be reached (1096b31-35). Therefore happiness is the only perfect goal that is selected for its own sake. It makes life worth living (ibid., 1097b15). Aristotle appreciated most of all theoretical contemplation, but Dewey criticized this kind of separation of theory and practice.

Aesthetic experiences as defined by Dewey are good examples of that what makes life worth living, what makes people happy. There are thus historical grounds for maintaining that Dewey's philosophy of art can be called praxialism in the same sense as this term has been used in recent discussion in philosophy of music and music education. Dewey's notion of aesthetic experience is, when applied to music, in accordance with for example Thomas Regelski's characterization that praxially, music is "good time" (Regelski 1996, 36). Also David Elliott's emphasis on flow experiences is in accordance with Dewey's conception.

Recent controversies

Praxial philosophers of music have been very critical to what they call aesthetic ideology. According to Elliott this ideology entails autonomy of the individual, irrelevance of the individual's back-

ground, stripping of all social and practical links in the purpose of entering the *quasi-religious* realm of aesthetic experience (Elliott 1995, 23-25). Aesthetic ideology also “posits a fictional object that exists in an ideal world apart from any physical score and any single performance of that score” (ibid., 25-26). Regelski refers to “some kind of transcendent aesthetic response from musical *qualia*” (Regelski 1996, 34). In contrast to this they want to consider music as a situated phenomenon, as a part of human social life in general.

This criticism applies to the Kantian notion of aesthetic experience. But it is not necessary to be a neo-Kantian in order to discuss aesthetic experiences. Dewey certainly was not. And if this point is neglected, the criticism may go astray. If someone uses the expression in Deweyan sense, there is no point in criticizing this person for being a transcendentalist. Elliott quotes Reimer: “Aesthetic experience serves no utilitarian purpose. It is experience for the sake of experience in and of itself” (Elliott 1995, 36). I am not going to discuss whether Reimer is a transcendentalist or not. The point is that this quotation is not enough to prove that he is. These words as such can be interpreted to say the same thing as Dewey: People go to concerts in order to have good experiences. Some people call them aesthetic experiences, some people don't. These experiences are not means for further experiences in the same sense as the experience of buying a ticket is a means. People usually do not go to concerts because they want to have ticket buying experiences. This distinction does not prevent Dewey from saying that art serves life, education, personal growth and other things that are familiar from Elliott's book.

There are also problems arising from different uses of the term “transcendent”. In his recent book Keith Swanwick takes a definition from a general dictionary according to which to transcend means simply to rise over, to go beyond some limits (Swanwick 1999, 28). This definition has, unfortunately, only nominal connection to the philosophical use of the term described above. He runs the risk for being criticized to maintain a transcendental (Kantian) notion of aesthetic experience. However, after trying to find out what he really means by the term one might come to the conclusion that he is more close to the Deweyan notion. He points out that the concept of flow experience, that is widely used by Elliott and others, and the notion

of aesthetic experience he wants to apply are quite similar to each other. It is, of course, a confusion to identify the flow experience with the Kantian notion of aesthetic experience, as Regelski has pointed out (Regelski 1996, 36), but Dewey's notion is a different issue.

Dewey and praxialism

Dewey seems to be more praxialist than the praxialists themselves. Elliott identifies mind with brain and shares therefore some of the background assumptions of Kantian transcendentalism: mind and meanings (contents of thought) are separated from the external world, they are located "in the head" (see Määttänen 1998). To use Elliott's words, they are stripped of all their social and practical links to the world. This framework of discussion is basically Cartesian (see Määttänen 1995, Chapter 5). Mind functions for a while, and gives the orders to the body. One might have expected that if a praxialist emphasizes the situated and practical nature of musical thinking, then he would use the same approach to all thinking. Why is "knowing-in-action" important only for musical knowledge and not for knowledge in general?

Dewey was of the opposite opinion. He maintained that thought cannot be separated from external action, practice. Mind is a capacity developed by a natural being in its interaction with the natural (and social) environment (Dewey 1984). For Dewey meaning is use. These notions are necessarily tied with social practice. This holds, of course, also for musical meanings (see Määttänen & Westerlund 1999). The "praxial" nature of music can in a natural way be analysed in the context of "praxial" cognition in general. Musical meanings are not separated artificially from other meanings.

Dewey can thus be said to be a protopraxialist before the contemporary praxialists. He is more consistent in his views about the relationship between thinking and practice, and his notion of aesthetic experience has its roots in Aristotle's conception of *praxis*.

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Tiivistelmä

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Esteettinen kokemus on kantilaisittain ymmärrettynä pyyteetöntä ja älyllistä, elämän yläpuolelle nousevaa, puhtaan kauneuden tuottamaa mielihyvää. Musiikin filosofiasta kirjoittaneet praksialistit ovat esittäneet oikeutettua kritiikkiä tätä käsitystä vastaan ja luopuneet tällä perusteella esteettisen kokemuksen käsitteestä. John Deweyn mukaan esteettisen kokemuksen pyyteettömyys tarkoittaa vain sitä, että se ei ole väline joidenkin muiden kokemusten saavuttamiseksi, se on jotakin jota tavoitellaan vain sen itsensä vuoksi. Optimaalinen kokemus (flow experience), jota praksialistit tarjoavat kantilaisen estetiikan sijaan, on varsin lähellä Deweyn tarkoitusperiä. Deweyn käsityksillä on myös aristoteeliset juurensa, aivan kuten praxialisteillakin.

PRAGMATISM, ART, AND THE REAL WORLD

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine the way in which pragmatist theories of art can be, or ought to be, realistic – though not realistic in any strong metaphysical sense.¹ I argue that artworks should be understood as (1) being parts of the real world, i.e., emergent cultural constructs embodied in material nature; as (2) referring to, or representing, reality (though not exactly in the way in which we take scientific theories or everyday beliefs to be representing reality); and, more reflexively, as (3) being (sometimes) used to intervene in the realism issue itself through problematizing our human ways of representing and cognizing the real world. Here, (3) in particular explicates what I take to be the philosophical relevance of (at least some) works of art. Like transcendental philosophical theories, certain conceptually complex artworks may reflexively investigate the nature and limits of our representations of the world and, hence, their own representational (or non-representational) features. The form of realism applied to art in the pragmatist approach I shall outline is both ontological, epistemological, and semantic; as a truly pragmatic doctrine, this kind of moderate realism should always remain subordinated to pragmatism. In my view, pragmatism functions here as a meta-level (transcendental) standpoint within which it is possible to be a realist about art (or about many other things as well) – roughly in the sense in which it is possible to be an “empirical realist” about the natural world within Kantian “transcendental idealism”.

Section 2 below will be devoted to point (1) and section 3 to points (2) and (3). Finally, in section 4, I shall briefly discuss Joseph Margolis’s ideas as an example of the kind of pragmatist position I try to formulate. The chief issue with which I am concerned is, thus, the ontology of art in a pragmatist framework. Above all, I wish to emphasize the ontological seriousness of pragmatist theorizing about art, while abandoning all forms of metaphysical realism² that take artworks to exist (or to fail to exist) “in themselves” or “as

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¹ ON PRAGMATIC REALISM ABOUT ART, CF. FURTHER PIHLSTRÖM (1996), CH. 5.2, AND (1998), CH. 9.5. THIS PAPER IS PARTLY BASED ON AND OVERLAPS THESE EARLIER WORKS OF MINE.

² THE NOTION OF “METAPHYSICAL REALISM” IS HERE USED IN A RATHER PEJORATIVE SENSE, THOUGH I SHALL MAKE NO DETAILED ATTEMPT TO DEFINE IT. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN METAPHYSICAL AND INTERNAL (OR PRAGMATIC) REALISM HAS, AS IS WELL KNOWN, BEEN FORMULATED BY HILARY PUTNAM IN THE 1970S AND 1980S. INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO SHOW THAT METAPHYSICAL REALISM IS FALSE (OR, BET-

TER, MEANINGLESS), I SHOULD LIKE TO REFER TO PUTNAM'S WORKS (IN WHICH ART IS NOT TOO MUCH DISCUSSED, THOUGH) AND MY EARLIER CRITICAL DISCUSSIONS OF THEM: CF., E.G., PUTNAM (1978), (1992), AND (1994), AS WELL AS PIHLSTRÖM (1996) AND (1998).

such". In this respect, as we shall see, Margolis's otherwise admirably pragmatist views are somewhat problematic, too.

A final cautionary remark is in order before I begin. Obviously, I cannot hope to *prove* that pragmatism is correct either as a general philosophical position or as a theory of art. Rather than actually defending pragmatism in any systematic way in this paper, I wish to adopt it as my starting point and remind pragmatist theorists of art about the unavoidability of ontological issues and of the transcendental issue of realism, in particular. Whether such an ontologically loaded species of pragmatism (and its linkage to realism) is fruitful or not remains for others to judge. The "truth" of this philosophical view should be tested by its pragmatic outcome – in this case, by its relevance in understanding art and the artworld.

Art as a Part of the Real World

Realistic ontologies of art are sometimes formulated in terms of Karl Popper's notion of "World 3". With this concept, Popper means to designate the world of human-made cultural artefacts that are not reducible either to the physical world (World 1) or to the subjective states of individual minds (World 2).³ The key idea here is that works of art, as cultural entities irreducible to mental states or to physical objects and events but nevertheless "embodied" in physical nature and requiring human mental action in order to exist, ought to be regarded as World 3 entities, roughly in the sense in which scientific theories, natural numbers, or societies and institutions are taken to exist in World 3.

³ POPPER HIMSELF DOES NOT DISCUSS ART IN ANY DETAIL. ON WORLD 3, SEE, E.G., NIINILUOTO (1999); CF. ALSO PIHLSTRÖM (1996), CH. 5. WE SHOULD NOT TAKE THE POPPERIAN THREE-WORLD ONTOLOGY TOO LITERALLY; IT IS, RATHER, ONLY A HEURISTIC TOOL TO BE USED IN ORDER TO EMPHASIZE THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF THE MENTAL AND CULTURAL "LEVELS" OF EXISTENCE.

Although the Popperian framework is by no means universally accepted, closely related theories of art have been in circulation. Among relatively recent theorists, Arthur Danto (1981, ch. 6) and Arto Haapala (1989, ch. 5) regard *interpretation* as a criterion of the existence and identity of a work of art. Artworks exist only as interpreted. This view can easily be accepted from the point of view of pragmatism and Popperian World 3 ontology: without an "art-world", a social institution or practice within which works are created, received, interpreted, and assessed as works of art, there could be no works of art at all. There would, as Danto argues, only be commonplace objects – say, pieces of matter instead of sculptures or

paintings, sounds in the air instead of symphonies, material copies of books and manuscripts instead of poems or novels. The existence of such works *as* works of art necessarily presupposes a complex network of socio-cultural relationships on the cultural level of World 3, irreducible to Worlds 1 and 2. This context, in which all interpretive communication and interaction takes place, enables the entity manifested in material and mental reality to emerge as a cultural entity, as a work of art. As cultural entities, works of art, together with their interpretatively relevant structural features, belong to World 3.⁴

Even though Danto and other historically oriented philosophers of art (or most pragmatists, for that matter) do not want to use these terms, we may say that a historically changing interpretative context is *constitutive* of art in the sense in which the *transcendental conditions* for the possibility of some given phenomenon are, in a Kantian way, constitutive of the phenomenon.⁵ What I want to defend, through the notion of World 3, is a transcendently motivated pragmatic and cultural realism about artworks, not a metaphysically realist picture of some basic structure of reality in itself. To distinguish my claim that artworks belong to World 3 (and, thus, to the real world) from the metaphysical realist's much stronger existence claims, my statement can be understood as a pragmatic proposal regarding the way we should conceptually structure the cultural reality we have ourselves created. We should not forget that all our ontological decisions are pragmatic and deeply value-laden (see Pihlström 1996). The "reality" or "nature" of what artists and their audiences do can be described in many different ways, and some of these descriptions are (pragmatically) more relevant than some others.⁶ To make my thesis more precise, it may be formulated as stating that artworks are real and belong to World 3, *if* a suitable language, conceptual scheme, or theoretical framework (whose rationality and acceptability we must, of course, critically discuss) is chosen by us in order for us to be able to study and evaluate art in an interesting and efficient way. Apart from all such purpose-oriented schemes and frameworks, reality, and *a fortiori* the entire humanly constructed cultural reality that contains artworks, is nothing to us. I am not claiming, then, as the metaphysical realist perhaps would, that artworks exist "essentially", "as such", "in themselves", or that they belong to the "furniture of the world" – or that they do not exist in this sense. What I am claiming, in the spirit of the ontolo-

⁴ NOT ONLY ARTWORKS THEMSELVES, BUT CERTAIN THEORETICAL FEATURES THAT CAN BE POSITED IN THEM BY RESEARCHERS TAKING A REALISTIC ATTITUDE TO THEIR OBJECTS OF STUDY, CAN BE SAID TO BELONG TO WORLD 3. FOR INSTANCE, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF LITERARY CRITICISM, WE MAY SUGGEST THAT IMPLIED AUTHORS, IMPLIED READERS, AUTHORIAL PERSONAS AND SIMILAR THEORETICAL ENTITIES OF NARRATOLOGY AND READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM ARE DENIZENS OF WORLD 3. SINCE WORLD 3 ENTITIES CAN BE REGARDED AS REAL, SINCE UNOBSERVABLE THEORETICAL ENTITIES CAN BE REGARDED AS REAL (IF WE ENDORSE SCIENTIFIC REALISM, CONTRA SKEPTICAL EMPIRICIST RESTRICTIONS), AND SINCE NARRATOLOGICAL ENTITIES LIKE IMPLIED AUTHORS (ETC.) ARE HUMAN-MADE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN WORLD 3 AND ALSO UNOBSERVABLE POSTULATIONS OF LITERARY THEORY, WE MAY CONCLUDE THAT THEY ARE REAL THEORETICAL WORLD 3 ENTITIES AND THAT, MORE GENERALLY, THERE CAN BE THEORETICAL ENTITIES OF HUMANISTIC RESEARCH TO BE FOUND IN WORLD 3. AS WORLD 3 ENTITIES, IMPLIED AUTHORS AND IMPLIED READERS ARE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE TEXT, SETS OF NORMA-

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TIVE PROPERTIES CREATED AND MAINTAINED IN OUR CULTURAL PRACTICE OF PRODUCING AND RECEIVING LITERATURE. THEY ARE THEORETICAL ENTITIES, SINCE THEY CANNOT BE OBSERVED DIRECTLY BY MERELY LOOKING AT THE TEXT. THEY EXIST IN THE THEORETICALLY DISCERNIBLE STRUCTURE OF THE LITERARY WORK, WHICH IS OF COURSE DEPENDENT ON THE SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF THE LANGUAGE USED IN WRITING THE WORK – PROPERTIES THAT ARE, IN TURN, BASED ON SOCIAL CONVENTIONS OF LINGUISTIC MEANING AND ULTIMATELY ON THE LIFE OF THE RELEVANT LINGUISTIC (AND ARTISTIC) COMMUNITY. THUS, THEY ARE PRODUCTS OF OUR HUMAN CULTURE, TRANSCENDING ALL INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THAT CULTURE. UNLIKE FICTITIOUS CHARACTERS, HOWEVER, THEY ARE GENUINELY OBJECTS OF NARRATOLOGICAL STUDY. THE FACT THAT THEY ARE, IN A WAY, CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT OR AN ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT POSES NO PROBLEMS TO THE "NARRATOLOGICAL REALIST" WHO ACCEPTS THE REALITY OF WORLD 3. ALL WORLD 3 ENTITIES ARE CONSTRUCTIONS, AND IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT HUMAN SCIENCES INQUIRE INTO SUCH HUMAN-MADE CONSTRUCTIONS. MOREOVER, SINCE WORLD 3 IS A DYNAMICAL AND CONSTANTLY CHANGING CULTURAL REALM, DEPENDENT ON THE ENTIRE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PRAXIS WE ENGAGE IN, IT IS NOT

gical tolerance essential to pragmatic realism, is that there are as good pragmatic reasons for tolerating their existence as there are for tolerating the existence of such entities as electrons, genes, natural numbers, thoughts, social institutions, or nations.

Of course, by pragmatically admitting such entities as works of art into our ontologies, we have to dispense with the ideal of ontological parsimony. Yet, as tolerant, pluralistic pragmatists, this is precisely what we should do. The fact that an entity is postulated as real by a literary critic or an art historian and not by a physicist or a molecular biologist – that is, within some particular normative practice rather than some other normative practice – does not make it any less real than the postulations of the physicist or the biologist. On the other hand, clearly, there must be some limitations to what kinds of entities are responsibly acceptable even for the pragmatically oriented World 3 ontologist. Undoubtedly there are false theories about the nature of art. We have quite good reasons for rejecting the idealist doctrine that works of art are spiritual, immaterial entities in the mind of the artist (i.e., in World 2), existing independently of any World 1 basis or World 3 cultural network. A simple application of the pragmatic method – pragmatists' central philosophical tool – leads us to seriously doubt the coherence of this idea. What in the world would such spiritual entities be? What kind of practical results (e.g., regarding our enhanced understanding of art) could be expected by their postulation? How could we, or anyone, be aware of anything like that? If these pure World 2 entities were intended to function as works of art, how could they, as subjective states, ever be interpreted by anyone except the artist her- or himself?

Furthermore, even if we emphasize the importance of *aesthetic experience* as constitutive of art, as is customary in pragmatist aesthetics (cf., e.g., Shusterman 1992), we should not identify artworks with subjective World 2 experiences of individual persons (whether artists or members of the audience). What we need is a wider notion of experience – understood as something that can only be adequately discussed in culturalist World 3 terms. Such a notion has, of course, been developed in the pragmatist tradition from James and Dewey to Shusterman and other contemporary pragmatists, without overlooking the fact that artistic and other humanly significant experiences are not only culturally loaded but parts of "human nature"

as well.⁷ In this tradition, experience has always been discussed in relation to habitual human practices, never in relation to an abstract individual mind facing an external world independently of socio-cultural relations.⁸ Thus, in my view, it is somewhat ambiguous to characterize pragmatist theories of art by saying that they treat works of art as "rather experiences than objects", while it is of course correct to say that, according to pragmatism, "art is an essential part of life and society and should be analysed in the context of social and cultural practices and institutions".⁹ The picture of pragmatism I wish to put forward here is an ontologically committed one: neither in relation to art nor elsewhere should pragmatists try to avoid ontological seriousness. In this sense artworks are, for pragmatists, "objects", but they are objects that can never be torn apart from our culturally loaded human experiences of artistic and other aesthetic values.

If what I have said is on the right track, then there should be no obstacle to a moderately realistic ontological investigation of art in a pragmatist setting, as soon as we give up all metaphysically realistic ontologies according to which artworks belong or do not belong to the fundamental furniture of the world (see also section 4 below). What is more, there should be no need to contrast aesthetic experiences and the cognitive and conceptual functions of art; the latter can, in pragmatism, be understood in experiential terms. It is one of tasks of a pragmatically realistic theory of art to say something about the latter functions of art, too.

Art as Referring to the Real World – and to the Problem of Reference

Despite the above-described ontological tolerance associated with pluralistic pragmatism which approaches reality in experiential and irreducibly socio-cultural terms, the pragmatist ontologist of art must explain why there cannot be anything whatsoever in the world. She or he must be prepared to make substantial ontological statements and to argue for them, despite her contention that there is no absolute (metaphysical) way of settling ontological disputes in the sense dreamed of by metaphysical realists. In particular, the pragmatist will have to decide whether the specific human practice referred to as the artworld is related to something extra-artistically

NECESSARY TO SUPPOSE THAT NARRATOLOGY SHOULD UNCOVER ANY UNIVERSAL CATEGORIES OR ESSENTIAL, UNCHANGING STRUCTURES OF NARRATIVE TEXTS. THE IDENTITY OF BOTH LITERARY WORKS AND OF THEIR NARRATOLOGICAL ENTITIES IS DEPENDENT ON INTERPRETATION, AND INTERPRETATION IS ALWAYS A DYNAMICAL WORLD 3 PROCESS, OPEN TO CHANGE. (FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE ELABORATION OF THIS ARGUMENT IN RELATION TO THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM, I REFER THE READER TO PIHLSTRÖM 1996, CH. 5.2.)

⁵ FOR EXAMPLE, KANTIAN CATEGORIES OF UNDERSTANDING ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF EMPIRICAL OBJECTS IN THIS WAY.

⁶ FOR INSTANCE, IT IS HARDLY RELEVANT AT ALL TO DESCRIBE A WORK OF ART FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL PHYSICS, PRESENTING THE BASIC MOLECULAR (OR EVEN QUANTUM) STRUCTURE OF (SAY) A PAINTING. TO PUT IT IN ANOTHER WAY, SUCH A DESCRIPTION CANNOT BE A DESCRIPTION OF ITS OBJECT AS A WORK OF ART.

⁷ THE CULTURALLY ORIENTED PRAGMATIST THEORY I HAVE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED NEED NOT DENY SHUSTERMAN'S INSISTENCE ON THE NEED OF BOTH A NATURALIST AND A CULTURALIST OR HISTORICIST POINT OF VIEW IN UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF ART. ACCORDING TO SHUSTERMAN (2000), THE IDEA OF ART AS "DRAMATIZATION" – AS STAGING OR FRAMING – INTEGRATES THESE TWO VIEWPOINTS OFTEN UNNECESSARILY OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER. IT IS, IN MY VIEW, PART AND PARCEL OF THE PRAGMATIST TRADITION TO REFUSE

TO DRAW ANY SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN "NATURE" AND "CULTURE". ART AS AN INTENSIFICATION OF NATURAL HUMAN EXPERIENCES CAN, THROUGH ENTIRELY NATURAL HUMAN LIFE, BE TURNED INTO CULTURALLY "HIGH" TRADITIONS AND INSTITUTIONS OF ART.

⁸ WE MAY NOTE IN PASSING THAT, IN DISCUSSING EXPERIENCE, PRAGMATISTS LIKE SHUSTERMAN (1992) OFTEN EMPLOY, PERHAPS UNINTENTIONALLY, WHAT LOOKS LIKE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTATION: FOR INSTANCE, SHUSTERMAN ARGUES THAT AN EXPERIENCING SUBJECT IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE VALUE AND MEANINGFULNESS OF ARTWORKS AND THAT (CONTRA RORTY) WE NEED A UNIFIED PICTURE OF THE SELF IN ORDER TO ACCOUNT FOR THE (RORTYAN) IDEAL OF "IRONIC AESTHETIC LIFE".

⁹ THESE PHRASES ARE TAKEN FROM THE BROCHURE OF THE AWE SYMPOSIUM (WHERE THIS PAPER WAS FIRST PRESENTED).

¹⁰ FURTHERMORE, IT SHOULD BE PERCEIVED THAT THIS IDEA OF REFERENTIALITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE (SOME) ARTWORKS FROM REFERRING (PERHAPS ONLY) TO THEMSELVES - AS WELL AS TO THEIR ABILITY TO REFER TO AN EXTRA-ARTISTIC REALITY (OR TO THEIR LACK OF SUCH AN ABILITY). I SHALL RETURN TO THIS TOPIC IN A MOMENT.

real or not. Pieces of art, e.g., paintings or fictional works of literature, very often describe imagined people and states of affairs; nevertheless, it appears that they in most cases do have something to say about the "real world" (i.e., the world that lies outside the art-world or of which the latter is a part).

It is often asked, therefore, whether we should think that there is some sort of a semantic (or, more generally, semiotic or symbolizing) relation between an artwork and the external reality it is "about". Can a piece of art tell us something *about* the world, provide us with knowledge about it, show us something? My own view is, unsurprisingly, affirmative: art, realistically construed, is a symbolic means of referring to reality, especially to humanly significant moral problems and other parts of the cultural world we live in. Of course, since artworks themselves are parts of reality (i.e., belong to World 3, as explained above), art may refer to art itself, and works can refer to one another. According to this realistic picture, works of art can genuinely be about other works of art, that is, not merely quote them or allude to them. But if the semantic dimension of realism is taken seriously in the philosophy of art, it must be admitted that art can also refer to, or be about, the extra-artistic world, things and events that are not themselves artworks.¹⁰

Such a realist position affirming the (possible) referentiality of art has by no means been generally accepted among philosophers of art. In the twentieth century analytic philosophy of art in particular, an *aestheticist* conception of the autonomy and practical "uselessness" of artworks has been dominant. It has been almost a dogma that artworks ought to be detached from their social, cultural and historical background (i.e., from the "reality" environing them) and analyzed "as they are in themselves". One of the clearest expressions of this view was formulated in the school known as "new criticism" in the theory of literature. Contrary to this pure aestheticism, one may argue that artworks are in fact among the most useful things we human beings have (cf. Wolterstorff 1987). This is a natural view for the pragmatist to adopt, as pragmatists usually oppose sharp dichotomies between the aesthetic and the practical (see, again, Shusterman 1992). Aestheticist philosophy of art is, from a pragmatic perspective, extremely one-sided in failing to draw attention to the enormous value that works of art (may) possess in the interaction

between people and their environment. Our relation to the world would probably be entirely different from what it is, had we no enjoyable music, literature or pictorial art at our disposal. This pragmatist position, which emphasizes the practical value of art and aesthetic experiences in people's lives, need not lead to a narrowly instrumentalist view, which would regard art as only instrumentally valuable. Our human practices can be oriented toward aims that are (non-instrumentally) valuable in themselves, such as the *understanding* of our lives and the world. This is also what the aims and purposes of the practices of art and art criticism may be like. Were such values not in place in the artworld, art would be too far from, and irrelevant to, human life at large. We humans would hardly like to produce or receive such works of art.

We have thus preliminarily formulated a pragmatically realistic account of the role of art in our (forms of) life. Artworks are, as was explained, parts of the world. But this is not enough. To be valuable from the viewpoint of the human life taking place within that same world, they ought to be able to *refer* to that very real world. Some theorists have, indeed, argued against aestheticism and related views that works of art may offer us *knowledge* about reality – perhaps not primarily propositional knowledge, but rather "practical" knowledge of human values, attitudes, and moral problems.¹¹ It would, then, be illusory to see a gap between art and reality. In fact, many artists have regarded "truthfulness" as one of the key tasks of art: a profound, perceptive description of the world possibly connected with a genuine (though often indirect and implicit) ethical assessment.¹² It would not be easy to understand the work of many artists *without presupposing a moderately realistic philosophy of art like this*. Even if we are not prepared to say, for instance, that literature equippes us with knowledge, we may still consider literature relevant or perhaps even necessary in the acquisition of *moral* knowledge, in particular (insofar as there can be such a species of knowledge at all).¹³ Detaching art completely from the humanly inevitable ethical sphere of life may in the end be based on an immoral philosophy of art. In order to be ethically acceptable as a responsible human practice among other practices, art cannot step beyond morality or judge ethical concerns aesthetically irrelevant (see also Shusterman 1992).

¹¹ Cf., e.g., PUTNAM (1978). IN THE FINNISH DISCUSSION, DR. MARKUS LAMMENRANTA HAS DEFENDED THIS VIEW, EMPHASIZING FURTHER THAT SINCE KNOWLEDGE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ARTWORKS SHOULD MAINLY BE EVALUATED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR COGNITIVE FUNCTION.

¹² THIS IS HOW I AM TEMPTED TO READ, FOR EXAMPLE, MILAN KUNDERA'S (1986) REFLECTIONS ON HIS OWN WORK. ACCORDING TO KUNDERA, THE NOVELIST SHOWS US HUMAN POSSIBILITIES BY INTRODUCING "EXPERIMENTAL" FIGURES AND SITUATIONS.

¹³ "MORAL UNDERSTANDING" MIGHT BE A MORE APPROPRIATE NOTION HERE, SINCE, ACCORDING TO SOME MORAL PHILOSOPHERS, TALK ABOUT "KNOWLEDGE" IN RELATION TO ETHICS LEADS US ASTRAY (CF., E.G., GAITA 1991).

Still, in emphasizing the ethical and cognitive functions of art I by no means want to subscribe to any version of the classical mimesis theory, according to which artworks just copy or reproduce reality, creating "verisimile" illusions. The kind of realism that is to be subordinated to pragmatism (if my proposal is correct) need not presuppose any detailed copying of an external reality. Artistic "knowledge" and "truth" (or "understanding") certainly differ from scientific knowledge, but in neither case do we encounter simple relations of copying. It would, nonetheless, be quite overhasty to claim that artworks do not bear any cognitive or semantic relations to an external world at all. At least this aestheticist statement does not follow from the fact that art cannot be reduced to a sheer copying of reality.

It should now emerge quite clearly that the view I take to be basic to a pragmatist philosophy of art is in a sharp opposition to several postmodernist and poststructuralist ideas associated with the study of art and literature. Pace such highly influential thinkers as, say, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida (whose writings I am of course unable to discuss in any detail here), we should think not only that art is a part of the real world (as argued in section 2 above) but also that there indeed is a world external to a work of art – a world, moreover, to which the work may bear a semantic relation of reference, representation, or even truth, and about which the work can therefore offer us knowledge or understanding.

It goes naturally with this realism to claim, again contra most "postmodernists", that artworks cannot be interpreted in any manner whatsoever. Even though the author's intention and the meanings she or he has "given" to the text cannot dictate any single correct interpretation, it would be wildly implausible to deny their relevance altogether. In this sense, the author should not be declared to be dead, at least not according to any reasonably pragmatist philosophy of art.¹⁴ There always is, or has been, a genuine subject who has produced the work, a flesh-and-blood human being living in a complex natural and cultural world. This subject, as well as the relatively objective cultural network that is the context of her or his artistic activity (the artworld), must inevitably be taken into account in interpretation. The biographistic tradition of art interpretation one-sidedly emphasizes the life of the author, whereas those postmodern-

¹⁴ THE ISSUE OF THE "DEATH OF THE AUTHOR" IS CRITICALLY DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHERS, BY SHUSTERMAN (1986), OLSEN (1987), AND HAAPALA (1989).

¹⁶ GOODMAN'S VIEWS OF WORLDMAKING ARE, OF COURSE, HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL AND SHOULD, PERHAPS, BE TAKEN NO MORE LITERALLY THAN POPPER'S TALK ABOUT THE "THREE WORLDS". FOR A CRITICAL DISCUSSION, SEE PIHLSTRÖM (1996), CH. 4.4., AND (1998), CH. 1.

¹⁷ THE VIEW THAT ART CONTAINS AN ETHICAL DIMENSION (AND IS THUS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE MORALLY PROBLEMATIC HUMAN LIFE) IS ALSO A PROFOUNDLY WITTGENSTEINIAN THEME (CF. HERE ESPECIALLY TILGHMAN 1991). A WORK OF ART MAY MAKE US SEE REALITY SUB SPECIE AETERNITATIS – NOT, NEEDLESS TO SAY, IN THE METAPHYSICAL REALIST'S WAY, BUT IN A HUMAN, MORALLY CONCERNED WAY WITH AN OPENNESS TO LIFE'S VALUE AND SIGNIFICANCE (OR, POSSIBLY, TO ITS LACK OF VALUE AND SIGNIFICANCE). WE MIGHT PERHAPS THINK OF A WORK OF ART AS SHOWING (THAT IS, NOT DIRECTLY STATING) SUCH A COSMIC PERSPECTIVE AS A PERSPECTIVE OF AN INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING, DEVELOPING TOWARD THE PRODUCTION OF THAT VERY WORK. THAT IS, A GOOD ARTWORK MIGHT BE ABLE TO SHOW US THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIFE THAT HAS LED UP TO ITS PRODUCTION.

Putnam does not explicitly discuss artistic reference in his defense of this non-reductive and non-essentialist view. We can, however, think about, say, fictional literature as a language-game (or perhaps as a family of language-games, paying attention to distinctions between genres of literature) in which language is used in certain distinctive ways in order to refer to the world, differently from the way in which scientific theories or everyday speech acts refer. Employing Nelson Goodman's (1978, 1984) terms, the pragmatist philosopher of art may contend that scientific and artistic ways of constructing "world-versions" are very different, but equally acceptable, and the resulting versions (or "worlds") may be regarded as equally "actual". In particular, the scientific ones are not "more real" than the artistic ones. Both science and art are, then, practices of "worldmaking" in a Goodmanese sense; both can aim at truth or (more generally) pragmatic "rightness". Science, then, enjoys no privileged position of speaking about reality as it is in itself any more than art (or some other cultural practice seriously engaged in by humans) does. There in a sense is no such reality at all, if the pragmatist's opposition to metaphysical realism is taken seriously.¹⁶ The pragmatist, moreover, regards questions about the rightness of both scientific and artistic world-versions as inherently valuational questions. The concept of a work of art is, she or he should be prepared to argue, a value-laden concept. There is, after all, no value-neutral way of "defining" art (cf. again also Shusterman 1992). One of artists' important tasks is to inquire into how values – all kinds of values: aesthetic, ethical, epistemic, and so forth – are manifested in our world. Artists ought not to close their eyes. This ethically relevant role of art results from the referential features of artworks we have discussed.¹⁷

The value-ladenness of art can be recognized even independently of pragmatism, although a pragmatist overall position certainly helps in recognizing it. The literary theorist Stein Haugom Olsen (1987) has argued that the concept of a literary work of art should be understood as an evaluative concept. Works of literature are, in his view, intentional and institutional objects, and the literary institution they belong to is defined by a normative structure of rules. To say that an object is a work of literature is to relate it to a human practice and human purposes; the interpretation and evaluation of the work are inextricably intertwined. Interpretation requires aesthetic evaluation and aims at finding the value that the work may

possess. Olsen even encourages us to abandon the notion of the "meaning" of a literary work altogether. The correct way of approaching literature is "appreciation", since it is precisely the appreciation of literary works in the institution of literature that makes them such works in the first place. At this point we might ask: How is artistic value produced? Why is literature valuable? According to Olsen, the practice of literature and the very concept of literature are constituted by the assumption that "a literary work should say something about the world, about central human concerns, about 'the human predicament'" (p. 160). Literature, as distinguished from mere fiction, is humanly significant.¹⁸ It cannot be reduced to the themes dealt with by philosophical and religious works, but it is closely connected with them. I believe, with Olsen, that it is precisely for this reason that we actually produce and receive not only literature but all kinds of artworks. By means of art, we try to conceptualize our existence in this world. We try to understand what it is like to be a human being in a human world. There can hardly be a more pragmatic task ahead of us (cf. here further Pihlström 1998).

¹⁸ FOR THIS REASON, A PHILOSOPHICALLY MOTIVATED DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIGH AND POPULAR ART SHOULD, IN MY VIEW, BE MAINTAINED (PACE SHUSTERMAN'S, 1992, DEFENSE OF POPULAR ART ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS). THIS ISSUE CANNOT, HOWEVER, BE DISCUSSED IN THE PRESENT PAPER.

It is, presumably, for the same reason that we produce and consume religious and philosophical texts – as well as, perhaps, scientific ones, too. To be sure, the strategies employed and the aims pursued in these parts of culture differ substantially. Still, within the artistic framework, pieces of art can and should be evaluated on the basis of how successfully they describe and problematize the human existence they themselves arise out of, even though this need not be the only relevant criterion in artistic evaluation. Now, arguably, this requirement is applicable only if art is understood in the moderately realistic way I have suggested, since otherwise artworks cannot really be "about" human life in any significant sense. Furthermore, no one (especially not the pragmatist) should overlook the fact that some features of our world are better captured in artistic descriptions than in scientific ones (and *vice versa*). Our inevitable human condition, *death*, may be one of these. We might think that death is a necessary condition for there being any morally relevant problem concerning the value or significance of a human life. It can be compared to a limit which enables us to pose such questions in the first place. Therefore, it may indefinitely escape scientific scrutiny and even philosophical (that is, conceptual, analytical, and theoretical) treatment. Yet, some poets, novelists, playwrights and other artists

have built their entire artistic visions around the theme of death. By so doing they have succeeded in artistically describing a key element of our world, a (transcendental) condition for our even meaningfully asking whether our life or the world has any value or significance.

There is still a further dimension to the kind of pragmatic realism about art that I favor. Not only can art refer to the world in general or to the moral and other humanly important problems constitutive of our being-in-the-world. Not only can artworks lead us to see such problems in a new light. They can even discuss profoundly philosophical problems concerning their or any other symbol systems' very ability to do this (although they will, clearly, have to do this from a manner different from systematic and theoretical philosophical discussions). For example, George Orwell's famous novel, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), has been described as the strongest challenge to anti-realism ever written.¹⁹ In this case, we can say that a work of art implicitly challenges itself in a self-referential manner, thereby seeking to justify itself: as a devastating critique of anti-realist views that refuse to acknowledge any independent, opinion-transcendent truth or reality, Orwell's novel also criticizes those views which would deny *its* ability to refer to and describe a world not entirely of our own making (i.e., its status as a piece of realistic art). It is precisely because *Nineteen Eighty-Four* describes humanity in the horrifying way it does that it succeeds in convincingly formulating the important philosophical point that there is a world to be perceived, described and understood (instead of merely to be constructed) by human beings by experiential, linguistic and conceptual means. Hence, arguably, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* reflexively defends the possibility of (pragmatically) realistic art, perhaps even better than many contemporary artworks whose explicit reflexivity is often somewhat artificial.²⁰ More concretely, artworks can (reflexively) criticize aestheticist conceptions of art and artificial oppositions between (allegedly "higher") world-transcending aesthetic experiences and real-life moral problems. If an artwork succeeds in such a critique, it *ipso facto* justifies itself as a morally responsible human action.²¹

¹⁹ THE CHARGE IS, OF COURSE, THAT THE ANTI-REALIST'S POSITION DOES NOT DIFFER FROM O'BRIEN'S. SEE MOUNCE'S (1997, CH. 13) CRITIQUE OF RORTY'S (1989) EXTREME PRAGMATISM ON THIS BASIS.

²⁰ I DO NOT, OF COURSE, WANT TO PROPOSE ANY THESIS ABOUT THE ABSOLUTELY "CORRECT" WAY OF READING ORWELL'S WORK, SINCE GOOD NOVELS ARE USUALLY OPEN TO SEVERAL FRUITFUL INTERPRETATIONS.

²¹ THIS IS NOT TO DENY THAT THE RELEVANCE OF ART TO "REAL LIFE" ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES CAN RECEIVE MONSTROUS INTERPRETATIONS. THINK ABOUT, SAY, THE NAZIS' ADMIRATION OF WAGNER.

By describing a reality of genuine value problems, in particular ethical ones, art may increase our moral understanding, including our understanding of the moral tasks and limits of art itself. There can

hardly be any absolutely conclusive argument demonstrating the importance of this ethical point of view in art; it may not be possible to justify such a point of view to a person who simply does not care about it. But pragmatists emphasizing the practical significance of artworks need not be able to conclusively refute their opponents by means of a knock-down argument. They can just urge that it is their pragmatic view, rather than the non-pragmatists' one, that is itself pragmatically justified. It is a pragmatic move to adopt a pragmatist view of art – and even this reflexivity could perhaps be artistically examined. The pragmatic fruits of this position can be seen in its ability to discuss art in moral terms, which is of course something that the critic of pragmatism may not want to do at all. What we have here is an inevitably circular defense of pragmatism. But, as I stated already in the beginning, it is not my purpose to defend pragmatism non-circularly against its possible opponents. Rather, I am making my remarks about the ethical point of view in art from within the pragmatist perspective.

Now, admittedly, some art enthusiasts might want to restrict the use of the term "art" to the designation of some purely aesthetic activity in which no cognitive, ethical, conceptual, practical (or, in general, non-aesthetic) interests would play any role whatsoever. This extreme possibility must be left open by the pragmatist, too, since (again) no conclusive or non-circular demonstration of the superiority of the pragmatist account is forthcoming – and since no argument regarding terminology is necessary here at all. Such (perhaps only imagined) aesthetes would, however, need to face Danto's (1981) famous thesis about the "end" of art, about its transformation into philosophy *via* contemporary highly conceptualized art. If we want to be able to say, *pace* Danto, that art (or the history of art) has not yet come to its end, we have to pragmatically acknowledge the entanglement of our artistic, cognitive, and moral values and purposes. This view leaves plenty of room for art history to develop along with the more general historical development of human life and societies.

At this point, a critic could perhaps claim that I have betrayed my own pluralistic pragmatism (cf. Pihlström 1996, 1998) by stressing so strongly the referentiality of artworks. Why should reference and representation be central in art? Doesn't art function in our lives in

many different ways? Don't we have to give up the referentialist point of view especially if we are willing to endorse pragmatism? After all, art offers us strong emotional experiences, makes us believe (or stop believing) in the meaningfulness of life, comforts us, turns us on, intensifies our feelings, and so forth. However, if we do not think about the referentiality of art as any kind of metaphysical essence of art, and if we stop searching for a metaphysical essence of reference and representation themselves (as I have suggested we should), we can accommodate the multiple functions of art within our pragmatically referentialist view. It is precisely because of its open-ended, multifarious referentiality that art succeeds in doing all the nice things that it in fact does to us. So, we should locate the kind of referentiality of art that is acceptable to the pragmatist firmly within the more inclusive pragmatistic and pluralistic framework through which pragmatists wish to deal with all human practices and their relations to reality at large. Referring to the world is not the *essence* of art any more than the existence of normative regularities is the essence of language. In both cases, the relevant "essence" can be realized in actual life in indefinitely many ways. Our critique of anti-realism, fictionalism, and aestheticism should not, then, slide toward a naive essentialism or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, as should be clear on the basis of what has been said in this section, the "referentiality" of art I am willing to defend must be understood so broadly that it applies even to artworks which critically comment upon the issue of reference itself in human life and culture – including (post)modernist works standardly taken to be "non-referential". There is much more to the issue of referentiality and non-referentiality of artworks than meets the eye, at least if we admit that it is possible for us to refer (artistically) not only to events of natural life but also to cultural formations created by humans, e.g., to (other) artworks and to philosophical problems (about art or about anything else).

A Concluding Note on Margolis and Danto

I do not pretend to have expressed any entirely novel or surprising thoughts about the relation between artworks and the real world in the remarks presented above. On the contrary, the type of view I have defended, or at least views closely resembling it, have been put forward earlier in the tradition of pragmatism. Much of what

I have said is, to my mind, compatible with what Joseph Margolis has argued for several decades, as well as with Arthur Danto's even better known position (even though the latter is not usually classified as a pragmatist one). I shall conclude my investigation of the ontological features of the pragmatist theory of art by a brief critical reflection on Margolis's recent critique of Danto.

Among contemporary philosophers of art, Margolis has perhaps more emphatically than any other advocated an ontological theory in which artworks are regarded as emergent (but embodied) constructs belonging to the historically developing world of human culture (see, e.g., Margolis 1995). A related idea was formulated in Danto's (1964, 1981) now classical conception of the artworld. The pragmatist may easily accept the view that the ontological identity of artworks lies in their being constantly (re)interpreted within the artworld – that is, in their belonging to a human practice with a history and with certain (historically changing) ends in view. Such a historical practice is a (quasi-)transcendental condition for their possibility *qua* artworks. This idea was already discussed in section 2 above. The ontology of art should, I have tried to argue, be subordinated to a pragmatist analysis of ontology in general, according to which *any* ontological commitment is in the last analysis grounded in pragmatic considerations of purposive efficacy and fruitfulness (see Pihlström 1996). I believe this statement is not far from Margolis's position.

Margolis (1998), however, has attacked Danto's theory of art by claiming that it leads to an anti-realist conception of both artworks and human selves: there "really" are, in Danto's view (on Margolis's interpretation), no artworks (or selves), since artworks are, in Danto's terms, only "transfigurations" of "mere real things". Margolis claims, in effect, that no ontology of art can be found in Danto's work except an eliminativist one, according to which "artworks simply do not exist" (p. 371). Danto "views art as the *rhetorical* effect of an artist's treating some 'real thing' metaphorically", as a work of art (p. 374). This is how Margolis contrasts Danto's and Nelson Goodman's positions, both of which he finds hopeless:

[...] Danto claims [...] that there are (there exist), as such, no artworks [...]. Apparently, for Danto, it is only by the rhetorical imputa-

tion of certain non-discernible 'attributes' that we are ever justified in treating 'mere real things' (things that are not artworks) as artworks. Nothing really exists as an artwork. Goodman admits real artworks, but loses (or diminishes) the run of their perceptual properties; and Danto saves what we ordinarily mean to include as the distinctive properties of artworks, but he voluntarily abandons the existence of artworks as such, and, with that, the literal relevance of ever speaking of the perceptual discernibility of 'their' properties. (p. 365)

I have to admit that I am somewhat puzzled by Margolis's employment of the phrase "as such", which is, *prima facie*, a phrase that a pragmatist ontologist should avoid. Similarly, Margolis could have taken a more pragmatic attitude to Danto's ideas in order to really use them instead of sticking to the problems created by their specific formulation (which is, admittedly, problematic from the point of view of ontologically serious pragmatism). In a word, Margolis might, it seems to me, have adopted a more thoroughgoing pragmatism in relation to (Danto's theory of) artworks. Whatever Danto's original position may have been, the pragmatist philosopher of art is free to reinterpret the notion of transfiguration in an ontological (and transcendental) way: it is our historically developing practice of transfiguring "the commonplace" that yields culturally real emergent products we refer to as artworks and without which those products could not have come about.²² The pragmatist may argue, *pace* Margolis, that a (pragmatically) realistic ontology of art emerges from what Danto (1964) calls the "is of artistic identification" (cf. Margolis 1998, pp. 366, 371). She or he may, that is, suggest that the existence of artworks emerges from and is transcendently dependent on our treating certain things as artworks – things that are, *as such*, identified as nothing specific, neither as "mere real things" nor as artworks. Whatever we take to exist as something must always already have been conceptualized by us as some thing or another within our human (cultural and historically developing) practices. This is perhaps the most basic idea underlying any pragmatist ontology, transcendently interpreted.

²² AN ELABORATED ACCOUNT OF THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE WOULD BE NEEDED HERE, BUT IT IS, FORTUNATELY, ONE OF THE KEY NOTIONS IN MARGOLIS'S OWN POSITION; SO, I CAN REFER THE READER TO HIS WORKS (E.G., MARGOLIS 1984). SEE ALSO PIHLSTRÖM (1999). SIMILARLY, THE RELATION BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTATION IN GENERAL WOULD DESERVE MORE DISCUSSION (CF. PIHLSTRÖM 1998).

It is in this transcendental or constitutive sense that ontology is, for pragmatists, deeply tied to our practices. The assumption that there is "something" (e.g., "mere real things") existing "as such" prior to their being conceptualized as anything – i.e., prior to any specific

ontological commitment rooted in a human practice – is an assumption that only a metaphysical realist can make. Hence, pragmatically (re)interpreted, the picture Danto offers us is not an eliminative or fictionalist account of the non-existence of artworks. Instead, it can be seen as a picture of how the existence of artworks pragmatically requires purposive human action, conceptual work – that is, a cultural level of human action, the artworld, which functions as the transcendental background rendering art possible for us.²³

In any event, we pragmatists should join Margolis in rejecting the non-pragmatist idea (whether it is Danto's or not) that there are "really" only mere real (physical) things which are only later identified (but are never "really" taken to be) works of art (see pp. 366 – 367). Such a metaphysics of art would actually amount to an "error theory" paralleling error theories of moral values: according to such a view, there is, truly and ultimately, only a physical world (Popper's World 1), even though some elements of that world are (mistakenly or, at best, "imaginatively") taken to be works of art (or other cultural objects on the level of World 3). A critique of this anti-realist or fictionalist ontology of art (as well as the parallel critique of a fictionalist conception of values) should be a part of our more general pragmatist critique of metaphysical realism. There is, indeed, a quick pragmatic argument to be offered against such fictionalism: "Why (I ask myself) should dealers, galleries, museums buy and sell paintings at all if what Danto says is true is true? Surely, the great prices paid for Picassos and Van Goghs would be a very grave risk if paintings were not real – 'ontologically', to favor Danto's idiom [...]", Margolis writes (p. 368). Analogously, a similar argument works against any non-pragmatic attempt to eliminate some part of our cultural World 3 from what is real. What is troublesome in Margolis's critique is merely his finding the very notion of existence "as such" useful and his resulting attack on Danto. What a more self-consciously pragmatist philosopher of art can do is simply to admit that our transfiguring activity constitutes (in a transcendental sense, as already explained) ineliminably real cultural entities, such as artworks – entities that would not be possible without such activity.

²³ I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER DANTO HIMSELF WOULD APPROVE OF THIS SUGGESTION, BUT I DO NOT CARE. THE PRAGMATIST ONTOLOGIST OF ART, TO SAY IT AGAIN, IS FREE TO USE DANTO'S (OR ANYONE'S) IDEAS FOR HER OR HIS OWN PURPOSES. IF THEY TURN OUT TO BE USEFUL IN A PRAGMATIST ACCOUNT, THAT IS TO THEIR MERIT.

This is not to deny that Margolis makes an important point that any pragmatist should pay attention to: pragmatic or cultural realism about artworks cannot be separated from a pragmatic or cultural realism about human selves. "I say you cannot disjoin the 'ontologies' of selves and artworks, because, like language and action, artworks are the culturally apt utterances of culturally formed selves (ourselves)" (p. 370). This observation is closely related to what was suggested in section 3 above. Art is one of our highly important human means to refer to reality, to utter something about how things are, morally or otherwise, in the real world – our human world. It is also, more reflexively, a means of problematizing this referential relationship itself (as we saw). It is, then, only natural that a theory of art must be closely linked to a theory of human selves who produce and consume art and are able to experience aesthetic values. The prospects of the latter theory and its relation to pragmatism cannot, of course, be dealt with in this essay.

Let me conclude by noting that contemporary conceptual art in a way asks the very ontological question we have been asking in this paper: what is art? It asks, in brief, whether it (art) is itself real – and, more transcendently, what sort of conditions make it possible as what it is, i.e., as art. This reflexive way of posing some of the most general ontological questions related to art obviously resemble transcendental reflections on how we are able to use language meaningfully (while all the time using it), how we can have cognitive experiences of the world (while all the time having them), and so forth. In an art museum (or in a concert, or when reading a literary work of art), we are often able to confront the very ontological issue regarding the existence of art, while being all the time convinced that artworks do exist, seeking (both philosophically and artistically) the transcendental conditions for their possibility as such cultural entities. Pragmatist theories of art may teach us that this issue should be taken seriously even if we have come to the (pragmatic) conclusion that artworks ought to be conceptualized dynamically in experiential and socio-cultural terms. By no means, then, is pragmatism a "post-philosophical" way of thinking about art (or about anything else); on the contrary, it encourages us to dig deeply into the most basic philosophical questions we can ask about a humanly important practice such as art.²⁴

²⁴ PARTS OF THIS PAPER WERE PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL AWE SYMPOSIUM – ARTIST, WORK OF ART, AND EXPERIENCE – IN HELSINKI, ON JUNE 14, 2000. I AM GRATEFUL TO ALL PARTICIPANTS FOR COMMENTS AND CRITICISM, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE ORGANIZERS OF THE MEETING, PENTTI MÄÄTTÄNEN AND HEIDI WESTERLUND.

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Tiivistelmä

Artikkelissa käsitellään pragmatistista taidefilosofiaa realismin ongelman kontekstissa ja argumentoidaan, että pragmatistin tulee suhtautua vakavasti ontologiseen kysymykseen taideteoksen olemassaolosta. Pragmatisti voi luontevasti kannattaa käsitystä taideteoksista emergentteinä kulttuuriolioina, jotka eivät palaudu aineelliseen eivätkä mentaaliseen perustaansa. Esimerkiksi musiikkiteos on jotakin "enemmän" kuin ääniaallot ilmassa ja/tai säveltäjän, soittajien tai kuulijoiden kokemukset. Samoin maalaus tai veistos on kulttuurioliona "enemmän" kuin materia, josta se koostuu. Erityisesti tarkastellaan Joseph Margolisin ja Arthur Danton teorioita taideteoksen ontologiasta. Pragmatistille mahdollinen mallittainen realismi sisältää myös ajatuksen taideteoksista todellisuuteen viittaavina symbolijärjestelminä, jotka voivat myös problematisoida tuon viittaussuhteen luonteen.

SAMI
PIHLSTRÖM

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OF KNOWING WHAT WHAT WE DO DOES:

REACTIONS TO THE MAYDAY ACTION IDEAL NO. 5 AND THE COLLOQUIUM PAPERS

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Music education - the field, in theory and practice - should be seen in broad terms: as a socially and culturally critical endeavor, accepting the nature of music, teaching, and learning, as a many-faceted phenomenon that transcends the boundaries of psychology, sociology, philosophy, and economy, and polity. The profession, hence, needs a broad operational framework, that would embrace the many elements that contribute to the breadth and depth of our globalized, fragmented, conditioned, and mediatized enterprise.¹

¹ CF. , E.G., GIDDENS (2000, 1994, 1991), DE NORA (2000), SPIVAK (1999), DENZIN (1997), HALL ED., (1997), FORNÄS (1995), FULLAN (1991), HOOKS (1990), MCLUHAN (1964).

If the past is "sedimented into the present [] the social assumptions are more compelling as the social histories of schooling are obscured by our contemporary discourse" (Popkewitz 1987, 21), we do indeed, as Detels suggests, need soft boundaries and multidisciplinary perspectives. And as Ojala so well points out, we are at the crossroads of various routes of evolving thought, basic and applied. If we host our half-way saloon well, we are, potentially, entitled to cash on knowledge and understanding reached in other fields, because "the most important issues are being lost in the cracks between the rigid boundaries of the disciplines" (Giroux 1988, 147). Problem-based inquiry and rigorous thinking may save us from routine ways of doing things, and secure multiple horizons, through which our version of 'truth' can be delineated on the basis of competent practical judgement, or, phronesis, as Regelski suggests. I am, however, reminded of the Foucaultian analysis of the nature of power and truth. Foucault suggested, in a pragmatist fashion, that one should strive to become a master of the consequences of one's actions. He is quoted saying: "People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does" (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 187). Philosophical literature on music education has addressed the 'whats'

and the 'whys', but the latter consequential half of music education has been less examined (cf. Plummeridge 1999). Our professional discourse, I suggest, should now broaden to the areas of socio-historical inquiry, and the contemporary criticism of critical theory, pragmatism, and post-structuralism addressing matters of knowledge, power, and educational practices in the world of pluralistic cultures and visions, reformed identities, and socially reconstructed truths. This would mean moving beyond "philosophical or macro-sociological analysis towards a detailed historical investigation of the motives and actions underlying the presentation and promotion of subjects and disciplines" and the particular interests of "factions within the subject" (Goodson 1987, 10-11).²

I take the first "what" of this compound to refer to the very call of this colloquium, mindlessness, or what Greene (1973, 1978, 1995) calls "taken-for-grantedness," of the handed-down habits or norms that keep reproducing practice. I take the second "why" to mean, that the rationale of the normative practice is placed under scrutiny. Following the three-part Aristotelian structure, we then have our big 'but': an implication of insufficient competence, lack of rigor, and low standards of professional ethics: 'What they don't know' suggests an insight, that calls for going beyond the safe assumptions about our practice and methods of studying it. Otherwise we may miss the point of problematising the consequences of 'what what we do,' actually, 'does' to us, our students, our communities, our profession, our nation, or the human kind.

We should ask, I think, is it a song that celebrates humanity? And we should examine, as we have started to do, the ontological and epistemological justification and the various ways of being in and with music. I would like to explore this professional ethical quest of great importance from the point of view of curriculum.

The Postmodern Curriculum

The contemporary "postmodern" discourse on curriculum has grown out of so called reconceptualist movement and the critique of the Tylerian curriculum rationalism (e.g., Pinar ed., 1998, 1975; Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman, 1995).³ Addressing concerns of dignity, identity, and caring, it is conducive to economic, eco-

² STUDYING CURRICULUM IN FINLAND, THE U.S., AND ENGLAND, I HAVE POINTED TO THE FACT THAT NO ANALYSIS OF THIS KIND EXISTS IN THE FIELD OF MUSIC EDUCATION (E.G., HAUSSILA 1992, 1997/1994, 1998). GOODSON (1997) AND POPKEWITZ (2000), REPORTING STUDIES IN OTHER SUBJECT AREAS, ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION IN STUDIES ADDRESSING HISTORIES OF SCHOOL SUBJECTS AND CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES OF SOCIAL PURPOSES EXPLICATIVE OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND ACADEMIC RESONANCE OF IT.

³ RECONCEPTUALISTS CLAIMED THAT CURRICULUM WAS NOT ONLY A PRACTICAL MATTER OF DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT, BUT CALLED FOR A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PEDAGOGICAL ACTIVITY AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE. SUCH THEORIZING BUILT ON EUROPEAN HERMENEUTIC, PHENOMENOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIAL AND CRITICAL TRADITIONS, DIRECTING ATTENTION TO "WHAT TRULY MATTERS" AND INTRODUCING A HUSSERLIAN CONCEPT OF *LEBENSWELT*, A SITUATIONAL INTERPRETIVE WORLD, IN WHICH KNOWING IS MEANING MAKING BY INTERSUBJECTIVE AND INTRASUBJECTIVE CONSTRUCTION (E.G., SCHÜTZ, GADAMER, RICOUR, MERLEAU-PONTY, HEIDEGGER, HABERMAS, SARTRE). IN THE GERMAN AND SCANDINAVIAN EDUCATIONAL THEORY A WIDELY USED TERM WITHOUT ANY PEJORATIVE CONNOTATIONS 'DIDACTIC' WOULD COVER SUCH CONSIDERATIONS (HAUSSILA 1997/1994, 1998).

logical, environmental, and educational equilibrium that affect our human lives (Slattery 1995), by promoting elements and approaches that are

- 1) cultural, i.e., the perspectives of race, gender, and ethnicity;
- 2) historical, i.e., the perspective of which is contextual, multidimensional, ironic, proleptic/anticipating, contingent/accidental, evolving, autobiographical;
- 3) political, i.e., addressing the problematic of reproduction and reconstruction and the power of knowledge, and thus hovering between the neo-Marxist and Habermasian projects and post-structurally informed postmodern discourses;
- 4) ecological, i.e., concerns of global interdependence and ecological sustainability;
- 5) aesthetic, i.e., exploring *qualitative*, aesthetic, and humanistic inquiry and ways of knowing “for the reconstruction of the self” (208); and,
- 6) theological, constituted by “a holistic process perspective”, committed to theological inquiry and hermeneutic interpretation of texts, language, relationships.

The list is long, and the challenge of making *qualitatively* different curricular and didactic moves, serious. Faced with blurred boundaries of identities, teachers, who by the very essence of their work, are “forever involved in constituting meanings” (Greene 1973, 272), are asked to engage in acts of ethically informed, cultural criticism (Giroux 2000, 1988). We do need to cross numerous boundaries, if we are to answer this call.

Multicultural education, most populist of topics, provides a case to think of. Token efforts – theme days, new content, casual visitors etc. – do not make the difference; rather, the call is out in democratic societies for transformative acts and political commitment, if we want to take into account critical voices that speak for the ‘Other’ in the name of race, gender, and class, in order to ameliorate social differences, inequity, and inequality (Banks 1997, 1996, 1994; Torres 1999, 1998).

Empirical evidence of an integrated pilot project with South African music educators and students in a Finnish upper secondary school in December 1999 (Haussila 2000a, 2000b; Sibelius-lukion vuosikertomus 1999-2000) indicate, that for a socially concerned curricular action group only their imagination, pedagogical expertise, and civilian courage set the limit in addressing troubling contemporary issues, the study of which are of great relevance to students (cf. Cheryholmes 1988).

A Philosophical Fandango

Regelski offered an excellent account of the Habermasian philosophy and how such inter-subjectivist paradigm could serve us in developing our practices. In this theory, subjects are not oriented to success, as in strategic action, but towards reaching a mutual understanding by way of reason-giving practice, making claims of validity and opting to redeem such claims, which, in turn, can create a possibility for a peaceful coordination of social action (1987, 1984). Through my interest in action research as a means of studying curriculum, I was thrilled of the idea of emancipatory interest (Carr & Kemmis 1986), and quite recently wanted to base my presentation at the ISME 2000 Conference titled "North South Encounters" on the Habermasian concept of communicative action. Lived experiences and further readings in social theory, however, advised me to caution in reference to ideal speech situations and communicative rationality.⁴

Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault, as major figures in the contemporary political and philosophical discourse, offer insight for pragmatist criticism of social inequalities, the nature of which is "aesthetic and artistic as well as intellectual and political," (Cheryholmes 1999, 38).

Within the normative frames of national curriculum frameworks, our actions are situated and contextualized, and this framework constrain our actions that we take as morally responsible educators. Does this framework support acts of emancipation? Or is it a structure in which technologies of power suppress our efforts towards autonomy?

⁴ THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, HOSTING THE ISME '98 WORLD CONFERENCE IN PRETORIA, PROVIDES EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SUCH POSSIBILITY BY ITS POLICY AND THE INTENDED NATIONAL EMPOWERMENT. THIS INSPIRED ME WHEN I, AS THE CHAIR OF THE NATIONAL SECTION OF ISME, INITIATED A DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROJECT OF ISME FINLAND IN 1998.

Habermas' version of critical theory appeals to many. And indeed: wouldn't it be a nice philosophical frame within which people from North and South, multinational corporations and ordinary workers, traditionalists and vanguards, ecologists and consumerists, lovers of music and whose passions lie elsewhere, could settle their various disputes? However, recent literature (e.g., Ashenden & Owen 1999; Cherryholmes 1999, 1988; Kelly, 1994; Hoy & McCarthy, 1994) alleges, that he sought to justify and complete the project of modernity and overcome the defects of Enlightenment by further enlightenment and critical reason. To this end, Morrow and Torres posit, that he only ended up with the "paradox of a theory that seeks to be comprehensive, but cannot fully include its own meta-critique" (in Popkewitz & Brennan 1998, xi).

In education, critical studies inspired by Foucault make use of his genealogical analysis – or "performances of a historical pragmatics" (Ashenden & Owen 1999, 7)⁵ – of 'knowledge' and 'power' and the related concepts of 'governmentality' and 'technologies of self' through which acts of power are exercised and discourses of truth constituted (e.g., Popkewitz 1991, ed., 2000, 1991, Popkewitz & Fendler, eds. 1999, Popkewitz & Brennan eds., 1998; Cherryholmes 1999, 1988; Goodson 1997).

⁵ FOUCAULT ADHERED TO MARX, NIETZSCHE AND FREUD, BUT DID NOT ASPIRE TO THE STATUS OF GLOBAL OR SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN HIS WORK. HE FOUND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY "LUDICROUS," IF IT TRIED "FROM THE OUTSIDE, DICTATE TO OTHERS... IN THE LANGUAGE OF NAIVE POSITIVITY;" AND FAVORED SELF-CRITICAL, GENEALOGICAL EXPLORATION OF "WHAT MIGHT BE CHANGED, IN ITS OWN THOUGHT, THROUGH A PRACTICE OF A KNOWLEDGE THAT IS FOREIGN TO IT." HIS OEUVRE IS THUS ANTI-DISCIPLINARY NATURE, WHICH MAKES IT ELUSIVE AND DIFFICULT TO INTEGRATE TO THE CONVENTIONAL DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES.

Central to his thinking is the context, in which power is being exercised: "there is no power [or ethical] relation without a correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power [and ethical] relations" (10). Foucault, hence, reverses the traditional belief that knowledge is power and looks for power as a way of disciplining individuals in their everyday lives. In this perspective, the concept of power is productive: it circulates "through institutional practices and the discourses of daily life" and produces "systems of ideas that normalize and construct the rules through which intent and purpose are constructed in action" (Popkewitz & Fendler 1999, 5-6).

"Educational knowledge" is thus seen as a "social practice related to issues of power" which yield "policy and pedagogy as governing practices through which the rules and standards" are applied in educational settings (Popkewitz 2000, vii). Educational knowledge,

thus, constructs the “objects” that constitute particular issues, problems, and governing practices. Curriculum, hence, is seen as a “discursive field through which the subjects of schooling are constructed as individuals [who are challenged] to self-regulate, discipline, and reflect upon themselves as members of a community” (Popkewitz & Brennan 1998, 13).

Popkewitz (2000) uses concepts such as ‘hybridization’ and ‘scaffolding’ to address discourses that “join the global and the local through complex patterns that are multiple and multidirectional.” He uses ‘indigenous foreigner’ for considering the relation of international heroes and heroic discourses, that function to produce national imaginaries or “fabrications of the citizen and nationess” (4-11). Such “foreigners” are immortalized in national reform efforts, and their “names appear as signs of social, political, and educational progress in the national debates.” Dewey constitutes such icon of longevity; more contemporaneous heroes, who “appear in the discourse as if they were indigenous or universal,” include, e.g., Habermas, Foucault, and Freire. When such narrative is examined, it turns out to be “without specific historical reference and practices,” a discourse “*empty of history*” with no social mooring to the interpretations and possibilities of action, as they do in the specific circumstances in which they were created. An indigenous foreigner, thus, effects the power, the national discourses of policy and research, which embody “multiple historical trajectories as principles for governing action and participation. (12)

Soldiers of a Fuzzy Field

In music education, I think, Foucauldian concepts could provide valuable means to analyze inherited patterns, normative structures, and handed-down practices. Such theorizing could take us away from the *cul de sac* of professional reflection and provide us with the tools to think about various challenges of the contemporary globalized world. Foucault’s post-structural criticism could help us to study inter-national concerns and drastically belated comparative investigation of policies addressing state practices in conjunction with larger sets of political, cultural, and economic relations that exist among nations. We could thus think of music education in the context of larger issues: e.g., why do the Finnish speakers, in

this gathering, build on an American pragmatist tradition, whereas the interest of critical American curriculum thinking is in continental philosophies? And wouldn't our understanding grow if we were able to understand the story behind the index of state involvement in curriculum reforms in different countries?

Thinking of where we stand at the moment, I feel weary. Global reality bites, and makes me wonder, what good can our reconstructive efforts and communicative acts ever make, if domination hides in social structures and mechanisms, and we, victims of Foucauldian technologies of power and self, are bureaucratized, administered, and governed by social institutions, practices, and language. At the same time, however, the good old idealist teacher in me waves the flag for the sanctity of human life and the possibility of the modern dream of self-actualization and empowerment explicated in the curricular narrative. There is also *telos*, and a philosophically grounded need to reach beyond objectivism and relativism, towards critical and dialogical communities (e.g., Bernstein 1983; Greene 1978, 1995).

To my growth as a music educator, the studies and encounters at Teachers College, Columbia University in the late eighties were crucial: John Dewey's spirit guided my study of child and curriculum, experience and nature, art and experience, reconstruction in philosophy and how we think, and democracy and education; grounding on the traditions of American pragmatist and European phenomenological, existential, and critical philosophy; Maxine Greene invited me into 'doing philosophy' and thinking about questions of freedom, underlining the significance of subjectivity and partiality of perspective; and, Lenore Pogonowski, whose assistant I was for courses in comprehensive musicianship and in contemporary methods of music education, exemplified new methods of teaching and learning. This extended exposure and a study of curriculum history and theory in three countries revealed that ours is a "fuzzy field" (Eräsaari, Lindquist, Mäntysaari & Rajavaara 1999) which we need to evaluate, perceptive of power which "substitutes many times for authoritative foundational texts that we do not have" (Cherryholmes 1999, 110). If we want to discuss music education and develop our practice in global terms, by means of a critical, trans-national and cross-cultural evaluative study, we have to maintain our sense of

“positionality,” which “coexists with our ethnocentrism” (111) and acknowledge structures and the conditioned, the contingent, and the contextual, that confine, but upon scrutiny may also reveal ruptures, in which agencies can develop and work towards a new pedagogy of music constituted by sonic “material that happens over time and in particular ways” and acts as a medium for diverse purposes (DeNora 2000, 158).

“We are the Soldiers in Song and Dance” sings a South African troubadour Vusi Mahlasela, inspiring us to test whether universal human values have real purchase in the global village of open markets.⁶ This we cannot do – as Rorty points out – without adhering to various ways of knowing about our being in the world, informed by the “post-structuralist rejection of false dichotomies, awareness of the unknowable, understanding of the limits of rationality, and an awareness of the dangers posed by both, and the terrorism of closure of monology” (Slattery 1995, 205).

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I first got deeply interested in pragmatism when I came to teach in the United States in the mid-eighties. I think the main reasons for my interest in pragmatism are typical for many philosophers. First, there was the feeling that analytic philosophy was not making the sort of progress it had initially hoped for. It was still good as a critical tool and method, and its best work seemed to be in progressively criticizing its own founding theories, notions, and projects: those enunciated by G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, the early Wittgenstein, Frege, the Vienna Circle. But secondly, there was the excitement I felt about continental theories of poststructuralism (Foucault, Derrida) and the Frankfurt-school (especially Adorno and Walter Benjamin). Continental philosophy seemed to deal with larger, more politically relevant questions and issues that analytic philosophy seemed to almost completely ignore. But the style of much continental theory seemed too unclear, inadequately argued, and undisciplined for my tastes. Pragmatism, as James and Dewey practiced it, seemed to provide the model of how to combine the clear arguments and common sense of analytic philosophy together with the large and socially important issues of continental philosophy. My book *Pragmatist Aesthetics* (Shusterman 1997a), by treating particular problems and topics in the philosophy of art, also tries to show how pragmatism is a very fruitful middle way between the analytic and continental traditions of philosophy.

The most influential pragmatists in the United States (Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam) are those who, like myself, turned from analytic philosophy to pragmatism. These two philosophers and Nelson Goodman and Joseph Margolis (also important analytic philosophers of art who then expressed strong pragmatist tendencies) are all older philosophers who have had a very helpful influence on my work, even if I very often disagree with them. Putnam and Margolis are far more interested in traditional metaphysical questions than Rorty or I am, and they are far less subjectivistic and voluntaristic than Rorty. But I also do not share the extremity of Rorty's sense of contingency and idiosyncrasy. As I argue in a number of my book, Rorty's treatment of contingency confuses what is not absolutely necessary with what is merely arbitrary and accidental. He thus does not give adequate attention to the power and justifiability of social norms, and to the biological nature of human beings. He tends too easily to dismiss both the social sciences and

aesthetic experience to those people, he himself did nothing in his writings to make a real case for the aesthetic value and legitimacy of the popular arts. He seemed to recognize that popular art would need to be seriously discussed and written about in order to gain adequate cultural legitimacy, but he himself failed to provide such writing. To fill in these disturbing gaps in pragmatist aesthetics, I had to develop my own theories that relate to popular art and contemporary art practices. I explain this more in detail in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* and my new book *Performing Live*, but also in an article "Popular Art and Education" that is also published in Finnish (1997b).

What inspired me about Dewey's aesthetics is his stressing of the value of experience, deeply felt and fully embodied experience, in the appreciation of art. Most contemporary aesthetics has tended to be overly intellectualist, emphasizing art as a symbol system or an object of mere cognitive interpretation, rather than an object of deeply felt experience and intense pleasure. This stress on the power and value of aesthetic experience is I think very important for the contemporary artworld, which seems to be losing its appeal for the general public because of its failure to create powerful aesthetic experience. I discuss this in a controversial paper called *The End of Aesthetic Experience* (1997c) and further in *Performing Live* and in French book of 1999 (*La fin de l'expérience esthétique*). Dewey is important in affirming the value of aesthetic experience and in insisting on its natural roots, but (as I argue in my book in Finnish and in these newer texts), he makes a mistake by trying to simply define art as experience and by tending to view aesthetic experience simply as foundational historic constant without adequately recognizing its historical and cultural modifications. Nonetheless, Dewey's democratic openness and his interest in integrating art and life are very pertinent and valuable for art today, including the idea of the art of living.

LV: In the 1990's there appeared pragmatic tendencies in Anglo-American philosophy of music education in the form of praxial philosophies. Among other things, these standpoints want to distance themselves from the aesthetic positions, and center on the notion of music as a form of praxis, or as signifying practice. Another thing these positions suggest is to pay attention to the world musics and

Tiivistelmä

MARJUT
HAUSSILA

Musiikkikasvatus on tieteellistä tietoa soveltavana käytäntönä monien alojen ja diskurssien leikkauskohdassa. Se tekee alan oman teorianmuodostuksen vaikeaksi, sillä monivivahteista käytäntöä on vaikea selittää yhtenäisellä ja kattavalla mallilla. Habermasin kommunikatiivisen toiminnan teoria nostaa esiin tärkeitä näkökohtia vastuullisen käytännön toiminnan kehittämisen kannalta; se on nähty kuitenkin modernin edistysprojektin jatkajana. Tässä keskustelussa mm. Foucault'n tiedon ja vallan suhdetta koskeva kritiikki ja sen pohjalta kehittynyt tutkimus ja diskurssi voivat auttaa kasvatuksellisen kontekstin ja opettajan tehtävän moninaisuuden hahmottamisessa.

INTERVIEWING RICHARD SHUSTERMAN (No. 1)

Note: This part of the interview was made via email in May 2000. Dr. Shusterman kindly answered to a series of questions concerning the role of pragmatism in contemporary philosophy, the new approaches to John Dewey's thought, pragmatist aesthetics in art and music education, and the Finnish-translated book, Pragmatist Aesthetics (Shusterman 1997a). The second part of the interview, reporting a discussion that took place at the Hotel Helka in June 2000, will be published in near future.

LV: There seems to be a general renaissance of pragmatism gaining hold within many disciplines, including aesthetics and educational philosophy. Why do you think pragmatism has attained new popularity both sides of the Atlantic? Is there a need for these revitalized pragmatic standpoints, especially in current theory of art and in related fields? Are there competing positions in the new stream of pragmatic thought, e.g., those following Rorty and other relativists contra "traditional" pragmatists? Do you think that postmodern philosophy and classical pragmatic standpoints cohere enough to justify these positions? Is there a deep contradiction in doing pragmatic philosophy in analytic terms?

RS: Yes, there has been a significant revival of pragmatism in the United States and to some extent also in Europe since the mid-1980's. From the 1950's to the mid-1980's pragmatism was very much eclipsed in the States by analytic philosophy imported from England and the continent (e.g. Carnap). However, in areas like education, which were very central to Dewey's interests but completely marginal to analytic philosophy, there remained throughout this time a core of philosophers who were faithful to the pragmatist tradition, but they had little influence on the main philosophical scene in America. (I should mention that Dewey's great interest in education was not only expressed in theoretical writings -- many articles and his famous book *Democracy and Education* (LW 9), but also in practical work. He set up a very influential experimental school in Chicago.)

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natural sciences. He focuses on literature as the way to self-salvation and social improvement. I differ not only from Rorty but from all the other pragmatists I mention by insisting on the value of the non-linguistic dimension of experience (the other philosophers tend to equate experience with linguistic experience and Rorty rejects the notion of experience altogether) and on the importance of attention to a bodily dimension of philosophy, which I partly pursue through the notion of philosophy as a way of life.

The other significant area where my work is very different from theirs is in my attention to popular art as a valuable source for reviving aesthetic experience and directing new energy to social and political causes. My positions are in some ways postmodern, but they are not nihilistic or relativistic in the sense that anything goes or that any view is as justifiable as any other. Though in some of writings I have, for polemical and didactic purposes, sharply contrasted analytic aesthetics to pragmatist aesthetics on several key points, I don't think it is impossible to combine analytic philosophy and pragmatism, especially if we think of analytic philosophy more as a method or style of argumentation. Goodman, Putnam, Rorty, Margolis, Stanley Cavell, and myself combine ideas and methods of analytic philosophy with certain general pragmatist orientations that the classic pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey made famous: orientations that are less about breaking things down and tracing them back to their ultimate foundation and more about looking forward to see how their consequences work in practice.

LV: What about the role of Dewey's aesthetics today? What does Dewey's aesthetics have to offer for the current art world? What difference would it make if we thought of the arts pragmatically? What implications do you see that it would hold for art education? What about the art politics in general?

RS: In some ways, Dewey's aesthetics seem obsolete even for the art-world of the time in which he wrote his famous book *Art as Experience* (LW 10). Though he wrote in the 1930's his taste in plastic art did not really extend past turn of the century post-impressionism. He never really came to grips with cubism and other very influential movements. Similarly, while Dewey affirmed in principle the right of people to enjoy popular art and suggested its potential to give

aesthetic experience to those people, he himself did nothing in his writings to make a real case for the aesthetic value and legitimacy of the popular arts. He seemed to recognize that popular art would need to be seriously discussed and written about in order to gain adequate cultural legitimacy, but he himself failed to provide such writing. To fill in these disturbing gaps in pragmatist aesthetics, I had to develop my own theories that relate to popular art and contemporary art practices. I explain this more in detail in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* and my new book *Performing Live*, but also in an article "Popular Art and Education" that is also published in Finnish (1997b).

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popular music practices as suitable materials for music education. How do you see these developments in relation to the development in the general theories of art?

RS: Unfortunately, music education is not my specific field and I do not know the work of the American philosophers of music education. Still I can easily understand their interest in turning from traditional views of musical aesthetics that focus on the identity and sanctity of the musical work, which is therefore often considered to be an ideal transcendental form. This position is usually called platonism in musical aesthetics. In contrast, I think it is more fruitful and accurate to adopt a more pragmatic praxial view that treats music as a practice. For pragmatist aesthetics, it is clear that we have no musical works without practices of playing and listening, which themselves are embedded in wider social practices. There is, of course, a musical artworld as well as the visual arts' artworld. Analytic aesthetics has been talking since the late sixties about the "artworld" and its practices. But many of the philosophers who correctly view art and music as social practices of signification, fail to explain or even recognize sufficiently the ways in which these signifying practices are embedded into wider cultural and social practices that determine to some extent the nature and possibilities of our art practices.

Pragmatist aesthetics therefore tries to go a bit beyond the internalist approach by recognizing the wider social issues that frame artistic practices of creation and reception. That is why my discussion of popular art and of rap is quick to consider the major social and political issues that they raise. By focusing on popular music and different world musics, we find a good way to break out of our habit of thinking about music in terms of transcendental works of genius so as to understand them better in terms of practices of creating, playing, and hearing. So I think you are right that there is a logical connection between practice-oriented aesthetic theory and a greater openness to musical expression beyond the classical and established modernist tradition. My position (as expressed in *Pragmatist Aesthetics* and *Performing Live*) is of course a position that emphasizes art as practice, but I argue that praxial theories too often tend to ignore the dimension of experience, so I insist especially on that dimension, as did Dewey.

Rap makes all these points in various ways. It insists on the dimension of movement and dance for its appreciation, and on the transformative power of aesthetic experience; it claims to be not only music and poetry but also philosophy and a kind of non-technical science which can be useful for life; rap artists often identify themselves as teachers and rap affirms the notion of "Edutainment" (education through entertainment), which is the name of an album by KRS-One. Rap has been used to teach reading and writing in some urban schools; and it has also been active politically, causing even Presidents of the U.S. to engage in critical debate with rap representatives. (Of course, gangsta rap has also taught some bad lessons that have emerged in several famous shooting incidents between rap stars; so it is important to emphasize the more positive messages of rap, taught by the more positive "knowledge" rappers). In its struggle to acquire cultural recognition, rap has often made the point that political and social oppression are the structuring background of the failure to appreciate the aesthetic potential of their music; and rappers also make it clear that their struggle for cultural and aesthetic recognition is part of a larger struggle to improve the general social status of the black urban youth population from which the music originated. Success in a musical career can mean money that can then provide opportunity for wider emancipation. All these points are developed in much more detail and with concrete examples in my book. So, because rap seemed so clearly to manifest the themes I wanted to stress in my pragmatist aesthetics (including the idea that such an aesthetics should deal with contemporary aesthetic forms and not just old and already established works of art), rap seemed a natural choice of genre. I never imagined that rap would become the center of media attention to the book. Perhaps I was naïve, but I was surely lucky that the public controversy over rap contributed to interest in my aesthetic theory.

Leaving aside the issue of being controversial, I think that it is important to study cultural forms that have not yet received adequate aesthetic attention, even if these cultural forms are not at all repressed. Take American country music, for example, which is the topic of a long chapter of my new book, *Performing Live* (Cornell University Press, 2000). Country music is the music of the mainstream majority in America and was never censured or publicly attacked in the way that rap has been. But country music, even more than rap, is

generally scorned by intellectual culture as aesthetically worthless kitsch, and thus fails to receive serious philosophical-aesthetic analysis that could better reveal its value. Because there is some country music I find worthwhile, I wanted to understand and better appreciate the source of appeal of this music, rather than just assuming the consensus view that condemns country as worthless and shallow. So in terms of the pragmatist theory of William James, I develop an argument that shows the aesthetic qualities, values, and strategies of this music and that also explains how some of our traditional philosophical prejudices blind us to what is worthwhile in country music. In the same book, I also do a similar job of critical but sympathetic and reconstructive analysis for a variety of contemporary body disciplines that have an important and explicit aesthetic aspect.

Let me conclude by reminding readers that my pragmatist aesthetic is not directed against the established genres of high art, only against their frequent claims of exclusivity. As you know, my book also contains the analysis of the high modernist poetry of T.S. Eliot. I just think that so much aesthetic analysis is devoted on the established genres of high art that it is important also to study forms of aesthetic expression that are as yet less legitimized and studied, though they are socially and culturally very significant. Moreover, it is important to study these less legitimized forms by considering them in aesthetic terms of meaning and value, in much the same way that we study the canonized works of high art, rather than simply approaching these popular but less legitimized forms of cultural expression merely in terms of sociological or ethnographic analysis – as we typically do for the cultural expressions of alien or primitive cultures. The popular arts are part of our lives and can play a profound role in our experience, so we should enable them to play this role more successfully through aesthetic criticism and interpretation of those arts. We cannot assume, as some educational theorists have argued, that these arts are so clear and transparent to everyone that they do not need to be explained and should have no place in our school curriculum. But I make this point more extensively in an article called “*Popular Art and Education*”, which, as I already mentioned, has been published in Finnish (1997b).

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
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